Contextos Kantianos PDF
Contextos Kantianos PDF
Contextos Kantianos PDF
Con-Textos Kantianos
n 2
Noviembre 2015
ISSN 2386-7655
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. i-iii
ISSN: 2386-7655
Equipo Editor
Ricardo Gutirrez Aguilar, IFS-CSIC, Espaa
Ana-Carolina Gutirrez-Xivill, Philipps-Universitt Marburg / Universidad de Barcelona, Espaa
Claudia Juregui, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Mai Lequan, Universidad de Lyon III, Francia
Reidar Maliks, Universitetet i Oslo, Noruega
Macarena Marey, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Pablo Muchnik, Emerson College, Estados Unidos
Faustino Oncina, Universidad de Valencia, Espaa
Pablo Oyarzn, Universidad de Chile, Chile
Ricardo Parellada, UCM, Espaa
Alice Pinheiro Walla, Trinity College Dublin, Irlanda
Hernn Pringe, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Faviola Rivera, IIF-UNAM, Mxico
Concha Roldn, IFS-CSIC, Espaa
Rogelio Rovira, UCM, Espaa
Konstantinos Sargentis, University of Crete, Grecia
Manuel Snchez Rodrguez, Universidad de Granada, Espaa
Thomas Sturm, Universidad Autnoma de Barcelona, Espaa
Pedro Jess Teruel, Universidad de Valencia, Espaa
Gabriele Tomasi, Universidad de Padua, Italia
Marcos Thisted, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Salvi Turr, Universidad de Barcelona, Espaa
Milla Vaha, Univ. of Turku, Finlandia
Astrid Wagner, TU-Berln, Alemania
Sandra Zakutna, Univ. de Preov, Eslovaquia
ii
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. i-iii
ISSN: 2386-7655
Editorial Team
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. i-iii
ISSN: 2386-7655
iii
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 1-6
ISSN: 2386-7655
ENTREVISTAS / INTERVIEWS
[FR] Entretien avec Claude Pich, Mara Hotes (Univ. de Munich,
Allemagne) pp. 11-19 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33887
ARTCULOS / ARTICLES
Seccin monogrfica Kant y las declinaciones de la armona /
Monographical Section Kant and the Meanings of Harmony
[ES] Hacia una crtica de la razn armnica, Alberto Pirni (Scuola Superiore di SantAnna,
Italia)
pp. 20-31 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33888
CTK 2
[EN] Harmonia in commercio vs Harmonia absque commercio. Kants eclectical dealing with
causality, Gualtiero Lorini (Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal)
pp. 32-47 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33889
[PT] Os tons harmnicos e o fundamento das representaes. Breve comentrio a uma anotao
de Kant sobre uma metfora musical de Eberhard, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques
(Universidade Estadual Paulista, Marlia, Brasil)
pp. 48-61 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33890
[EN] The principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions in Kants
Practical Philosophy, Jean-Christophe Merle (Univ. of Vechta, Germany)
pp. 62-71 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33891
[IT] Kant. Il trascendentale e larmonia delle facolt, Francesco Valagussa (Univ. VitaSalute San Raffaele, Italia)
pp. 72-85 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33892
[DE] Die bereinstimmung zwischen Einbildungskraft und Verstand und die Erkenntnis
berhaupt , Oscar Meo (Univ. Genua, Italien)
pp. 86-99 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33901
[ES] Correspondencia o armona. La literatura en la distincin kantiana de las bellas artes,
Germn Garrido (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Espaa)
pp. 100-114 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33903
[IT] Unit e concordanza teleologica del mondo in Kant, Gerardo Cunico (Univ. di
Genova, Italia)
pp. 115-127 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33904
[ES] Armona en la dualidad frente a monismo naturalista: Kant y Habermas, Ana Mara
Andaluz Romanillos (Univ. Pontificia de Salamanca, Espaa)
pp. 128-150 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33906
[EN] Concepts of Aesthetics of Arts in Slovak Aesthetics of the 19th Century and Kants
Conception of Harmonization , Jana Sokova (Univ. Of Preov, Slovakia)
pp. 151-161 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33907
[EN] Self-deception and self-knowledge: Jane Austens Emma as an Example of Kants
Notion of Self-Deception, Jeanine Grenberg (Univ. Saint Olaf, USA)
pp. 162-176 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33972
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 1-6
ISSN: 2386-7655
DOSSIER / DOSSIER
Kant and the Enlightenment /
Kant y la Ilustracin
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 1-6
ISSN: 2386-7655
CTK 2
DOCUMENTOS / DOCUMENTS
[ES] El concepto kantiano de propiedad, Howard Williams (Univ. de Aberystwyth, Gran
Bretaa). Traduccin de Lorena Cebolla (Universit degli Studi di Trento, Italia)
pp. 347-359 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33983
[EN] And the Corpus still Breathes, David Pena-Guzmn (Laurentian Univ., Canada).
Review of Jennifer Mensch, Kants Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical
Theory, University of Chicago Press, 2013, 258 pp.
pp. 365-369 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.34032
[PT] Regresso a Kant. tica, Esttica, Filosofia poltica, Cludia Fidalgo da Silva (Univ.
Porto, Portugal). Resenha de Ribeiro dos Santos, L., Regresso a Kant tica, Esttica,
Filosofia Poltica, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2012, 549 pp.
pp. 380-388 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.34034
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 1-6
ISSN: 2386-7655
[ES] La filosofia prctica del profesor Immanuel Kant, Luciana Martnez (Universidad de
Buenos Aires, Argentina). Resea de O. Sensen/L. Denis (Eds.), Kants Lectures on Ethics,
CUP, 2014, 289 pp.
pp. 389-393 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.34035
[IT] Critica della ragione e teoria dellintuizione, Federico Ferraguto (Pontifcia Univ.
Catlica do Paran, Curitiba, Brasil). Recensione di Anselmo Aportone, Kant et le pouvoir
rceptif. Recherches sur la conception kantienne de la sensibilit, Paris, LHarmattan, 2014.
pp. 415-419 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.34039
[ES] La obra de Kant como progreso hacia s misma. La senda elptica, Jess Gonzlez
Fisac (Univ. de Cdiz, Espaa). Resea de Karl Ameriks, Kants Elliptical Path, Clarendom
Press, Oxford (UK), 2012.
pp. 420-425 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.34040
OBITUARIO / OBITUARY
[ES] Massimo Barale. In memoriam (1941-2015) (Univ. de Pisa, Italia), Nuria Snchez
Madrid (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Espaa)
pp. 426-427 / Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.34041
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 1-6
ISSN: 2386-7655
CTK 2
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 1-6
ISSN: 2386-7655
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 7-8
ISSN: 2386-7655
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33885
Editorial de CTK 2
El nmero 2 de Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)
presenta varias novedades con respecto a los nmeros 0 (Noviembre 2014) y 1 (Junio
2015). Por un lado, es la primera vez que se incorpora una seccin monogrfica, con el
ttulo de Kant y las declinacin de la armona / Kant and the Meanings of Harmony, cuyo
editor invitado es el profesor de la Scuola Superiore di SantAnna, Alberto Pirni. Tenemos
el placer de acoger en l artculos de Jeanine Grenberg, Jean-Christophe Merle, Ana M.
Andaluz Romanillos, Oscar Meo, Gerardo Cunico y Gualtiero Lorini, entre otros colegas.
En los prximos nmeros tenemos previsto dedicar secciones monogrficas a temas tales
como Kant en la Europa del Este y El cosmopolitismo kantiano, a cargo de Vadim Chaly
(IKBFU, Rusia) y Pablo Muchnik (Emory College, USA), respectivamente, como editores
invitados. Por otra parte, se inaugura una nueva seccin, la destinada a Dossiers, donde
recogeremos textos que mantengan alguna discusin sobre cuestiones de inters para el
estudio y actualizacin del pensamiento de Kant, dedicada en esta ocasin a Kant y la
Ilustracin y protagonizada por los colegas de la Univ. de Illinois, Sam Fleischacker, de la
Univ. de Montral, Claude Pich, y de la Univ. Memorial de Canada, Jol Madore, Jay
Foster y Sami Rajiva. El equipo editor se siente muy satisfecho con esta colaboracin, que
enriquece y ampla el alcance y proyeccin internacional de la revista.
Otra novedad es que la traduccin del texto de Kant no lo es al espaol, sino al
portugus, porque hemos advertido que sera interesante dar a conocer traducciones de
textos kantianos en cualquiera de las seis lenguas admitidas por nuestra revista (espaol,
ingls, francs, portugus, italiano, e incluso alemn, si se tratara de un original en latn),
concediendo especial relevancia a las lenguas romances. Tampoco habamos previsto
publicar dos reseas de un mismo libro, pero el inters concitado por alguno de los ttulos
reseados as lo aconsej. Ojal esa situacin se repita en ulteriores ocasiones. Los
colaboradores de CTK nos van dictando todas estas novedades, que vienen a dinamizar
nuestra estructura inicial. Siguen presentes las secciones dedicadas a Entrevistas en esta
ocasin realizada al prof. de la Univ. de Montral, Claude Pich; Discusiones con
motivo de un escrito de Anna Laura Macor, de la Universidad de Oxford, comentado y
discutido por Luca Bodas, de la Univ. Autnoma de Madrid; Documentos donde el
Roberto R. Aramayo
lector encontrar la traduccin al espaol del primer artculo publicado por Howard
Williams, de la Univ. de Aberystwyth y Crtica de Libros, que pretende ofrecer una
panormica amplia de las novedades bibliogrficas en el campo de los estudios kantianos,
atendiendo a su variedad lingstica. Recordamos que el Boletn de Noticias se publicar
nicamente en el primer nmero de cada ao. Finalmente, hemos decidido abrir una
seccin compuesta por semblanzas vinculadas a obituarios, que inauguramos con la
dedicada al profesor Massimo Barale, de la Univ. de Pisa, antiguo responsable de la revista
Studi Kantiani, recientemente fallecido.
Nos planteamos ampliar las iniciativas de la revista con la publicacin de una serie
editorial inspirada en los Sonderhefts promovidos por algunas revistas prestigiosas, es
decir, una coleccin de fascculos paralela a los nmeros ordinarios semestrales, quiz con
una periodicidad anual, en la que podran tener cabida contenidos varios de investigacin
kantiana, manteniendo siempre la impronta internacional y multilinge. Contendran desde
volmenes colectivos al estilo de los Companions anglosajones, a tesis doctorales, escritas
igualmente en cualquiera de los seis idiomas ya mencionados, seleccionadas mediante un
concurso ad hoc, estudios monogrficos en las modalidades de senior y junior, as como
traducciones de Kant cuidadosamente introducidas y anotadas de textos cuya longitud
desbordase la longitud que dedica a esta seccin cada nmero ordinario.
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 7-8
ISSN: 2386-7655
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33885
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 9-10
ISSN: 2386-7655
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33886
Roberto R. Aramayo
Massimo Barale (Univ. of Pisa, Italy), former main editor of the journal Studi Kantiani,
who recently passed away. The international Kantian research will always have him in
grateful remembrance.
We study to enlarge the agenda of the journal launching a new publishing action
inspired in prestigious journals Sonderhefts, i.e. a collection of materials to be published
once per year, which will contain results of international and multilinguistical Kants
research. CTK Sonderhefts will accept collective volumes in the vein of Anglo-Saxon
Companions, PhD essays, written in one of the six mentioned languages, selected by a call
ad hoc, monographic studies in modalities senior and junior and finally Kants translations
accurately introduced and critical edited, whose length would discourage to include them
in a CTK issue.
