Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries

Amitrajeet Batabyal and Peter Nijkamp

No 04-013/3, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Goods are often allocated publically by means of queuing processes in developing countries.In such situations, which group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition,what should be the basis for this favoritism? To the best of our knowledge, these salient questionshave received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to firstdemonstrate that when allocating goods publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular groupof citizens. Next, we show that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes receivedby the corrupt government official but also on the efficiency with which this official discharges hisduties.

Keywords: Bribery; Corruption; Favoritism; Queuing Theory; Wait Time (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 H40 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01-22
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040013

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