Talk:Free will

On concepts much discussed in treatments of 'free will'

The article presently includes this paragraph:

"Though it is a commonly held intuition that we have free will,¹ it has been widely debated throughout history not only whether we have free will, but even how to define the concept of free will.²"

Sources

¹Galen Strawson (2010). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0199247501. Quoted by The Information Philosopher.

²Stanislas Dehaene (2014). Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts. Penguin. p. 263. ISBN 0698151402.

This thought was supplemented by the following remark deleted without Talk page commentary:

"Defining 'free will' often revolves around the meaning of phrases like "ability to do otherwise" or alternative possibilities."

Of course, the use of Google links to pull up over 3000 hits for each of these phrases with their connection to 'free will' is not a standard in printed articles, but it makes the point needed here. If there is objection to this manner of presenting the issue, then a more standard and extensive presentation of the confusion surrounding these phrases and their role in the definition of 'free will' should be attempted. At the moment, the subject of "alternative possibilities" is mentioned in a sub-subsection on two-stage models while the phrase "ability to do otherwise" is not even mentioned. Given the prominence of these ideas as evidenced in the references provided by the Google book links above, this underemphasis and even omission should be rectified. Brews ohare (talk) 15:34, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

In case there is some confusion over these terms:

ability to do otherwise

As an introduction to this term, see for example Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter §4.2 The Meaning of 'Ability' Argument: "I have free will only if it is at least sometimes true that I have the ability to do otherwise."1

"alternative possibilities"

As an introduction to this term, see for example: Moses Mendelssohn's Metaphysics and Aesthetics "Having a free will means having alternative possibilities to act" 2

Of course, there are many views as to the role of these phrases, as the 3000+ books identified in the links provided indicates. Brews ohare (talk) 20:40, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

I don't see a concrete proposal for change ----Snowded ^TALK 14:46, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

The concrete proposal is to leave the reverted material in the article. A less concrete proposal is to explore the terms in detail. Advice upon the choice is solicited. Brews ohare (talk) 15:24, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

Here is Thomas Pink on "doing otherwise". Brews ohare (talk) 14:51, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded's reversions

In this reversion of minor changes to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Snowded, among your reversals are such simple matters as paragraphing: the version you prefer is:

¶"Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been blah blah blah. Those who define free will as freedom from determinism are called incompatibilists, blah blah blah

¶"Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists blah blah blah.

The reverted version separates the preamble from the discussion of incompatibilists and provides a parallel construction with a separate paragraph for each of compatibilism and incompatbilism:

¶"Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been blah blah blah.

¶"Those who find free will cannot coexist with determinism are called incompatibilists" blah blah blah

¶"Those who find free will can coexist with determinism, are called compatibilists." blah blah blah

To make the reading easier this version uses parallel construction for both terms: parallel paragraphs and parallel use of the widely used verb "coexist" that makes simple sense of the terms compatibilism (can coexist) and incompatibilsm (cannot coexist) that is absent in the confusing version you prefer.

This change to parallelism was made all by itself in this edit clearly labeled with the Edit Summary give each view its own paragraph separate from the introductory segue.

Now, Snowded, you claim that you cannot live with this change or the others equally clearly identified and individual, and instead have deleted all of them en masse. You request that each be individually discussed here, but do not adopt your own advice. Instead of blanket deletion, you easily could have chosen the specific changes that you disagree with and brought them here with your objections. That would constitute a cooperative approach, in contrast with removing them all at one swoop with zero Talk page comment.

This article is a mess of poor organization and opaque discussion, and Snowded, you seem unwilling to cooperate in sorting it out.Brews ohare (talk) 15:59, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: In view of the lack of response, I suggest this change be reintroduced. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

I did this. Brews ohare (talk) 16:50, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded removed these changes without comment in this thread. In a different thread Snowded made a comment that I take as his reasons for reverting this change:

"5. Your general rephrasing of incompatibilist and compatibilist views has created some rigid categories which are a partial perspective at best."

Of course, I might have misunderstood Snowded's meaning, and he may not have made any comment at all about his reversion of this paragraphing to obtain a parallel construction. In either case, Snowded's oblique reference to "rigid categories" and "partial perspective" are assertions without amplification, and are hard to respond to given their vagueness.

My own attempt to guess what Snowded was objecting to is that these definitions of compatibilism and incompatibilism are somehow restrictive upon the meaning of these terms. These definitions are:

• Those who find free will cannot coexist with determinism are called incompatibilists
• Those who find free will can coexist with determinism, are called compatibilists

In assessing the use of the word "coexist" in this connection, such usage is widespread:6,140 hits on Google books.

Instead, if we use the WP article on Incompatibilism, the article defines the subject as:

"the view that a deterministic universe is completely at odds with the notion that people have a free will; that there is a dichotomy between determinism and free will where philosophers must choose one or the other."

This definition does not conflict with the "coexist" formulation. Likewise, the article on Compatibilism defines the topic as:

"the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent. Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics."

The first sentence suggests the matter is simply one of definitions, and the second sentence that it goes beyond that to involve a belief about a state of affairs. The word "coexist" allows both.

My assessment is that either Snowded said nothing at all to explain his reversion of this change, or that what he said (his comment #5) has no merit. I am therefore reinserting this change. If Snowded does have some objection to this change, I suggest that he indicate his reason in this thread where it will be clear that he intends his comments to apply to this particular change. Brews ohare (talk) 12:56, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Brews, the constant attacks on anyone who disagrees with you do not encourage collaboration. I'm not happy with your changes but I think aspects might be OK. I will review it later and make changes. If you don't like that then we go back to the stable state. Why oh why or why cannot you not simply try and agree principles before you plunge into what you know may be controversial? Why can't you simply address content issues without pejorative statements and section headlines? You are your own worst enemy ----Snowded ^TALK 13:14, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Why do you make reversions without any attempt at support in the relevant thread? Brews ohare (talk) 13:15, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm not the only one Brews, other editors have given up on you and done the same thing, you have problems with LOTS of editors not just me and that should tell you something. That comment almost triggered me simply reverting you again. Try and listen. You create multiple threads on the talk page and seem to want every other editor to match you way of thinking/acting. I had responded to this change already in ONE place not three.

The purpose in making one change at a time is to follow your request to do so. That is a good idea because it keeps a narrow focus upon one change, avoiding wandering responses that are hard to relate to specifics. Brews ohare (talk) 13:28, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Another Snowded reversion

In this reversion of minor changes to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Snowded, among your reversals are such simple matters as repositioning an irrelevant paragraph: the version you prefer is:

"¶The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. blah blah blah

"¶The connection between autonomy (self-determination) and the ideal of developing one's own individual self was adopted within the psychology of Abraham Maslow, who saw the goal of human development as "self-actualization". For Maslow, the most developed person is the most autonomous, and autonomy is explicitly associated with not being dependent on others.[16] For others, true free will must involve self-realization, which is a maturing of the self that allows the dissolution of one's counter-productive obsessive, internal pre-occupations and assumptions, including unrecognized peer-pressure and the like, all of which reduce our actual choices, thus reduce our freedom.[17]

¶"Classical compatibilists have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as blah blah blah

The middle paragraph about Maslow has nothing to do with the preceding or following paragraphs and interrupts the flow of discussion. The version you reverted moved the Maslow paragraph to a sub-subsection of its own, taking it out of this discussion, avoiding breaking up its flow. This change was made in the successive edits Move material on Maslow to sub-subsection on Self-acutalization; it is a distraction where it was and Maslow has been moved to Self-actualization.

Again, this change is clearly labeled and individually made and could have been left standing if you chose to look at your reversion more carefully. Brews ohare (talk) 16:33, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: In view of the lack of response, I suggest this change be reintroduced. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

I did this. Brews ohare (talk) 16:51, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

It appears that the motivation behind introduction of Maslow is related to this discussion of constraints. This connection has to be made clearer to warrant retention of this material. Brews ohare (talk) 14:04, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

A change that could be discussed

In this reversion of minor changes to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Among your reversals is an explanatory few lines and a bit of re-organization to consolidate scattered discussion. The version you prefer is:

"The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). The need to reconcile freedom of will with a deterministic universe is known as the problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the dilemma of determinism.[13] This dilemma leads to a moral dilemma as well: How are we to assign responsibility for our actions if they are caused entirely by past events?[14][15]"

Much later in the same subsection is a paragraph continuing the first thought, which is unrelated to the moral issue raised above as a second thought:

"Despite our attempts to understand nature, a complete understanding of reality remains open to philosophical speculation. For example, the laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness:[28] blah blah blah"

The version you reverted explains the status of the ideas causing the dilemma. It reads:

"The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism or nomological determinism is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). The validity of causal closure has long been debated.[20] One form of criticism of causal closure is to claim science itself does not support determinism.[21] Other objections revolve around the subject-object problem and the applicability of scientific method: are subjective events understandable in principle as physical events and at bottom subject to scientific theory?[22]"

"Despite our attempts to understand nature, a complete understanding of reality remains open to philosophical speculation. For example, the laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness:[23] blah blah blah

"Regardless of these reservations, the attempt to reconcile freedom of will with a deterministic universe continues and is known as the problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the dilemma of determinism.[28] This dilemma leads to a moral dilemma as well: How are we to assign responsibility for our actions if they are caused entirely by past events?[29][30]"

The dangling later paragraph of the version you prefer has been moved into a position to complete the thought of the first paragraph and the idea of moral responsibility is placed separately after the context for the dilemma has been established.

The link to nomological determinism is separated from that of physical determinism (they are not the same, obviously). It is pointed out that there are those that contest the issues leading to the dilemma, with links to sources and other WP articles. That seems appropriate.

Perhaps you wish to discuss these changes further? Brews ohare (talk) 17:00, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: In view of the lack of response, I suggest this change be reintroduced. Brews ohare (talk) 14:45, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

I did this. Brews ohare (talk) 16:51, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Another change that might be discussed

In this reversion of minor changes to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Among your reversals is an amplification of the uncertainties about free will. The version you prefer has as its second paragraph:

"Though it is a commonly held intuition that we have free will, it has been widely debated throughout history not only whether that is true, but even how to define the concept of free will. How exactly must the will be free, what exactly must the will be free from, in order for us to have free will?"

The version you reverted retains this paragraph, but adds this sentence with two sources to describe this uncertainty further:

"Some philosophers despair over any 'solution' to these issues.^{1, 2}

Sources

¹Thomas Nagel (1989). "Freedom". The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. p. 112. ISBN 9780195056440. Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed.

²John R Searle (2013). "The problem of free will". Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. Columbia University Press. p. 37. ISBN 9780231510554. The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.

Searle and Nagel are two very well known philosophers on this topic. Perhaps you would like to discuss further the possible inclusion of this sentence? Brews ohare (talk) 19:11, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: In view of the lack of response, I suggest this change be reintroduced. Brews ohare (talk) 14:45, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

I did this. Brews ohare (talk) 16:51, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

The one change that has received some comment here

In this reversion to Free will, Snowded, you claim in your one-line Edit Summary:

"OK I can live with the early formatting changes. But all the rest is partial and selective and was already rejected by another editor. Please discuss before editing"

Among your reversals is a sentence placed at the end of the reverted Intro, which is the only change that fits your Edit Summary, namely:

"In discussing these positions, the analysis of free will often is presented in one of three ways:¹ either as the ability to decide unimpeded (freedom of volition ),² or as the ability to act unimpeded (freedom of action ),³ or as the combination of both the ability to decide and to execute a decision unimpeded (freedom of conduct ).^{4, 5}

Sources

¹Robert Kane (1998). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press. p. 3. ISBN 9780195126563.

²Henrik Walter (2011). "Chapter 27: Contributions of neuroscience to the free will debate — The cognitive neuroscience of volition and intention". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 522 ff. ISBN 9780195399691. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)

³McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin (February 25, 2015). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Compatibilism: §3.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). The word freedom in the expression freedom of will modifies a condition of action and not the agent's will.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

⁴Rudolf Steiner (2011). The Philosophy of Freedom (English translation of 1916 by Hoernlé reprint ed.). Lulu.com. p. 26. ISBN 9781257835126. the nature of human action presupposes that of the origin of thought

⁵Bernard Baertschi, Alexandre Mauron (2011). "Determinism tout court". In Judy Illes, Barbara J. Sahakian, eds (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. p. 155. ISBN 9780199570706. Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the capacity possessed by persons to decide and to act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

I think the sources speak for themselves. However, if you are ready to discuss what other sources say on this matter, please bring them forward. I am not interested in your own personal opinions, but in those found in published sources. Brews ohare (talk) 19:49, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Read up on WP:SYNTH ----Snowded ^TALK 21:02, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Reporting what sources say is OK. No synthesis here unless you see something I don't. Brews ohare (talk) 21:47, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

I do see something you don't and I have explained it to you in two different places. Sorry Brews I am not prepared to engage in interminable repetitious conversations on talk pages. Two editors have reverted you and a lot of this is very similar in content (and approach) to attempts you have made in the past. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:16, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

Your unwillingness to attempt to point out or link to where you have "already" made clear where the "synthesis" occurs is simple avoidance. I'm afraid that you have no valid objection and your "exhaustion" is with that realization. Brews ohare (talk) 05:29, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

You have that problem with many editors and many editors have my problem with you. That should tell you something. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:42, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

I have to say I agree witht the careful, thoughtful and well referenced analysis of User:Brews ohare. I commend him for the care and time he puts into this discussion, and particularly his patience. Frenchmalawi (talk) 13:52, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

It is agreeable to get support, but of course progress depends upon assistance in portraying the sources accurately. I think that has been done here, and apparently Frenchmalawi agrees, but Snowded says he disagrees. He refuses to say why he has this opinion, citing non-existent prior explanation and refusing to point it out or summarize where he is coming from. A blunt recommendation to read WP:SYN is not a substitute for an explicit recommendation, and does not help to evolve the article.

I expect that Snowded remembers the discussion of this sentence here where it was proposed as a lead sentence. His comment at that time was

Snowded, given this resistance on your part, how about addressing the other 4 remarks about reversions of yours where only matters of presentation are involved and we might progress? Brews ohare (talk) 15:13, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

I have searched for earlier discussion by Snowded, following up on his reluctance to do so himself. I have found that his objections result from a misinterpretation of WP:SECONDARY.

Snowded's discussion of the presently disputed sentence took place earlier when it was proposed as a lead sentence. His objection then was:

"Proposal seeks to make a general definition based on a synthesis of sources which look at aspects of the field in the main. The Neuroscience perspective is one, but only one take. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:45, 26 March 2015 (UTC)

The idea that WP:SYN is involved here is a result of Snowded's confusion about the role of secondary sources on WP, as will become clear shortly.

This comment was followed up with this one:

"The names of your sources indicate their orientation Brews. Find a third party source, if you are 'right' it should not be difficult. Then propose a new wording, the one you used has been rejected by two editors. Continuing to insist you are right rather than accommodating others concerns is problematic to say the least." ----Snowded ^TALK 06:29, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

As was pointed out at the time, the title of one of the sources that involved the word 'neuroscience' was used only for its general philosophical background on the subject, not its neuroscience. The other sources' orientation and their titles are not in dispute. These second remarks of Snowded also were addressed at the time.

Snowded's insistence upon a third party source is contrary to the WP policy WP:SECONDARY which states:

"Policy: Wikipedia articles usually rely on material from reliable secondary sources. Articles may make an analytic or evaluative claim only if that has been published by a reliable secondary source."

The policy description of a secondary source reads:

"It contains an author's interpretation, analysis, or evaluation of the facts, evidence, concepts, and ideas taken from primary sources. Secondary sources are not necessarily independent or third-party sources."

It is obvious that the cited sources are all secondary sources, and that the sentence objected to by Snowded is an appropriate use of secondary sources, provided only that it makes no claim not espoused by these sources. Objection should therefore be based upon identifying some misrepresentation of what these sources say (which has not occurred, IMO) or, if there is some lack of objectivity in these sources, then opposing views based upon alternative secondary sources should be provided. Snowded has not attempted this approach.

Instead of a content-related discussion, Snowded has elected to move the discussion to a dispute of WP:SECONDARY as I have portrayed this policy. Although I think his opposition is misguided and inarticulate, particularly in its confused dragging in of third-party sources as essential to avoidance of WP:SYN, there will be no resolution of this difference of opinion. So I think it is better to move on to the other 4 reversions where choice of sources is not at issue. Brews ohare (talk) 16:44, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

Well, instead of writing this lead based on articles like uhm maybe one entitled "free will" or why not Chapter 1 of these books, where key concepts are defined, you pick whatever section of these otherwise reliable sources that fits your agenda. This is the lead paragraph and it should reflect how the topic is handled in the literature. It should not be some idiosyncratic synthesized representation based on whatever fragments we like. There are so many problems with the source usage here. For example, when Robert Kane discusses his distinction between freedom of action and freedom of will, he plainly states that this is a minority view. Kane certainly deserves adequate weight, but the entire phrasing above is biased against the mainstream view and is therefore unacceptable for the lead paragraph. Vesal (talk) 23:21, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

Vesal: I am happy to see you aim to approach this matter based upon what sources say. There is no doubt whatsoever that free will is traditionally the combination of a decision to act along with the ability to execute that decision.Baertschi & Mauron, for example. That being the case, there is also no doubt that "free will" has these two facets. Now whether you decide to define "free will"" as item A + item B or item A alone or item B alone is a choice that different authors will make differently. The sentence at issue does not say one or the other of these three choices is preferable, but only that these three choices are available and sometimes one and sometimes the other have been chosen. Do you dispute the existence of these possible choices? Now one could follow up by saying the first choice is traditional (as has been said) and the other two are less common. But is it a balanced introduction to the topic of "free will" to focus upon only the first choice as though it were all that there is? Brews ohare (talk) 01:03, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Its one aspect Brews but I'm not at all sure it belongs in the lede. The Oxford Companion says that it is two problems (i) metaphysical and (ii) moral. The distinction you make is not mentioned in the summary as a defining one, ----Snowded ^TALK 06:15, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: The Oxford Companion of Neuroethics and The Oxford Companion of Free Will have already been linked to show that the two aspects of volition and execution are well-recognized aspects of what is called "free will". The Oxford Companion to Consciousness suggests "Free will is about the compatibility of prior causes over how we act with power which is our own control over our actions." [Some liberties taken in omission of some clauses] This article by Thomas Pink stresses the unconscious vs. the conscious control of our actions, the limitations of "volition". In §4 it says "In Libet's view the exercise of freedom is inherently conscious...Libet concludes, our actions are free only to the degree that we can intervene and block their final causation once we begin to be aware of their likely production" Here we have an attempt to conjoin "exercise" with "volition".