Berlin, November 2015
Roberto R. Aramayo
Editor-In-Chief of CTK
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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 9-10
ISSN: 2386-7655
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33886
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 11-19
ISSN: 2386-7655
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33887
MARIA HOTES
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt, Munich, Allemagne
Claude Pich est n Salaberry-de-Valleyfield (Qubec, Canada) en 1952. Il a fait ses tudes de
baccalaurat (1971-1974) et de matrise (1974-1975) en philosophie lUniversit de Montral.
Aprs avoir complt sa matrise en dposant un mmoire sur Kant sous la direction de Garbis
Kortian (1938-2009), il quitte le Canada afin de poursuivre ses tudes doctorales lUniversit
de Heidelberg (1975-1979), sous la direction de Dieter Henrich (1927-). Sa thse de doctorat,
intitule Das Ideal. Ein Problem der Kantischen Ideenlehre, a t publie chez Bouvier en
1984. Immdiatement aprs avoir complt sa thse de doctorat, il est embauch titre de
professeur au Dpartement de philosophie de lUniversit de Montral en 1980, o il a enseign
jusquau mois de juin 2015. l'Universit de Montral, il a donn des cours et sminaires sur
Kant (philosophie thorique et pratique), l'idalisme allemand, le no-kantisme et la
phnomnologie. Au-del de ses activits professorales, Claude Pich est un chercheur actif la
fois sur le continent amricain et sur le continent europen. ce dernier titre, il convient de
souligner son rle au sein de la Socit dtudes kantiennes en langue franaise (SEKLF), dont
il est vice-prsident depuis 2001. Il fait galement partie du comit de rdaction des KantStudien.
(1) En considrant les nombreuses annes que vous avez consacres l'enseignement et
la recherche fondamentale en philosophie, la premire question qui se pose est sans doute
celle de la motivation. Quest-ce qui vous a conduit vous intresser la philosophie ?
Il faut dire quau Qubec, dans les collges, c'est--dire au niveau pr-universitaire,
il y avait quatre cours de philosophie obligatoires1. Or j'ai tout de suite t fascin par ces
enseignements. Sans doute, je ne connaissais rien la philosophie jusqu'alors, mais la force
dattraction de cette discipline a opr immdiatement. Et il y a de bonnes raisons pour
Doctorante de philosophie chez la Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt (Munich, Allemagne). Boursire
du CRSH (Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada). E-mail de contact:
1
maria.hotes@gmail.com
l'heure actuelle, il y a trois cours obligatoires.
11
Mara Hotes
cela : c'est que j'ai commenc frquenter le collge en 1969 et mon professeur de
philosophie revenait tout juste dun sjour dtudes Paris, donc au lendemain de ce qu'il
est convenu d'appeler la pense 68 . C'tait une priode d'effervescence incroyable. Il
nous faisait dcouvrir Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Barthes, Ricoeur etc. Ainsi, par
exemple, Foucault avait publi en 1966 Les mots et les choses et Derrida avait fait paratre
lanne suivante, coup sur coup, De la grammatologie, La voix et le phnomne et
Lcriture et la diffrence. C'tait un temps bni pour la philosophie. Pour le jeune tudiant
que j'tais et qui s'intressait la littrature et la culture en gnral, c'tait quelque chose
de tout fait extraordinaire comme dcouverte. Je peux me considrer privilgi d'avoir t
le contemporain de ce mouvement philosophique.
Avant votre entre l'Universit, vous aviez donc t en contact essentiellement avec la
pense franaise
Oui, mais en mme temps aussi avec la pense philosophique traduite en franais :
je me rappelle en loccurrence que La linguistique cartsienne (1969) de Chomsky faisait
partie de notre cursus philosophique. De mme pour la pense allemande, le tout passant
par la tradition franaise. Et je pense que c'tait une excellente chose.
(2) On a souvent tendance opposer, tort ou raison, l'histoire de la philosophie
la philosophie. Si l'on admet cette opposition, il ne semble pas abusif d'affirmer que
votre dmarche est avant tout celle d'un historien des ides. Comment en tes-vous venu
privilgier cette faon de faire de la philosophie ?
Avant dentrer luniversit, j'avais tudi la littrature, dont jtais passionn. Or,
cette poque, on privilgiait lapproche structurale des textes littraires. On peut
penser ce que lon veut du courant structuraliste qui prvalait alors, mais je crois que ce qui
doit retenir lattention ici, cest le fait qu'une uvre, quelle quelle soit, possde une
articulation et qu'il vaut la peine de s'intresser sa construction, sa matrialit, sa
lettre. Ainsi, lorsque je me suis ensuite dirig vers la philosophie, il me semblait que c'tait
une manire tout fait naturelle d'aborder les textes : porter attention sa textualit et de l
sa teneur mme. On peut dire en consquence que j'ai d'abord mis laccent sur une
approche de la philosophie que lon pourrait qualifier de philologique. Quel meilleur accs
l'esprit d'un texte, en effet, que le passage par la lettre ? Sans en rester une lecture
servile, bien sr.
(3) La philosophie allemande a la rputation d'tre particulirement difficile d'accs, si
bien qu'il semble pertinent de se questionner, non seulement sur l'intrt que prsente pour
vous la philosophie en gnral, mais plus particulirement la philosophie allemande,
laquelle vous consacrez vos recherches. Comment expliquez-vous cet attrait, premire
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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 11-19
ISSN: 2386-7655
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33887
vue sans doute difficile comprendre ? Et, dans ce contexte, pourquoi s'intresser tout
particulirement Kant ?
Les dfis que prsente la lettre du kantisme prennent entre autres la forme
d'ambiguts. Or on se rend compte quil sagit dambiguts qui sont, le plus souvent,
philosophiquement significatives, en ce sens qu'elles ne sont pas dues simplement une
insouciance quelconque de la part de Kant. Bien sr, on sait que ce dernier ne possde pas
une terminologie parfaitement stable et que, lorsquil formule des dfinitions, il prend
parfois un malin plaisir y droger. Il nen reste pas moins que la difficult prouve par
lapprenti qui se confronte au texte a bien souvent voir avec la chose mme. C'est une
difficult qui est inhrente au thme lui-mme et qui nest pas imputable une maladresse
littraire de la part de Kant. Bref, le kantisme prsente un corpus qui est trs riche, difficile,
mais dune difficult laquelle il vaut la peine de se frotter mon avis.
Vous me demandez : pourquoi la philosophie de Kant en particulier ? La question
simpose parce que, videmment, dans la tradition allemande il y a plusieurs oeuvres qui
sont d'une difficult redoutable : on pense Fichte, Hegel ou encore Husserl et
Heidegger. Pourquoi alors la philosophie de Kant ? Bien sr, parce que c'est le philosophe
de la raison. Mais, d'abord et avant tout, c'est un penseur qui, comme on sait, s'est appliqu
dlimiter la raison, en tracer les bornes. J'ai t demble sensible cette approche. On
dit de lui, juste titre, qu'il est un philosophe de la finitude. Donc un philosophe de la
raison, oui, mais qui, avant toute chose, s'emploie rabaisser les prtentions de cette raison
et mettre en veilleuse l'aspect conqurant de la philosophie moderne qui, se rclamant de
cette raison, a pu prtendre un certain moment tre en mesure de rsoudre tous les
problmes. Bref une raison revue la baisse et rvalue selon ses justes prtentions et son
potentiel lgitime, tant du point de vue de la philosophie thorique que du point de vue de
la philosophie pratique.
Sil est un aspect qui minterpelle tout particulirement chez Kant, cest la
reconnaissance de la contingence. Kant est un philosophe qui maintient ltonnement
devant la contingence. Or l'tonnement, comme on le sait, c'est peut-tre la vertu
philosophique premire. Pourquoi ? Parce que la contingence reprsente la part de ce qui
est inattendu, ce qui n'tait pas prvisible. Cest ce quoi le philosophe est confront. On
pense en outre la troisime Critique : la beaut naturelle, par exemple, provoque
ltonnement, tout comme la finalit des organismes. Kant est le philosophe qui prend acte
de cette contingence et qui tente de l'expliquer, mais sans la rduire ou sans chercher la
dduire d'un principe premier qui liminerait la dimension de surprise lie la contingence.
L'tonnement demeure chez lui parce que le principe explicatif, mme s'il est
transcendantal dans le cas de la beaut naturelle, renvoie ultimement un substrat
extrieur, un vis--vis hors de porte. Si lon se tourne par ailleurs vers la premire
Critique, on constate que la contingence y est galement prsente. Kant nous avoue trs
franchement que l'espace et le temps, comme formes de l'intuition, sont pour nous des
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 11-19
ISSN: 2386-7655
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33887
13
Mara Hotes
formes irrductibles et inexplicables. Les choses sont ainsi et pas autrement. De la mme
faon, les catgories sont au nombre de douze, ni plus ni moins. Il faut faire avec cette
contingence, sans tenter de la rsorber. Je dirais en somme que Kant accepte la pluralit
des lments, la pluralit des principes, ne serait-ce qu'au plan du partage entre thorie et
pratique : il y a l des principes qui sont irrductibles les uns aux autres. Irrductibilit
donc des lments dans leur pluralit. On a le sentiment que chez lui cest le point de
dpart dans la pluralit qui savre philosophiquement fructueux, dans la mesure o le
philosophe a pour tche de retracer les relations et linteraction entre les lments en vue
de dgager, tout au plus, leur convergence et leur unit tlologique. Que lon songe au
refus de Kant de driver les diffrentes races humaines dune race unique, ou encore ses
rticences dduire les facults de lme dune facult fondamentale.
Il y a malgr tout une dimension systmatique chez Kant, voire une prtention fonder
un systme
C'est une exigence qu'il se pose comme philosophe au nom de la scientificit. Le
philosophe doit prendre en compte le tout et tenter d'y voir clair. Le systme est en
revanche complexe chez lui et en attente constante de sa clture. On le sait, les successeurs
immdiats de Kant ont t dus par la faon dont, dans la Critique de la facult de juger,
il a tent de ficeler le systme. Il faut en convenir, les traits d'union entre thorie et pratique
tels qu'ils sont prsents dans la troisime Critique, savoir le volet esthtique et le volet
tlologique, sont plutt modestes. Et c'est, je pense, tout fait caractristique de la
philosophie de Kant. Le systme demeure une exigence et Kant a tent dy rpondre
laide des moyens sa disposition. Il y a l une modestie qui n'est pas un trait de caractre
mais qui vient de la confrontation la chose mme.
(4) Lorsque l'on s'intresse vos recherches sur Kant, on constate un intrt soutenu, tout
au long de votre carrire, pour des enjeux d'ordre thorique (on peut penser notamment
la question du jugement, au problme de la chose en soi, de la dduction transcendantale,
de l'auto-rfrentialit du discours kantien, etc.). Toutefois, ces dernires annes, vous
semblez vous intresser de plus en plus des enjeux relevant de la philosophie pratique,
tels que le cosmopolitisme kantien par exemple. Comment expliquez-vous ce changement,
condition que vous admettiez qu'il y a un tel changement ?
Oui, c'est tout fait vrai. J'ai d'une certaine faon suivi l'itinraire de Kant, qui a
commenc aussi par des considrations trs clairement thoriques. Ce sont les problmes
thoriques par lesquels je suis entr dans la philosophie de Kant : la Critique de la raison
pure offre en effet des dfis vraiment considrables pour lapprenti-philosophe comme par
exemple, vous lavez dit, le thme de la chose en soi ou la thorie du discours
philosophique. Ce sont des problmes qui mintressent encore et jy travaille toujours.
