Preference-directed regulation when ethical environmental policy choices are formed with limited information

Christopher Jeffords

Empirical Economics, 2014, vol. 46, issue 2, 573-606

Abstract: Preference-directed regulation (PDR) can supplement traditional environmental policies through frequent regulatory revision (Livermore, Va Environ Law J 25:311–386, 2007 ). Using original survey data, PDR is operationalized via counterfactual simulations within a limited information discrete choice model. Augmenting individual opinions about one of the three policies at driving environmental outcomes, stakeholders can induce preference switching in favor of or in detriment to a specific policy. The three policies are summarized as: (1) ban; (2) tax; and (3) label. The resulting substitution patterns demonstrate that the extent of preference switching between policies depends on the relative change in individual opinions about a policy. Furthermore, different forms of PDR may be more effective at inducing preference switching in favor of or in detriment to a specific policy. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Discrete choice; Limited information; Survey data; Environmental policy; Preference-directed regulation; C25; C51; D12; Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00181-013-0687-4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Preference-Directed Regulation When Ethical Environmental Policy Choices Are Formed With Limited Information (2011)
Working Paper: Preference-Directed Regulation When Ethical Environmental Policy Choices Are Formed With Limited Information (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:empeco:v:46:y:2014:i:2:p:573-606

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... rics/journal/181/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00181-013-0687-4

Access Statistics for this article

Empirical Economics is currently edited by Robert M. Kunst, Arthur H.O. van Soest, Bertrand Candelon, Subal C. Kumbhakar and Joakim Westerlund

More articles in Empirical Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().