uling Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership: Implications for Property Rights

Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev

No 343, Working Papers from Leibniz Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and Southeast European Studies)

Abstract: We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites’ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites’ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.

Keywords: Endogenous property rights; credible commitment; “stationary bandit” (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 O17 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2014-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights (2015)
Working Paper: Ruling elites' rotation and asset ownership: Implications for property rights (2013)
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