Ainsi, il nous revient de reconstruire la mthodologie transcendantale de Kant parce que
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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS
International Journal of Philosophy
N.o 2, Noviembre 2015, pp. 11-19
ISSN: 2386-7655
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33887
15
Mara Hotes
honntet possible, en montrer la cohrence et la cohsion avant de songer le critiquer. Il
sagit dun dfi constamment renouvel pour un enseignant, surtout avec des auteurs
complexes. Et ce dfi est dautant plus redoutable que, dans une situation pdagogique, on
ne sait jamais d'o va venir la question ; cest parfois linterrogation nave nous donne plus
de difficult, et non la question savante. Ceci est particulirement vrai du premier cycle. Si
lon songe en revanche aux sminaires des cycles suprieurs, lattitude adopter est
diffrente : le professeur a pour mission dinstaurer un climat de recherche, mais une
recherche que l'on fait en commun avec les tudiants autour de textes dtermins
l'avance. Nous avons donc un objet en commun et nous tentons d'y voir clair. Je dois
avouer que j'ai eu, dans ma carrire, des tudiants extrmement brillants qui ont rendu ces
sminaires d'autant plus riches et intressants. J'prouve dailleurs une trs grande
satisfaction voir mes tudiants progresser et poursuivre leur cheminement de manire
indpendante.
(6) Revenons en arrire. Avant d'y tre professeur, vous avez frquent l'Universit de
Montral titre d'tudiant de baccalaurat (B. A.) et de matrise (M. A.) entre 1971 et
1975. Vous avez alors dcid de rdiger votre mmoire de matrise sur Kant sous la
direction de Garbis Kortian (1938-2009). Or, on sait que, avant 1970, la philosophie
allemande tait plutt marginale au Qubec2, si bien que le choix d'y faire carrire ne
devait pas aller de soi. Que retirez-vous, en ce qui concerne particulirement la situation
de la recherche en philosophie allemande, de ces annes de formation ?
J'ai eu de la chance d'arriver l'Universit de Montral quelques annes peine
aprs l'embauche du Professeur Garbis Kortian. Il avait reu sa formation l'Universit de
Vienne et avait sjourn en Allemagne o il avait frquent les milieux philosophiques : il
avait suivi les enseignements d'Adorno, de Habermas et de Gadamer. C'est donc quelqu'un
qui possdait une connaissance de premire main de la philosophie allemande
contemporaine tout en tant un minent spcialiste de Kant et de l'idalisme allemand.
Dans ses cours, nous tions dentre de jeu plongs dans cet univers passionnant ou dans
ce que Hegel appelle l lment de la philosophie. Cest aussi Garbis Kortian qui m'a
incit rdiger un mmoire de matrise sur Kant et qui m'a encourag poursuivre mes
tudes doctorales en Allemagne.
Concernant vos tudes en Allemagne, justement : est-ce que votre formation doctorale
l'Universit de Heidelberg, sous la direction de Dieter Henrich (1927-), a modifi la
manire dont vous conceviez l'poque la recherche en philosophie allemande ?
Cf. Jean Grondin, Les dbuts de la philosophie allemande au Canada franais : Contexte et raisons , in:
R. Klibansky et J. Boulab-Ayoub (dir.), La pense philosophique d'expression franaise au Canada. Le
rayonnement du Qubec, Qubec: Presses de l'Universit Laval, 1998, p. 211.
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travail d'appropriation doit tre fait par chacune des aires linguistiques et, en langue
franaise, force nous est davouer que la chose est fort bien amorce. Il ne tient qu nous
de poursuivre cette tche.
(8) La recherche en histoire de la philosophie, et plus forte raison dans les tudes
kantiennes, est plus souvent qu'autrement une tche trs thorique, voire spculative. Dans
une perspective kantienne, il y a pourtant une prsance du pratique sur le thorique, si
bien que l'on peut dire que le travail philosophique, mme dans son volet thoricospculatif, doit, en dernire instance, conduire l'agir moral. Dans ce contexte, comment
concevez-vous le rle de la philosophie et du philosophe ?
Kant crit dans la Critique de la raison pure, propos de la Rpublique de Platon,
qu'il ne sied pas de se moquer de telles constructions idales bien quelles soient
proprement parler sans doute irralisables. En effet, si nous ne disposions pas de tels
modles qui prennent la forme d'une Ide, l'humanit ferait du sur place. Il faut qu'il y ait
une orientation, quitte ce que ce soit le philosophe qui en esquisse le fil conducteur. On
se rappelle, par exemple, qu'en 1784, dans l'Ide d'une histoire universelle au point de vue
cosmopolitique, Kant voque une lecture de l'histoire qui, si l'on s'en tient strictement
l'enchanement des faits, donne l'apparence d'un chaos. Il procde alors une interprtation
de lhistoire qui tente de lui confrer un sens, savoir ici, comme on le sait, lamlioration
progressive des constitutions politiques. Il sagit manifestement l, comme le titre de
lopuscule lindique, dune simple Ide . Mais il y a en vrit un devoir philosophique
implicite de rechercher, dans le cours de l'histoire, les indices dun progrs moral (au sens
large). Et si ce n'est pas un progrs thique, du moins peut-il sagir dun progrs au sens
juridique, au sens politique. Voil donc une manire de souligner le rle crucial de l'Ide
chez Kant, rle qui tait demble mis en valeur dans la Critique de la raison pure. J'ai
dailleurs consacr ma thse de doctorat au thme de l'idal. Il sagit dun thme qui fait de
Kant sans contredit un penseur idaliste, cest--dire un idaliste sans illusion mais qui
insiste sur le caractre indispensable de lIde dans une perspective thique. Nous ne
sommes pas autoriss, selon lui, d'un point de vue moral, dsesprer du cours de l'histoire
humaine.
La question qui se pose ds lors est la suivante : comment le philosophe peut-il
intervenir de faon concrte, aprs avoir rappel notre devoir de lire l'histoire ou
d'interprter le cours des actions humaines d'un point de vue thique, mme si les faits nen
tmoignent pas de faon concluante ? Or le travail du philosophe, pour Kant, ne doit pas
tre sous-estim ici : il sagit en fait dun travail thorique au plan des concepts. Mais cet
claircissement conceptuel qui est aussi l'une des connotations du mot Aufklrung,
savoir rendre l'Ide, comme dirait Descartes, claire et distincte est un travail
philosophique trs spcifique, voire trs technique. Cette lucidation des concepts a une
porte que Kant n'a jamais nglige, savoir ici prsenter de faon conceptuellement juste
le critre du Bien, y compris le souverain bien politique. Pour Kant, c'est lun des lments
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Investigador de Filosofa poltica, Profesor adjunto de tica pblica en la Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna
Pisa. E-mail de contacto: a.pirni@sssup.it. Agradezco el apoyo lingstico recibido de Roberto R. Aramayo y
Nuria Snchez Madrid para ofrecer la presente versin al espaol de mi trabajo.
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1. Pensar en comunidad
[H]asta qu punto y con qu correccin pensaramos, si no pensramos, por decirlo as, en
comunidad [Gemeinschaft] con otros a los que comunicar [mittheilen] nosotros nuestros
pensamientos, y ellos los suyos a nosotros?.1
Esta afirmacin, que Kant incluye en las pginas finales de su importante escrito
Que significa orientarse en el pensamiento?, quiz nos brinde la posibilidad de captar uno
de los puntos de acceso ms directos a nuestro tema. El pasaje y, ms en general, el ensayo
en el cual aparece, ha de verse previamente contextualizado como parte de la trayectoria
intelectual del filsofo de Knigsberg.
El ensayo aparece en la Berlinische Monatsschrift en octubre del 1786, insertndose
as en un arco temporal comprendido entre 1783 y 1786, particularmente prolfico para
Kant. Ciertamente, en este perodo, Kant pblica muchos opsculos que testimonian, junto
a los cursos de las lecciones conservadas, una constelacin de intereses particularmente
fecundos para el tema que se intenta abordar aqu. Son estos los aos en los que Kant
vuelve al planteamiento metodolgico de la nueva crtica, pero tambin puntualiza sus
doctrinas de filosofa de la historia, filosofa del derecho y antropologa, aparte de
continuar, con gran xito, las lecciones de tica y de filosofa de la religin.
Ms especficamente, este es el trienio que comienza con la publicacin de los
Prolegmenos para toda metafsica venidera, la obra en la cual Kant comienza a trabajar
inmediatamente despus de la publicacin de la primera Crtica terminada al finalizar el
verano de 1782 y publicada al comienzo de 1783 con la intencin de ofrecer una especie
de compendio, de gua para la lectura y, sobre todo, una aclaracin general de la obra
mayor, impulsado sobre todo por algunos comentarios iniciales que parecan desconocer la
importancia de su propia propuesta, hasta tergiversar el intento general del criticismo.2
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Por otra parte, este es el trienio en que vern la luz algunos de los ensayos breves
ms clebres de Kant, desde la Idea de una historia universal en sentido cosmopolita a
Respuesta a la pregunta: Qu es la Ilustracin?, ambos del 1784. No por eso se debe
olvidar que en ese mismo perodo Kant plantea explcitamente el tema moral dentro del
criticismo, o sea, que abre una importante (y para la poca de la primera Critica tal vez
todava inesperada) ampliacin del criticismo hacia la bsqueda y definicin del
supremo principio de la moralidad [GMS, AA 04: 392, 3-4] que tendr en la
Fundamentacin de la metafsica de las costumbres (1784) una primera e importantsima
sntesis, en vista de la revolucin copernicana que se pretende realizar en el dominio de
la moral, de la cual se har cargo la Crtica de la razn prctica (1788).3 Por ltimo, para
confirmar un conjunto de intereses verdaderamente relevantes y que solo su genio supo
unir, 4 es necesario recordar dos aspectos, que ofrecen la frmula interpretativa ms
prxima a la cuestin que se intenta tematizar aqu.
Por un lado, Kant prosigue en estos aos con la articulacin y desarrollo de la
obra abierta con la primera Crtica. Este proceso consigue dos resultados relevantes.
Ante todo, Kant continua desarrollando su prometida tarea en las partes finales de la
primera Crtica, cuando publica los Primeros principios metafsicos de la ciencia de la
naturaleza (1786). Se trata de una obra que segn el propsito del filsofo es de algn
modo paralela a la Fundamentacin de la metafsica de las costumbres, al pretender
desplegar los dos dominios tradicionales de la metafsica, ms precisamente de las
costumbres y de la naturaleza, en la obra Critica. De manera secundaria, Kant trabaja,
durante todo 1786 y por un perodo ms largo de lo que haba previsto en una segunda
edicin de la obra mayor, o bien una zweite, hin unde wieder verbesserte Auflage [KRV,
AA:3, 5], que como es sabido enriquecer cabalmente esa obra.
Por otro lado aqu est el segundo aspecto que deseaba subrayar , a partir del
23 de abril de 1786, Kant es nombrado Rector de la Universidad de Knigsberg. Este
importante cargo que adems ser una de las causas del retraso del trabajo de la segunda
edicin de la Crtica y tal vez de su abandono, antes de una primera revisin del texto
completo nos da la idea de un Kant indito, empeado en una responsabilidad
institucional y pblica de organizacin y transmisin del saber que afront con seriedad,
aunque fuera por un breve perodo, a pesar de la gran cantidad de trabajo cientfico que
todava recaera sobre l para tratar de dar al sistema crtico una integridad, diremos, una
cierta armona.
