Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

No 1822, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Incomplete information; Robust predictions; Information structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
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