Do threshold patterns matter in public good provision?

Maoliang Ye, Plamen Nikolov, Lorenzo Casaburi and Sam Asher ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an experiment to explore how varying patterns of thresholds affect the willingness of subjects to contribute to a public good. We had subjects play a multi-period game where each subject was allocated an initial point endowment and told a threshold for the group had to choose how much to contribute to the common pot. Each period is identical, except for the possibility of having a different threshold, which is always stated before the players make their contributions. We found that while contributions are similar for the increasing and decreasing threshold group types when thresholds were low, a sizeable gap opens up around the average threshold size. We found that for nearly every threshold, it is more profitable to be in an increasing than in a decreasing threshold group type. Early cooperation seems to facilitate the achievement of harder-to-reach thresholds, which require considerable contributions from all members of the group. These findings are also very robust in the regression specifications. Our findings shed light on the role of past cooperative success and threshold patterns on subsequent willingness to cooperate.

Keywords: Experimental economics; Public goods decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D81 G14 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pbe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12029/1/MPRA_paper_12029.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12275/1/MPRA_paper_12275.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12029

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().