Considerndolo ntegramente, en el trienio 1783-86 Kant se encuentra en uno de los
momentos ms importantes de su vida, caracterizado por una doble excepcionalidad. Por
un lado, nos hallamos ante el lapso ms complejo de su carrera intelectual, si se observa la
3
He intentado reconstruir el tortuoso camino que, a partir del periodo pre-crtico conduce a Kant a la
ampliacin de ambos ensayos en este periodo de tiempo A. Pirni, Kant filosofo della comunit, Pisa, ETS
2006, cap. 1.
4
No podemos ocuparnos aqu de los cursos impartidos por Kant en su intensa actividad didctica, pero en las
lecciones de metafsica, antropologa, derecho natural, tica y doctrina de la religin se aprecian las semillas
ms importantes de posteriores obras fundamentales del filosofo de Knigsberg.
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variedad e importancia de los intereses tericos que tena ante s en aquel tiempo. Por el
otro, es este el perodo que culmina para el filsofo prestando la mxima atencin al
frente pblico y con el desempeo de responsabilidades pblicas, ciertamente a partir del
ejercicio del cargo de Rector, siendo esta funcin institucional inusitada en un camino
biogrfico que, como es sabido, encontr su sello caracterstico en la sobriedad y la
cautela, antes que en la bsqueda de visibilidad y poder.
Por tanto, este es un periodo en el que Kant, consciente de lo realizado y, al mismo
tiempo, del todava dilatado camino que le esperaba, no ceja en la compleja bsqueda de
una armona dentro del proprio sistema, que tal vez nunca como en aquellos aos apareca
a sus ojos necesitado de una orientacin general (quiz las partes dedicadas a la
Arquitectura y Disciplina de la Razn pura fueron acaso inspiradas tambin por esta
urgencia de fondo, ms amplia, de la misma exigencia de crtica de la razn?).
Y es en este contexto temporal donde madura tambin el ensayo Que significa
orientarse en el pensamiento? Kant, al tomar partido dentro del intenso debate entre el
racionalismo y el dogmatismo de Mendelssohn y el fidesmo intuicionista de Jacobi,
propone fecundas reflexiones sobre la nocin de limite y sobre la necesidad subjetiva, si
bien, con una mayor relacin respecto a nuestro tema, se detiene varias veces en el
problema de cmo sobre cmo sea posible orientarse en la bsqueda de las condiciones
que determinan los diversos campos, mbitos y lmites de posibilidad de una filosofa
trascendental, o sea, en la bsqueda de una armona entre las numerosas partes de un saber
crtico limitado pero, por este mismo motivo, totalmente slido y estable, con
independencia del rumbo que se proponga tomar: he aqu lo que, en definitiva, se ha
intentado calificar como una crtica de la razn armnica.
Para su elaboracin, cabra subrayar al menos dos declinaciones del pensar en
comunidad mencionado al principio. Una razn pura armnica, por un lado, se ve
obligada a constituir una comunidad, una unin, una systematische Verbindung entre los
diversos saberes, o bien entre las necesidades de la razn, para encontrar respuesta a
exigencias diferentes, por ejemplo desde la historia a la moral, y desde sta a la poltica y
al derecho, solamente por citar uno de entre los mltiples caminos de armonizacin
buscados.
Por otro lado, esta armonizacin se encuentra en el centro de una comunidad de
comunicaciones, un nexo entre diversos sujetos que, solo compartiendo unos con otros los
propios pensamientos, pueden cultivar la esperanza de armonizar los contenidos de estos
ltimos: Hasta qu punto y con qu correccin pensaramos?. En primer lugar, a nivel
individual, en el plano de la coherencia subjetiva e interna y, con respecto al mbito
intersubjetivo, en el plano del consenso alcanzable y alcanzado solo por la armona,
aunque igualmente por la concordia discordans, de un debate autntico y libre, un debate
del que quepa esperar que represente un genuino avance en cada posible campo del saber.
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2. La armona como crtica y horizonte pblico del filosofar
Junto a las ya sealadas exigencias biogrficas y tericas de Kant, tendentes a poner
orden en la propia agenda de investigacin, se trata de descubrir, a partir del lapso
temporal aludido, una declinacin metdica y especfica del concepto de armona que
aparece ms pronto que tarde. Obviamente, las figuras y los significados de la armona
para Kant son muchos y especficos. Los ensayos recogidos en esta seccin monogrfica lo
testimonian con la variedad de su anlisis. Sin embargo, el sentido metdico que decamos
posea una caracterizacin posterior, al tratarse de una declinacin que, por un lado,
devolva la frmula pre-ilustrada de Kant y, por el otro, confirmaba su peculiar
interpretacin de la Ilustracin y de la pregunta acerca de su sentido, a la que el filsofo, en
el fondo, sigue respondiendo a lo largo de toda su trayectoria intelectual.
Si se opta por una frmula sinttica, propondra conjugar armona y crtica, en la
forma precisa de una crtica armnica. Lo que pretendo afirmar es que, a partir de la gran
luz de los aos 60, es la institucin lo que llevar a Kant a acuar el concepto de
trascendental y a concebir el esquema de lo que ser ms tarde la Crtica de la razn
pura, que comporta la doble conciencia de tener el material para comenzar un nuevo
decurso para la filosofa de su tiempo con vistas a los tiempos venideros y,
simultneamente, la conciencia de asumir la tarea de poder desarrollarlo, teniendo de ese
modo que volver siempre como antecedente al camino recorrido por toda la filosofa hasta
l mismo, para comprenderla mejor con arreglo a la inextirpable exigencia metafsica de la
razn y sacarla as a la luz gracias a los precisos tejidos consolidados de la filosofa
crtica.
En esto consiste el intento, diremos, comprehensivo y por ende intrnsecamente
armnico de Kant, al no evitar la comparacin y no dejar de lado ninguna teora, sin
antes haberla examinado bajo la luz de crtica, ejercitando esta ltima como muestra de
armona transcendental, es decir, de equilibrio entre como era antes y quiz pudiera al
margen de la empresa crtica, y cuanto es posible ahora, en el espacio acaso ms limitado,
pero seguramente por ello mismos mejor fundamentado, segn un interminable proceso de
ida y vuelta, que parte de las tradiciones y las restituye al presente iluminado por la crtica.
En el interior de este cono de luces, tal vez estn comprendidos o reledos an los
innumerables binomios conceptuales que Kant disemina a lo largo de toda su obra, desde
el concepto escolar contrapuesto al concepto csmico de la filosofa o la ms clebre
distincin entre fenmeno y nomeno, solo por mencionar dos de los de mayor impacto, a
binomios que consideramos ms internos a su sistema: sensible / inteligible, espacio /
tiempo, posibilidad / imposibilidad, sentidos / entendimiento, entendimiento / razn, razn
/ fe, analtica / dialctica, limitado / ilimitado, naturaleza / libertad, libertad / ley, guerra /
paz, metafsica / crtica, cuya enumeracin exhaustiva resultara excesivamente prolija.
Partiendo de la comprensin conjunta de estos dos ltimos binomios conceptuales acaso
pueda emerger con mayor claridad el sentido comprehensivo y metdico de la idea
kantiana de armona. Luego se volver sobre este punto.
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No es ahora posible detenerse analticamente sobre esto, an siendo un texto de inters, en el que Kant
interpreta y revisa en manera muy interesante las tesis leibnizianas. Nos referimos aqu a los Principes de la
Nature et de la Grce fonds en raison (1714) y a los Principes de la Philosophie (obra redactada en francs
en 1714, pero publicada en alemn en 1720, con el ttulo de Lehrstze ber die Monadologie. Kant imagina y
describe aqu una funcin ms directa y activa de las mnadas, que quedan en equilibrio y armona entre
ellas, sobre todo por la originaria actividad de cada una, que necesita la ocupacin de un spatiolum alrededor
de s misma y que, consiguientemente impide a cada mnada acercarse a las otras ms all de cierto lmite.
Esto sucede, segn Kant, sobre la base del newtoniano principio de repulsin fsica entre los cuerpos y no,
leibnizianamente, a partir de la intervencin divina de armonizacin entre las mnadas, culminando la
armona preestablecida entre el Reino de la Naturaleza y el Reino de la Gracia. Entre los estudios ms
recientes sobre la confrontacin crtica entre Kant y Leibniz vase S. Storrie, Kant's 1768 attack on Leibniz
conception of space, Kant-Studien, 104 (2013), no. 2, pp. 145-166.
6
Trume, AA 02: 330, trad. por C. Canterla. Para un anlisis exhaustivo de las numerosas referencias
implicados en este pasaje y en todo el segundo captulo sigue siendo en mi opinin un estudio de referencia
la obra de A. Lamacchia, La filosofia della religione in Kant. I Dal dogmatismo teologico al teismo morale
(1755-1783), Lacaita, Bari 1969, spec. pp. 296-303 e pp. 523-534.
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El mundo formado por los seres inmateriales se estructura como un enlace [Verbindung],
o bien como una conexin [Verknpfung], en una relacin que implica reciprocidad y
comunidad, que, sin obstculos procedentes de las particularidades y obstculos materiales,
se presenta as de modo indisoluble como comunidad dinmica. El discurso protagonizado
aqu por los seres inmateriales los espritus se volver a mencionar y a desarrollar
denominndolos seres razonables o integrantes del reino de los fines, figura posterior
que ser paradigmtica de la armona crtica en su especfica declinacin moral,
introducida en la Fundamentacin, sobre la cual no es posible ahora detenerse
analticamente7; mientras la totalidad por s misma es independiente, calificada ahora
como indisoluble, ser considerada en el contexto ms maduro de la filosofa crtica,
como una unin sistemtica.
Ahora bien, como se ha mencionado con anterioridad, para captar quiz el ncleo
ms caracterstico de una ideal crtica de la razn armnica, es necesario volver a dos de
los binomio citados ms arriba, ms exactamente a aquel que rene a la guerra y la paz, y
aquel otro que hace lo mismo con la metafsica y la crtica. Naturalmente, todo intento de
presentar con mayor detalle este conjunto conceptual superara los lmites de este texto.
Con todo, en la amplia obra de Kant es posible descubrir un breve texto, diez aos
posterior respecto al citado anteriormente, que parece constituir un tornasol ideal de este
plexo temtico. Se trata del Anuncio de la prxima conclusin de un tratado de paz
perpetua en la filosofa, publicado en diciembre de 1796 en la Berlinische Monatsschrift,
que quiz pueda ser interpretado como la mayor expresin kantiana de la vocacin
autnticamente pblica de la filosofa crtica, y al mismo tiempo, de toda filosofa que
pretenda inspirarse en esa indicacin metodolgica.8
Como es sabido, es posible encontrar en Kant numerosas connotaciones,
eminentemente jurdico-polticas y tico-religiosas, del concepto de paz perpetua. Sin
embargo, parece poderse reconocer tambin perfilada en su obra una idea ms
comprensiva de paz, que incluye no solo estas facetas del saber filosfico, sino tambin
una que posibilita estas ltimas: la dimensin metafsico-gnoseolgica. 9 A esta ltima
parece dedicarse ms plenamente Kant justo en el escrito de 1796, aun cuando en realidad
no puede considerarse una novedad en trminos absolutos. Desde el Prefacio a la
primera edicin hasta llegar a la Doctrina del mtodo de la Crtica de la razn pura Kant
haba presentado el campo de la metafsica como un lugar de combate y, al mismo
tiempo, la crtica como el tribunal resolutivo de toda controversia posible en semejante
7
Para un anlisis ms amplio de este concepto me permito remitir a: A. Pirni, Il regno dei fini in Kant.
Morale, religione e politica in collegamento sistematico, il melangolo, Genova 2000.
