Coalition formation among farsighted agents

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2010022, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.

Keywords: coalition formation; farsighted players; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents (2010)
Working Paper: Coalition formation among farsighted agents (2010)
Working Paper: Coalition formation among farsighted agents (2010)
Working Paper: Coalition formation among farsighted agents (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010022

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