Spyros Katsoulas
Spyros Katsoulas is a strategic historian specializing in geopolitics, alliances, strategic culture, and diplomatic history.
He is an Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Affairs at the American College of Greece, Deree, and an Adjunct Professor at the Hellenic National Defense College.
Additionally, he serves as a research associate at the Institute of International Relations (IDIS) of Panteion University, editor-in-chief of the Greek peer-reviewed journal Strategein, and a translator of several books in the field of international relations.
He has been awarded scholarships by the Greek State Scholarship Foundation (IKY) and the Fulbright Foundation in Greece.
His teaching experience includes fellow positions at the University of Peloponnese and the University of Piraeus.
He holds a degree in International Relations from Panteion University, Greece, an MA in War Studies from King's College London, and a PhD in International Relations and Strategy from the University of Reading, UK. He has also conducted research in diplomatic history at Boston University.
He is an Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Affairs at the American College of Greece, Deree, and an Adjunct Professor at the Hellenic National Defense College.
Additionally, he serves as a research associate at the Institute of International Relations (IDIS) of Panteion University, editor-in-chief of the Greek peer-reviewed journal Strategein, and a translator of several books in the field of international relations.
He has been awarded scholarships by the Greek State Scholarship Foundation (IKY) and the Fulbright Foundation in Greece.
His teaching experience includes fellow positions at the University of Peloponnese and the University of Piraeus.
He holds a degree in International Relations from Panteion University, Greece, an MA in War Studies from King's College London, and a PhD in International Relations and Strategy from the University of Reading, UK. He has also conducted research in diplomatic history at Boston University.
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Η μελέτη της στρατιωτικής ιστορίας δεν επιβεβαιώνει αυτή την εντύπωση, η οποία δημιουργήθηκε περισσότερο για λόγους πολιτικής σκοπιμότητας και στρατηγικής επικοινωνίας. Παρά τη γενναία αυτοθυσία των Τούρκων στρατιωτών στα βουνά της Κορέας, η Τουρκική Ταξιαρχία δεν διασώθηκε από τη γενικότερη στρατηγική αναποτελεσματικότητα των συμμαχικών δυνάμεων του ΟΗΕ. Οι κυριότερες εμπλοκές της στον πόλεμο συνδυάστηκαν με συντριπτικές ήττες.
Οι επιδόσεις του τουρκικού εκστρατευτικού σώματος δεν θα επηρέαζαν ούτως ή άλλως την ένταξη της Τουρκίας στο ΝΑΤΟ. Ελλάδα και Τουρκία εντάχθηκαν στην Ατλαντική Συμμαχία κυρίως λόγω των γεωπολιτικών συνειρμών που προκάλεσε ο Πόλεμος της Κορέας στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες ως προς τις βλέψεις και στόχους του κομμουνιστικού μπλοκ στην ευρασιατική ήπειρο.
The accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO is inextricably linked to the Korean War, where both countries sent expeditionary forces. The aim of this paper is to assess the reputation of Turkish military prowess that was born in the battlefields of Korea. The reputation of a strong military accompanied Turkey for a long time, affecting the way the United States perceived Turkey, and Turkey perceived itself. The "legend of the Turkish soldier" was born in the highlands of Korea partly because of the self-sacrifice shown by the soldiers of the Turkish Brigade on the battlefield. However, it was mainly the circumstances of the early Cold War that provided for the inflation of Turkey’s reputation of power.
The study of military history does not confirm this reputation, which was created for reasons of political expediency and strategic communication. Despite the bravery shown by the Turkish soldiers in the mountains of Korea, the Turkish Brigade did not stand out in the overall strategic inefficiency of the UN coalition of forces. Its major engagements in the war were met with crushing defeats.
In any case, the performance of the Turkish expeditionary force would not have affected Turkey's NATO membership. Greece and Turkey joined the Atlantic Alliance largely because of the geopolitical connotations of the Korean War in the United States regarding the aspirations and goals of the communist bloc in the Eurasian continent as a whole.
