Papers by Clifford Winston
Journal of Law and Economics, 1995
... Coefficient Vehicle attributes: Number of friends owning cars with air bags (defined only for... more ... Coefficient Vehicle attributes: Number of friends owning cars with air bags (defined only for carmodels with driver-side air bags) .382 (.105) Average number of hours spent watching television per day (defined only for car models with driver-side air bags) .069 (.026) ...
SSRN Electronic Journal
* This paper draws heavily upon and extends Winston (2013b) and Winston and Mannering (forthcoming).
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Journal of Public Economics
Choice Reviews Online
When should government intervene in market activity and when is it best to let market forces take... more When should government intervene in market activity and when is it best to let market forces take their natural course? How does the existing empirical evidence about government performance guide our answers to these questions? In this clear, concise book, Clifford Winston offers his innovative analysis-shaped by thirty years of evidence-to assess the efficacy of government interventions. Markets fail when it is possible to make one person better off without making someone else worse off, thus indicating inefficiency. Governments fail when an intervention is unwarranted because markets are performing well or when the intervention fails to correct a market problem efficiently. Winston concludes from existing research that the cost of government failure may actually be considerably greater than the cost of market failure: "My search of the evidence is not limited to policy failures. I will report success stories, but few of them emerged from my search." The prevalence of market failure is due to a lack of conviction in favor of markets, the inflexibility of intervening government agencies, and political forces that enable certain interest groups to benefit at the expense of society as a whole. Winston suggests that government policy can be improved by making greater use of market-oriented solutions that have already produced benefits in certain situations.
... In the absence of such scenarios, however, we share the pessimism of many that widespread imp... more ... In the absence of such scenarios, however, we share the pessimism of many that widespread implementation of congestion pricing on public roads remains a long way away. ... One possibility would be to charge tolls on congested roads. ... Journal of Monetary Economics 23, pp. ...
Journal of Economic Literature, Feb 1, 1993
Page 1. Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXI (September 1993), pp. 1263-1289 Economic Deregul... more Page 1. Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXI (September 1993), pp. 1263-1289 Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists By CLIFFORD WINSTON The Brookings Institution I am grateful to a long ...
Journal of Law and Economics, 1987
... approximation to contestability."5 In response, Shepherd ar-gues that &q... more ... approximation to contestability."5 In response, Shepherd ar-gues that "airline competition can be explained well by established con-cepts of market structure and entry."6 Turning to empirical studies of the airline industry, Moore, Call and Keeler, and Graham, Kaplan, and Sib ...
Despite a decline in its mode share, investment to build new urban rail transit systems and exten... more Despite a decline in its mode share, investment to build new urban rail transit systems and extend old ones continues. We estimate the contribution of each U.S. urban rail operation to social welfare based on the demand for and cost of its service. We find that with the exception of BART in the San Francisco Bay area, every system actually reduces welfare and is unable to become socially desirable even with optimal pricing or physical restructuring of its network. We conclude rail's social cost is unlikely to abate because it enjoys powerful political support from planners, civic boosters, and policymakers.
Journal of Economic Literature, 1985
J Public Econ, 2011
ABSTRACT We assess the welfare effects of highway privatization accounting for government&#39... more ABSTRACT We assess the welfare effects of highway privatization accounting for government's behavior in setting the sale price, firms' strategic behavior in setting tolls, and motorists' heterogeneous preferences for speedy and reliable travel. We find motorists are able to benefit from privatization by negotiating tolls with private providers that increase their consumer surplus. Surprisingly, we find that by obtaining tolls and service that align with their varying preferences, motorists may be better off negotiating with a monopolist than with duopoly providers or under public-private competition. Toll regulation may be counterproductive because it is likely to treat motorists as homogeneous.
The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2002
Research in Transportation Economics
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Papers by Clifford Winston