Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives

Robert Dur and Joeri Sol ()
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Joeri Sol: Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 08-094/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We discuss some empirical evidence supporting these predictions.

Keywords: social interaction; altruism; incentive contracts; co-worker satisfaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 J41 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-02, Revised 2009-08-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives (2010)
Working Paper: Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives (2009)
Working Paper: Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080094

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