The world of strategy has been littered with fallacies that obscure the strategic judgment of policy makers throughout the ages. Until tested in practice, strategy is a painstaking, mental process of searching for ways to impose our will on the opponent. Our ideas, perceptions, and theoretical assumptions have a decisive role in strategy formulation. The fallacy lies in the belief that a dominant way can be found with absolutely guaranteed success, ignoring the many dimensions of strategy and the chameleonic nature of war.
in international treaties, alliances are not formed out of affinity, neither are they dissolved out of a sudden aversion. They are based on geopolitical reasoning. Although the two sides might even agree on the irreconcilable differences ground, a Turkish-American break-up would be far from consensual, even as a new rival contender is lurking just around the corner.
Υπάρχουν δεδομένα προβλήματα στην ανάλυση και τεκμηρίωση κάθε στρατηγικής κουλτούρας, τα οποία προέρχονται από τον φιλοσοφικό χαρακτήρα της έννοιας. Παρά τα μεθοδολογικά της προβλήματα, η μελέτη της στρατηγικής κουλτούρας προσφέρει ένα πολύτιμο πλαίσιο κατανόησης της στρατηγικής διάδρασης και εμπλουτίζει τον τρόπο σκέψης όσων καλούνται να λάβουν κρίσιμες αποφάσεις.
Strategic culture refers to the set of beliefs, attitudes and behavior patterns of a collective entity which is geographically located and with shared historical experience. It is based on the assumption that each collective entity thinks and acts differently in matters of strategy, influenced by its history, its geographical environment and a host of individual tangible and intangible factors.
There are certain problems in the solid analysis of any strategic culture, which stem from the philosophical nature of the concept. Despite its methodological problems, the study of strategic culture offers a valuable framework for understanding strategic interaction and enriches the way of thinking of those called to make critical decisions.
Μια τέτοια περίπτωση αποτελεί η αντιπαράθεση Αρμενίας και Αζερμπαϊτζάν για το Ναγκόρνο-Καραμπάχ. Το πρόβλημα με τις παγωμένες συγκρούσεις είναι ότι δεν είναι καθόλου δύσκολο να "ξεπαγώσουν" και οι εχθροπραξίες να ξαναρχίσουν, έστω και προσωρινά.
In the South Caucasus, in a case of irony, the end of the Cold War gave way to "frozen" conflicts, as it has been established to call those conflicts in which, although hostilities have ceased, a satisfactory political solution has not yet been found.
One such case is the confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The problem with frozen conflicts is that they are not at all difficult to "unfreeze" and hostilities resume, even temporarily.
Leaps of technological progress often create excessive ambitions for policy makers and strategists. The purpose of this presentation is to put Unmanned Aerial Systems in their correct dimension, that is, as nothing more or less than a tactical means, and to point out that their effectiveness depends solely on their utilization at a political and strategic level. Strategy is defined as the synergy of ends, ways and means. The danger of tacticizing strategy lurks when decision-makers get carried away by the dynamics of tactical means while ignoring long-term political and strategic goals.
In 1964, US President Lyndon Johnson averted a planned Turkish invasion of Cyprus by sending the Turkish prime minister a letter so sharp that US Under-Secretary of State George Ball described it as the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb. In 1974, Turkey once again prepared to invade. According to US diplomat James Spain, President Richard Nixon also sent a letter that was even more strident than Johnson's. The Nixon letter, however, never reached its recipient and Turkey, after securing Kissinger's tolerance, invaded Cyprus.
Book Reviews by Spyros Katsoulas
Υπό αυτό το κρίσιμο ερώτημα έγινε η επίσημη παρουσίαση του βιβλίου «Ελληνική Υψηλή Στρατηγική», αποκαλύπτοντας εν πολλοίς τον λόγο που παρακίνησε τους Καθηγητές Αθανάσιο Πλατιά και Χρήστο Χατζηεμμανουήλ να προχωρήσουν στο συντονισμό της συλλογικής προσπάθειας και στην επιμέλεια αλλά και τη συγγραφή του.
Η μελέτη της στρατιωτικής ιστορίας δεν επιβεβαιώνει αυτή την εντύπωση, η οποία δημιουργήθηκε περισσότερο για λόγους πολιτικής σκοπιμότητας και στρατηγικής επικοινωνίας. Παρά τη γενναία αυτοθυσία των Τούρκων στρατιωτών στα βουνά της Κορέας, η Τουρκική Ταξιαρχία δεν διασώθηκε από τη γενικότερη στρατηγική αναποτελεσματικότητα των συμμαχικών δυνάμεων του ΟΗΕ. Οι κυριότερες εμπλοκές της στον πόλεμο συνδυάστηκαν με συντριπτικές ήττες.
