Honesty and Informal Agreements

Martin Dufwenberg, Maros Servátka and Radovan Vadovic ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Maroš Servátka

No 538, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

Abstract: We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions ?split-the-difference and deal-me-out ?to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are two natural ways to do this, leaving us with 2x2 models to explore. In the experiment, a temptations-constrained version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner.

Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.unibocconi.it/igier/igi/wp/2015/538.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Honesty and informal agreements (2017)
Working Paper: Honesty and Informal Agreements (2016)
Working Paper: Honesty and Informal Agreements (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:538

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://repec.unibocconi.it/igier/igi/

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University via Rontgen, 1 - 20136 Milano (Italy).
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().