 Private, social and self-insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help. A political economy analysisPierre Pestieau and Philippe De Donder Post-Print from HAL Abstract: We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters can top up with private insurance, saving and family help. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help, and amount of family help received. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels, while private insurance is actuarially fair. The income-to-dependency probability ratio of agents determines whether they prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority-chosen level. A majority of voters would oppose banning private insurance. Date: 2017 Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2017, 19 (1), pp.18-37. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12163⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03957967 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12163 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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