8
He presentado una interpretacin de todo el ensayo, situndolo en relacin con otros dos escritos menores
significativos de aquellos aos, De un tono de gran seor recientemente adoptado en filosofa y Sobre un
presunto derecho a mentir por filantropa en: A. Pirni, The Philosophers Public Calling: The Problems and
Implications of Kants Announcement of the Upcoming Conclusion of a Treatise of Perpetual Peace in
Philosophy, in R. Orden/ J. Rivera de Rosales /R. Hanna / R. Louden/ N. Sanchez Madrid (ed.), Critical
Paths Outside the Critiques. Kants Shorter Writings, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Cambridge
(forthcoming).
9
Para amplio examen de este punto, vase: G. Cunico, Pace, guerra e conflitto in Kant, in I. Kant, Guerra
e pace. Politica, religiosa, filosofica, a cura di G. Cunico, Diabasis, Reggio Emilia 2004, pp. 9-32.
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campo, gracias a su doble capacidad, por un lado, de limitar las pretensiones cognoscitivas
de lo suprasensible y, por el otro, de dirigir fundadamente sus pretensiones legtimas
articulando un camino que de la sensibilidad conduca al intelecto y de este a las tres ideas
de la razn, entendidas como estructuras capaces de conferir unidad teleolgica al conjunto
de los conocimientos posibles.
El Anuncio puede situarse en esta ltima lnea, pero contiene un tejido
argumentativo diferente y original, de inicial matriz antropolgica. Kant comienza
considerando el carcter de la vida entendida como accin inmanente de fuerzas
estimulantes que connota la naturaleza del hombre, pero entendido antes de su
universalidad, es decir antes de la obtencin del carcter racional que lo distingue
especficamente de cualquier otro animal. Este carcter le permite en efecto sutilizar
[vernnfteln], filosofar, pero tambin disputar con un tono encendido, hasta llevar a la
guerra abierta, unidos en masa contra otros (escuela contra escuela, como ejrcito contra
ejrcito).10
No obstante, este es un carcter o un impulso sano, que permite al hombre
mantenerse activo y mantener lejos [] la gran desgracia de descomponerse todava
viv[o]. Por este motivo hay que conservar este carcter pero, al mismo tiempo, incentivar
su estabilizacin, de forma permanentemente dinmica, sobre todo gracias a y a travs de
la filosofa. Segn Kant, la estabilizacin perpetuamente dinmica puede ser ofrecida slo
por la filosofa crtica. Esta es una filosofa que deja abierto el campo a la libre capacidad
de la razn humana, pero tras haberlo encerrado establemente dentro de la ms slida
legitimidad gnoseolgica. Esta filosofa, dice significativamente Kant, es un estado
siempre armado (AT, AA 8: 416, 23-25), contra los que, tratando de eliminar o discutir
esos lmites, no hacen ms que confundir los fenmenos con las cosas en s. Pero es
tambin una filosofa que tiene la prerrogativa de mantener siempre en activo las fuerzas
del sujeto [] para promover el propsito de la naturaleza de vivificar continuamente al
sujeto y preservarlo del sueo de la muerte (ibd.).
Aqu reside el significado ms profundo del ideal de paz perpetua aqu propugnado,
junto al concepto de armona como crtica, que constituye su pendant especulativo por el
lado terico: su carcter perenne, en un sentido, el punto de no retorno que el cambio
trascendental ha impreso en el saber filosfico, su inagotable dinamismo, en el otro, por el
cual la paz perpetua en filosofa (y la razn armnica) no es sinnimo de estaticidad, es
decir, de muerte en vida, sino de solidez de la base crtica en la que solo puede
desarrollarse de nuevo la discusin pblica ms viva, racionalmente fundada y, al mismo
tiempo, a la altura de la tarea de Ilustracin al que la razn ilustrada no puede renunciar.
3. Para una armona crtica polifnica, en y ms all de Kant
En este horizonte global, de enfrentamiento crtico armnico, o sea dinmico, siempre
reiterado y no simplemente ejercitado de manera constante, se inscribe as pues el itinerario
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cumplido en primera persona por Kant, pero tambin lo preconiza para cada camino del
pensar que est a la altura de su propia tarea. Desde este punto de vista parecen
confirmarse como un bajo continuo las palabras recordadas al comienzo de las
consideraciones aqu propuestas. De acuerdo con ello, dando lugar a aquella misma
indicacin metdica, se han intentado recoger en esta seccin monogrfica otros
numerosos significados, como dira George Herbert Mead, de la mano de contribuciones
de prestigiosos intrpretes, no solo de la letra kantiana, sino tambin de la tarea de fondo
que a ella subyace, en y ms all de Kant. Antes que nada, para intentar pensar en
comunidad aquella tarea, tratando de aproximarse a la esperanza de no haberla
desatendido del todo. Con el fin de entregar al lector una presentacin, algo armnica de
los textos presentados aqu, que proceden libremente del amplio depsito semntico de
la armona elaborado por Kant, se propone organizar el extenso material, de manera ideal,
en tres crculos concntricos que, conforme al orden general aqu articulado, encuentran su
elemento distintivo en otras declinaciones la idea de dilogo.
El primer crculo se concentra en la comparacin y dilogo de Kant con
pensadores contemporneos suyos, siempre en relacin con el tema de la armona. Se
recorren as las pginas que el filsofo, en el perodo pre-crtico, dedica al tema de la
causalidad en relacin con algunos autores de referencia de su poca, como Wolff y
Baumgarten, Knutzen y Crusius. El tema es interpretado revisando el punto de vista del
influjo fsico elaborado por dichos autores, en una direccin que perfilar una
redefinicin de la idea de espacio, un contexto en el que encontrar su oportuna ubicacin
la nocin de interaccin (commercium) entre sustancias, teniendo ciertamente como base
una relevante nocin metafsica de armona (Gualtiero Lorini). Se analiza y contextualiza
asimismo una anotacin escrita por Kant en los textos preparatorios del que ms tarde ser
el texto contra Eberhard, Sobre un descubrimiento, por el que toda nueva Crtica de la
razn pura debera volverse prescindible. El texto contiene una significativa anotacin y
metfora musical, que ofrece la ocasin para una ms amplia consideracin sobre el uso
del lxico musical en Kant y en Eberhard, un contexto semntico que ciertamente restituye
la principal y ms natural referencia del tema armnico en su conjunto, en comparacin
con aquellos con los que el filsofo de Knigsberg demuestra competencia y familiaridad
(Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques).
El segundo crculo de estudios se dirige en cambio al dilogo de Kant consigo
mismo, o sea al dilogo entre diferentes partes y obras del sistema, que se evocan unas
a las otras en una prolongada respuesta a varias, pero que en el fondo seran declinaciones
convergentes del tema de la armona. En este contexto se introduce en primer lugar una
reflexin acerca del principio de igualdad que gobierna acciones y reacciones el cual, en
conexin con el concepto de influjo fsico mencionado anteriormente y partiendo desde los
Principios metafsicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza, enfoca algunos textos relevantes de
la filosofa prctica kantiana, hasta culminar en la Rechtslehre, en dos diferentes
significados (dinmico y legal) del mismo principio (Jean-Christophe Merle). Pero el
camino que Kant articul a travs de las tres Crticas aparece tambin como el ensayo de
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reconstruir una lgica armnica que esas mismas obras haban separado: de este modo, la
armona entre ser y pensar, separada de la primera Crtica, y aquella entre virtud y
felicidad, dicotomizada por la segunda, encuentran en la tercera, a travs de una resemantizacin de la idea de naturaleza ahora ya no objeto de conocimiento, pero s
regla para una empresa esttica y artstica una posibilidad de recomposicin armnica
y comprensiva de las facultades de la razn (Francesco Valagussa).
Profundiza en este camino, o sea en el interior de la tercera Crtica, una reflexin
en torno a la nocin de cognicin en general, destinada a resolver el problema de la
comunicabilidad de los estados mentales relativos al juicio de gusto, as como el tema de la
armona entre comprensin e imaginacin. Aqu la buscada armona entre las facultades
cognitivas permite pensar en el dinamismo de las formas expresivas a un nivel pre-terico,
hasta interesar la posibilidad de experiencia de lo bello (Oscar Meo). Disponiendo bajo
otra luz este mismo tema, se profundiza tambin en un aspecto sustantivo de la misma
experiencia de lo bello: la funcin de la literatura y, ms especficamente, de la poesa,
como punto de elaboracin armnica entre el sentimiento de placer, tpico del uso del
bello, y las facultades cognoscitivas. La referencia a la literatura implica, en efecto, la
mediacin posible y necesaria entre sensibilidad y entendimiento, dando forma de este
modo, en una progresin retrospectiva desde la tercera a la primera Crtica, a una
interesante comparacin entre la nocin de correspondencia tpica de la primera teora
esttica con la de armona introducida en la Crtica de la facultad de juzgar (Germn
Garrido Miambres).
Cierra este segundo crculo concntrico una reflexin completa sobre el sistema del
pensamiento kantiano, dedicada al concepto de mundo. Se reconsidera, de este modo, la
nocin de armona en su significado ontolgico fundamental, o sea, en el interior de una
concordancia teleolgica que estaba en el centro de la metafsica dogmatica y que, a travs
del criticismo, destruye y configura nuevamente ya no en su dimensin tericoespeculativa, sino en virtud de un renovado significado teleolgico-moral que encuentra en
la concordancia final de los entes terminados su perspectiva propia (Gerardo Cunico).
Para finalizar, el tercer crculo concntrico que aqu se presenta intenta dar forma a
la imagen de otros pensadores en dilogo diacrnico con Kant. Esta parte comienza con un
ensayo dedicado a un captulo importante del dilogo, ms reciente, entre Habermas y
Kant, con particular referencia a la dinmica armnica entre lo sensible y lo inteligible,
resuelta por el primero, en el contexto del debate sobre determinismo y libertad, en el
marco de un naturalismo dbil. Tal solucin, siguiendo con fidelidad el itinerario de
Kant, podra enriquecerse posteriormente atendiendo al juicio reflexionante, que considera
al hombre simplemente como ser biolgico, natural y, al mismo tiempo, en armona
constituyente con su capacidad de libertad (Ana Mara Andaluz Romanillos). Prosigue este
ltimo crculo un ensayo que parte de la esttica entendida como fundacin de una filosofa
del arte, del acto, o ms bien del evento artstico, desde un significativo, aunque poco
conocido dilogo mantenido en el siglo XIX con Kant por parte de tres autores eslovacos,
Gregu, Vandrk y Kuzmny. De la mano de una interpretacin dinmica de la idea de
armonizacin kantiana, se propone una renovada fundamentacin de la potencialidad
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esttica del arte (Jana Sokova).
Cierra para finalizar el crculo, como si se tratara de un significativo contrapunto
musical, lo que en realidad aparece como un contrapunto moral y toda una leccin de
sabidura. Se trata del indirecto dilogo entre el personaje de Emma, en el homnimo libro
de Jean Austen y las pginas kantianas dedicadas al auto-engao moral del sujeto racional.
La enseanza que este conversar consigo mismo nos proporciona remite a la misma
perspectiva de la dialctica natural reconocida sobre todo en la tendencia de la razn a ir
ms all de los lmites de lo conocido. Del mismo modo en que la Crtica de la razn pura
pretenda enfrentarse a tal dialctica, la Fundamentacin de la metafsica de las
costumbres ofrecer en primer lugar la va del autoconocimiento moral como primer deber
de supresin del auto-engao y el ms slido apoyo para la promocin de una sabidura en
el individuo que siga siendo dinmicamente armnica (Jeanine M. Grenberg).
