1. Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks. (2024). Polanski, Arnold.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:215:y:2024:i:c:s0022053123001710.

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2. Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting. (2022). Ghosh, Sambuddha ; Dasgupta, Ani.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:200:y:2022:i:c:s0022053121001290.

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3. Group cooperation against a hegemon. (2021). Cheikbossian, Guillaume.
   In: Journal of Theoretical Politics.
   RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:33:y:2021:i:1:p:25-55.

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4. Group cooperation against an incumbent. (2019). Cheikbossian, Guillaume.
   In: CEE-M Working Papers.
   RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-02378829.

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5. Group cooperation against an incumbent. (2019). Cheikbossian, Guillaume.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02378829.

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6. Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoners dilemma game. (2019). Ai, Hongfeng ; Zeng, Weijun ; Zhao, Man.
   In: Applied Mathematics and Computation.
   RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:359:y:2019:i:c:p:148-164.

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7. Repeated Games Without Public Randomization: A Constructive Approach. (2019). Ghosh, Sambuddha ; Dasgupta, Ani.
   In: Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
   RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2017-011.

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8. Trust in cohesive communities. (2017). Escobar, Juan ; Balmaceda, Felipe.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:170:y:2017:i:c:p:289-318.

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9. Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring. (2016). Carmona, Guilherme ; Carvalho, Luis.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:63:y:2016:i:c:p:131-138.

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10. Relational contracts and supplier turnover in the global economy. (2016). Suedekum, Jens ; Fischer, Christian ; Defever, Fabrice.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:103:y:2016:i:c:p:147-165.

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11. Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty. (2015). Pecorino, Paul.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:162:y:2015:i:3:p:243-262.

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12. Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games. (2013). Chen, Xiaojie ; Wang, Xiaofeng ; Gao, Jia.
    In: Chaos, Solitons & Fractals.
    RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:56:y:2013:i:c:p:181-187.

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13. On dynamic compromise. (2012). Bowen, T. Renee ; Zahran, Zaki .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:391-419.

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14. Revisiting environmental groups and members’ behaviour: budget, size and (im)pure altruism. (2011). Asproudis, Elias.
    In: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies.
    RePEc:spr:envpol:v:13:y:2011:i:2:p:139-156.

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15. Cooperation and Self-Governance in Heterogeneous Communities. (2008). Escobar, Juan.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:sip:dpaper:07-038.

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16. On Dynamic Compromise. (2006). Bowen, T. Renee ; Zahran, Zaki .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~06-06-10.

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1. Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring. (2016). Ishii, Yuhta ; Deb, Joyee.
   In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2042.

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2. The emergence of cooperation through leadership. (2015). Fujishima, Shota.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:17-36.

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3. Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring. (2015). Ekmekci, Mehmet ; Atakan, Alp.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:553-605.

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4. Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games. (2014). Ekmekci, Mehmet ; Atakan, Alp.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:54427.

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5. Competing for firms under agglomeration: Policy timing and welfare. (2014). Gerritse, Michiel.
   In: Regional Science and Urban Economics.
   RePEc:eee:regeco:v:49:y:2014:i:c:p:48-57.

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6. Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts. (2011). Wolitzky, Alexander.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:595-607.

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7. Policy competition and agglomeration: a local government view. (2010). Gerritse, Michiel.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2010-31.

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8. Policy competition and agglomeration: a local government view. (2010). Gerritse, Michiel.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2010/9/doc2010-31.

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9. When is reputation bad?. (2008). Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Ely, Jeffrey.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:2:p:498-526.

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10. On the size and structure of group cooperation. (2007). Lagunoff, Roger ; Haag, Matthew .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:135:y:2007:i:1:p:68-89.

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11. Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships. (2007). Mailath, George ; Cripps, Martin ; Samuelson, Larry.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:287-316.

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12. Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria. (2007). Hausken, Kjell.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:97:y:2007:i:2:p:138-144.

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13. Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts. (2006). Pearce, David G. ; Abreu, Dilip.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000640.

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14. Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent. (2006). Pesendorfer, Wolfgang ; Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Celentani, Marco.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:699152000000000019.

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15. Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures. (2006). Pearce, David G. ; Abreu, Dilip.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001218.

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16. The battle of the sexes when the future is important. (2005). Hausken, Kjell.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:87:y:2005:i:1:p:89-93.

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17. When is Reputation Bad. (2005). Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Ely, Jeffrey.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000016.

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18. On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation. (2002). Lagunoff, Roger ; Haag, Matthew .
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
    RePEc:wrk:warwec:650.

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19. On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation. (2002). Lagunoff, Roger ; Haag, Matthew .
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0209005.

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20. On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation. (2002). Lagunoff, Roger ; Haag, Matthew .
    In: Wallis Working Papers.
    RePEc:roc:wallis:wp33.

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21. One Size and Structure of Group Cooperation. (2002). Lagunoff, Roger ; Roger Lagunoff & Matthew Haag, .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~02-02-05.

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22. On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation. (2002). Lagunoff, Roger ; Haag, Matthew .
    In: Economic Research Papers.
    RePEc:ags:uwarer:269463.

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23. Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games. (2000). ABREU, D. ; Pearce, D..
    In: Princeton Economic Theory Papers.
    RePEc:wop:prinet:00f2.

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24. Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. (1999). Sorin, Sylvain.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:29:y:1999:i:1-2:p:274-308.

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25. Two essays on reputation effects in economic models. (1998). Melkonian, Tigran A.
    In: ISU General Staff Papers.
    RePEc:isu:genstf:1998010108000012873.

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26. Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games. (1997). Thomas, Jonathan ; Cripps, Martin.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:141-158.

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