These "Companions" envision two aspects to free will: volition and action, and stress one or the other or both as the need arises. You have pointed out nothing objectionable about the added sentence, so far as I can see, and it is clear that both aspects play a role in the concept of free will acknowledged in the published literature. This sentence should be added. Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

In fact, this sentence should be expanded upon. Brews ohare (talk) 14:42, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Okay, Brews, this distinction might even be suitable for the lead paragraph, but the objection is to frame this in a way that implies compatibilist accounts are somehow defective. Both IEP and SEP do take this up, not quite in their lead, but close enough, so this can and maybe should be done. It just needs a much more neutral phrasing than what's being suggested above. On the other hand, I concede there are problems with the current lead: it seems strange to say that the mere freedom to make choices can be constrained by chains. Vesal (talk) 15:23, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Vesal: I may be a bit tone deaf here. I don't see how pointing out that an action involves two aspects, and they are sometimes included under "free will" together or sometimes individually, prejudices any subsequent discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 15:35, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

You can't cherry pick stuff from a neuro-philosophy perspective, or for that matter use Pink (who is not a philosopher) as an authority to define the overall subject. It is valid in a section and can be summarised in the lede. Brews you really need to work on agreeing changes here first. It may take an extra day or so but it will get more co-operation unless you simply keep asserting the same position without change ----Snowded ^TALK 15:52, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: My recent introduction of the practical example of addiction to the main article had the purpose of showing there was more than semantics involved in "free will", a point lost upon the article's intro that is way overboard into semantics. This recently attempted addition had a purpose different from this thread. This thread has the purpose of pointing out that even within the present Intro's myopic focus upon meanings of "free will", it omits the very widely acknowledged semantic division into two parts: "volition" and "exercise of volition", as documented now by at least four sources.

Hopefully you can separate the issue of a definition in full accord with various Oxford Companions from the issue of practical importance (and main interest) versus academic word play. Brews ohare (talk) 16:11, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

OK Brews you seem determined to carry on as before so some points:

1. You had a response to all your suggested changes which was the response that you were using partial references out of context. The fact that other editors are not prepared to spend hours indulging in detailed explanations under multiple sub-headings when they have already made the point does not justify you in simply reimposing your position.
2. To say 'per talk page' when you do not have agreement on the talk page is a misleading edit summary
3. Saying that there has been no response to your comments and suggesting they be reinstated is fine. Waiting only two hours (when you know those of us in the UK are probably in bed) then making those changes as there has been no response is simply not on
4. You have taken the position that the intuition v natural law conflict is 'semantic' which is a perjorative label
5. Your general rephrasing of incompatibilist and compatibilist views has created some rigid categories which are a partial perspective at best.
6. You have given undue prominence to Maslow by creating its own sub-section. Its very dubious if that paragraph even has value in a philosophy article and it should probably be deleted. It should certainly not be made a separate section.
7. Once again (as in the 2014 round on this article) you are defining the whole field by a partial set of sources you find interesting and useful. And using those without qualification.

Of all the changes you made, some brief (but not partial) summary of the objections would be useful but NOT solely from a particular scienctific background. To be very direct please read the first point above and gain AGREEMENT on the talk page before making changes ----Snowded ^TALK 05:32, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Lets start again

I think we can all agree that the lede needs improvement and there is a need for some change elsewhere. But those changes have to be agreed. This is not going to work if one editor keeps making the same changes. So how about we treat this more as a project and tackle one issue at a time on the talk page, rather than multiple issues at a time on the main article. The question of the lede should be left to last so for the moment I suggest we agree an agenda of areas that need change, then agree the principles of those changes and agreed sources, then draft changes. There is no great rush here or need for conflict.

As far as I can see we need to:

1. Prune material which properly belongs to psychology (such as Maslow) and generally tidy up all other references
2. We need a better summary of compatibilism and incompatibilism and their various permutations ideally from a third party source, not one perspective.
3. We need to more clearly separate some of the ethical from metaphysical aspects

OK so that's my take - other opionions? ----Snowded ^TALK 05:44, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

My suggestion is to look one by one at the four separate changes recently made and reverted by yourself. Each has a thread already set up where it can be individually and separately discussed. Each is a rather simple matter, and probably can be resolved easily through discussion in its own particular thread. This approach avoids taking a mouthful too large to chew and so getting nowhere.

I think the complexity increases in the order they are presented, so as a first step let us look at setting up a parallel construction that presents compatibilism and incompatibilism in a similar manner? Brews ohare (talk) 06:22, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

That is not starting again, its continuing a line you are taking which has been rejected ----Snowded ^TALK 07:41, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Compatibalism et al

In summary (using The Oxford Companion but open to others which cover the field as a whole)

• incompatibilists believe that determinism (if true) would destroy moral responsibility, those who are incompatibilists who think determinism is wrong are Libertarians, those who think it is true, per William James are hard determinists.
• Compatibilists believe that freedom and determinism are compatible, they are sometimes called soft determinists but that label is deprecated. Their argument rests in part on the I would have done otherwise if I had chosen point
• Determinism is contrasted with randomness, some modern thinking based on complexity offers a different ontology but that only has limited references so we probably can't include it yet, ditto some of the thinking on quantum mechanics which doesn't really have enough material yet.
• An approach suggests that having one conception of freedom is false and this both compatibalism and incompatabilism are wrong. In effect we have two notions of freedom one involving origination and voluntarism and the other voluntarism alone. That is referenced. More recent discussions (I remember them with Honderich and others at Hay last year) are starting to link that idea with complexity but again it is far too early to include any such material here.

In terms of a summary I think that is all we need to cover. We can then have a history section with the major thinkers - not as quotes but summary, Thoughts?----Snowded ^TALK 09:06, 5 April 2015 (UTC) All of those use the moral issue to illustrate the metaphysical one.

Do we retain the present lede and use 'constraints' as the starting point? I think that is a good approach. If it is retained, the next step is not incompatibilism and compatibilism, but how constraints are related to determinism in a broad sense that includes reductionist, enactivist, and theological aspects. The various compatibilist-incompatibilist arguments tend to pick their own strawman version of determinism and talk past each other. We can do better by presenting a broader spectrum of published opinion. Brews ohare (talk) 15:14, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

The present Intro takes a stab at this by linking to physical, nomological, theological determinim articles. That is too incomplete because the connection is not made and tailored to the context of free will. Connection has also to be made with reductionism (neuroscience and genocentrism in particular [ Rosenberg, eg? ]), and antireductionism (including enactivism). Brews ohare (talk) 15:25, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I have a feeling that a good Intro along these lines will make the compatibilism-incompatibilism debate more vivid and interesting. Brews ohare (talk) 15:31, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

In particular, it will allow us to bury nomological determinism and logical determinism as completely removed from modern views and focus on views that have some credibility. Brews ohare (talk) 16:03, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Brews we need to be very careful about synthesis here. We don't make connections we summarise ones that other people make. I'm not clear what structure you propose and to be honest I think this is a fairly short article with references to others ----Snowded ^TALK 16:06, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I agree that synthesis has to be avoided. That may be a narrow line in some regards. It can be navigated only with specific sources in mind. However, you have not addressed whether the 'constraints' approach is satisfactory as a starting point? Brews ohare (talk) 16:31, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't think it is. As I pointed out above its mainly a historical illustration ----Snowded ^TALK 16:39, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't think constraints are an historical issue only. If you are a neuroscientist like Eric Kandlel, brain activity is neurons and synapses at work, and free will is an illusion because there is no "thought" that could not in principle be predicted from a fine-grained understanding of the neurons and synapses and knowledge of the stimulus from the inanimate universe.

In very broad outline, my view is that the two major divisions are the reductionists that reduce all mental activity to synapses and further suppose that ultimately the brain is a machine, and the antireductionists who are opposed to this idea in various ways. If you are a reductionist, free will is simply something correlated with brain activity observable with scopes, and the brain activity is fundamental. There may be some semantic nuances here, but basically free will is an illusion. On the other hand, if you are an antireductionist there are a lot of options, and I'd guess that whatever option you choose, free will is a possibility. This is the big canvas, and the compatibilist-incompatibilist debates have to be fitted into this puzzle. Do you have some comments on this as a broad picture, nevermind the details of what sources can be found, if they can be found? Brews ohare (talk) 16:53, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

That is a perspective from one approach to the issue. It is not supported by the whole field sources I checked. I summarised one of those above. Your synthesis (and it is a synthesis) is not even up todate on post-cartesian ideas of consciousness or for that matter the implications of autonomic/novelty receptive processing for freewill. Now that is an area I do know about, but I also know its not even close to being in reliable third party sources which is what we reflect here. So I'm sorry but I do not find your summary supported by third party sources, only by your synthesis of selective sources. Other editors have told you this as well but instead of moving on you continue to assert your original position. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:00, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Well "post-Cartesian consciousness" and "autonomic/novelty receptive processing" are pretty intimidating monikers. I gather that you think Kandel's views and the Blue Brain Project are out of date and need not be presented because today no-one today thinks of the brain as a machine governed in principle by mathematically formulated laws. My take is that there are many very recent discussions of this as a position to be reckoned with.e.g. this As for the contrary views, which are legion, I take it that your stance is that compatibilism and incompatibilism are both incorrect. I might subscribe to that stance, but of course as these positions are defined in terms of their view of determinism, it is hard to say what they are about until you pin them down on the version of determinism they involve. In most cases, existing discussion is about forms of determinism that are of no interest. Comments? Brews ohare (talk) 17:12, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't find them intimidating, my point is that I would not attempt to insert that material until it is covered by a third party source. You are cherry picking original sources. Sorry I've explained this too you far too often. I am not prepared to engage in a discussion about the subject, only about what reliable third party sources say about the subject.----Snowded ^TALK 17:20, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Well, one can google "post-Cartesian consciousness" and "autonomic processing" and maybe track down some relevance to free will. However, I had hoped to come to further understanding of your viewpoint. A retreat into the "third-party sources" theme isn't going to get us anywhere. I take it to be a warning shot that any attempt to use secondary sources will be reverted as synthesis, despite the obvious contradiction of that stance with WP:SECONDARY? Is this the best we can do together? Brews ohare (talk) 17:27, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Why can't you indent your comments, I shouldn't have to do it for you. Its not a retreat its the way we work here. You constantly want to synthesis material that you consider relevant. That is why you keep getting into problems with other editors. My viewpoint on the subject is note relevant to Wikipedia - come along to the Hay Philosophy festival this year and I'll happily debate it with you but this is not the place.----Snowded ^TALK 17:35, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

So now I am to be chastised for your introduction of the "third-party sources" routine? I made several content-related inquiries above, all ignored. Go ahead and propose a specific package for commentary. Brews ohare (talk) 19:47, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

See previous comments ----Snowded ^TALK 05:21, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Your 3 points at the top of this thread are broad objectives, like "prune", "summarize" and "separate". It is not feasible to discuss the adequacy of execution of such directives without specifics. In the present sub-thread you are presumably providing an amplification of the "Summarize" directive to be clear about varieties of compatibilism and incompatibilism. Apart from the lack of specifics like sources and proposed wording, this four-asterisk summary settles upon "determinism" as the antonym of "randomness" (all other discussion ruled as "premature"), a very narrow view of determinism indeed - basically a mathematical definition devoid of philosophical or scientific content. This restricted definition will curtail the understanding of compatibilism viz a viz incompatibilism. So IMO you have glanced over the terrain, made a few tentative missteps, and are yet to sally forth. Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I summarised the definition in a reliable third party source Brews to see if we could move forward. If you want to write an essay on the subject go and get it published in a journal. To be accused of missteps in my own subject has of course mortified me. I will take my self for a long walk to reflect on my failure to appreciate your wider project. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:37, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: Again you wish to assert your role on WP as being an expert, adopting the role of authority in this subject area. Of course, WP does not recognize expertise. The value of expertise is to guide a contributing editor to a judicious presentation of sources in their field, based upon their knowledge of them. Unfortunately, it is a very common hubris of experts to have great impatience with the less knowledgeable and to expect automatic agreement with expert pronouncements. In my experience, the Wikipedian determination to treat experts like everyone else and to rely upon published reliable sources is well-founded. Many experts are only expert in a very narrow area, and have a pronounced tendency to extrapolate their self-importance to arenas where they have no expertise at all. Brews ohare (talk) 14:58, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

These are, of course, simply general observations, and should not be taken personally, but as an elucidation of how things work on WP. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

No Brews I simply made an ironic response to your little attack, sorry you didn't get it and now you have gone over the top in response. Work with third party sources and no problem. I suggested doing that and all we got was you going back to the same edits and same sources that had already been rejected by other editors. That is tendencious editing, something that many people have mentioned to you in the past including ArbCom. When you are ready to move forward let us know ----Snowded ^TALK 15:06, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm ready for you to propose something specific, as pointed out innumerable times already. These vague "third-party sources" comments are a stall on your part. You seem not to want to implement your plan but just to wave the flag around. Brews ohare (talk) 15:29, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

A named third party source is not vague, neither is an attempt to agree a structure for the change before putting the effort into detailed writing. Understanding that would help you on this and many other pages. At the moment you assertion of your original edits means (I think) that you do not support that structure so I'm not putting effort into detail. When there is an agreement happy to engage. Oh and please lay off the personal attacks (especially the ones that you require to make a second editor to say they were not attacks) . OK they are mild by your usual standards but still tedious.

Your claim to have summarized a reliable third-party source (an unspecified Oxford Companion, obviously a secondary source, whichever Companion you refer to) actually disagrees with The Oxford Companion to Philosophy which has as its entry under compatibilism and incompatibilism: "Compatibilism is a view about determinism and freedom that claims we are sometimes free and morally responsible even though all events are causally determined. Incompatibilism says we cannot be free and responsible if determinism is true" The entry is written by R.C.W., a single author. The entry has no in-line citations but appends Honderich, Kane and Inwagen as three general references with no specification of page numbers. Not a very good model for a WP article. As pointed out here, two Oxford Handbooks (again secondary sources) don't agree with you either. Brews ohare (talk) 15:58, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Brews, we have discussed the Oxford Companion before so I assumed you would understand the reference. I have it on the desk in front of me at the moment - 2nd edition 2005 edited by Honderich. If you think I have summarised it incorrectly point out why. It is a peer reviewed summary of the field as a whole so it is far better to use that than your selection of sources. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:03, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I have linked and quoted the 2005 edition you mention edited by Honderich. Its entry under "compatibilism and incompatibilism" is one paragraph, and can hardly be seen as much more than a dictionary entry, having no detail whatsoever. Aside from its paucity of sources, it is not different from the other secondary sources cited throughout this talk page. Brews ohare (talk) 16:20, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

The section on Freewill and Determinism is the best part of two pages and the section there on compatibilism and incompatibilism is around half the entry. Otherwise I'm sorry but to determine the overall important of different aspects of the field a peer reviewed directory or companion from a major university with an authoritative editorial panel has more status than your cherry picking sources to decide what should be included. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:34, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Your abbreviated attempt to elevate this Oxford Companion above various other Companions and Handbooks, never mind on-line encyclopedias like The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a separate and interminable discussion.

To return to content, IMO this entry disagrees with your "summary" in several respects. First, it draws in the idea of responsibility as an essential part of the compatibilism/incompatibilism difference, and second it does not specify "lack of randomness" as its meaning for determinism. Brews ohare (talk) 16:41, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm not elevating it above other companions etc. The point I made about your one on neurobiology was it was focused on one aspect not the field as a whole. If you want a to propose a schema based on another full field directory or equivalent feel free, or on your interpretation of Honderich if you want. Just to be clear though I am using Honderich's article on Free Will not on one aspect. It seemed appropriate to do that given the title of this article. Just don't based it on a synthesis of your own choosing or an opinion piece from an on line one which does not go through the same referee process.----Snowded ^TALK 16:48, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

So now the "third-party source" idea yields to the "full field directory or equivalent"? The idea being, I guess, that for instance The Oxford Handbook of Consciousness, or The Oxford Handbook of Freewill is not "full-field" and so is not an acceptable secondary source? And I suppose further (please clarify) that although The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy or The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy are undoubtedly full-field when seen in their entirety, nonetheless any given article in these compendia is not full-field and so is not acceptable? Brews ohare (talk) 17:07, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Relax Brews. The one on consciousness is obviously applicable to that subject, but one on Philosophy with a section on consciousness probably more so for a Philosophy article. The one on Freewill looks interesting and I've ordered a copy. The issue there was you chose the section on Neurobiology and the wider objection was that you were only tackling the subject from a science perspective. Hence the point about synthesis. I've explained the point on the online ones ad nausea and there have been discussions elsewhere on that in Wikipedia. I'm not wedded to Honderich but I haven't seen you suggest a comparable alternative yet. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:14, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

The point I wish to emphasize is that a secondary source on, say, neurobiology, that enters into a discussion of free will, for example, as might arise in discussing Libet's experiments, provides a perfectly acceptable point of view and may be used in complete accordance with WP:SECONDARY to present that viewpoint in accordance with WP:NPOV. It is undesirable, in fact, to limit discussion to the views of philosophers, who have completely botched the job so far (at least, in Searle's and Nagel's opinion). Presenting the neurobiology view is not saying it is the one-and-only view, as you seem to imply, and any such impression is readily dispersed by including other opinions from other secondary sources. Brews ohare (talk) 17:26, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Ok so philosophers have botched the job and Brews like the 5th Cavalry will ride in and rescue them with his preferred sources. Nice try. Source is fine to support a neuro-biological perspective but NOT to define the field as a whole. There you may just have to learn to live with Philosophers ----Snowded ^TALK 17:54, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Two points: (1) Who gets to "define the field as a whole"? Can philosophers say "free will" is strictly a philosophical issue and while neurobiology may enter the discussion, the principles lie completely outside neurobiology? And if so, who is to decide whether the philosophers have adequately understood the neurobiology they use in their philosophy? Who arbitrates? And (2), who said that what is at stake here when a neurobiologist is cited is the BIG question of "defining the field as a whole"? It isn't.

