On the Transparency of Nudges: An Experiment

Sandro Casal, Francesco Guala () and Luigi Mittone

No 1902, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: We investigate the effects that transparency may have on people’s reactions to a simple nudge. Using an incentivized task and eliminating possible confounds due to strategic reasoning, we test two behavioral predictions: (a) that increasing the quantity and quality of information affects significantly the efficacy of nudges; and (b) that people mind about being nudged and reverse their decisions when the behavioral policy is transparent. Our results indicate that transparency does not necessarily trigger reactance (people in general do not mind being nudged), but the quality and quantity of information can have a significant effect on the efficacy of a behavioral policy.

Keywords: Nudge; Overconfidence; Transparency; Reactance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:1902

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