Οι επιδόσεις του τουρκικού εκστρατευτικού σώματος δεν θα επηρέαζαν ούτως ή άλλως την ένταξη της Τουρκίας στο ΝΑΤΟ. Ελλάδα και Τουρκία εντάχθηκαν στην Ατλαντική Συμμαχία κυρίως λόγω των γεωπολιτικών συνειρμών που προκάλεσε ο Πόλεμος της Κορέας στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες ως προς τις βλέψεις και στόχους του κομμουνιστικού μπλοκ στην ευρασιατική ήπειρο.
The accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO is inextricably linked to the Korean War, where both countries sent expeditionary forces. The aim of this paper is to assess the reputation of Turkish military prowess that was born in the battlefields of Korea. The reputation of a strong military accompanied Turkey for a long time, affecting the way the United States perceived Turkey, and Turkey perceived itself. The "legend of the Turkish soldier" was born in the highlands of Korea partly because of the self-sacrifice shown by the soldiers of the Turkish Brigade on the battlefield. However, it was mainly the circumstances of the early Cold War that provided for the inflation of Turkey’s reputation of power.
The study of military history does not confirm this reputation, which was created for reasons of political expediency and strategic communication. Despite the bravery shown by the Turkish soldiers in the mountains of Korea, the Turkish Brigade did not stand out in the overall strategic inefficiency of the UN coalition of forces. Its major engagements in the war were met with crushing defeats.
In any case, the performance of the Turkish expeditionary force would not have affected Turkey's NATO membership. Greece and Turkey joined the Atlantic Alliance largely because of the geopolitical connotations of the Korean War in the United States regarding the aspirations and goals of the communist bloc in the Eurasian continent as a whole.
The world of strategy has been littered with fallacies that obscure the strategic judgment of policy makers throughout the ages. Until tested in practice, strategy is a painstaking, mental process of searching for ways to impose our will on the opponent. Our ideas, perceptions, and theoretical assumptions have a decisive role in strategy formulation. The fallacy lies in the belief that a dominant way can be found with absolutely guaranteed success, ignoring the many dimensions of strategy and the chameleonic nature of war.
in international treaties, alliances are not formed out of affinity, neither are they dissolved out of a sudden aversion. They are based on geopolitical reasoning. Although the two sides might even agree on the irreconcilable differences ground, a Turkish-American break-up would be far from consensual, even as a new rival contender is lurking just around the corner.
Υπάρχουν δεδομένα προβλήματα στην ανάλυση και τεκμηρίωση κάθε στρατηγικής κουλτούρας, τα οποία προέρχονται από τον φιλοσοφικό χαρακτήρα της έννοιας. Παρά τα μεθοδολογικά της προβλήματα, η μελέτη της στρατηγικής κουλτούρας προσφέρει ένα πολύτιμο πλαίσιο κατανόησης της στρατηγικής διάδρασης και εμπλουτίζει τον τρόπο σκέψης όσων καλούνται να λάβουν κρίσιμες αποφάσεις.
Strategic culture refers to the set of beliefs, attitudes and behavior patterns of a collective entity which is geographically located and with shared historical experience. It is based on the assumption that each collective entity thinks and acts differently in matters of strategy, influenced by its history, its geographical environment and a host of individual tangible and intangible factors.
There are certain problems in the solid analysis of any strategic culture, which stem from the philosophical nature of the concept. Despite its methodological problems, the study of strategic culture offers a valuable framework for understanding strategic interaction and enriches the way of thinking of those called to make critical decisions.
Μια τέτοια περίπτωση αποτελεί η αντιπαράθεση Αρμενίας και Αζερμπαϊτζάν για το Ναγκόρνο-Καραμπάχ. Το πρόβλημα με τις παγωμένες συγκρούσεις είναι ότι δεν είναι καθόλου δύσκολο να "ξεπαγώσουν" και οι εχθροπραξίες να ξαναρχίσουν, έστω και προσωρινά.
In the South Caucasus, in a case of irony, the end of the Cold War gave way to "frozen" conflicts, as it has been established to call those conflicts in which, although hostilities have ceased, a satisfactory political solution has not yet been found.
