Separazione funzionale o strutturale nelle industrie regolate? I vincitori non puniscono; possibilmente cooperano (e innovano)

Structural or functional separation in regulated industries? Winners do not punish; possibily cooperate

Pierluigi Congedo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Structural v. functional separation in regulated industries, in electronic communications in particular, is still a debated issue. The article, based on the Ph.D. studies carried out by the Author at King's College London, tackles the reasons that may suggest "cooperative" solutions, such as the negotiation of undertakings with the national competition authorities or sector regulators, aimed at enhancing innovation while granting consumer welfare imperatives. From Shumpeter to Arrow, from Coase to recent developments at European Commission level, the Author combines (Competition) Law and basic principles of economics, having in mind the recent British experience of Openreach fucntional separation of British Telecom.

Keywords: structural; functional; separation; electronic; communications; Coase; Whish; commitments; undertakings; competition; commission; innovation; technology; consumer; welfare; broadband; digital; divide (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K0 K21 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-30, Revised 2009-03-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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