Charities and the political support for estate taxation

Georges Casamatta (), Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau
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Georges Casamatta: LISA - Laboratoire « Lieux, Identités, eSpaces, Activités » (UMR CNRS 6240 LISA) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Università di Corsica Pasquale Paoli [Université de Corse Pascal Paoli]

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Abstract: We explain why wealthy people often favor estate taxation, while wealthless people oppose it. Wealthy people devote part of their estate to charities. Estate taxation with tax breaks for charities increases contributions to an otherwise underprovided public good. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Estate taxation; Charities; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
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Published in Economics Letters, 2012, 115 (3), pp.423-426. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.101⟩

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Journal Article: Charities and the political support for estate taxation (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02520601

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.101

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