Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

No 1909RR, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Incomplete information; Robust predictions; Information structure; Sufficiency; Blackwell ordering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2013-09, Revised 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games (2016)
Working Paper: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (2015)
Working Paper: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (2015)
Working Paper: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (2013)
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