The field as a whole is under negotiation, with reductionists saying it is fundamentally a correlation with subliminal neural activity most properly lying within neuroscience and its advances, and the antireductionists saying science is disqualified from subjective phenomena and can deal only with objective aspects. Brews ohare (talk) 21:26, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

In any of the modern books I have on the subject philosophy incorporates near-science and indeed there are common practitioners - people who work in both domains. So the idea that something could be a strictly philosophical issue without incorporating findings from science (which are not just confined to the Neuro side in free will debates) is not one I have seen many advocate. Most would incorporate it. The one thing you can't do is take a particular neurobiologic stance or just address the article from that perspective. Your definition of reductionist and anti-reductionist is terribly Newtonian if I may say so. I've seen far more nuanced treatments than that simple dichotomy. Even if your perspective was right (which I don't think it is by the way) then we still couldn't reflect it until the broader treatment of the field reflected it - reliable sources and all that. ----Snowded ^TALK 21:34, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't think we are conversing here, so goodbye. Brews ohare (talk) 21:43, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Maslow

I propose deletion - its not rerferenced in Philosophy and even in theory of the Organisation has been replaced by people like Vroom. Inclusions is a formof synthesis. ----Snowded ^TALK 09:07, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

I have not looked into Maslow. Perhaps this could be postponed until more important issues are settled ? Brews ohare (talk) 14:31, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

Its pretty brain dead - no mention in any philosophical literature and not uptodate anyway so it fails the reference test. But happy to hold it for the moment ----Snowded ^TALK 14:49, 5 April 2015 (UTC)

The value of the thirteenth century view of free will

I have been reading Tobias Hoffmann (2014). "Chapter 30: Intellectualism and voluntarism". In Robert Pasnau (ed.). The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy: Volume 1. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781139952927.. This discussion is such an enormous relief after reading this WP article. The views of the thriteenth century described here are so close to common-sense understanding that it is clear the discussion of free will has not only not progressed as said by Thomas Nagel (1989). "Freedom". The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. p. 112. ISBN 9780195056440.

"Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed."

but has regressed, affirming Searle's depiction of it as a scandal John R Searle (2013). "The problem of free will". Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. Columbia University Press. p. 37. ISBN 9780231510554.

"The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress."

A presentation of Hoffmann's discussion would be a good addition to this article. Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Searl is notable enough that his opinion could be incorporated in the body of the article as his opinion. A full history section could sensibly include summary material from the source mentioned ----Snowded ^TALK 15:30, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

And Nagel is not sufficiently notable? Brews ohare (talk) 16:01, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

What for? Searl's overall status means that his commentary is probably worthy to be included as his opinion. Not sure what you want to use Nagel for, you seem to be arguing that he is right which is fine as an opinion. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:17, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

An interesting aspect of this summary is the discussion of the relation between "will" and "reason". The basic idea, as I understand it, is that the "will" is the executing agent that causes something to be done, and "reason" informs the will about the value of alternatives. In this process, "reason" may miscalculate, leading to bad judgment, but the "will" has always the final say as to whether the recommendation of reason will be followed, and may decide against reason in favor of "lower powers of the soul". The connection to morality is clear, as is the connection to thought. The two aspects of "free will" - volition and execution are clearly outlined, showing that this bipartite division was well established in the thirteenth century. Brews ohare (talk) 16:30, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Its always been an aspect of the debate Brews, it just doesn't define it. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:55, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

The idea that splitting free will into two aspects "defines" it is nonsense and nowhere suggested. Brews ohare (talk) 21:30, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unimpeded

The title of this thread is the definition of free will provided in this article. The use of the term "agent" presumably is not intended in the sense of a "sales agent", but would seem to be connected with philosophical agency, the ability to act. According to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "An agent performs activity that is directed at a goal, and commonly it is a goal the agent has adopted on the basis of an overall practical assessment of his options and opportunities. Moreover, it is immediately available to the agent's awareness both that he is performing the activity in question and that the activity is aimed by him at such-and-such a chosen end."

Adopting this as the idea behind the choice of the word "agent", I believe the first sentence of the lede should be more clear about this intention, as the word "agent" is to be read by those for whom philosophy is not their calling. The intention of this sentence would seem to me to be more clearly expressed by saying:

"Free will is the ability of agents to assess and/or to make choices unimpeded."

If we go back to the thirteenth century, "Freedom — that is, acting or refraining from acting as one wants — requires the self-movement of the will and the cognitive capacity for reflecting upon one's act...Even if reason judges an act of the will to be evil, the will has the option of desisting from this act or not." This view describes the two phases of assessment and action and suggests "free will" is their combination.

Some more modern opinions are:

"Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the capacity possessed by persons to decide and to act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own." — Bernard Baertschi, Alexandre Mauron; Determinism tout court

Here again the combination of deciding and then acting constitute free will.

"Free will, then, is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants" — Michael McKenna, Justin Coates

Here the stress is less clear: the role of doing something is clearly included, but what wanting to do it means is not spelled out. What does a drug addict "want" - the drug, or to be free of the drug — and how do we know what the addict really wants? Is the "assessment" idea built into this definition or not?

In psychology, the idea of setting a goal and acting to achieve it are separated in the so-called Rubicon model of action phases.Achtziger & Gollwitzer

In any event, the proposed change is clearer in emphasizing what is meant by "agent", and indicates the two aspects of free will, the division into action and volition, that permeates the subject. Brews ohare (talk) 09:01, 10 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm not wild about it given some of the modern meanings of 'agent' in AI and CAS, in fact 'agency' is increasingly problematic as a word. We need the lede (as I have said many time) to reflect a third party source not be a synthesis of discussions of the subject by editors ----Snowded ^TALK 11:28, 10 April 2015 (UTC)

We need some clarification here, Snowded. You use the term "third party source" with your personal definition, and not that of WP. WP explains a third party source in the context of finding an unbiased observer: "one that is entirely independent of the subject being covered". Obviously, no such source exists to define what "objectively speaking" is meant by 'free will'. For example, sources like The Oxford Handbook of Whatever or The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy contain articles that are what WP calls "secondary sources", that is,

"A secondary source provides an author's own thinking based on primary sources, generally at least one step removed from an event. It contains an author's interpretation, analysis, or evaluation of the facts, evidence, concepts, and ideas taken from primary sources."

Possibly you mean to use the term tertiary source defined by WP:TERTIARY as: "publications such as encyclopedias and other compendia that summarize primary and secondary sources." However, the role of such sources is primarily to argue that a position has not been given undue weight, and so far as establishing veracity:

"Some tertiary sources should not be used for academic research, unless they can also be used as secondary sources or to find other sources." [My emphasis]]

I would conclude that the role of a tertiary source in establishing a definition, particularly when (as is usually the case) its viewpoint is that of a single author, may rest upon seeing it as a secondary source. In that regard, as WP:SECONDARY points out:

Policy: Wikipedia articles usually rely on material from reliable secondary sources. Articles may make an analytic or evaluative claim only if that has been published by a reliable secondary source.

With all this in mind, your remark " We need the lede (as I have said many time) to reflect a third party source not be a synthesis of discussions of the subject by editors" should be reworded. IMO, what we need is a lede that either:

• (1) provides a single definition widely adopted by secondary sources of all stripes as a starting point (whether they are compatibilists, incompatibilists, or whatever). This approach is utopian, IMO.

or

• (2) provides several assorted definitions with appropriate secondary sources sufficient to satisfy WP:NPOV. For example, definitions acceptable to compatibilists and others acceptable to incompatibilists, and so on.

Both approaches require some judgment to establish that indeed the selected definition is (or definitions are), in fact, representative. And both require quotations for definition(s). Would you adopt a strategy such as this as a substitute for your own wording? Brews ohare (talk) 16:16, 10 April 2015 (UTC)

You are just repeating old arguments Brews, and as ever at length. Sorry don't agree. I'll have time to work on your other edits this weekend ----Snowded ^TALK 05:19, 11 April 2015 (UTC)

It's a simple question: how does your idea of a "third-party source" square with WP policy definitions? It is clear that it does not, and the relevant policy is WP:SECONDARY in conjunction with WP:NPOV. Brews ohare (talk) 13:15, 11 April 2015 (UTC)

Its been explained to you by multiple editors on article pages and also on policy pages when you have tried to change them to support one of your content disputes. Sorry Brews I'm simply not prepared to carry on saying the same thing over and over again ----Snowded ^TALK 19:32, 11 April 2015 (UTC)

Apparently you believe you have dealt with the problem that your concept of "third-party sources" is yours and yours alone. It is my opinion that has not happened, and you have never faced the fact that secondary sources are the backbone of WP sourcing as pointed out in WP:SECONDARY. However, this failure to connect with WP policy is not a critical factor in attempting to establish an adequate & sourced definition of "free will". In particular, we have two candidates already quoted at the start of this thread.

1. "Free will, then, is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants" — Michael McKenna, Justin Coates

2, "Traditionally, free will has been conceptualized as the capacity possessed by persons to decide and to act in accordance with an unimpeded will of their own." — Bernard Baertschi, Alexandre Mauron; Determinism tout court

Of the two, the last one seems to me to be the least ambiguous, as terms like "unencumbered ability" and "doing what one wants" bury a host of difficulties, among them: whether "do" involves both decision and action, either of which could be "encumbered". According to MMcKenna & Coates, that allows the compatibilists to limit laws of nature to action and leave will unencumbered. Somehow, I don't think this interpretation is the only way to look at the two-aspect formulation and incompatibilists could work with this definition. Anyway, choose one, or provide an alternative sourced version you like better with some reasons why. Brews ohare (talk) 21:16, 11 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm loosing track of what you are proposing Brews and I don't have to choose one of yours if I am happy with the present wording or think it preferable. Of the two quotes yo give the second is preferable but I really don't see what your issue is. Maybe summarise exactly what change you are looking for ----Snowded ^TALK 03:43, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

The second definition says 'free will' as a capacity, a capacity both to decide and to act. It identifies two aspects. Now some authors focus on one or the other, not both. So this "traditional" view does not satisfy WP:NPOV. The lack of unanimity about the "traditional" point of view should be explained and cited.

The present first sentence is a bit oblique, but adopts the traditional view by using the word 'agent' linked to the WP article on philosophical agency (which implies action directed toward a goal selected after due consideration). It has therefore two defects: it is unclear, and it is unsourced.

So my issue is to fix the first sentence to be 1) clear & 2) sourced & 3) identified as a common but not universal view. Brews ohare (talk) 14:17, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Replacement of chains or imprisonment

An example of constraints limiting free will was provided as "physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment)". Technically "imprisonment" might fit better under social constraints, so I moved it there along with censure. The example of chains is trivial, and not any philosopher's real concern. A better example, and one of importance, is the constraints of laws of science. So for example, one cannot defy gravity whatever one's choice, and there is much discussion over whether in fact thought can influence events at all (not being one of the fundamental forces recognized by laws of science) and whether in fact original thought is a chimera should it be found that all "thought" is merely an accompaniment to more fundamental events that are indeed due to forces included in the laws of science. So I replaced "chains" with "requirements of the laws of science", which is in fact a topic of concern to almost all philosophical comment on free will. Brews ohare (talk) 05:47, 12 April 2015 (UTC)

I made a minor modification to put back some of the old text but otherwise I think that is OK. Otherwise the last set of changes seem fine but with the removal of a logical position with no adherents (that statement I have referenced) so I also removed the picture as it implied such a position was real ----Snowded ^TALK 07:42, 12 April 2015 (UTC)

Filled in citation template for your source and removed the "that have been studied" phrase that seems neither here nor there. Brews ohare (talk) 17:42, 12 April 2015 (UTC)

OK will live with that and thanks for the template. Not sure why you are breaking the wikipedia convention on indenting - not like you ----Snowded ^TALK 03:39, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Use of term 'natural law'

The term natural law appears to have been appropriated by the legal system as a reference to morality. So where science is meant, the laws of science or physical law appears to be a better choice of words. Unfortunately, the WP articles on these topics border upon the views of Laplace or Leibnitz and hardly reflect a modern position. Brews ohare (talk) 18:08, 12 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't agree with you there and Natural Law is more commonly used. If you have more recent references happy to look at it again but even science is not fully agreed on the idea of 'laws' ----Snowded ^TALK 03:38, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Please do that. Here is a link to a definition Also, look at the WP article natural law. And here is a Google book search. The common understanding of 'natural law' relates to "an ethical belief or system of beliefs supposed to be inherent in human nature and discoverable by reason". From context, this topic is not the one intended.

The second philosophical meaning in the linked definition is 'A nonlogical truth such as a law of nature'. In contrast to natural law, the laws of science or physical law is on target and unambiguous. Brews ohare (talk) 06:48, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

As a compromise, I have substituted "laws of nature" for "natural law". Hope that works. Brews ohare (talk) 15:23, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

It's your view again Brews, in this context I want a reference which makes that point in the context of free will and says it has replaced natural law. I'm tempted to do a mass revert but I will look at it. Please accept that if something is reverted you DISCUSS it before reinstating ----Snowded ^TALK 17:03, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: I don't understand your remarks. The substitution of "laws of nature" for "natural law" makes no claims about "free will" and has nothing to do with it. Its just a question of everyday usage, and the Google books link shows that the usual interpretation of "natural law" is its legal context. Switching to "laws of nature" just avoids a possible misdirection. Brews ohare (talk) 17:47, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

I am assuming that you agree that the ensuing discussion of causal closure is related to the "laws of nature" (scientific laws) and is not pertinent to "an ethical belief or system of beliefs supposed to be inherent in human nature". Brews ohare (talk) 17:53, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

It can related to ethical laws drawn from 'nature' that in effect provide restrictions. The legal context derives from the philosophical use so you were wrong to change it, There are also restrictions from laws of nature in the sense you mean them but your phrasing does not help that. I'll go through the recent changes in then next day or so. I'm flying to the US tomorrow so I won't have time for a day or so ----Snowded ^TALK 21:57, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

I am surprised by your remarks because I don't find any connection to ethics in this particular paragraph, which IMO is entirely devoted to what you call " laws of nature in the sense you [i.e. myself] mean them", namely the laws of nature that form science. Brews ohare (talk) 00:23, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

The context in question is:

"The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and laws of nature arises when either causal closure or physical determinism or nomological determinism is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). However, despite our attempts to understand nature, ... " [bold font emphasis added].

If there is any indication that ""an ethical belief or system of beliefs supposed to be inherent in human nature and discoverable by reason" is the subject of interest here, perhaps you can point it out to me? Brews ohare (talk) 04:55, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

It's a philosophical position Brews, I doubt you agree with it I have some sympathy with it, The point is that you are conflating a term incorrectly to mean what you think it should. ----Snowded ^TALK 06:56, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

The linked definition provides three philosophy related meanings. The first is about ethical principles. The second is about 'laws of nature'. The third is about rationally supported legal principles. The question here is which meaning applies to the context at hand. It is the second: laws of nature. So ambiguity about which meaning applies is removed by saying simply 'laws of nature' instead of 'natural law'. I am sure you understand the advantages of clarity. So your objection would seem to be that the 'laws of nature' meaning does not apply in a discussion of causal closure. I await some argument that relates the ethical and legal meanings to discussing causal closure, an exercise in futility, IMO. Brews ohare (talk) 13:07, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

As I said I will look at it, but I am happier using a common term than one preferred by Brews albeit with links, to my mind that is clarity. Neither am I happy with you focusing on causal closure I think its partial at best. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:01, 14 April 2015 (UTC

Snowded: this sentence is old text and not a recent introduction of mine. However, I agree with it that causal closure is worth bringing up. After all, the whole free will problem predating Chrysippus is the reconciliation of our intuition that we are free agents with our everyday observations that similar circumstances lead to similar results. Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

The issue yes Brews, its your use of it as a focus I am more concerned about. But I'm not getting sucked into a discussion of the subject with you, we are not here to co-author an essay but reflect what third party sources say. I'll review the recent changes in the next day or so ----Snowded ^TALK 14:25, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

I hope that review will include specific references to sources. Brews ohare (talk) 15:09, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

Try not to be snarky Brews, it's more likely to result in a mass revert than a willingness to wade through yet another set of edits ----Snowded ^TALK 22:52, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

Claims that dualism is largely an incompatibilist view

In the introductory paragraph to In Western philosophy the following stand-alone sentence occurs:

"Although incompatibilist metaphysical libertarianism generally represents the bulk of non-materialist constructions,[15] including the popular claim of being able to consciously veto an action or competing desire,[21][22] compatibilist theories have been developed based on the view of complementary vantage points in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the [third-person] neural correlates of choosing."[23][24]

Sources

[15] Shariff, Schoolker & Vohs, pp. 183 etc.

[21] Libet

[22] Robert Kane

[23] Shariff, Schooler & Vohs, p. 193

[24] Velmans

According to the article libertarianism, it posits that agents do have free will, and that, therefore, determinism is false. This formulation assumes that "agents have free will" is an empirical fact, and the definition of free will then logically implies that determinism is false. This is a precarious assertion, as the 'empirical fact' is doubtful and the logical contradiction depends upon a particular choice of definitions not considered by everyone to capture the problem.

However, the statement beginning this thread has other difficulties. One is its use of the words "non-materialist constructions" that conveys nothing to the average reader. Another is the claim that the "bulk" of non-materialist views is comprised by metaphysical libertarianism. That statement is untrue, both historically speaking and in terms of the modern views of the limitations of causal closure.

