Dynamic Behavior and Player Types in Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests

Alan Gelder () and Dan Kovenock
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Alan Gelder: Economic Science Institute, Chapman University

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: In a dynamic contest where it is costly to compete, a player who is behind must decide whether to surrender or to keep fighting in the face of bleak odds. We experimentally examine the game theoretic prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing penalty, as well as the contrasting prediction of surrendering in the corresponding contest with no penalty. We find varied evidence in support of these hypotheses in the aggregated data, but more conclusive evidence when scrutinizing individual player behavior. Players’ realized strategies tend to conform to one of several “types”. We develop a taxonomy to classify player types and study how these types interact and how their incidence varies across treatments. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, escalation is the predominant behavior, but last stand and surrendering behaviors also arise at rates responsive to the importance of losing penalties.

Keywords: Dynamic Contest; Multi-Battle Contest; Player Type; Experiment; All-Pay Auction; Escalation; Last Stand; Maximin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 D44 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... ovenock-01-27-15.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests (2017)
Working Paper: Dynamic Behavior and Player Types in Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:15-02

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