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Abuse of a dominant position : Cases and experiments. (2009). Müller, Wieland ; Muller, W ; Larouche, P ; van Damme, E. E. C., .
In: Other publications TiSEM.
RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7e29244c-5b35-4759-ab63-b5c813dedc8a.

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  1. Behavioral Antitrust. (2017). Martin, Stephen.
    In: Purdue University Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:pur:prukra:1297.

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  2. Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence. (2014). Normann, Hans-Theo ; Müller, Wieland ; Hinloopen, Jeroen ; Muller, Wieland.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:65:y:2014:i:c:p:164-180.

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  3. Output Commitment through Product Bundling: Experimental Evidence. (2011). Normann, Hans-Theo ; Müller, Wieland ; Hinloopen, Jeroen ; Muller, Wieland.
    In: Vienna Economics Papers.
    RePEc:vie:viennp:1112.

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