Administrative failures in anti-poverty programmes and household welfare: An investigation of India's employment guarantee programme

Parantap Basu, Rajesh Raj and Kunal Sen

No wp-2020-41, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Administrative failures in anti-poverty programmes are widespread in developing countries. We focus on one such administrative failure—the persistent delay in paying beneficiaries on time in India's iconic anti-poverty programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). Using a life cycle model, we argue that a long wage payment lag in this flagship programme could adversely affect the welfare of the poor through two channels. First, it imposes an implicit consumption tax on the household.

Keywords: NREGA; Employment guarantee; Good credit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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