Can't we do a bit better? Brews ohare (talk) 17:16, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded's blanket reversion

Snowded you have reverted a host of changes you say you agree with because of reservations (unspecified in any way) and without discussion here. Unless you make some attempt at discussion here. I think your changes should be undone. Brews ohare (talk) 14:57, 16 April 2015 (UTC)

You were hasty with your revision, and we now have duplicate text about the dilemma. You also seem to think the mind-body problem and subject-object problem are unrelated to the issue of causal closure, which is unfortunate. And last, you still have not addressed the ambiguities of 'natural law'. Brews ohare (talk) 01:59, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Remove the duplicate material by all means. Otherwise I have explained my reasoning and I'm not going into it again. ----Snowded ^TALK 04:16, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, nowhere have you "explained" anything. You have stated your personal preference for 'natural law', unsupported by any vestige of argument. You have not addressed at all your removal of links to subject-object problem and mind-body problem and their connection to causal closure. Before you do that you might read this discussion in the Stanford Encyclopedia. Brews ohare (talk) 05:28, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Please don't assume that Brews does not agree with this is the same as This has not been explained ----Snowded ^TALK 10:58, 17 April 2015 (UTC).

No basis laid for such a trivialization. Links supplied showing three philosophy- related meanings for 'natural law' of which two including the one discussed in Natural law are irrelevant, suggesting clarity is improved by use of "law of nature". You also have not responded to the request for explanation of your causal closure censureship.

I understand that is your opinion Brews and I'm sorry you thought it was mocking. It wasn't; it was just a very direct way of saying that I am not prepared to explain a point again and again and again simply because you disagree or won't compromise. The fact you are now returning to other articles to try and impose changes that were rejected last time round just illustrates the uncompromising and intransigent nature of your interactions with other editors.----Snowded ^TALK 14:59, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: My remarks merely repeat and link to published sources and are the opinions of those cited authors. As you know, these sources matter whether you agree with them or not, and whether I agree with them or not. So get off your fanny and provide sources of your own for comparison and proper summary. And stop with the mud slinging and nonresponses, Brews ohare (talk) 19:48, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Hard incompatibilism

life is still killing me and i don't have time to even engage in responses to this, but I just noticed that the definition given for hard incompatibilism currently in the lede is incorrect, and i'm not sure when that started.

it currently says that hard incompatibilism is the position that determinism is false and still we don't have free will.

the correct definition is that it's the position that whether or not determinism is true or false, either way we wouldn't have free will.

though there's a sourced quote saying the former position has no adherents, i'm fairly positive the latter position has at least some, since that's what the whole dilemma of determinism is all about (whatever the story is on determinism, either way undermines free will). also those who put forth the Mind Argument (so called by Van Inwagen) are claiming exactly that if determinism were false (which it is) then we could not have free will.

Pfhorrest (talk) 04:33, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

The position you find lacking is sourced and so is its repudiation as lacking advocates. Do you have sources for your modified view of hard incompatibilism and its reception? Brews ohare (talk) 05:33, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

The 'no adherents' was mine and it is well sourced, happy to change if there are some. ----Snowded ^TALK 10:59, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

The cited source says the position we have called "hard incompatibilism" has no adherents and no name. He suggest calling it libertinism. Vesal (talk) 02:49, 18 April 2015 (UTC)

I basically just removed the claim that this is called "hard incompatibilism", which is a position that has notable proponents, such as Derk Pereboom. It seems that the "no free will" position is nowadays more commonly called free will pessimism, skepticism, impossibilism, etc. Vesal (talk) 17:12, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

You may be correct in taking a wider stance on this issue, but I think that actions like this should be supported by inks to specific comments in published sources, not just on what might be called "name dropping" of a reference to Pereboom. Brews ohare (talk) 23:58, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Laws of science

Brews would you please stop equating the Laws of Science with types of physical constraint. We are dealing with a subject that has a long history in which that term means something different, and even in the current day the question of what is included has some ambiguity. For example is ritual covered by the laws of science? Some at the biological end of Anthropology would argue they do, others that they don't. Also given that change has already been opposed bringing it back in anywhere in the article without agreement is edit warring. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:23, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: the definitions of physical determinism and nomological determinism were taken from hose articles and are not opinions of mine. If you prefer, I will source these definitions. In any event, it is clear that physical and nomological determinism differ. The use of "physical determinism (nomological determinism)" could be construed as saying they are different names for the same thing. That would be incorrect, so it is better to separate them. Brews ohare (talk) 15:32, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

The fact that one source discussing a problem uses a particular verbal construct does not justify making it an absolute statement. That is why we go to third party reviews of the field as a whole when we are doing that. You are far too particular in your choice of sources and use of them to make definitive statements. I've made this point a hundred times (as have several other editors both directly and in RfCs) and until I consent on the talk page I'm not accepting that type of change. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:59, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, I'm lost. Your reversion is concerned with nomological cf. physical determinism. The Oxford Dictionary suggests nomological is the broader term, including physical as an example. Your comment seems to be about some other point not the subject of your reversion. What is the issue? Brews ohare (talk) 16:13, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

And I've suggested a way out of the woods for you too many times to repeat myself. Read the aspect I criticised in my first comment. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:22, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded - if you cannot identify the topic here, how can we proceed? Is it about these two definitions or something else? If something else, what has your reversion of these definitions got to do with what you wish to assert? Please clarify the subject here. Brews ohare (talk) 16:26, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

See multiple previous comments----Snowded ^TALK 16:37, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

A useful reply consists of a "yes" or a "no", just one word to answer if the issue here is to settle the difference between nomological and physical determinism. If this is the issue, The Oxford Dictionary settles the matter: nomological determinism is the broader term and includes physical determinism. If this is not the issue, I propose to reinstate this difference as explained in the text you removed simply because this distinction is the entire meaning and purpose of the removed text. Brews ohare (talk)

It does appear from your initial words to me to stop conflating 'laws of science' with 'physical constraints' has nothing to do with your reversion, leading me to think you made this reversion without reading what you reverted. Brews ohare (talk) 01:14, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

If you restore it with the conflation I will revert Brews. You are not the arbitration of truth here. Neither am I obliged to keep repeating myself ----Snowded ^TALK 03:03, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

The only conflation occurring here is the conflation of nomological with physical determinism that I am trying to avoid by providing the Oxford Dictionary definition that shows 'nomological' to be a broader term than 'physical' determination. You have not opposed this view, and you have identified no other "conflation" so you seem to have nothing at all to say here. Brews ohare (talk) 05:04, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

See OPENING STATEMENT in this thread "Brews would you please stop equating the Laws of Science with types of physical constraint" ----Snowded ^TALK 07:28, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

Already responded to just above-your reversion is unrelated to "equating laws of science and physical constraints". It deals instead with the Oxford Dictionary definition of 'nomological' as a broader term than 'physical' . You appear to confuse these separate matters. Brews ohare (talk) 14:01, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm open to you separating issues with different edits over a longer period But with your policy on putting together controversial and non-controversial edits together with a reference form which makes it difficult to change, there is little alternative but to revert. I made the reasons for my reversion clear. ----Snowded ^TALK 03:27, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

You are speaking in generalities, but what we face here is a narrow specific edit explaining 'nomological' cf 'physical' determinism. No grand themes of multiple edits and standard forms of citation you dislike. Brews ohare (talk) 05:19, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't dislike the citation form Brews, I think its excellent for stable text. But it is a real pain for other editors who have less time that you when the article is being actively edited. What it means in practice is that you are more likely to face a mass revert than a revision. ----Snowded ^TALK 10:37, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Which is related how to the topic of "nomological" versus "physical" determinism? I'll rewrite this discussion to provide more detail and more sources. You could contribute as well, you know. Your role as arm-chair film director is not all that you could do, Brews ohare (talk) 16:20, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

Nomological, physical determinism, causal closure, laws of nature

Snowded: these topics are not treated the same way by all authors. Some treat nomological and physical determinism as synonyms, some distinguish between them. Some take causal closure as indisputable, others as extrapolation at best. The ideas are clear, but he terminology is not. Perhaps we should tackle these topics on the basis of the conceptions involved, and we can then agree on some mutually acceptable labeling? Brews ohare (talk) 15:35, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

Here is a possible starting point. Brews ohare (talk) 16:04, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

You can't synthesis different sources, you need a source that does the synthesis ----Snowded ^TALK 03:26, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: I now see that your idea of "synthesis" does not refer to WP:OR, that is, you do not refer to a WP editor making an unsupported claim. Rather, you refer to presenting sourced opinion from multiple secondary sources. So, if source A says a and source B says ~a, you would reject a WP sentence that says "There is a difference of opinion on this subject, for example, A says a and B says ~a. "

I am guessing that you object on the grounds that there may be other sources, other views, not discussed by A or B and worthy of mention. In other words, such a sentence might suffer from a lack of breadth or from WP:UNDUE. That could be the case. However, WP attempts to correct such situations by having various WP contributors contribute additional sourced opinions over time, eventually converging upon a balanced presentation that compensates for the ignorance or impetuous choices of a few.

I think you do not subscribe to this evolutionary process. That is why you want to reject all such contributions, unless they express the views of a select few sources you have annointed.

WP is designed around a cooperative process that involves many over a long time. You need more faith in such collaboration and in the constructive comparison of sources. Try it out, please. Brews ohare (talk) 05:07, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Wikipedia does not allow synthesis Brews. If you want to have an evolutionary approach then discuss on the talk page and reach agreement as to what should be included before directly editing the article based on your particular perspective. Several editors have point out over the last two years that you have a particular take on the subject so you need to be more aware of that ----Snowded ^TALK 10:35, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, you have reintroduced the term "synthesis", which in terms of WP policy is defined by WP:OR and refers to including a WP editor's personal opinion unsupported by citations to reliable sources instead of following WP:SECONDARY. Your notion of "synthesis" as you outline it here has nothing to do with following WP:SECONDARY. Your idea of "synthesis" is any contribution that has not reached talk page agreement with you, whether it fits WP:SECONDARY or not. Obviously talk page agreement is desirable. But it is reached by editors making comparisons of sources, not by diatribe, but by all participants using WP:SECONDARY.

You exhibit a huge reluctance to engage this way in talk page discussion. Most of your commentary makes no attempt at improving proposed text using sources, but instead complains using abstractions and generalities unrelated to specifics, and without introducing links to a single source to widen or to deepen discussion. Thus avoiding "synthesis" as you understand it becomes, not agreement about what the literature has to say, but merely agreement with Snowded.

I hoped my invitation in this thread might be an opportunity to collaborate. Brews ohare (talk) 13:05, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm not interested in having discussions about your particular perspective on the subject Brews. if you want that go and study the subject at a University or find a study group. Out business here is to create a encyclopaedia. You are also getting pretty tedious on the accusations. Can I remind you that on multiple RfCs in the past you were not supported by other members of the community and I'm not the one with a major topic ban from ArbCom ----Snowded ^TALK 02:55, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

I am surprised that you would indicate such indifference to WP procedures, and dress that up as a well justified pique over my "general behavior". I think we could work together on this article in the fashion I outlined based upon presenting sourced and cited opinion. However, it is your view that any sources I present are inadequate, simply by virtue of being found by me, and there is no point in your presenting any sources of your own because I'd never understand them anyway. Well, that attitude can lead nowhere. Brews ohare (talk) 07:36, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

Brews, you have consistently refused requests to agree things on the talk page first. You also have this bad habit either mistaking or misunderstanding views that contradict your own. Synthesis is well defined in Wikipedia and the issue is your use of sources. ----Snowded ^TALK 10:12, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

An odd response, completely avoiding my reply about process, and returning to your theme of saying that I won't accept views other than my own and misuse sources. I guess I have to repeat that I present only sourced opinion, whether I agree with it or not, while you rarely use sources at all, and present your visceral reactions unsupported, mostly without specifics about improvements in presentation. Of course, if I cherry picked sources, then you could counter with sources known to you. Instead, you prefer this kind of personality assassination that has nothing to do with explaining with what sources say. A practical method is to follow WP:SECONDARY, with both of us identifying and summarizing published sources. There is no room there for personal opinion or cherry picking. Nor, I add, is there room in such a source-based process for arbitrary reversion of sourced material supported by glib one-line Edit Summaries that provide no clue as to how statements could be amended to be a more accurate portrayal of sourced opinion, but assert a self-annointed authority to adjudicate. Brews ohare (talk)

You present your selection of sourced opinion and you do not respond to suggestions which would make it easier to work with you. There is no requirement if you have 5 cherry picked sources for me to find another 5 and pepper the article with them. Our objective is not to synthesis a selection of material but to use third party sources. Either way, the Oxford Handbook on Free Will and also the one on Causation have just arrived at home so I am going to take a look at the material in those and see if we can salvage something here. For the moment jet lag is catching up with me ----Snowded ^TALK 19:39, 23 April 2015 (UTC)

Your jet lag will not improve your analytical talents, so it is good to wait for recovery. Your claim that sources are "cherry-picked' is just your personal bias until you provide alternative sources that have different views. If you do that, the proper course is to add these alternate views to the WP text so as to satisfy WP:NPOV, not to argue over who cherry-picked what. Presenting the opinion of a variety of sources, despite your own personal definition, does not constitute "synthesis" as it is defined by WP:SYN. It is the correct process according to WP:SECONDARY. And as for your choice of "third-party" sources, the Oxford Handbook on Free Will and on Causation, they are not WP third-party sources (A third-party source is one that is entirely independent of the subject being covered) as all the articles are written by single authors actively involved in the philosophical issues they report upon. They are secondary sources as described by WP:SECONDARY. Brews ohare (talk) 16:27, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

What a mess

What a rambling mess this article is. Compare it with the comparatively tidy SEP article. It's also unnecessarily complicated, if we take the view that Wikipedia is for a general audience, perhaps people from the age of 15 upwards, to your own grandparents. 'Nomological determinism' is mentioned throughout without any attempt to explain it (I know the theory is that you can click on the article it is linked to, but that makes it read very badly). Many of the sections are just lists of opinions held by philosophers.

Also interesting that logical determinism has no article about it, although there is the Problem of future contingents (whose introduction I wrote years ago).

The talk page above gives me a headache. Can anything be salvaged? Peter Damian (talk) 18:49, 23 April 2015 (UTC)

Nothing would please me more than if someone ignored the talk page (which is making no progress) and took a fresh look at it ----Snowded ^TALK 19:27, 23 April 2015 (UTC)

The term 'nomological determinism:' has a variety of meanings ranging from a general definition indistinguishable from determinism:

Given the state of the world at one time and various "laws of nature" (which may include laws beyond physical laws), there is only one possible way the world could be at other times

to physical determinism:

All physical events have physical causes, and are determined by antecedent physical events. Of course, a "physical event" is pretty vague, and might be limited to oscilloscope traces generated by a hadron collider.. :-)

So the upshot for free will is that you cannot discuss verbal morass surrounding 'freedom' until you set up the "determinism" from which the will is free. It seems likely that an approach based upon this summary could be more understandable and shorter than the present hodgepodge, which is a result largely of the variety of usages of terms leading to constant confusion about who is talking about what. A Tower of Babel. Here is one forlorn attempt to untangle it, and here is another. Brews ohare (talk) 15:50, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

'Physical event' is completely vague. What if scientists discover a different kind of matter or substance or force that turns out to be the basis of free will? What is the point of the different types of determinism? Start with a single definition that covers them all. Peter Damian (talk) 19:46, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Recent reversal by Snowded

In this edit with the one-line edit summary:

"I don;t by 'appears' and 'inescapable' as other than an opinion and stringing together references is no way to edit an article (per previous exchanges with multiple editors)"

that invokes non-existent exchanges with other editors over this new material, Snowded reverted the following text, a modification of a paragraph previously existing:

It appears difficult to reconcile the intuition that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical laws.¹ An inescapable contradiction between the intuition of free will and the scientific view arises with nomological determinism,^{2, 3} the doctrine that all events are determined by antecedent causes.^{3, 4} The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law is less clear when causal closure and physical determinism both are asserted. Causal closure is usually limited to the physical domain, and states that if a physical event has a cause, that is a physical cause.⁵ The assertion of physical determinism is that every physical event has a physical cause, and therefore asserts that there are no uncaused physical events.⁵ Belief in these two tenets does not logically exclude the possibility that there may be events and entities that lie outside the physical domain.⁶

As an example of phenomena that possibly could lie outside the physical domain, ...

Sources

¹ Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.

² Steven W Horst (2011). "§7.5 Nomological determinism". Laws, Mind, and Free Will. MIT Press. pp. 97 ff. ISBN 9780262015257.

³ Stathis Paillos (2007). "Past and contemporary perspectives on explanation". In Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard, John Woods, Theo A.F. Kuipers, eds (ed.). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Elsevier. p. 156. ISBN 9780080548548. According to determinism, every event that occurs has a fully determinate and sufficient set of antecedence causes. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

⁴ There is a lack of consensus on terminology regarding 'nomological determinism'. Some authors equate 'physical determinism' with 'nomological determinism', and some equate 'nomological determinism' to determinism itself. Where the term 'nomological determinism' is distinguished from 'physical determinism', 'nomological determinism' is taken to be the broader claim. See Brian Doyle (2011). Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy. I-Phi Press. p. 149. ISBN 9780983580263. and "'nomological'". Oxford Dictionary. Retrieved April 23, 2015.

⁵ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 9781400840847. The causal closure of the physical domain. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t

⁶ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 9781400840847. It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is

Comment

• Of course, the selected works might be improperly presented, but Snowded has not suggested that is the case or in what way that might be true. It also could be that there are other views that should be presented, but Snowded has not provided any sources that should be added to make the presentation more representative of published opinion. I invite him to provide some actual reasoning behind his action, preferably based upon sources. Brews ohare (talk) 00:03, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

• You (i) changed the language to your own perspective on the problem and (ii) created a long list of references to further add commentary rather than to support the text. If you check back a year when you last attempted to do this over 4/5 Philosophy articles, that approach was rejected in several RFAs ----Snowded ^TALK 05:13, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, not a single specific piece of text you object to nor a single source you claim is misrepresented or irrelevant to the presentation. Just primping and window dressing, Snowded, nothing of substance in your comments. Brews ohare (talk) 05:19, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

• Response to Snowded's vague assertions of fault:

The current text preferred by Snowded states:

"It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law.¹ The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect)."

Snowded's charges are that the proposal

(i) changed the language to your own perspective on the problem. The perspective has indeed changed, although it is not my own perspective but those of the additional sources cited. The current text fails to distinguish between nomological determinism and physical determinism. As the proposal points out, some authors do not distinguish between the two, but many do distinguish, and where a distinction is made (see Kim), 'nomological' is seen as a broader claim including all events, while 'physical' is confined to physical events.