One such case is the confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The problem with frozen conflicts is that they are not at all difficult to "unfreeze" and hostilities resume, even temporarily.
Leaps of technological progress often create excessive ambitions for policy makers and strategists. The purpose of this presentation is to put Unmanned Aerial Systems in their correct dimension, that is, as nothing more or less than a tactical means, and to point out that their effectiveness depends solely on their utilization at a political and strategic level. Strategy is defined as the synergy of ends, ways and means. The danger of tacticizing strategy lurks when decision-makers get carried away by the dynamics of tactical means while ignoring long-term political and strategic goals.
In 1964, US President Lyndon Johnson averted a planned Turkish invasion of Cyprus by sending the Turkish prime minister a letter so sharp that US Under-Secretary of State George Ball described it as the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb. In 1974, Turkey once again prepared to invade. According to US diplomat James Spain, President Richard Nixon also sent a letter that was even more strident than Johnson's. The Nixon letter, however, never reached its recipient and Turkey, after securing Kissinger's tolerance, invaded Cyprus.
Υπό αυτό το κρίσιμο ερώτημα έγινε η επίσημη παρουσίαση του βιβλίου «Ελληνική Υψηλή Στρατηγική», αποκαλύπτοντας εν πολλοίς τον λόγο που παρακίνησε τους Καθηγητές Αθανάσιο Πλατιά και Χρήστο Χατζηεμμανουήλ να προχωρήσουν στο συντονισμό της συλλογικής προσπάθειας και στην επιμέλεια αλλά και τη συγγραφή του.
Παρότι οι ΗΠΑ χρειάζονταν τόσο την Ελλάδα όσο και την Τουρκία για να επιτύχουν τους στόχους τους, οι δύο άσπονδοι σύμμαχοι έφτασαν έξι φορές στο κατώφλι του πολέμου.
Οι ΗΠΑ έπρεπε κάθε φορά να βρουν τρόπο για να συγκρατήσουν τους δύο πυλώνες της νοτιοανατολικής πτέρυγας του ΝΑΤΟ προκειμένου να αποφύγουν μια ολέθρια σύγκρουση που θα οδηγούσε σε ρήξη τη Συμμαχία και σε απώλεια του ελέγχου της κομβικής περιοχής της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου.
Ταυτόχρονα, όμως, δεν ήθελαν να χαλάσουν τις σχέσεις τους ούτε με τη μια αλλά ούτε και με την άλλη πλευρά, κάτι που έγινε γνωστό ως η πολιτική των ίσων αποστάσεων.
Το δίλημμα του φύλακα είναι ένα θεωρητικό μοντέλο που αποτυπώνει το πλέγμα των ανεπιθύμητων επιλογών που απλώνονται μπροστά σε μια μεγάλη δύναμη όταν αντιμετωπίζει προβλήματα μεταξύ των συμμάχων της: όποια στάση κι αν τηρήσει σε περίπτωση κρίσης, η πλευρά που δυσαρεστείται από τη συμπεριφορά της αισθάνεται εγκαταλελειμμένη και η πλευρά που ικανοποιείται αισθάνεται ενθαρρυμένη να διεκδικήσει περαιτέρω τους στόχους της.
Σκοπός του βιβλίου είναι να φωτίσει τα αδιέξοδα που προκύπτουν σε τριγωνικές συμμαχικές σχέσεις, εξετάζοντας τον ρόλο της Αμερικής σε έξι ελληνοτουρκικές κρίσεις κατά τη διάρκεια του Ψυχρού Πολέμου, αντλώντας χρήσιμα διδάγματα για το σήμερα και το αύριο.
The strategy of a great power involves not only tackling threats from enemies, but also dealing with problems that arise between allies. Every time Greece and Turkey threatened to go to war against each other, the United States had to effectively restrain its two strategic allies without straining relations with either one of them. This book explores how the United States responded to the guardian’s dilemma in six crises during the Cold War, pursuing a policy of dual restraint to prevent an intra-alliance conflict, mitigate the consequences of each crisis, and maintain effective control of the Rimland Bridge.
From a neoclassical-realist standpoint, the book examines how the United States responded to each Greek–Turkish crisis, for what reasons, and with what results. It will be of interest to scholars of foreign policy, security studies, geopolitics, and international relations.