A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets

Eduardo Azevedo and Jacob D. Leshno

Journal of Political Economy, 2016, vol. 124, issue 5, 1235 - 1268

Abstract: This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous preferences. The model departs from the Gale and Shapley model by assuming that a finite number of agents on one side (colleges) are matched to a continuum of agents on the other side (students). We show that stable matchings correspond to solutions of supply and demand equations, with the selectivity of each college playing a role similar to that of prices. We apply the model to an analysis of how competition induced by school choice gives schools incentives to invest in quality and to asymptotics of school choice mechanisms.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (134)

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