(ii) created a long list of references to further add commentary rather than to support the text. Additional references have indeed been added in the proposal. However these are not 'commentary' unrelated to supporting the text. The only 'commentary' is footnote 4 that points out differences in usage for the term 'nomological' and cites Doyle and the Oxford Dictionary to the effect that there is a difference according to some authors.

Reference [1] is in the current text and is retained.

Reference [2] is to the discussion of nomological determinism by Horst. Among other matters he quotes Vihvelin to the effect that one cannot have all encompassing laws and yet allow free actions by human beings. This discussion of Horst supports the view that nomological determinism in the broad sense of including all events is incompatible with free will, as asserted in the sentence to which this citation is attached.

Reference [3] is to a definition of determinism which is as quoted.

Reference [4] as discussed already points out some differences in usage for 'nomological determinism'

Reference [5] is to Kim, a very influential writer in this area, and serves to support the stated meanings for 'causal closure' and 'physical determinism' as limiting their claims to physical events, leaving open the possibility of other kinds of events. This is a key point, not made in the current paragraph. According to Kim (p. 16) "It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is"

As these reference by reference explanations show, Snowded's claims about "my own perspective" and "references added to allow commentary" are groundless.

If Snowded finds these explanations deficient in some way I suggest that he provide more detailed objections to these sources and the 'nomological' vs 'physical' determinism distinction. Brews ohare (talk) 14:46, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

By the way, the WP articles nomological determinism and physical determinism do make a distinction. Brews ohare (talk) 15:04, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

The issue is not that you have found references by google searches Brews but the questions raised (here and elsewhere over various articles and repeatedly as you do't address them) are (i) is your selection partial and (ii) is your interpretation or use of what you have found valid. Otherwise references are there to justify the next not to provide additional reading or commentary ----Snowded ^TALK 07:30, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm still not up to speed with the issue here. When I looked at additions by Brews, they were all strictly correct, although sometimes poorly worded, but they tended to introduce material that was not relevant to the true focus of the article. I think every article should have a subject, addressed at the right level of scope and granularity, but this article has at least 10 subjects, addressed in all kinds of different ways. Is that the issue? I have also engaged with Brews on this page (see below) and he sometimes seems to miss the point. Peter Damian (talk) 07:35, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

The "issue" here is to use sources to construct a presentation of published opinion. Instead, the discussion loses all focus upon presentation of sourced opinion on this topic. Instead of pitching in with the process envisioned by WP:SECONDARY and WP:NPOV, useful construction of a presentation satisfying WP:SECONDARY and WP:NPOV is replaced by off-the cuff pronouncements and reversions, which diversions do avoid doing any reading or exploring for additional sources, and do allow entertainment to triumph over progress. Brews ohare (talk) 14:15, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I have rewritten the proposal and put it back into the main article. I think the revision will avoid the objections raised, vague though they are. Brews ohare (talk) 16:53, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Discussion with Damian on logical contradiction

Brews writes "An inescapable contradiction between the intuition of free will and the scientific view arises with nomological determinism". This is incorrect, and I doubt the sources say this. A contradiction is two statements which cannot both be true, or both false. Intuition cannot contradict causal determinism in this sense. The current text "It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law" is better, because 'difficult to reconcile' is not as strong as 'contradictory'.

On the current text, this doesn’t quite get the problem right either. The conflict is between our conception of free will as making it possible to change the future, with the position that the causes of the future lie in the past, the past is necessary, therefore the future is necessary. I.e. the root of the problem is the tension between possible and necessary, not between 'causally effective', whatever that means, and 'the scientific view'. I also don't like the minute distinctions that the article insists on making. Kindness to WP's readers means clarity, and that usually means starting with the generic and moving to the specific. I.e. start with the conflict between free will and determinism = between possibility and necessity, and perhaps later, if at all, move to the fine distinctions between types of determinism. Peter Damian (talk) 19:42, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Damian: I appreciate your interest in this article, but I think you have a utopian view of making it all simple. It begins simply - some things are determined, fixed, by past occurrences and some are not. But that is the end of simplicity. Millennia of reformulations are not easily summarized, and the solution, I believe, is not to attempt to do that, but rather to identify understandable sources that present the various views and cite them. Maybe you are up for this? Maybe you have improvements over the presentation of the nomological vs physical distinction? Brews ohare (talk) 21:18, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

In connection with "inescapable contradiction", of course we are talking about a logical contradiction, not a matter of fact. And a logical contradiction between free will and determinism obviously depends upon what choice you make for each term. With the definition of free will as allowing individuals to initiate original acts and the definition of determinism as the future determined ineluctably by past events, there is a clear inescapable contradiction. That is what the quote of Vihvelin by Horst points out. Of course, that settles nothing because various authors simply change the definitions around claiming that their choice of definition better captures "what people mean" - a very vague target given that there is no empirical evidence to support such an assertion. Hence the unending dither. Brews ohare (talk) 22:46, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

You have not read what I wrote. A contradiction is between two statements. An intuition is not a statement, it is a feeling or a state of mind. I do not know what you mean about a 'choice' for each term. Do you mean definition? The utmost precision in the language we use for this kind of subject is essential. On your view of how to present a subject simply, as I said above, we have a duty to the readers. Do I have improvements over the causal versus physical distinction? In order to present the problem, there is no need of making it. Peter Damian (talk) 23:07, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

On your second point “With the definition of free will as allowing individuals to initiate original acts and the definition of determinism as the future determined ineluctably by past events, there is a clear inescapable contradiction.” Your definition is imprecise. You mean that free will is the capability for individuals to initiate original acts? The definition of determinism is not “the future determined ineluctably by past events”, for determinism is a kind of theory. Determinism is not the future. More sloppy language. Even if I paraphrase you, I do not see a contradiction. There is no contradiction between being able to ‘initiate original acts’ and the theory that ‘the future is determined ineluctably by past events’. It depends on what you mean by ‘original’ of course, but there again I see sloppy expression and sloppy thinking. Peter Damian (talk) 23:13, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Damian: I've been very clear that I am speaking about logical contradictions. Did you pick that up? Brews ohare (talk) 23:15, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

To avoid going in circles, try discussing Horst's quote from Vihvelin. Brews ohare (talk) 23:21, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

I was speaking of logical contradiction, yes. And no, you haven't been very clear, as I have just said. Your formulation of the issues is sloppy and lacks precision. Peter Damian (talk) 23:26, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Use Vihvelin's then. Brews ohare (talk) 23:28, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

I am off to bed now. (I am in London). I am looking at Vihvelin's article in the SEP. It is very wordy and hard to extract a precise definition. I will look tomorrow Peter Damian (talk) 23:43, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

I looked. Vihvelin's description is hopeless Peter Damian (talk) 07:18, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

If you think Vihvelin is incomprehensible, how about finding a source you recommend? Brews ohare (talk) 14:25, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Maybe McKenna & Coates, who refer to Vihvelin? They directly duck the issue of free will viz a viz determinism and instead frame it as an aspect of moral responsibility, a topic of great significance in free will and under-emphasized in the article Free will. Brews ohare (talk) 15:07, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

You will find here that my attempt to give McKenna & Coates some prominence was unsuccessful. Brews ohare (talk) 15:15, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Maybe this is helpful? Jack Martin, Jeff H. Sugarman, Sarah Hickinbottom (2009). Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 20. ISBN 9781441910653. Traditionally, at least at the extremes, philosophical arguments concerning agency are predicated on a strict contradiction between free choice and complete causal determinism.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) Brews ohare (talk) 16:24, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm still not in a place where I can be fully involved here right now, but I'm skimming through just to see how things are going. I appreciate your involvement here Damian, it's good to have some new voices.

While I like your overall sentiment about moving from the general to the specific, one thing I think we need to be cautious about in the specifics you mention is not to start out in a way that defines free will in relation to determinism, as that biases the article in favor of incompatibilist conceptions of free will. Within the discussion of that concept of free will, I like your thoughts; but we have to also keep in mind that there are broad schools of thought that don't see a conflict at all between the two, so we should not start from a place that assumes that conflict, but somewhere even more general than that. That was the purpose of the "constraints" language that I introduced long ago, which became the most recent stable version of this article before this conflict with Brews began; we start with the almost-vacuous generalism that free will is a will that is free from something, then move into the things that it might or might not need to be free from (determinism being only one of several proposals there) to be free in the relevant way, and then into problems specific to each of those different conceptions of it. --Pfhorrest (talk) 19:10, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Thank you! There doesn't have to be a conflict between general causal determinism (i.e. every event, whether physical or not, is caused) and free will, but that really depends on the definition of 'free will'. If everything whatsoever is determined, we have to define 'free will' as absence of restraint or something like that. Or we could, like Duns Scotus, fall back on a concept of synchronic contingency: the past could have been otherwise, although it happened that way. Or we could fall back on some epistemic notion of necessity. Alternatively, we could redefine the scope of the determinate (as Brews would like, I suspect), and restrict it to the merely physical or, with Aristotle, the 'natural'. But this all means dividing up the subject in a way that is coherent and uncluttered, but this is what the article is not, currently. Peter Damian (talk) 19:49, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

More nitpicking from Damian

The introduction characterises determinism as a form of constraint. Is it? Some philosophers argue that this confuses between 'voluntariness', namely acting without constraint or coercion, and 'origination', namely acting without there being any cause.

The wording of the introduction is very bad. " Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been determinism of some variety ". What does this mean? "the two most prominent common positions are named incompatibilist or compatibilist for the relation they hold to exist between free will and determinism." That is presumably a clumsy way of saying that the two main opposing positions are incompatibilism and compatibilism. But positions on what?

" Those who find free will cannot coexist with determinism are called incompatibilists, as they hold determinism to be incompatible with free will.[ " – clumsy. Why not "Incompatibilists hold that free will is inconsistent with determinism"?

"it has been widely debated throughout history is 1066-ish. Peter Damian (talk) 07:18, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

On constraint and compulsion, it's thought by some philosophers that there is a confusion between constraint and determination. See Honderich's excellent website, and this excellent paper on it, by Van Inwagen. "It is evident that determinism places me under no constraints." Peter Damian (talk) 08:12, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I believe the constraint approach you dislike was constructed by Pfhorrest, who seems to have a significant familiarity with the subject, although he is prone to express his personal opinion, probably based upon his own expertise, but not firmly backed by citations. You seem to think Honderich has a good web site (perhaps this one?) and like a paper by Van Inwagen. You will find there are many persuasive contributors to the free will discussion, ranging over millennia, many repeating the same arguments with a different technical vocabulary, and the challenge (I hope you agree) is not to arbitrate between them and rank them in some way, but to identify the basic theses and present them with citations to their proponents. Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

As for the presentation, I believe a major issue in arriving at a balanced presentation is that WP editors, like everyone else, have an intuitive idea of what "free will" is, and allow that to bias their editing against views that do not match their intuitions. That bias takes the form of peremptory reversion of what are seen to be unpalatable views and assassination of opposing opinion. The common way around this problem is to make the discussion a word game, choose a definition, try to find its implications for determinism and moral responsibility, and argue that your definition fits the most "reasonable" intuition. A different way to handle the matter is to admit reductionism and physicalism have practical limits. There may be less than an infinity of possibilities, but there are enough to have occupied philosophers from before the time of Chrysippus. Brews ohare (talk) 15:38, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Featured article

I found the article in its featured article state, December 2004. It is better than the current version. Peter Damian (talk) 07:22, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Thats an interesting proposition, I'm open to it ----Snowded ^TALK 07:31, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Well I didn't actually make a proposition, only an observation. Peter Damian (talk) 07:32, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

It's could be a good idea. Create a sandpit and invite those editors with some knowledge of the subject to help put, use that as a start and then create something that can be put to a RfA here ----Snowded ^TALK 08:11, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

OK I will think about it. The problem as always is time. I have about four nearly finished papers to polish and send off, and Wikipedia is a form of displacement activity. Free will is an interesting problem. Peter Damian (talk) 08:14, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I'd agree that 2004 edition has a lot to recommend it, at least as far as clearly stating the main issues. As with many WP articles, it has been a downhill run since that time. Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Tendentious editing

At issue (at least as I understand it) is Brews' insistence on using a melange of citations from primary sources, to advance a novel presentation without citations or references to other, secondary sources supporting this presentation. This runs afoul of Wikipedia policies of No Original Research and avoidance of Synthesis. Despite this being pointed out to him repeatedly (mostly but by no means exclusively by User:Snowded) the process has become completely mired in edits, reversions, accusations, accusations of bad faith and general battleground mentality (see the talk page discussions of any of the articles listed for ample examples). This also leads to forum shopping and canvassing with seemingly endless RFCs and petitions on policy pages (Wikipedia_talk:NOR#Explaining_rejections.3F), project pages (Wikipedia_talk:WikiProject_Philosophy) and various users' talk pages to bring others to Brews' d way of thinking, almost always to no avail. Then the whole cycle starts again on another article. ANI April 2014

That agrees with my very brief assessment of the situation. I haven't encountered Brews before (to my knowledge), though I have heard of him (the Speed of Light arbitration case). I was asked by user Snowded to look at this article, I have read as much of the talk page as I can bear, and I have looked at some of Brews contributions. My view is precisely as characterised above, namely the use of citations to advance a novel presentation etc. Peter Damian (talk) 09:14, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

It is a difficult situation, however. I haven't found yet any cases where Brews adds something that is unequivocally incorrect. But here is a good example. Snowded reverts with the comment that the original was much clearer (I agree) and that the "Quintessence paragraph adds nothing just confuses". I broadly agree, and this is also the problem with the article here – the additions are not incorrect, but they tend to complicate the article. Again, our first duty is to the readers, not the editors. Peter Damian (talk) 09:38, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

It is annoying that you opine Snowded's reversion of this material removed a contribution that is "unequivocally incorrect" without explaining how it misrepresents the sources cited in its support. (That was not Snowded's claim BTW.) A tendency toward unsupported assertion is hard to quell, but try we must. Your phrase describing my efforts as "namely the use of citations to advance a novel presentation" is an oxymoron, as WP:SYN and WP:OR refer to a WP editor's introduction of personal opinion, not an editor's attempt to present what sources say. Although I am sure error is possible in my efforts to do this, the way forward is not to accuse me of some agenda, but to improve the presentation to make portrayal of the source more accurate or, if necessary, to introduce additional sources that make the presentation closer to a neutral point of view. Brews ohare (talk) 14:41, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

As for ANI's claim that I use primary sources "to advance a novel presentation without citations or references to other, secondary sources supporting this presentation", this is pure nonsense as secondary sources are used aplenty and there is no "novel agenda". These statements float in the aether, without any substance. They also are a misdirection from the objective of this Talk page of assessing content of this article Free will. Brews ohare (talk)

It was not incorrect. I said I hadn't found any instances of incorrectness. I then gave an example of the actual problem. "the additions are not incorrect, but they tend to complicate the article". Sorry for the misunderstanding.Peter Damian (talk) 16:51, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Much as I am intrigued by the article, I think I shall bow out and leave Snowded to it. I have four papers to finish, as I said, and life is too short. Peter Damian (talk) 17:48, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

The basic problem is that Brews is enthusiastically writing essays based on reading the results of google searches on the subject. That is not what writing an encyclopaedia is about. If I look at the Oxford handbook on Free Will - which I now have at home - the selections made by Brews come from articles advocating or explaining a particular perspective on the problem but are used to support a statement about the field as a whole. In the edits I had to revert this morning a list of different perspectives on free will is used by Brews to draw the conclusion that there is no agreement on definitions, something that the source does not support. That is Brews conclusion which may or may not be valid. But its not the way Wikipedia is written. Unless and until Brew's gets his head around WP:OR and WP:SYNTH we are going to have these problems. The trouble is, from his attempts on policy pages, that he doesn't really agree with those policies as commonly understood. Again that is legitimate point of view, but he needs to change the policies before he edits articles against those policies ----Snowded ^TALK 05:20, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

I see your jet lag has passed, but there is no increased interest in supporting your peculiar stance with sources. That there is a wide difference among authors on the usage of 'nomological determinism' is perfectly obvious, and is not limited to the sources cited. Even the minimal effort needed to read Doyle's separate definitions of 'nomological' and 'physical' determinism seems to be beyond your interest or capacity at the moment. As for finding authors that equate the two, just make a simple Google book search. Brews ohare (talk) 05:32, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Nothing is obvious unless it is referenced Brews. Find a third party source which says there is a wider spread disagreement and fine. Making "simple Good book seaches" is part of the problem here, not the solution. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:40, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

The text you support lumps physical determinism and nomological determinism together, despite the distinctions drawn (and sourced) in the WP articles on these separate topics. Here are two links that also confound the two: "Physical determinism is generally used synonymously with nomological determinism". "The thesis of physical (or causal or nomological) determinism fits very closely with the kinds of physicalism that we studied.." Other authors equate nomological determinism to determinism itself (for instance, Viv\hvelin in the SEP). Doyle and many other authors carefully distinguish the two. You have nothing to complain about here, you are mistaken, and additionally have made no substantial criticisms or contributions toward clarification. Brews ohare (talk) 05:59, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Happy to talk about that aspect here Brews, but its one aspect of a series of changes you made. Starting with 'Nomological" rather than the current more accessible text is also a mistake. Drafting something that just makes that distinction and agreeing it here would be the best way forward. For example the idea that nomological determinism encompasses physical determinism but is not encompassed by it is an interest proposition implied by Doyle, but the very title of Doyle's book indicates controversy. At the same time "nomological" does not appear in the index of the Oxford handbook on Free will or The Oxford Companion to Philosophy both make use of Nomic but do not make the distinction you are making in your edit. So we need to be careful there to avoid synthesis of current debates ----Snowded ^TALK 06:21, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm still having a little trouble in understanding the exact disagreement. Brews says there is a distinction between nomological and physical determinism. Fine, I don't think there will be any disagreement in that. The question for me is whether that distinction is a very fine-grained one, too fine to belong in a general 'flagship' article on the subject. The problem then is that there are no Wikipedia guidelines, AFAIK, about what a flagship article looks like. My instinct is that subtle or fine distinctions do not belong in general introductions to a subject, particularly if they don't really contribute towards understanding the subject. My view on the nomological/physical distinction is that it doesn't contribute. Therefore it hinders understanding. Therefore leave it out (but perhaps mention it in a footnote). Peter Damian (talk) 07:39, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

On Snow's point about looking at other general introductions (such as the Oxford Companion, which I referred to), that is a good rule. Few of the introductory texts I have looked at mention the distinction at all. Peter Damian (talk) 07:41, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Yep, that was my point. Without some reference in something like the Oxford Companion it is difficult to avoid synthesis and difficult to prove relevance. Per your other comments I also agree that the problem is not that Brews does not reference his material, but that he chooses to advance a particular thesis by his choice of primary sources. Now it can, in some circumstances be legitimate to provide some summary of that, but if contested the nature of the summary and sources used should be agreed on the talk page before the page is edited. And in all cases contested edits should not be inserted again simply because their author is unhappy with the response they have received on the talk page. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:10, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Opposition to the proposed paragraph appears to be that nomological determinism is not mentioned in the index of The Oxford Handbook on Free Will or The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, and therefore is inconsequential or a "subtle point" and irrelevant to this article on Free will. I am unimpressed with the due diligence exhibited here regarding usage of this term, which is taken by Vihvelin to be the exemplar of the word "determinism" in his Arguments for Compatibilism. He says (lead sentence of §1) "In the literature, “determinism” is sometimes used as an umbrella term for a variety of different claims which have traditionally been regarded as threats to free will. Given this usage, the thesis that I am calling “determinism” (nomological determinism) is just one of several different kinds of determinism, and the free will/determinism problem we will be discussing is one of a family of related problems." [Bold font is mine]. According to Schreuder, p.50 "Nomological determinism is the most common form of causal determinism." Horst, pp. 97-100 devotes an entire subsection to nomological determinism. Griffith, p. 19 says: "Others...talk about determinism in terms of laws of nature (nomological determinism — ‘nomological’ refers to the natural laws — or just determinism." Doyle, p. 149, whom Snowded and Damian pooh-pooh, has a section: The Determinisms containing a lexicon of varieties, in which nomological determinism is defined as "a broad term to cover determinism by laws, of nature, of human nature, etc." According to Snowded, Doyle, and by implication this definition, is controversial, but it fits the definition of 'nomological' provided by the Oxford Dictionary and the references just linked.