Este camino, el marcado por el proyecto y la tarea de una crtica de la razn
armnica, se encuentra orientado hacia s mismo, hacia su origen. Pero este es un origen
necesariamente doble. Por un lado, desde una perspectiva ontolgica, comprendiendo en
ella todo lo concerniente a la idea del orden del ser, a las fuerzas fsicas que constituyen
leyes, a la modalidad y lmites de cada posible armonizacin, hasta llegar a la unidad
teleolgica del todo como mundo. Sin embargo, en su articularse aquella crtica descubre
en s misma tambin el origen y el conjunto de su obrar, el destino autnticamente moral
de su proprio realizarse, o sea el intento de elaborar y, si es posible, de imprimir al entero
orden del ser, desde el todo hasta sus partes, una orientacin metdica del equilibrio del
conjunto, con un fin ms exigente, dirigido a la justicia, si bien combatiendo siempre
crticamente contra aquella dialctica natural que no cesa de diferir el alcance de ese
objetivo.
Bibliografa
Cunico, G. (2004), Pace, guerra e conflitto in Kant, in I. Kant, Guerra e pace. Politica,
religiosa, filosofica, a cura di G. Cunico, Diabasis, Reggio Emilia, pp. 9-32.
Guerra, A. (201318), Introduzione a Kant, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
Lamacchia, A. (1969), La filosofia della religione in Kant. I Dal dogmatismo teologico al
teismo morale (1755-1783), Lacaita, Bari.
Martinetti, P. (19452), Introduzione, in I. Kant, Prolegomeni ad ogni metafisica futura che
vorr presentarsi come scienza, introduzione, traduzione, note e allegati a cura di P.
Martinetti, postfazione e apparati di M. Roncoroni, Rusconi, Milano 1995.
Storrie, S. (2013), Kants 1768 attack on Leibniz conception of space, Kant-Studien,
104, no. 2, pp. 145-166.
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Pirni, A. (2000), Il regno dei fini in Kant. Morale, religione e politica in collegamento
sistematico, il melangolo, Genova 2000.
(2006) Kant filosofo della comunit, Pisa, ETS.
(forthcoming), The Philosophers Public Calling: The Problems and
Implications of Kants Announcement of the Upcoming Conclusion of a Treatise of
Perpetual Peace in Philosophy, in R. Orden/J. Rivera de Rosales/R. Hanna/R. Louden/N.
Sanchez Madrid (ed.), Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Kants Shorter Writings,
Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Cambridge.
Vrlander, K. (1967), Einleitung, in I. Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden knftigen
Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten knnen, Meiner, Hamburg, pp. I-XLI.
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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
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ISSN: 2386-7655
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GUALTIERO LORINI
Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon, Portugal
Abstract
The present paper aims to provide an overview on Kants dealing with the main theories of causality
which were proposed and discussed in his time. The goal is to show that, since the pre-critical
period, he has never simply accepted the theories of causality that he could find in second-scholastic
sources, but has always tried to develop an original position. Starting from a general acceptance of
the theory of the physical influx, Kant tries to amend this theory, as it had been roughly provided
by Knutzen and Crusius. This emendation is carried out through elements coming from the
Leibnitian tradition. But neither in this field Kant totally embraces the Wolffian, as well as the
Baumgartenian model. The paper tries also to shed light on the way in which the critical conception
of space allows Kant to fulfill his original theory of causality as an amended version of the physical
influx.
Key words
Physical Influx; Occasionalism; Pre-established Harmony; Causality; Space
Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon (CFUL). E-mail
contact: gualtiero.lorini@gmail.com .
[Recibido: 27 de septiembre de 2015
Aceptado: 17 de octubre de 2015]
32
Resumen
El presente artculo pretende ofrecer una perspectiva del tratamiento que Kant dedica a las
principales teoras de la causalidad propuestas y discutidas en su tiempo. El objetivo es mostrar que
Kant nunca acept, desde el periodo pre-crtico, las teoras de la causalidad que pudo encontrar en
fuentes de la Segunda Escolstica, sino que intent siempre desarrollar una posicin original.
Tomando como punto de partido la aceptacin general de la teora del influjo fsico, Kant intenta
corregir esta teora, tal y como fue esbozada por Knutzen y Crusius. Esta correccin se lleva a cabo
por medio de elementos procedentes de la tradicin leibniziana. Pero ni siquiera en este campo Kant
abraza totalmente el modelo de Wolff y Baumgarten. El artculo aspira a arrojar luz sobre la manera
en que la concepcin crtica del espacio permite a Kant completar su teora original de la causalidad
como una versin corregida del influjo fsico.
Palabras clave
Influjo fsico; ocasionalismo; armona pre-establecida; causalidad; espacio
1. Kant and his sources on causality, force and change in the pre-critical period
Kants approach to the different theories of causality that are at stake in the scientific
and philosophical debate of his age is characterized, on the one hand, by the reference to
his most direct sources, and, on the other hand, by the tendency to elaborate an original
perspective that is not totally reducible to the sources. In this context, one of the first focal
points is represented by a reference to Leibniz, which is often mediated by authors like
Wolff and Baumgarten. This sometimes leads Kant to maintain he is positioning himself
against Leibnizs theories, whereas he is actually attacking e.g. Wolffs thesis or the thesis
of a Wolffian. It happens less frequently for Baumgarten, who is a more orthodox
Leibnizian than Wolff.
A further line of interpretation consists in Kants employment of Crusius positions as a
term of constrast to the Wolffian formalism. However, though Kants disagreement with
Crusius is usually more hidden and implicit, it is nonetheless often sharp and also
determines the rise of autonomous positions in Kants thought. The still point in the
analysis of this panorama is what Kant himself (speaking of ontology) called the vestibule
of metaphysics (See: RPM, AA 20: 260). In this case the vestibule is the text through
which Kant faces the metaphysical tradition, namely Baumgartens Metaphysica, which he
employed throughout his entire academic carrier as a manual for his lectures on
metaphysics. That is why we will start from this text.
For Baumgarten ratio [Grund] is meant as the ground of a thing [ens],1 in the widest
metaphysical meaning of nexus. The principle is what contains the ground of something
else, and it can be of being [essendi], of becoming [fiendi] or of knowing
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Gualtiero Lorini
[cognoscendi],2 while the force [vis] characterizes the internal nexus through which the
accidents adhere to the essence of the substance insofar as it is their sufficient ground.3
As regards the adherence to the essence of the modes, and even more of the relations,
we need a further determination, that is a ground, which is a cause and not a force, and
which coincides with the principle of existence (to be understood under the principle of
becoming). 4 This principle is the ground of the complement of essence or of internal
possibility 5 of a thing. Among the meanings of the concept of cause expressed by
Baumgarten, Kant adopts since the Thoughts on the true estimation of the living forces, the
efficient cause [causa realitatis per actionem]. 6 Nevertheless, while Kant adopts this
concept in order to explain the physical influx among the substances, Baumgarten is a
supporter of the pre-established harmony. Consequently, for Kant also the action of the
force has a causal value, since it can be exerted by one substance on the other, whereas
Baumgarten reduces the relationship among substances to a force that is internal to any
substance.7
The pre-established harmony presupposes a monadist theory of substance, which is
attacked by Kant in the third section of the New elucidation through the exposition of two
principles that are supposed to be deduced from the principle of sufficient ground. The first
is the principle of succession: No change can happen to substances except insofar as
they are connected with other substances; their reciprocal dependency on each other
determines their reciprocal changes of state (NE, AA 1: 410). Here Kants main polemical
target is Wolff, according to whom a simple substance is subject to constant change in
virtue of an inner principle of activity (NE, AA 1: 411).8 Kant brands Wolffs theory as
untenable for several reasons. Firstly, a change requires new grounds that should
necessarily come from outside, but it cannot be the case, since the internal determinations
that already adhere to the substance are posited in virtue of inner grounds which exclude
the opposite (NE, AA 1: 410). Furthermore, the changes of the internal determinations of
the substance cannot derive from a change in their grounds because these grounds are by
definition immutable, just as the determinations simultaneous to them. Thus, insofar as the
essential determinations are immutable, they cannot be the source of the internal changes
of the substance. The Wolffiansso Kanthave constructed an arbitrary definition of
force so that it means that which contains the ground of changes, when one ought to
declare that it contains the ground of determinations (NE, AA 1: 411). This refers to the
Thoughts, where the force was defined as the most authentic expression of causality and its
peculiar character was represented by activity, which characterizes the Wolffian
2
Ivi, 311.
Ivi, 197.
4
Ivi, 307.
5
Ivi, 55.
6
Ivi, 319.
7
Ivi, 449ss. See: e.g. TelF, AA 1: 18.
8
Anyway, in the Cosmologia generalis (209), Wolff admits that we can account for all the changes that
occur in a single element through the changes that take place in another.
3
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On the basis of his principle of succession Kant claims indeed to be able to utterly
overthrow the Leibnizian pre-established harmony (NE, AA 1: 412). But even as regards
the relation between ground and determination, which Kant discusses in these lines, his
criticisms do not actually affect the very Leibnizian conception. They are rather targeted
against Wolffs version of this relation.12 Kants objection rests upon the fact that, once an
essential ground internal to the substance is posed, a correspondent determination is in turn
immediately and immutably posed. So, a pure internal change is not admitted. Nevertheless
Leibniz, differently from both Wolff and Kant, rejects the contemporaneity between the
position of the ground and that of the correspondent determination. This allows Leibniz to
give reason of the change in terms of derivative rather than first causes.13 However, the
explanation of change in terms of first causes, or at least of essential grounds, is a goal
pursued by both the Wolffians and Kant, though by different strategies. That is why the
Leibnizian idealism is still unsatisfying for Kants purposes, even if the Kantian principle of
succession does not substantially weaken Leibnizs own position.
By the principle of succession Kant seems to claim that the sensible reality ultimately
consists of primitive physical points endowed with physical forces that generate causal
interactions. However, since these forces cannot be exposed to change, they cannot be
identified with the particular forces that we can observe in our sensible experience. They
seem rather to already coincide with the attractive and repulsive forces that Kant will treat
in the Physical monadology.14
In this latter writing, differently from the Wolffian atomi naturae or the LeibnizianBaumgartenian monads, the simplicity of Kants monads does not prevent them from
consisting of parts. For Kant the simplicity of the physical monads consists rather in that
even their eventual parts cannot be separated from one another, and such a definition of
simplicity cannot be found in any other author of Kants time.15 Nevertheless, once he poses
this element of originality, at least programmatically, the development of the Physical
monadology does not explain how the property of consisting of parts, which cannot be
separated from one another actually characterizes the simple substance. Thus, in the end
Kants definition of the simplicity of the physical monads still coincides with the Wolffian
definition of simplicity as absence of parts.16
12
14
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Kant illustrates here the modalities of the causal nexus among the substances that is
required in order for an internal change within any single substance to be possible. The
limitation of this treatment to the contingent substances is expressed by the reference to the
finite substances. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the insufficiency of the mere
singular existence of substances for the determination of their mutual relations seems to put
Kants position close to the doctrine of pre-established harmony. Indeed, if Kant would not
maintain to have already ruled out this theory in the exposition of the principle of
succession, passages like the following could be interpreted as totally consistent with
Leibnizs and Baumgartens position:
Since, therefore, in so far as each individual substance has an existence which is
independent of other substances, no reciprocal connection occurs between them; and since
it certainly does not fall to finite beings to be the causes of other substances, and since,
nonetheless, all the things in the universe are found to be reciprocally connected with each
other - since all this is the case, it has to be admitted that this relation depends on a
communality of cause, namely on God, the universal principle of beings. (NE, AA 1: 413)
The point on which Kant disagrees with Leibniz and Baumgarten is the real, and not
merely ideal, nature of the relation among substances, a relation that is based upon their
common dependence on the scheme of the divine understanding. However, the real nature
of this relation was already stated in the treatment of the principle of succession, so Kants
criticism is mainly focused on the insufficiency of the existence of substances in
determining their mutual relations. For this reason, the target of Kants criticism should be
identified with Crusius. Indeed, though Crusius admits the real nature of the relations
among substances, he claims that God can only create substances, whose existence poses
them ipso facto into a real relation.17 On the contrary, Kant maintains that substances can
also be created (with all their internal grounds) so that they have no mutual relations. In this
case, the relations would be added later and independently from the internal grounds. Since
the mere existence of substances does not necessarily imply their interaction [commercium],
it can neither give reason of the determinations arising from this interaction, then it is
obvious that, if you posit a number of substances, you do not at the same time and as a
result determine place, position, and space (NE, AA 1: 414). Thus, the space occupied
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Gualtiero Lorini
[eingenommen] or filled [erfllt] by the substances now begins to play a significant role in
the determination of the causal interaction among them.
