Arms or Legs: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games

James Cox and Duncan James

No 2010-01, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Centipede games and Dutch auctions provide important instances in which game theory fails empirically. The reasons for these empirical failures are not well understood. Standard centipede games and Dutch auctions differ from each other in terms of their Institutional Format (IF), Dynamic Structure (DS), and Information Environment (IE). This paper introduces new games that are constructed from centipede games and Dutch auctions by interchanging some of their IF, DS, and IE characteristics. The new games are introduced in isomorphic pairs. Experiment treatments with pairs of new isomorphic games provide data that yield insights into the effects on behavior of games' IF, DS, and IE characteristics.

JEL-codes: C72 C91 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2010-01, Revised 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2010-01.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2011-11.pdf Revised version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2010-01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by J. Todd Swarthout ().