Inflation and Welfare in Models with Trading Frictions
Guillaume Rocheteau and
Randall Wright
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Abstract:
We study the effects of inflation in models with various trading frictions. The framework is related to recent search-based monetary theory, in that trade takes place periodically in centralized and decentralized markets, but we consider three alternative mechanisms for price formation: bargaining, price taking, and posting. Both the value of money per transaction and market composition are endogenous, allowing us to characterize intensive and extensive margin effects. In the calibrated model, under posting the cost of inflation is similar to previous estimates, around 1% of consumption. Under bargaining, it is considerably bigger, between 3% and 5%. Under price taking, the cost of inflation depends on parameters, but tends to be between the bargaining and posting models. In some cases, moderate inflation may increase output or welfare.
Keywords: Money; Search; Frictions; Inflation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2003-11-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:03-032
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