2. The nature of space as a key-problem in the determination of the intersubstantial relations
As it is stated in the New elucidation, at point 5 of the Application of the principle of
co-existence, the concept of space derives from the corporeal substances, and expresses
their sensible relation, whose metaphysical ground is constituted by their dependence upon
the divine causality. Here Kant mentions a notio spatii, which is reduced to the
interconnected actions of substances, reaction always being of necessity conjoined with
such interconnected actions (NE, AA 1: 415). Thus, though Kant assumes, with Leibniz,
the derivative nature of space, he does not conclude, like Wolff, that space is merely
subjective. Rather, following Newton, he attributes to the space a reality that makes it an
essential element in the relations among the bodies. Indeed, Kants rejection of the
ontological primacy of space on the physical substances stated by Newton does not prevent
him from arguing that the external phenomenon of the universal relation among bodies is
called attraction. [] Since it [the attraction] is brought about by co-presence alone, it
reaches to all distances whatever, and is Newtonian attraction or universal gravity (NE, AA
1: 415).
Here the force expresses the most authentic essence of causality once more. When Kant
criticizes the theories of pre-established harmony and occasionalism, he turns back indeed
on the value of the efficient causality, and explains that through the common dependence of
substances upon God:
One is equally justified both in saying that external changes may be produced in this way
by means of efficient causes and also in saying that the changes which occur within the
substance are ascribed to an internal force of the substance, although the natural power of
this force to produce an effect rests, no less than the foundation of external relations just
mentioned, on divine support. (NE, AA 1: 415).
However, it is surprising that in these last lines of the New elucidation Kant even seems
to reject the theory of physical influx, which until this point had been defended both in its
presuppositions and by the exclusion of the concurrent alternatives:
[] whatever determinations and changes are to be found in any of them [the substances],
they always refer, indeed, to what is external. Physical influence, in the true sense of the
term, however, is excluded. There exists a universal harmony of things. (NE, AA 1: 415)
But Kant is here simply rejecting a rough version of the physical influx, in which we
can recognize Knutzens and Crusius versions. In the Thoughts Kant had indeed
sarcastically mentioned an acute author (Telf, AA 1: 21), who was the main supporter of
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is no space either. Thus, through the concepts of Ort and Lage Kant derives a notio prima of
space as a relative concept that is required by the substances (See: NDMR, AA 2: 23-24 and
Met Herder, AA 28: 29).
In the published writings of the late 1750s and the 1760s this conception of space is
particularly relevant. In the New doctrine of motion and rest and the Attempt to introduce
the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy, for instance, it is placed in a wider
discussion concerning the method of metaphysics. Even in the text in which such a
discussion reaches its peak, namely the Dreams of a spirit-seer, the argumentative
continuity with the problems treated in the New elucidation and Physical monadology is
clearly detectable. In the Dreams Kant admits indeed the existence of simple material
substances and tries to delineate by analogy with them the characteristics of eventual simple
spiritual substances (See: DSM, AA 2: 323). By doing so, he is clearly integrating the
perspective of the Physical monadology. In the Dreams he argues that, although even the
presence in the space of the spiritual substances is mediated by the sphere of their activity,
this presence is not a filling. Then Kant recalls some features linked to the relational
conception of space that had been stated in the Application of the principal of co-existence
and further developed in the lectures of the early 1760s (See: DSM, AA 2: 323-324).
Anyway, it is only two years later, in the writing on The directions in space (1768), that
Kant marks a fundamental, though not definitive, progress in the elaboration of his peculiar
version of physical influx. In this work Kant adheres indeed to Newtons absolute
conception of space, and acknowledges a particular reality to space, whose nature deserves
to be further investigated (See: DiS, AA 2: 378).
3.
Before considering the writing of 1768, we need to consider a Reflexion that comes
soon after (between 1769 and 1770), in which Kant specifies that when speaking of influx
we always need to admit the possibility of a direct influence of one substance on the other
since originally a substance cannot affect another substance, because substances do not
suffer from one another, unless it is claimed that substances suffer from one another insofar
as suffering is at the same time an action (Ref 4217, 1769-1770, AA XVII 17: 461). Here
Kant still adheres to the Baumgartenian thesis according to which even the suffering of one
substance from another can only be represented by the suffering substance itself in the form
of an action of its own, whose content expresses this suffering (See: Met Herder, AA 28:
51-53). 21 On the basis of this position Kant divides the physical influx into original
[originarius] and derivative [derivativus], and states that The former takes place if the
formal ground [ratio formalis] is internal [domestica] to the substances; the latter if this
ground is external [peregrina]. The first case represents the influence that the substances
could exert on one another only by virtue of their existence, and coincides with Knutzens
and partially with Crusius models, both rejected by Kant. Insofar as this ground assumes
21
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In the Inaugural dissertation this conception of space has immediate consequences on
the emendation of the physical influx, which is one of Kants goals. In 22 Kant claims
indeed that the primitive interaction among substances, insofar as it rests upon the
subsistence founded on their common cause, gives room to a generally established
harmony, whereas the harmony which only occurs in virtue of the fact that each individual
state of a substance is adapted to the state of another substance is an individually
established harmony. The interaction arising from the first kind of harmony is real and
physical, while the second is ideal and sympathetic (ID, AA 2: 409). Kant adds that
physical influx (in its more correct form) represents the most general form of the relations
among substances in the world. He states that this interaction is always and unavoidably
externally established, even in the case in which it is obtained individually for the states
of each substance (ID, AA 2: 409), which would be the case of pre-established harmony
and occasionalism. Yet the fundamental distinction between the physical influx and the two
alternative theories, that is what determines the reality of the first, again depends on the
nexus that unites the mundane substances as all dependent on a single creative cause:
Thus, if as a result of all substances being sustained by one being, the conjunction of all
substances, in virtue of which they form a unity, were necessary, then there would be a
universal interaction of substances by means of physical influx, and the world would be a
real whole. But if not, the interaction would be sympathetic (that is to say harmony
without true interaction), and the world would only be an ideal whole. For myself, indeed,
although the former of these alternatives has not been demonstrated, it has nonetheless
been rendered fully acceptable for other reasons. (ID, AA 2: 409)
Furthermore, although in the Scholium the space is defined as the universal and
necessary condition of the co-presence of all things, it can also be called Phenomenal
omnipresence [Omnipraesentia phaenomenon]. For the cause of the universeKant
states indeedis not present to each and every thing simply in virtue of the fact that that
cause is in places in which they are. It is rather the case that places exist, that is to say, that
relations of substances are possible, because the cause of the universe is inwardly present to
all things (ID, AA 2: 410). Thus, we can maintain that the emendation of the physical
influx that Kant mentions in 22 consists not only in the dependence of the substance on a
common cause, but also in conceiving space as subjective form of intuition, an idea that in
1768 was not present yet.
On the one hand, the emendation of the theory of physical influx sketched in the New
elucidation is here actually fulfilled, since Kant does not only avoid the mere migration of
accidents from one substance to another, but he is also able to think the interaction among
the substances through the conditions of their sensible relations. On the other hand, Kant
still poses one of the principles of the sensible world, namely the space, as dependent on the
formal principle of the intelligible world, namely the creative cause. Nonetheless, in 1770
this dichotomy is totally placed within the dimension of the knowing subject.
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This perspective is already recognizable both in the Reflexionen and the lectures on
metaphysics of the end of the 1770s. Here Kant divides the derivative interaction in
hyperphysical influx, which embraces pre-established harmony and occasionalism, and
physical influx, which refers to the laws of nature (Met L1 AA 28: 213).26 These laws of
nature correspond to the joint system of categories and pure intuitions that allows to
conceive nature as a whole. Indeed, once Kant has established that the connection
[Verknpfung] between God and the world is a connection of derivation [Verbindung der
Ableitung]which means that God is not entangled in the mutual determinations among the
parts of the world (Met L1, AA 28: 212), he adds that space, as a phenomenon, is the
infinite connection of substances with each other (Met L1, AA 28: 214). Of course the
language in the lectures is more academic than in the printed works. This is the reason why
Kant still talks about substances. Nevertheless, the critic approach is already clearly
recognizable when Kant states that if we sensibly imagine the connection among
substancesa connection that the purely intellectual approach limits to its divine
foundationthen space is the highest condition of the possibility of the connection (Met
L1, AA 28: 214). Therefore, space falls within the conditions of possibility that allow
imagination to operate the transcendental synthesis by which a subject is able to represent
nature as a whole according to general laws (See: Met L1, AA 28: 214 and Met Mrong,
AA 29: 868).
In his last course on metaphysics, in the mid-1790s, Kant maintains that Newtons
definition of space as the organon of Gods omnipresence is wrong, insofar as space is
nothing in itself; and cannot be thought as something in itself actually existent through the
connection of things (Met Vig, AA 29: 1007).27 The harmony between substances, that is,
the above mentioned relation according to general laws can be realized only as harmony
in commercio, through the physical influx, and not as harmony absque commercio, that is,
as one of the possible modes of the hyperphysical influx (Met Vig, 29: 1008).28 The specific
reality of space that Kant had already discerned between 1768 and 1770 can now be
achieved through its integration with the general laws of the human understanding.
Since the New elucidation Kant had indeed meant to make use of Newtons dynamics in
order to account for the way in which the most original link between substances could be
represented by the human understanding. In order to achieve this result, it was not enough
for Kant to ascribe to space a reality which was ontologically prior to substances, since this
would have put space at the noumenal level of that divine causality, of which it should be
the intelligible expression. The specific relation between space and the divine omnipresence
that Kant had discerned since his lectures of the early 1760swhen he had defined space as
the first act of the divine omnipresence (Met Herder, AA 28: 103; Nach. Met. Herder, AA
28: 888)is specified at the turn of the critical period, when he defines space as one
phenomenon of the divine omnipresence (Met L1, AA 28: 347; Met Mron, AA 29: 866).
26
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Bibliography
In this essay Kants works are indicated with the abbreviation of the English title, followed
by volume and page number of the Akademie Ausgabe (AA): I. Kant, Gesammelte
Schriften, edited by the Kniglich-Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Berlin 1900-. For the translations of Kants passages I followed, when
possible, the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.
CPR
TelF Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces. Trans. J. B. Edwards and M.
Schnfeld. In Immanuel Kant: Natural Science, edited by E. Watkins, Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012, pp. 1-155.
