Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties

Compensation of damages and frequency of trials with asymmetric information on preferences of litigant parties

Eric Langlais

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper addresses the issue of the impact of asymmetric information on risk aversion of litigant parties in a model à la Bebchuk. First we study the case where the plaintif is the informed party, and characterize the equilibrium with and without a pretrial negociation round. Then, we focuse on the comparative statics of the model and analyse the role of the choice of a cost allocation rule. Finally, we discuss several extensions: the case where the defendant is the informed party, the influence of the assumption on the representation of preferences, and the role of self-serving bias.

Keywords: litigation; asymmetric information on preferences; self-serving bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K10 K13 K4 K40 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10, Revised 2006-11-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur l'aversion au risque des parties (2008)
Working Paper: Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:1150

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