My conclusion? The term nomological determinism is used in many discussions about free will. Sometimes it is taken to be sufficiently broad as to represent determinism in general, and both nomological determinism and determinism in general have a subdivision called physical determinism.

This belaboring of a point would be unnecessary if the real objective of critics here was to depict the literature, rather than indulge in a purely rhetorical exercise.

These critics suggest that whatever else might be said, 'nomological determinism' is not very important to the subject of free will. To be pertinent here, this statement has to be viewed as a commentary upon the literature of free will. Historically, nomological determinism has been the huge focus of free will arguments through Hobbes, Hume, Laplace and so on. One may ask if it is so important in today's arguments, and I'd suggest that it is not, that physical determinism and the arguments over causal closure are the main thrust today. Assuming the critics might entertain this possibility, the importance of nomological determinism to this free will article is to help the reader understand that emphasis has shifted.

One consequence of this shift is Kim's point, p. 16 (referenced and quoted in detail in the reverted paragraph) that there is a logical out for free will with this formulation, namely that it limits itself to "physical events" (whatever they might be), and free will logically could lie outside this purview. See also Hutto, p. 89. In fact a great many modern thinkers including Wittgenstein, Nagel and Evans, adopt this viewpoint, which is a major aspect of any discussion of free will. See, as just one example, Smart on The mind/brain identity theory that processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain, basically a closure argument, and Freeman's extended discussion. Hence the importance of this distinction.

I would appreciate some attempt on the part of Snowded and Damian to help construct an accurate article and desist from polemics unrelated to any positive change. Brews ohare (talk) 14:31, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

If you can't keep a civil tongue in your mouth don't expect engagement ----Snowded ^TALK 17:49, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

So far, I have seen no engagement beyond rhetoric, put-downs, and polemics. No presentation of a source, not an idea for improved presentation, not a thing. Brews ohare (talk) 18:53, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

And just how many editors have you had this problem with today Brews? Should tell you something. Either way the comment stands. You have the clear view of several editors that your overall approach breaks WP:SYNTH so you either change policy or change your approach ----Snowded ^TALK 18:59, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Care to point out what aspect of WP:SYN is involved here? It deals with presenting unsupported WP editor's opinion. which is not at stake here at all, where secondary sources are summarized. Period. Brews ohare (talk) 19:27, 26 April 2015 (UTC).

I have many times, Damian just has, Pforest has in the past, other editors have in your previous failed RfAs. Sorry Brews there are a limited number of times anyone can reasonably be expected to repeat themselves ----Snowded ^TALK 19:31, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

These are imaginary events, Snowded. Will you ever get around to discussing the point here, the role of nomological determinism and its relation to physical determinism? So far you are in support of no distinction, which at best is a minority view, inconsistent with the views of at least half a dozed linked sources. Brews ohare (talk) 19:32, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Well a lot of us have had to spend a lot of time dealing with your imaginary events. Otherwise see above comments, this one is closed unless you have NEW arguments or other editors engage ----Snowded ^TALK 19:35, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Bob Doyle (inventor)

Brews links above to Bob Doyle (2011). Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy. Bob Doyle is Bob Doyle (inventor), most of which article was written by an account called Cmsreview, who has written an entire walled garden around this stuff. See e.g. Two-stage model of free will, which surprisingly Doyle himself has written about on his own website. I would of course be blocked in two seconds if I suggested that Bob Doyle is behind that account (unless Doyle is also Grant Shapps of course), but this is the problem with Wikipedia. Peter Damian (talk) 08:15, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Also Brews has a tendency to use sources from Physics on Philosophy articles. We had that with him trying to use Hawkins at one point. The problem is understanding the nature and origin of the source and its relevance. I agree with your suggestion (elsewhere) that some form of peer review is going to have to be the next stage of evolution here. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:19, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

The notion of "peer review" (at least in the scholarly sense) is alien to WP, which denies appeal to personal expertise and forces all authority upon published sources. Self-appointed "experts" are just pontificators in this scenario. The process envisioned in the policies of WP are summarized in WP:SECONDARY coupled with WP:NPOV. It consists of WP editors contributing presentations of what secondary sources say with links to them, and balance being maintained by a continuing process of constructive addition of sources or more careful presentation of sources already presented. Brews ohare (talk) 15:27, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

That was the interpretation you tried to have accepted Brews, it was not. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:39, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Correction: It was deemed so obvious to all that no change in policy to further emphasize it was thought necessary. Brews ohare (talk) 18:47, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

RfC: Distinguishing 'nomological' from 'physical' determinism

Comments are invited upon changing the third paragraph in Free will#In Western philosophy to more correctly separate the different roles played by the metaphysical doctrines of nomological determinism and physical determinism. Most importantly, the paragraph is expanded to incorporate Kim's view: "It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is." A possible replacement is proposed for comment. Brews ohare (talk) 00:58, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

Current paragraph

The paragraph that currently appears in the article Free will is as follows:

It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law.¹ The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect).

Sources

¹ Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.

Comment on current paragraph

There are several difficulties with the current paragraph that should be fixed.

One is the use of the parenthetic construction physical determinism(nomological determinism). The parenthetic addition of ('nomological determinism') is likely to be interpreted to mean that physical and nomological determinism are two names for the same thing. Although a few authors do not trouble to distinguish the two and take the definition of physical determinism as also being the definition of nomological determinism, that lack of distinction is not the general view of the literature on these subjects. A separation also is the reason for two WP articles instead of one: nomological determinism and physical determinism. The general view is that nomological determinism is a broader claim (including many sorts of 'events' and many sorts of possible 'laws').

It might be thought that this confusion of terms is not important to the topic of free will, but that is not the case, and leads to another important problem with the current paragraph. That is the confusion introduced by stating that a conflict arises between intuitively felt freedom and natural law when either physical determinism or causal closure are adopted. Although such conflict is obvious if nomological determinism is invoked because it encompasses everything, with physical determinism that statement is an exaggeration. The two concepts of 'physical determinism' and 'causal closure' apply only to physical events and an intuition of free will quite possibly (according to some authors anyway) is not such an event. And the two concepts have to be applied jointly, not individually.

Still another problem with this paragraph is the claim that with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). That is not the claim of the metaphysical doctrine of physical determinism, which limits its claims to only physical events, not all events, and secondly does not claim the past dictates the future, but only that physical events past or present are connected by physical laws. These laws may or may not be deterministic, depending upon which laws we are thinking about and what is known about physical laws in the epoch we live in.

However, the most significant difficulty with the current paragraph is that it omits note of the self-imposed limitation of the metaphysical doctrine of physical determinism to the physical domain, which opens way to the many modern discussions of what might lie outside this domain, in particular the ambiguities of the subject-object problem and their effect upon the metaphysics of free will.

Recommendation

The suggestion of the RfC is that this paragraph be rewritten to avoid its present failings. As a trial balloon the following paragraph is proposed:

Nomological determinism often is taken to be the "notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws",¹ or the doctrine that all events are determined by antecedent causes.² Other definitions are used,³ but if these particular formulations are used, then a contradiction is present between concepts describing our intuition of free will and nomological determinism.^{4, 5} Although it may appear difficult to reconcile the intuition that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical laws,⁶ a conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law is less clear when, instead of nomological determinism, causal closure and physical determinism both are asserted. Causal closure is usually limited to the physical domain, and states that if a physical event has a cause, that is a physical cause.⁷ The assertion of physical determinism is that every physical event does have a physical cause, and therefore asserts that there are no uncaused physical events.⁸ Belief in these two tenets does not logically exclude the possibility that there may be events and entities that lie outside the physical domain.⁹

As an example of phenomena that possibly could lie outside the physical domain, the laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness:¹⁰

Sources

¹ Duco A. Schreuder (2014). Vision and Visual Perception. Archway Publishing. p. 505. ISBN 9781480812949.

² Stathis Paillos (2007). Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard, John Woods, Theo A.F. Kuipers, eds (ed.). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Elsevier. p. 156. ISBN 9780080548548. According to determinism, every event that occurs has a fully determinate and sufficient set of antecedence causes. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

³ There is a lack of consensus on terminology regarding 'nomological determinism'. Some authors equate 'physical determinism' with 'nomological determinism', and some equate 'nomological determinism' to determinism itself. Where the term 'nomological determinism' is distinguished from 'physical determinism', 'nomological determinism' is taken to be the broader claim. See Brian DOyle (2011). Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy. I-Phi Press. p. 149. ISBN 9780983580263. and "'nomological'". Oxford Dictionary. Retrieved April 23, 2015.

⁴ Jack Martin, Jeff H. Sugarman, Sarah Hickinbottom (2009). Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 20. ISBN 9781441910653. Traditionally, at least at the extremes, philosophical arguments concerning agency are predicated on a strict contradiction between free choice and complete causal determinism.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

⁵ Steven W Horst (2011). "§7.5 Nomological determinism". Laws, Mind, and Free Will. MIT Press. pp. 97 ff. ISBN 9780262015257.

⁶Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.

⁷ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. p. 15. ISBN 9781400840847. The causal closure of the physical domain. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t

⁸ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness - Note 8". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. p. 16. ISBN 9781400840847. The thesis of physical determinism to the effect that every physical event has a physical cause

⁹ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 9781400840847. It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is

¹⁰ See Josh Weisberg. "The hard problem of consciousness". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. or Robert Van Gulick (Jan 14, 2014). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Consciousness: §9.9 Non-physical theories". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition).

Brews ohare (talk) 00:58, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

The last sentence above is not part of the trial balloon. It's just a segue to the next paragraph already present in the current article that briefly describes the hard problem of consciousness as an example of one discussion of what lies outside physical determinism.

NOTE THE TEXT OF THIS RFC WAS AMENDED BY THE CALLING EDITOR FOLLOWING INITIAL COMMENTS

Comments

• This paragraph is just a starting point, but it does correct the problems of the current paragraph. It also provides a reader with some sources for further reading. Changes or alternatives are invited. Brews ohare (talk) 00:58, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, can you address the problems with the current paragraph beyond adding to these problems your view that "nomological determinism" has no place in the discussion of free will? Your suggestion that the sources of the proposed paragraph are not WP:SECONDARY sources appears to me to apply (or not apply) equally to your preferred single-author expositions invited to appear in compilations by single editors, all parties with established philosophical positions. Brews ohare (talk) 12:38, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

• • You;ve called an RfC on that specific addition Brews, against the advice of two/three editors involved. I'm more than happy to have a discussion about what should be included in the lede and have offered that before. But rather than make such an agreement then draft you seem determined to draft and then challenge others to produce an alternative. My previous offer remains open, its up to you if you take it up or not. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:36, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: I have not grasped what seems to me to be distinctions without a difference. Here I have proposed a replacement paragraph for discussion. That discussion is open to you. You can propose different sources, different wording, or different content. I'd appreciate that proposed changes in content be source based, and not simply your own opinion (however well-based that may be upon your personal expertise). But why not go ahead and participate, help this paragraph evolve toward a cogent presentation? This is not an escalation of earlier battles, but a challenge to progress. Brews ohare (talk) 15:45, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

• • • • You have called an RfC because your disagree with the view of other editors on the nomological issue. Those opposed to you say that its lack of mention in the main third party sources means that it is not relevant here. An RfC is to resolve an issue, if you want other editors to engage more generally then ask at the notice boards. I've offered a way forward on rewriting the lede but you rejected it. Your call, no one can compel you. But calling an RfC requires the RfC to resolve that issue. ----Snowded ^TALK 07:15, 28 April 2015 (UTC)
• See my comments (as well as those of another editor) in the section Tendentious Editing above. In particular "At the same time "nomological" does not appear in the index of the Oxford Handbook on Free will or The Oxford Companion to Philosophy both make use of Gnomic but do not make the distinction you are making in your edit." Brews is choosing material he finds interesting from primary sources rather than reflecting secondary ones ----Snowded ^TALK 04:45, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

The RfC is not about disagreement at all - it is about obtaining participation. You opted out, as I understood the situation. Also the RfC is not about the lede at all, it is about the third paragraph in the subsection Free will#In Western philosophy. Your objection to distinguishing between two types of determinism is to say 'nomological' determinism is irrelevant to free will. Yet, the paragraph you reinstated includes 'nomological' determinism in a mistaken manner. In addition, you have arrived at this belief by ignoring cited discussions that do use this term, such as The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Horst, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Doyle and others. But the biggest issue, that of the role of 'physical' determinism as explained by Kim remains outside your attention.

I don't understand why you cannot address these matters more carefully. Brews ohare (talk) 13:19, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

You consume too much time to too little purpose Brews. The RfC is about getting other editors to help resolve an issue, that issue is stated in the text and editors comment. Its not the way to obtain general participation in the wider aspects of the article. Nothing in my comment here references the lede, it does make it clear the objection to your proposed text and that is all that is needed. I haven't opted out of the article, I have opted out of constantly repeating the same points to an editor who either chooses not to listen, or simply finds disagreement impossible to handle. I suspect both ----Snowded ^TALK 15:23, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: Your remarks are a reflex reaction patently wide of the mark. You have as yet never addressed even one of the issues raised with the current paragraph, never mind the proposed solution to them. As for never discussing the lede, you seem to have forgotten your immediately preceding remark that I've offered a way forward on rewriting the lede but you rejected it. Snowded, you are simply absentmindedly obstructionist. Please put your thoughts in gear and make some specific recommendations instead of vague maunderings. Brews ohare (talk) 15:38, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

To help structure a specific response the issues are as follows:

1. The parenthetic construction ‘physical determinism (nomological determinism)’ that seems to imply they are synonyms.

2. The confused treatment of what is only potential controversy between free will and the combination of physical determinism and causal closure

3. The confused idea of what physical determinism and causal closure mean.

4. The failure to draw attention to discussions of what could lie outside the physical domain, which leads naturally to the following paragraph on the hard problem of consciousness, presently just dangling in space.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:03, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

• Brews ohare, once again, I appreciate your high level contributions to Wikipedia.

I agree that the paragraph needs rewriting to bring its level down to the readership and to clarify its content.

Most forms of determinism are rooted in either unwarranted generalizations of Newtonian and other limited, deterministic physical theories, or in theistic rationalization of an ideal world. Neither of these varieties have more than a possible or probable logical connection to actual events.

Based on these biases, I opine that all references to either psychological or to subjective first person (Protagorean) views be excluded. You have plenty of other references to support either God given lawful (yeah, I know), or physical law based determinism. BlueMist (talk) 15:03, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

BlueMist: My thinking is that psychological and first-person views are the ones most important. For example, William James opined that any "theory" that doesn't support moral responsibility is incorrect right from the gate: "determinism... violates my sense of morality through and through." Unfortunately discussion of moral responsibility has largely been lost from the article. Kim, Evans, Nagel all point out that the ambiguities of the subject-object problem are behind the problems in grappling with free will. Here is a statement of the connection. Brews ohare (talk) 13:43, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

• As has been the case in the past, there is no interest from the Philosophy Project participants in maintenance of philosophy articles, even those articles like 'free will' that rank among the most famous and published-upon topics of philosophy. That apathy is demonstrated on most academic subjects found on WP and is an indicator of the gradual demise of activity here beyond celebrity tabloid coverage. Brews ohare (talk) 14:37, 1 May 2015 (UTC)
• Anticipating no further developments, I have inserted the following abbreviated amplification of the nomological-physical differences:

"It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the world can be explained to operate perfectly by natural laws.¹ A conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural laws arises when nomological determinism is asserted.² Such a contradiction is more open to debate if causal closure and physical determinism are asserted, because these doctrines self-limit themselves to the domain of the physical. With causal closure, every cause of a physical event is a physical cause, and physical determinism states that there are no uncaused physical events. That leaves open the possibility of events and causes that lie outside the physical domain, in particular, certain subjective events.³

Sources

¹ Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.

