Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale

Helmuth Cremer, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur and Pierre Pestieau

Revue d'économie politique, 2005, vol. 115, issue 2, 197-211

Abstract: It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would be no such implicit taxation. This raises the question of whether a bias in the benefit formula in favor of early retirement is necessarily the sign of a bad policy. We show that this implicit tax on potsponed retirement can be due to the desire by public authorities of using social security for redistribution when non-distortionary tools are not available. We also examine possible ways to mitigate these distorsions, for instance, through disability testing.

Keywords: retirement age; disability insurance; disability testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale (2005)
Working Paper: Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale (2005)
Working Paper: Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale (2005)
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