Monetary Policy, Crisis and Capital Centralization in Corporate Ownership and Control Networks: a B-Var Analysis

Emiliano Brancaccio, Raffaele Giammetti (), Milena Lopreite and Michelangelo Puliga

LEM Papers Series from Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy

Abstract: Based on a connection between network analysis and B-VAR models, this paper provides a first empirical evidence of the relationships between capital centralization expressed in terms of network control on one hand and monetary policy guidelines and business cycles on the other. Our findings suggest that a tightening monetary policy leads to a decrease in the fraction of top shareholders of network control which results in a higher centralization of capital; and that a higher centralization of capital, in turn, leads to a reduction of GDP with respect to its trend. These relations are confirmed both for the United States and the Euro Area.

Keywords: network analysis; ownership and control networks; centralization of capital; monetary policy; business cycle; financial crisis; B-VAR models. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Monetary policy, crisis and capital centralization in corporate ownership and control networks: A B-Var analysis (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2019/28

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