Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment
Christian Moser and
Pierre Yared
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2022, vol. 46, 27-50
Abstract:
This paper studies lockdown policy in a dynamic economy without government commitment. Lockdown imposes a cap on labor supply, which improves health prospects at the cost of economic output and consumption. A government would like to commit to the extent of future lockdowns in order to guarantee an economic outlook that supports efficient levels of investment into intermediate inputs. However, such a commitment is not credible, since investments are sunk at the time when the government chooses a lockdown. As a result, lockdown under lack of commitment deviates from the optimal policy. Rules that limit a government's lockdown discretion can improve social welfare, even in the presence of noncontractible information. Quantitatively, lack of commitment causes lockdown to be significantly more severe than is socially optimal. The output and consumption loss due to lack of commitment is greater for higher intermediate input shares, higher discount rates, higher values of life, higher disease transmission rates at and outside of work, and longer vaccine arrival times. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Keywords: Coronavirus; COVID-19; SARS-CoV-2; SIRD Model; Optimal Policy; Pandemic Restrictions; Lockdown; Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions; Rules; Commitment; Flexibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 H12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)
Downloads: (external link)
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2021.08.001
Access to full texts is restricted to ScienceDirect subscribers and institutional members. See https://www.sciencedirect.com/ for details.
Related works:
Software Item: Code and data files for "Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment" (2021) 
Working Paper: Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment (2021) 
Working Paper: Online Appendix to "Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment" (2021) 
Working Paper: Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment (2020) 
Working Paper: Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment (2020) 
Working Paper: Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment (2020) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:issued:20-442
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ription-information/
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2021.08.001
Access Statistics for this article
Review of Economic Dynamics is currently edited by Loukas Karabarbounis
More articles in Review of Economic Dynamics from Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().