Markets for Information: An Introduction

Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti

No 2142, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We survey a recent and growing literature on markets for information. We offer a comprehensive view of information markets through an integrated model of consumers, information intermediaries, and firms. The model embeds a large set of applications ranging from sponsored search advertising to credit scores to information sharing among competitors. We then review a mechanism design approach to selling information in greater detail. We distinguish between ex ante sales of information (the buyer acquires an information structure) and ex post sales (the buyer pays for specific realizations). We relate this distinction to the different products that brokers, advertisers, and publishers use to trade consumer information online. We discuss the endogenous limits to the trade of information that derive from its potential adverse use for consumers. Finally, we revisit the role of recommender systems and artificial intelligence systems as markets for indirect information.

Keywords: Information markets; Information design; Intermediaries; Mechanism design; Predictions; ratings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2018-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-des
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d21/d2142.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Markets for Information: An Introduction (2019)
Working Paper: Markets for Information: An Introduction (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2142

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().