² Nomological determinism often is taken to be the "notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws":Duco A. Schreuder (2014). Vision and Visual Perception. Archway Publishing. p. 505. ISBN 9781480812949. Others adopt the definition that "every event that occurs has a fully determinate and sufficient set of antecedent causes": Stathis Paillos (2007). "§16: Statistical explanation". In Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard, John Woods, Theo A.F. Kuipers, eds (ed.). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Elsevier. p. 156. ISBN 9780080548548. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) Still other definitions sometimes are used.

³ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 9781400840847. It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is

Brews ohare (talk)

Despite the noncontroversial nature of this paragraph, and despite its advantages in correcting misinformation in the paragraph it replaces, Snowded remains implacable in insisting upon its removal, although he has yet to provide any specific opposition, such as claiming some specific sentence is inaccurate, biased, misleading, or whatever. Brews ohare (talk) 15:29, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

Adherents to nondeterministic and no free will

The entry cites one article for an assertion that there are no adherents to the position that there is no free will and that the universe is nondeterministic, but Kevin Timpe seems to suggest there are. Hackwrench (talk) 16:38, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

What this article says about this is:

"It is possible that one is an incompatibilist, thinks that the actual world is not deterministic, and yet still thinks that agents in the actual world do not have free will. While it is less clear what to call such a position (perhaps "free will deniers"), it illustrates that hard determinism and libertarianism do not exhaust the ways to be an incompatibilist."

This statement is not an assertion that there are adherents of this position, only that it is a possible position, which is not a contradiction of what the text says at the moment. Brews ohare (talk) 17:20, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

Revisiting the role of moral responsibility

In a recent edit, Snowded removed the following simple statement about the importance of 'moral responsibility' to the subject of 'free will':

"Some philosophers consider the main reason for interest in free will to be the moral aspects, which impact everyday attitudes and the law, as well as philosophy:^1,2,3

¹ Timothy O'Connor (October 29, 2010). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Free Will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2002 Edition). Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action. {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)

² McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin (February 25, 2015). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Compatibilism: §1.1 Free will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

³ David K. Chan (2008). "Note 7". Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 221. ISBN 9781402068720. The primary motivation of most scholars...is the the perceived threat to moral responsibility and agency.

Snowded's justification for removing this sentence is the one line Edit Summary: "I'm sure they do, and some don't. The moral aspect is already well covered."

The superficial comment "some do, some don't" simply ignores the history of the subject of "free will" from the historic article by William James to the modern treatment of McKenna & Coates, both of which make moral responsibility the basis for their entire discussion.

Let's examine what Snowded thinks constitutes "well covered".

The current version of Free will addresses 'moral responsibility' in a short paragraph under Free will#In Western philosophy:

"The puzzle of reconciling 'free will' with a deterministic universe is known as the problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the dilemma of determinism.[21] This dilemma leads to a moral dilemma as well: How are we to assign responsibility for our actions if they are caused entirely by past events?[22][23]"

The remainder of the "coverage" consists of a sentence or so buried as asides in later paragraphs on other topics. The relegation of 'moral responsibility' to a few footnotes and asides is hardly adequate coverage of moral responsibility, considered by many philosophers to be the main reason for the widespread interest in the topic of free will, and probably a primary reason for any readership of this article. Brews ohare (talk) 13:35, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

Apparently, no comment is to be expected about the lack of emphasis upon moral responsibility that forms such a strong thread through the history of 'free will'. I therefore propose reinsertion of the deleted sentence indicating this emphasis. Brews ohare (talk) 14:31, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

I have inserted the above reference to the view that moral responsibility is an important aspect of free will, but shortened by stripping out the quotations that make clear the sources do address this point directly. I don't think this insertion is debatable. Brews ohare (talk) 16:54, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

The added sentence is:

"Some philosophers consider the main interest in free will to stem from the moral aspects, which impact everyday attitudes and the law, as well as philosophy."¹

Note

¹ Timothy O'Connor (October 29, 2010). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Free Will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2002 Edition).; McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin (February 25, 2015). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Compatibilism: §1.1 Free will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition).{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link); David K. Chan (2008). "Note 7". Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 221. ISBN 9781402068720.

Despite the innocuous nature of this addition, Snowded has removed it several times. It may be noted that the connection between free will and moral responsibility extends over two millennia beginning before Chrysippus and Plutarch. Brews ohare (talk) 15:08, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

The role of the subject-object problem

The metaphysical discussion of Free will is focused upon the 'compatibilist'-'incompatibilist' framework. This constricts discussion to a rather semantic debate over definitions of 'free', of 'will', of 'determinism', and it is indeed the content of a great deal of the philosophical literature. However, as the subsection In science points out, there is a deeper aspect of the metaphysics related to the applicability of science to subjective matters like the 'intuition' of free will. According to Eddy Nahmias: "there are problems other than determinism that need to be confronted—namely, challenges to free will suggested by discoveries in neuroscience and philosophy". Understanding these challenges confronts the problems raised in the Subject-object problem and the Mind-body problem. As David M Hart suggests: "the free will-determinism distinction is grounded in the same subject-object dualism that Heidegger is so intent upon critiquing and overcoming..." Another discussion (probably less acceptable to an academic) is found in Ken Wilber's The Spectrum of Knowledge.

I suggest that a sentence alerting the reader to this situation be included in the introduction to provide readers with a clue that the semantic 'compatibilist-incompatibilist' debate is not all that is involved in the metaphysics of 'free will'. For example, at the end of the third paragraph of Free will#In Western philosophy that brings up the limitations of physical determinism, the sentence could be appended:

"Despite our attempts to understand nature, a complete understanding of reality remains open to philosophical speculations, a variety of which are reviewed in the articles Subject-object problem and Mind-body problem."

Perhaps more can be said? Brews ohare (talk) 14:35, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

You're not asking us to take a 'cultist' like Ken Wilber seriously in a philosophy article are you Brews? Otherwise you have made the semantic point before and I have some sympathy if not full agreement. Does any third party source make the same point? ----Snowded ^TALK 19:27, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

There is Hart. If you read Wilber you'll see that he quotes at length a number of reputable opinions to establish the background of the subject- object problem. You don't have to subscribe to any cult extrapolations. The WP articles also have some useful sources. I hope you can draw upon your own knowledge of sources to provide a good starting point. I am happy to collaborate. Brews ohare (talk) 00:01, 30 April 2015 (UTC)

BTW: The quote you removed by Timpe, to the effect that the incompatibilist-compatibilist conflict is about possibilities not about whether 'free will' actually exists, ignores the more significant point that this brouhaha actually misses the issues involved in the mind-body problem and the subject-object problem. These more basic issues make clear that the incompatibilist-compatibilist argument is like arguing over whether to use chopsticks or a fork and knife when you have no food. Brews ohare (talk) 01:09, 30 April 2015 (UTC)

The fact that Wilber is even suggested is an illustration of the danger of searching the internet to find sources without some wider third party authority. I also think we need to remember there is another article on the Subject-Object problem and our job here is not to write a book on Free Will, but to provide a high level summary of the field. I'll look at Hart later ----Snowded ^TALK 04:15, 30 April 2015 (UTC)

My interest in the link to Wilbur is in his extended quotations from Suzuki, from Eddington, from Heisenberg and so on. These authors have something to say. The point of mentioning this essay is not to provide an "authoritative" source.

The subject-object problem and the mind-body problem are open-ended issues of course, and there are sources like Nagel (See for example the discussion on pp. 110 ff. "What I shall discuss are two aspects of the problem of free will..." ) that are extremely conjectural. There is also Herbert Feigl: see §III section 3. Another approach is enactivism, and the idea that the subjective and objective are not really separable in a tightly coupled feedback system where the internal and the external interact to create each other. Hutto, Sporns, Torrance, and this compilation of essays. Still another view is that an understanding of free will must ask about the role of consciousness.Caruso. I am of the opinion that there are no "answers" to free will here, but there is ample argument to establish clearly that the problem is badly formulated as a compatibilsm-incompatibilism debate. Brews ohare (talk) 15:31, 30 April 2015 (UTC)

Wilber is free to make extended reference to primary sources, but forgive me if I don't follow through on that. Cult leaders who claim to have achieved the ultimate synthesis of all know ideas lack credibility. But we do not write articles here in the way Wilber threads together said sources or extended quotes. We reflect reliable third party material. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:51, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: Are you going to engage the issues actually in front of us here? Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

If you are not up for a more extended treatment, the single sentence suggested above could be appended to alert readers to this connection. Brews ohare (talk) 14:26, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

Please don't interpret my unwillingness to engage with discussions about primary sources with my willingness to engage with the issues. You continue to refuse to accept that other editors disagree with you on synthesis. I understand you think you are right, but most of the rest of us do not. That means that efforts to synthesis primary material are going to be reverted. Refusal to help out by a temporary use of inline references while the aritlcle stabilises makes it more likely that you will snippet be reverted rather than amended, I've told you this a dozen times but compromise is not a part of your mind set.----Snowded ^TALK 17:43, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: Just how do you intend to engage with the issues? Brews ohare (talk) 00:29, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

You have said earlier you intended to read Hart and two recently acquired Oxford Companions as an aid to joining this conversation, and above I have provided links to some additional viewpoints. Your response is complaint about reference formatting and threats of reversion of any attempt on my part to present anything concerning the works I have linked. Can you provide your ideas of some addition on this topic? Brews ohare (talk) 14:04, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

I've got both and there is material in them that can be used but it doesn't really support your original research in that you are making partial selections You seem to make the assumption that the only alternative to your edits is proposing alternatives. That isn't the case, if your changes do not improve the article and/or constitute synthesis then reversion is a valid response. ----Snowded ^TALK 01:28, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, you seem to have lost track of what this thread is about. It is not about valid bases for reversion. It is not about how eclectic the sources are that I have mentioned. It is about putting together a contribution about the relation between the subject-object problem and free will that is representative of the spectrum of opinion on this subject. So present what you have found. Comment upon what I have found. Then we can construct a balanced overview. This whole thing is about sources and their opinions. It is not about you or about me. Brews ohare (talk) 04:13, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

No Brews, find a third party source which justifies addition or change. We don't assemble sources and is increasingly about your refusal to understand that ----Snowded ^TALK 05:10, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

"We don't assemble sources" — well, that seems to settle that. You are not going to discuss presentation of the literature and will simply revert every addition that is not from a "third-party" source. That terminates any possibility of contributing to this article, particularly because there are no third-party sources; all sources are secondary sources including your Oxford Handbooks that invite single-author contrubutions by philosophers with active interest in their own publications. I don't think you really feel this way, it is just your position when dealing with me. That is because you don't enjoy actually engaging in what the literature has to say. That is your prerogative of course, but it does impede development of WP. Brews ohare (talk) 21:31, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Nomological determinism not proven at this level

In this edit Snowded has said: Original reference was better, maybe some change in phrasing but not your synthesis. Nomological determinism per talk page is not proven as belong to an article at this level

This one-line edit summary makes no sense. For one thing, the current paragraph Snowded has restored says:

"The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted." (my emphasis)

Obviously, the term nomological determinism appears here, making nonsense of Snowded's reason for reversion. In addition, the 'original reference' of the current paragraph also is present in the removed paragraph, adding to the confusion of Snowded's rationale.

For another thing, the current paragraph has four defects pointed out earlier:

1. The parenthetic construction ‘physical determinism (nomological determinism)’ that seems to imply these two terms are synonyms.

2. The confused treatment of what is only potential controversy between free will and the combination of physical determinism and causal closure

3. The confused idea of what physical determinism and causal closure mean.

4. The failure to draw attention to discussions of what could lie outside the physical domain, which leads naturally to the following paragraph on the hard problem of consciousness, presently just dangling in space.

Snowded has addressed not even one of these deficiencies.

Inasmuch as Snowded has made no effort to engage here, his actions have no justification. Brews ohare (talk) 00:27, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

The removed paragraph has none of the listed defects, and is well-sourced. The other sourced changes removed by Snowded reduce the value and intelligibility of the article, and Snowded has made no attempt to explain these reversions at all.

Accordingly, I have rescinded Snowded's reversions, and ask him to kindly explain himself here to explain just what exactly he finds so misleading that removal is a better option than discussion here aimed at reformulation. Brews ohare (talk) 05:52, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

I've explained this before Brews and other editors have supported my position. You cannot force editors to engage with you in discussion of primary sources. If you can find a third party source that makes the term relevant to a summary article fine, but its not mentioned in the ones we have found so far. You really have to stop assuming that because you are not happy with a response on the talk page then the response is not adequate and justifies you in edit warring. Make a more modest set of proposals here and/or get other editors involved. Get agreement to a change before you make it, make smaller changes and give other editors time to respond, use inline references until things are stable. All of that would make it more easy to work with you. Accepting when you do not have agreement and moving on is also part of this The fact that you will never let go discourages other editors from engagement. You've driven one of the best philosophy editors from this page already, possibly two. This behaviourt got you a permanent block from physics articles before and I know you want to get that changed. Probably the best way is not to continue to exhibit the behaviour which resulted in that ban ----Snowded ^TALK 10:29, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, I see that you have crafted a fallacious response that makes no attempt to state specifics, neither as to your espoused 'position' (which remains nonexistent, or at least unexpressed ) nor as to your 'reasons' (yet to be enunciated) for reverting a few uncontroversial sourced corrections to errors in the text. In place of specific objections that could be addressed, your reply resorts to fictional talk-page history and personal intimidation. Constructive criticism appears to be alien. A four-point list of failures of the paragraph you support has yet to register. Brews ohare (talk) 13:48, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

No Brews, you don't agree with me nor are you paying attention to reasons given before against ascribing significance to this. I'll leave it a day to give you a chance to self-revert otherwise this is edit warring. ----Snowded ^TALK 01:25, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, there is no dispute here about content. You have said nothing specific to content. So how is it possible to alter these additions to suit you, where you provide no idea about what you object to? These sentences you have reverted say exactly what the sources cited say. There is no idea of my own presented. The sourced definitions of 'nomological determinism' are verbatim quotes. They are uncontroversial and are used in the WP article nomological determinism. The limitation of physical determinism to the physical is exactly as Kim has described, and again we have verbatim quotes of noncontroversial remarks. So what, please, are your objections in specific detail regarding this content? Brews ohare (talk) 03:58, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

A four-point list of failures of the paragraph you support has received no attention from you. Yet you wish to install this sloppy paragraph with wrong information. Why ?? Brews ohare (talk) 04:01, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

---

I have been following this dispute while on holiday. One thing that puzzles me is why Brews insists on highlighting the causal/physical distinction. How is it essential to the problem of free will? Peter Damian (talk) 13:06, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

[edit] I reverted the latest edit by Brews. I think I understand why he insists on this distinction.He writes:

It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the world can be explained to operate perfectly by natural laws. A conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural laws arises when nomological determinism is asserted. Such a contradiction is more open to debate if causal closure and physical determinism are asserted, because these doctrines self-limit themselves to the domain of the physical. With causal closure, every cause of a physical event is a physical cause, and physical determinism states that there are no uncaused physical events. That leaves open the possibility of events and causes that lie outside the physical domain, in particular, certain subjective events.

First of all, as I have pointed out, this conflates 'confusion' with 'contradiction'. A 'contradiction' is a technical term for two statements which contradict each other, i.e. if one is true, the other must be false. The introduction needs to state why there is a contradiction between 'conscious decisions are causally effective' and ' the world can be explained to operate perfectly by natural laws'. (Perhaps there is an implicit assumption that 'conscious decisions do not operate according to natural laws'?). Brews adds 'That leaves open the possibility of events and causes that lie outside the physical domain'. This makes it clearer what he is aiming for, but only slightly. If there were causes outside the physical domain, but physical determinism were true, how could the non-physical causes have physical effects? Also, what is any of this doing in the introduction, which is meant to be a summary of the article? Peter Damian (talk) 14:54, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Peter: I am happy to see some attempt made to criticize the text instead of myself. The text you have supported along with Snowded says:

"It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law.[17]"

the text you and Snowded reject says:

"It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the world can be explained to operate perfectly by natural laws."[17]

What is the difference here? The difference is that the sentence you support states a strong limitation to physical laws and the scientific view, while the sentence you reject is somewhat broader in scope, suggesting a conflict with what is customarily defined as nomological determinism.

Is this a distinction that does not matter? Well, to understand the distinction one has to understand the difference between nomological determinism and physical determinism+causal closure. The paragraph you and Snowded support makes no distinction at all, indicating with a parenthetic construction that the conflict arises when " either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted."

As I have pointed out repeatedly (see my list of four problems with this paragraph) a distinction has to be made. Implied synonymy is unacceptable. Also the idea of an 'either/or' for causal closure or physical determinism needs to be replaced by an 'and'.

I am interested to discuss also your other points, but this one is the simplest to begin with as it involves only definitions that are widely accepted. Perhaps you can comment upon this point in detail? We can then proceed further. Brews ohare (talk) 15:27, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I'd like to point out that a conflict with nomological determinism goes back to Chrysippus and Plutarch, while the restriction to physical determinism+causal closure began approximately with the views of Laplace. So if we are to frame matters in an historically inclusive manner as the header 'In Western philosophy' seems to suggest, nomological determinism is the way to start. Brews ohare (talk) 15:34, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

If some distinction is needed here, the next few sentences of the paragraph you and Snowded reject make sense. They say:

"A conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural laws arises when nomological determinism is asserted.[2] Such conflict is more open to debate if causal closure and physical determinism are asserted, because these doctrines self-limit themselves to the domain of the physical. With causal closure, every cause of a physical event is a physical cause, and physical determinism states that there are no uncaused physical events."

I think you will agree that these statements are accurate and the sources pertinent. I have referred to Kim, but these definitions of physical determinism and causal closure are not peculiar to Kim. I am open, of course, to other sources.

Your objection is that all this constitutes too much detail. You say:

"Also, what is any of this doing in the introduction, which is meant to be a summary of the article?"

Of course, the subtopic 'In Western philosophy' is only a subtopic and not the article, but it is a very long subtopic and needs an introduction as you say. In my opinion, the clear limitations of the school of thought that "physical determinism+causal closure conflicts with free will" should appear in this introductory material. Brews ohare (talk) 16:12, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

(I changed 'contradiction' to 'conflict' in deference to your distinction.) Brews ohare (talk) 16:16, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

• I agree that the material I reverted is not very good, but that is no reason to support the addition. You say "As I have pointed out repeatedly (see my list of four problems with this paragraph) a distinction has to be made." I don't agree, on the other hand I agree that the conflation should not be made either. Why not just stick with 'causal determinism' (='nomological determinism') or just 'determinism' throughout?
• Then you say "the clear limitations of the school of thought that "physical determinism+causal closure conflicts with free will" should appear in this introductory material. The apparent conflict at the heart of the free will problem is between free will and (causal) determinism, period. Now one way of resolving the apparent conflict is by limiting the scope of the determinism as the schoolmen did. Perhaps this should be mentioned in the introduction, but we should start with the general and then move to the specific.

Peter Damian (talk) 16:48, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

You propose to remove nomological determinism from the article entirely on the basis that all that really matters is physical determinism+causal determinism. If we do that it does not avoid the issue of limitations of this view. You have mentioned the objection to mental causation I think was first made to Descartes by Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia: "How could the non-physical causes have physical effects?" However, this separation is the basis of many philosophical articles that have to be included, such as Hutto, Nagel and Griffith. Brews ohare (talk) 16:59, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

That door is left open by the last sentence of the rejected paragraph that leads naturally to the subsequent paragraph on the hard problem of consciousness:

"That leaves open the possibility of events and causes that lie outside the physical domain, in particular, certain subjective events."[3] Brews ohare (talk) 17:05, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

"You propose to remove nomological determinism from the article entirely on the basis that all that really matters is physical determinism+causal determinism. " No, did I say that?

(I said "Why not just stick with 'causal determinism' (='nomological determinism') or just 'determinism' throughout?"Peter Damian (talk) 17:12, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Peter, what is wrong with limiting the free will conflict to nomological determinism has been pointed out several times. The term nomological determinism in broad terms is the doctrine that all future events are determined by antecedent events. The more modest claim of physical determinism limits itself to physical events and causes. That leaves open such questions as the hard problem of consciousness considered to be an active area by many philosophers. It also allows the views of enactivism which sees the objective stance of science as artificially excluding an interactive view, making the free will conflict something of an artifact of an inapplicable methodology. Naturally these summaries are only indicative, and sourced commentary is needed for the WP article. The point is that nomological is too restrictive to allow many modern positions, while physical determinism is not. Brews ohare (talk) 04:10, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Continuation of thread

Meanwhile, can we get clear on what I propose? Peter Damian (talk) 17:29, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I agree that keeps it simpler. A one/two sentence summary of some of the finer distinctions in the body of the article not the lede, if NOT sourced from primary sources might be OK. At the moment the article needs clarifying if anything ----Snowded ^TALK 17:35, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian: I take it that your summary

the heart of the free will problem is between free will and (causal) determinism, period.

means something different to you than my description based upon Kim of physical determinism+causal determinism. You can refer to Kim's definitions of these two items.physical determinism,causal closure. Perhaps you can identify what you have in mind with some other source? Brews ohare (talk) 17:43, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

No, I am objecting to your statement that I "propose to remove nomological determinism from the article entirely on the basis that all that really matters is physical determinism+causal determinism. " I did not say this. I never used the expression "physical determinism+causal determinism" and I am not sure what it means. Peter Damian (talk) 17:49, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

[edit] Yup, I would like clearly to understand what you mean by "physical determinism+causal determinism" Peter Damian (talk) 18:02, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

My meaning is that of Kim linked above. Is this confusing somehow? The idea in short is that of reductionism rather than antireductionism. The idea that within the physical domain all physical events are caused and caused only by physical causes. Brews ohare (talk) 19:11, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Kim does not say this. Where does he refer to "physical determinism+causal determinism"? Peter Damian (talk) 19:27, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Kim says:"The causal closure of the physical domain. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t....If a physical event has a causal explanation, it has a physical causal explanation."

Kim also says (Note 8): "The closure principle should be distinguished from the thesis of physical determinism to the effect that every physical event has a physical cause. Physical causal closure would make sense even if some physical events don't have causes."

So you are right, Kim does not mention the combination of the two Nonetheless he says: "Physical causal closure ...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is." This comment is all that is needed for the paragraph you reject, and if you prefer to avoid the construction physical determinism+causal determinism, fine, it makes no difference to the gist, although the wording would change.

Of course, as I say below: "Physical determinism = causal closure + no uncaused physical event". But now I am doubting your honesty. Sorry. Peter Damian (talk) 20:08, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I was unaware that you were proposing this equation. You will notice I proposed no equation at all. All I am after is that there is a door open to dualism in the logical construction involving physical causal closure. Accusing me of dishonesty is really beyond the pall. Brews ohare (talk) 20:39, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

" All I am after is that there is a door open to dualism in the logical construction involving physical causal closure." This is nonsensical babbling. I cannot see how you can write such nonsense unless you are deliberately provoking me Peter Damian (talk) 20:54, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian: I am sorry to see you use phrases like "nonsensical babbling" and "such nonsense" in what is intended to be a discussion of Kim's treatment of dualism and causal closure. Lacking any supporting quotations from Kim, you seem not to have read the linked sections which I have reported here with complete fidelity. Brews ohare (talk) 21:12, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Brew's behaviour on this article

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

---

This is ottava rima all over again. Some people are unable to admit a wrong, and will go to mind bending lenghts, over years, backing narrower and narrower into a corner to defend the incomprehensible. Because that is the limit of thier ability. This is clearly what is happening here with Brews. Is WP:COMPETENCE a defence? Ceoil (talk) 17:17, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Ceoil: You exhibit impatience with summarizing the literature, which apparently contains some ideas you deplore. However, your mind set is not what is wanted on WP, but rather the opinions of published scholars. Avoiding discussion of the literature by picturesque attacks upon myself will not improve the accuracy of the article. Brews ohare (talk) 17:23, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

No Brews, Wikipedia is governed by behaviour not by content resolution other than through the community and a series of agreed policies. The ongoing problem with you over multiple articles with multiple editors is that you do not feel constrained by either. You have been told time and time again that we do not synthesis primary sources but not only do you carry on doing so, you complain that other editors will not join you. You then edit war because you feel you are right and post longer and longer justifications on the talk page to the point where you drive other editors away from the articles (as you have here). You have been subject to community sanction for this behaviour but you seem incapable of learning from that sanction. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:35, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Guys, I'm sorry if I sound ill tempered, but I've been following this page and I suppose I was. But I've been down this road, and reasoned argument will not work, as evidenced by the circular route of this talk page and its many archives. A different route need to be taken, I would suggest along the lines of exhaustion. And Brews, your approach to 'summarizing the literature' is exactly the problem. Ceoil (talk) 17:42, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

The problems go deeper than anything that can be neatly solved. For example, nomological determinism seems to have been custom-written by Brews in order to support the importance of the distinction. AFAICS it is just another term for 'causal determinism', which itself is the main form of what is commonly called simply 'determinism' (the other two forms being logical d. and so-called theological d.). See also this page which I started in order to list the articles that Brews and Doyle are the main contributors to. I don't think there is anything unambiguously wrong in any of them (but I haven't been through with a fine toothed comb. The problem is that they place undue emphasis on distinctions that are not that important in the scheme of things. It may take some time to clear this all up. For example, I think Subject–object problem should be afd'd. There is no material that could not be found elsewhere, and the term itself has no fixed and accepted use that I can find. However, the fuss and bother it would cause is an immediate deterrent. Peter Damian (talk) 17:45, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for the summary Peter, and welcome back. But would the fuss and bother be any worse than the hand to hand, inch by inch combat here? Ceoil (talk) 17:55, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Well I would like to be fair to Brews. However, so far it seems that 'competence' may be an issue. Peter Damian (talk) 18:01, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Ask Snowded how that is likely to turn out. Ceoil (talk) 18:12, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I'm more with Ceoil on this. Trying to be fair to Brews over this round mainly on one article and a round last year on a dozen articles, just results in longer and longer talk page comments. Competence may the the issue, but its also his practice. See the multiple attempts to change policy to support his edit warring with various forms of synthesis. Its driven at least 2/3 editors away from Philosophy articles and makes change difficult It takes a lot of stamina to deal with Brews and if you don't respond on the talk page he just reinstates disputed text, so you have to respond and the cycle continues. As Peter is finding out he also has this habit of summarising the statements of opponents to say things they did not say and then hits out at the straw man ----Snowded ^TALK 18:15, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

OK well let me see if he replies to my last question (I think he realizes by now he was talking nonsense but let's be fair). The only other solution, other than infinite patience, is a topic ban from philosophy, yes? Peter Damian (talk) 18:20, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Peter, he has 21 edits to this talk page alone today; every one with...<sigh>...the problem is that each needs careful unravellng, application of meaning and debunking, and ties up subject experts. Ceoil (talk) 18:29, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

There is another possibility. Remove the topic ban from Physics but impose restrictions to 1rr on all articles, a formal caution on synthesis and a restriction on talk page edits if he can't get agreement to a change. That might help things as he could be a good editor. Maybe a mentor who's judgement he has to accept. I really don't like bans but I suspect the next one would be from all articles. If banned from Philosophy he would simply move elsewhere. I think it his is retirement hobby so if the energy could be channelled it would be good. ----Snowded ^TALK 18:32, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Good. This sounds like a first option to me. Ceoil (talk) 18:41, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

If I am permitted, I'll present my view. It is that no participants save myself have made any use of sources. Instead there is an assumption by other WP editors assembled here that they know the subject, and sources are unnecessary. If instead they used their vast knowledge of the literature on free will to assemble a solidly sourced presentation of their views, things would evolve more fruitfully than with the present approach of presenting their personal assessments and formulations as fact, and castigating me for the temerity of requesting sources as backup. Brews ohare (talk) 19:20, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

No, the problem is that you are both misusing the sources, and also (more problematically) you appear to misunderstand the sources. See my point above on 'physical determinism+causal determinism'. The source you are using nowhere uses this terminology, plus it is practically nonsensical -it's like saying "red+coloured". Peter Damian (talk) 19:30, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

[edit] It's possible you misread 'causal determinism' as 'causal closure'. But that means you aren't really paying attention + I never said that either + Kim does not talk about 'physical determinism + causal closure'. Physical determinism = causal closure + no uncaused physical event Peter Damian (talk) 19:38, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Its probably wise not to get further bogged down in specifics at this stage. There is enough debunking above, in the archives, etc. More general summaries of positions and habits would be better. Ceoil (talk) 19:45, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

But then he will complain that he is the only one making use of sources. I am hitting him at the very centre of this claim: namely he clearly has badly misunderstood the sources. Peter Damian (talk) 19:52, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Specifically, he has linked to an article by Jaegwon Kim (respectable philosopher), using it as a source to undermine me. But when I look at the source, it says nothing like what he claims. Peter Damian (talk) 19:53, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

[edit] Also, he says things like " Is this confusing somehow? " as though I were stupid not to understand what the source says. This bullying and dishonest tactic may work with some people, but I call it what it is: bullying and dishonest. He must surely be aware what the source is saying. Peter Damian (talk) 19:55, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

And now he concedes the source did not say that. Was it an accident? But how many accidents have there been? Note it took about an hour of arguing and explanation for him to concede that. Peter Damian (talk) 20:11, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

And another problem. He has just conceded he misrepresented the source. However the source was meant to counter a misrepresented summary of what I said. So there are two levels of misdirection: (1) the straw man (2) mispresenting sources used to attack the straw man. He has conceded (2), so we have ascended up a level back to (1), so now I must explain again how I did not "propose to remove nomological determinism from the article entirely on the basis that all that really matters is physical determinism+causal determinism. " This game could go on forever. I have not encountered this editor before (although his legend precedes him). I have no taste for these games. Peter Damian (talk) 20:21, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian: All that is here is just an attempt to present what leads to Kim's assertion that physical causal closure leaves the door open to dualism of some kind. That is it. Finito.

How you arrive at some imagined hostility on my part is a mystery. As for undermining your position, what is that? All I have to go by is your (unsourced) summary:

"the heart of the free will problem is between free will and (causal) determinism, period.

Your claim that "you are both misusing the sources, and also (more problematically) you appear to misunderstand the sources" is simply an undocumented assertion on your part. You seem to think that my use of the construction "physical determinism+causal closure" is some kind of misreading of Kim. Kim has not used this construction, but its use by me here is not some flagrant misrepresentation. Whether I need Kim's "physical clausal closure" or his "physical determinism" the only point that matters is that the door is open to nonphysical events and nonphysical causes which is stated in just so many words by Kim.

Rather than get you shirt in a knot, why not present your view carefully with some sources so we can see what you have in mind? Brews ohare (talk) 20:33, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Wow, there you go again. Further above, you wrote "physical determinism+causal determinism", directly above you write " "physical determinism+causal closure", so you misrepresent a misrepresentation. Neither of these makes sense anyway. Do you understanding anything of what you are babbling about? Either you are a skillful hoaxer, or you are merely confused. Peter Damian (talk) 20:46, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Wow indeed. Ceoil (talk) 21:16, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I am sorry to see this kind of activity on a talk page. If you all want to get serious, you can begin to address Kim's discussion. Else, goodbye. Brews ohare (talk) 21:21, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Well it's goodbye from me, for sure. Snowded asked me to help out with the article here, but it's beyond help. I would not have believed this, had I not seen it with my own eyes. Peter Damian (talk) 22:02, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Competence issues

The thread above has been locked because it involves 'behavioural' questions. I would like to address the 'brews problem' as one of competence alone. Brews simply does not take the time, or can't be bothered, to learn and understand some of the key terms of philosophical discourse, and this leads to endless talk page confusion and disruption, which in turn leads to more competent editors leaving the subject, perhaps even leaving Wikipedia. I give some examples below; if I (or anyone else) can find some more, there might be grounds for a ban on all philosophy articles.

• In this edit, brews clearly misunderstands the nature of implication. He thinks that 'p implies q' entails that p is the more general claim, q the more specific. Of course it is the other way round, which the other party picks up straight away. If p implies q, then q can be true with p being false, so q is more general. But p cannot be true with q false, so p is more specific. This is philosophical logic 101, and it is hard to continue a discussion with someone who persistently or wilfully disregards it. Note brews reply that this is nitpicking forms of implication, and that the other party (who has since left Wikipedia), has failed to respond to the issues. Yet no issue could be more basic than the implication!
• In the discussion immediately above, brews mentions a discussion "based upon [Jaegwon] Kim of physical determinism+causal determinism." Kim nowhere mentions this (which Brews eventually concedes), but then immediately trivialises it. ("You seem to think that my use of the construction "physical determinism+causal closure" is some kind of misreading of Kim. Kim has not used this construction, but its use by me here is not some flagrant misrepresentation"). But it is not trivial, for the whole article depends on a careful understanding of the terms. Briefly, causal closure obtains if every event has a physical cause, assuming it has a cause at all, thus it obtains even when some physical events have no cause. Physical determinism obtains when every event has a physical cause, i.e. the difference between physical determinism and causal closure is the stipulation of no uncaused events. Causal determinism (which is by definition the same as 'nomological determinism') obtains when every event, whether physical or not, has a cause, and so is a much stronger claim. Thus neither the expressions "physical determinism+causal closure" nor "physical determinism+causal determinism " make much sense, given that physical determinism already implies both causal closure, and causal determinism. If brews doesn't understand even these basic terms, it is pointless having these long protracted discussions.
  • Note that he later concedes all of this, but at what cost? Care about the use of terms, and perhaps just paying attention to what the other party actually says, would have avoided all this.
• Here he seems to misunderstand the nature of a 'contradiction'. I made the simple point that a contradiction can only be between propositions, and he prevaricates and obfuscates.
• A remark by John Blackburn here suggests that the problem is not confined to philosophy. " If you had read and understood the sources you claim to be basing your contributions on you would know this".
• This probably won't be allowed on Wikipedia , but this Citizendium article on the same subject was almost entirely written by Brews. It is philosophically incompetent, in my judgment. Worryingly, it points to what the Wikipedia article would look like if Brews were to continue unhindered and unconstrained, free.
• [edit] Blatantly fails to understand the precision required of philosophical discourse.
• [edit] Use of 'subjective event' [1]

That's all for now. Peter Damian (talk) 12:05, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

This smokescreen to avoid addressing the simple defects of a paragraph in free will is an amazing escalation of intemperance and incivility, all to avoid addressing sources and instead make personalities an issue. Brews ohare (talk) 13:37, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

I have added this to the list of competence issues. Please note that questioning competence is not a 'personality issue'. Thank you. Peter Damian (talk) 14:04, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

You are deflecting discussion of the content of this paragraph to a discussion of my competence; whether you consider my competence to be an aspect of my personality is simply another diversion. Questions of competence might arise in the interpretation of sources, but so far you have not engaged in a comparison of interpretations. The key points are (i) nomological determinism is defined to include all events and therefore subjective events, while physical determinism is restricted to physical events, and (ii) Kim points out that (logically, if not in fact) that means what he calls physical causal closure allows the possibility of events and causes beyond its reach. These are simple points. They require no particular competence beyond reading the source. Yet you want instead of discussing these points to engage in evaluating my competence! Why, exactly? This complex assessment has no bearing upon your acceptance of the proposed paragraph. Brews ohare (talk) 14:20, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Please see WP:COMPETENCE "disruption is disruption, and it needs to be prevented" Sorry. Peter Damian (talk) 14:30, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

There is no disruption in my asking you to consider the proposed contribution instead of your viewing such a request as a personal affront worthy of an all-out attack upon myself as a contributor in general. Brews ohare (talk) 14:35, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Your intense response to this simple matter of the limitations of physical determinism is out of proportion to the situation and suggests a deep visceral response rather than an intellectual one. Perhaps you could step back a bit and regain some cool? Brews ohare (talk) 14:43, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

"They require no particular competence beyond reading the source. " Clearly they do Peter Damian (talk) 14:44, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

How about commenting upon this quote from Kim. Does it disagree with the proposed paragraph? Is Kim's a minority view requiring an alternative opinion? Should the presentation of this view be made clearer? These are the type of questions to be discussed, wouldn't you say? Brews ohare (talk) 14:58, 4 May 2015 (UTC)