NE
PM
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Gualtiero Lorini
NDMR New doctrine of motion and rest. Trans. O. Reinhardt. In Immanuel Kant: Natural
Science, edited by E. Watkins, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012, pp. 396408.
DSM Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics. Trans. D. Walford and
R. Meerbote. In Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992, pp. 301-360.
DiS
ID
On the form and principles of the sensible and the intelligible world. Trans. D.
Walford and R. Meerbote. In Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770,
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992, pp. 373-416.
RPM What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and
Wolff? (1793/1804). Trans. P. Heath. In Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy
after 1781, edited by H. Allison and P. Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
2004, pp. 337-424.
Met L1 Metaphysik L1 (mid-1770s). Trans. K. Ameriks and S. Naragon. In Immanuel Kant:
Lectures on Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997, pp. 19-108.
Met Mron Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-1783). Trans. K. Ameriks and S. Naragon. In
Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1997, pp.109-288.
Met Dohna Metaphysik Dohna (1792-1793). Trans. Trans. K. Ameriks and S. Naragon. In
Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1997, pp. 357-394.
Met Vigilantius Metaphysik Vigilantius (1794-1795). Trans. K. Ameriks and S. Naragon.
In Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1997, pp. 417-506.
The translations of the passages from the lectures and the Reflexionen that are not included
in the Cambridge Edition are of mine.
Afeissa, H. S. (2009) Lunit du monde et les voies de la causalit. Une tude des crites
et des cours de la priode prcritique de Kant, in: Kant-Studien 100.2, pp. 139-165.
Baumgarten, A. G. (1739, 1743, 1750) Metaphysica, Halle. An. repr. [7 ed. 1779]
Hildesheim: Olms, 1963.
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Docente e pesquisador junto ao Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Estadual Paulista [Marlia, SP;
Brasil], no qual ingressou
ssou em 1989. E-mail
E
de contato: ubirajara.rancan@gmail.com .
[Recibido: 20 de octubre de 2015
Aceptado: 28 de octubre de 2015]
2015
48
Keywords
Kant; Eberhard; Musical metaphor; Harmonic; Ground of representations
Introduo.
Soar porventura bizarro comentar uma anotao de Kant a uma metfora1 musical
de Eberhard, quer em face da conhecida postura geral do filsofo associada msica
pouco elogiosa na economia das belas-artes 2 , quer diante do substrato da no menos
conhecida polmica entre ambos,3 na qual a arte dos tons no tem lugar. A despeito de
tais fatos, preciso notar que a metfora proposta por Eberhard tem por objetivo uma
questo nuclear de toda a filosofia transcendental, como tambm, por outro lado, que
referncias de natureza comparativa entre msica e filosofia ou o emprego de metforas
musicais em contexto filosfico no representam, na poca, uma estratgia retricoargumentativa inusual, at para o prprio Kant (cf. Rancan de Azevedo Marques 2011).
Neste mesmo sentido, j Lambert, no Prefcio ao seu Novo rganon, (cf. Lambert 1764)
introduz a msica por meio do estudo geral dos signos, de vez que ela compe os
modos restantes dos signos relativamente aos quais, porm [para o caso da msica
como para o da coreografia, da aritmtica, lgebra etc.], a linguagem permanece
sempre o repositrio universal do nosso inteiro conhecimento.4 Em tal contexto,
[o] primeiro modo de signos que podemos considerar [...] so as notas na msica.
Elas tm um considervel grau de perfeio, j que de pronto representam a altura do tom
e a sua durao, e, por meio de alguns outros sinais, tambm o modo como ele deve ser
Embora Eberhard fale em exemplo [Beyspiel] [cf., aqui, n. 18], parece-me no haver incorreo nenhuma
em tomar o mesmo como metfora. A propsito, quando, no verbete Beyspiel da sua Teoria Geral das
Belas-Artes, Sulzer conceitua tal expresso, em sentido amplo e em sentido estrito, sem nestes incluir
[die] Metapher, creio, no obstante, esta possa ser tomada por um caso de exemplo, ao menos in
weitluftigem Sinn; cf. Sulzer, Johann Georg. Allgemeine Theorie der Schnen Knste.Band 1. Leipzig,
1771; p. 165. Disponvel em: <http://www.zeno.org/Sulzer-1771/K/sulzer-1771-011-0165> Acesso em: 26.
set. 2015: Toda representao do universal pelo particular pode, em sentido amplo, ser nomeada um
exemplo, medida que as fbulas de Esopo, as parbolas, as alegorias pertencem ao exemplo. Em sentido
prprio, porm, o exemplo um caso particular aduzido com a inteno que o universal do modo ou do
gnero a que ele pertence seja convenientemente conhecido por este meio. [Jede Vorstellung des
Allgemeinen durch das Besondere, kann in weitluftigem Sinn ein Beyspiel genennet werden; in so fern
gehren die aesopische Fabel, die Parabel, die Allegorie, zum Beyspiel. In der engern Bedeutungaber ist es
ein besonderer Fall, in der Absicht angefhrt, dass das Allgemeineder Art oder der Gattung, wozu er gehrt,
mit Vortheil daraus erkennt werde.] Cf. ibid.: Metapher; Metaphorisch. Disponvel em:
<http://www.textlog.de/2787.html> Acesso em: 06 out. 2015.
2
Cf. Kant, KU, AA 05: 328: [Die Tonkunst] hat, durch Vernunft beurtheilt, weniger Werth, als jede
andere der schnen Knste.
3
Cf. id., ber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ltere entbehrlich
gemacht werden soll; cf. Kant, E, AA 08: 187-251. Este opsculo kantiano, o Streitschrift contra Eberhard,
conhecido em portugus como Resposta a Eberhard.
4
Lambert 1764, Vorrede [as pginas do Prefcio no esto numeradas]: bleibt die Sprache immer das
allgemeine Magazin unserer ganzen Erkenntniss.
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E, ainda:
podemos observar [...] que esta possibilidade de comparar conceitos abstratos com
sensaes e, por meio disto, tambm com os seus objetos, mostra-nos
mostra nos de um modo mais
prximo que possvel tornar figurvel o nosso conhecimento, e particularmente os
[conhecimentos] abstratos, representando-os
representando
por signos [...] . Mostramos na
6
dianoiologia [...] que a doutrina das inferncias tornou-se
se figurada e as inferncias
podem ser designadas, e que esta designao tem regras universais e rigorosas como as
dos tons na msica.7
7
Lambert 1764,p.
4,p. 487; cf. ibid., p. 73-74:
73
Wir knnen [...] anmerken, da diese Mglichkeit, abstracte
abstr
Begriffe mit Empfindungen, und dadurch auch mit ihren Objecten zu vergleichen, uns auf eine nhere Art
anzeigt, da es mglich ist, unsre Erkenntni,
Erkenntni , und besonders die abstracte figrlich zu machen, und sie
durch Zeichen vorzustellen [...] Wir haben in
i der Dianoiologie [...] gewiesen, da
da die Lehre von den
Schlssen figrlich gemacht, und die Schlsse gezeichnet werden knnen, und da
da diese Zeichnung
allgemeine und strengere Regeln habe, als die von den Tnen in der Musik.
Musik. [destaque meu]
8
Leibnitii 1840; p. 717-718:
718: La
La Musique nous charme, quoique sa beaut ne consiste que dans les
convenances des nombres, et dans le compte, dont nous ne nous apercevons pas, et que lme ne laisse pas
de faire, des battemens ou vibrations des corps sonnans,
sonnans, qui se rencontrent par certains intervalles.
intervalles.
9
Cf. Bailhache 1995: musica
musica est exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi.
animi
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Leibnitii 1840, p. 717: quoique Dieu ne soit point sensible nos sens externes, il ne laisse pas dtre trsaimable, et de donner un trs-grand plaisir. Nous voyons combien les honneurs font plaisir aux hommes,
quoiquils ne consistent point dans les qualits des sens extrieurs. Les Martyres et les Fanatiques, quoique
laffection de ces derniers soit mal rgle, montrent ce que peut le plaisir de lesprit: et, qui plus est, les
plaisirs mme des sens se rduisent des plaisirs intellectuels confusment connus. La Musique nous charme
etc.
11
Cf. Kant, Vorarbeiten zur Schrift gegen Eberhard, AA 20: 355 e seguintes.
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para o som
musical, donde, por exemplo, o subttulo de uma lio de Kant: Do som e dos tons.14
No presente texto, adotar-se
se- tom para traduzir o alemo Ton.
Ao que parece, aquela nota de Kant no tem atrado a ateno dos comentadores [se
que o ter feito alguma vez], o que se pode explicar pelas caractersticas de forma e
contedo que a envolvem: de modo especial, ela remete a texto cuja identidade no a
acompanha fazendo-o,
o, ademais, por meio de consideraes tcnicotcnico-musicais um tanto
breves ,, e, de modo geral, no mbito dos contra-ataques
contra ataques do filsofo aos seus primeiros
detratores, ela no exatamente relevante para a consolidao da filosofia transcendental.
Com respeito ao texto a que a anotao de Kant parece aludir,
alu
se se for ao
Magazine Filosfico editado por Eberhard, e, ento, ao terceiro fascculo do seu primeiro
volume, publicado no mesmo ano [1789] deste fragmento do filsofo, encontrar-se-
encontrar
nele
um texto deste adversrio da filosofia crtica, intitulado: Aplicao
Aplicao Adicional da Teoria da
Verdade Lgica ou da Validade Transcendental do Conhecimento Humano.15 Neste artigo,
12
Na verdade, termos tcnicos que a msica compartilha com a fsica, especialmente com a acstica, ao
menos no que tange a Nebentne
Nebentne e a Grundton.
13
Kant, Vorarbeiten
Vorarbeiten zur Schrift gegen Eberhard,
Eberhard AA 20: 358: weil
weil die am meisten Verwandten [sic] tne
[sic] nicht mit dem Grundton mitgehrt werden so mssen die Nebentne nicht in der Einbildungskraft
sondern ausser uns seyn (also gehrt musicalische Kenntnis nicht
nicht Warnehmung zu).
zu) Cf. Deutsches
Wrterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm [nebenton]: nebenton,
nebenton, m. gegensatz zu hauptton;
grammatisch der tiefton, gegensatz zu hochton: der hochton der deutschen worte liegt auf der stammsilbe,
der nebenton der affixe
fixe richtet sich nach der quantitt des stammes. Weinh. mhd. gr. 17; musikalisch der
oberton, aliquotton Heyse fremdwb. 32b.
32b. Por outro lado, se, no sculo XVIII, Oberton
Oberton respondia pelo tom
sustenizado [elevado em meio tom] ou bemolizado [abaixado em meio tom] [cf., por exemplo: Hobert1789,
p. 54], no sculo XIX passaria a distinguir o tom harmnico; cf., por exemplo: Helmholtz 1863, p. 37.
14
Cf. Kant, Vorlesungen ber Physik [Mrongovius], AA 29: 146. Cf. id., KU, AA 05: 224: ein
bloer Ton
(zum Unterschiede
chiede vom Schalle und Gerusch);
Gerusch) id., V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 342: Ich
Ich hre ein Gerusch,
das ist gewi eine zusammengesetzte Vorstellung, aber eine verworrene. Komme ich nher, und fange an die
Stimmen in dem Lerm und zuletzt auch die Worte dieser Stimmen
Stimmen zu unterscheiden, so ist das eine deutliche
Vorstellung. Cf. Sulzer 1771b[Klang]:
1771b[
ber
ber die Bedeutung des Wortes Klang, merken wir noch an, dass
der Schall, insofern er anhaltend und wohlklingend ist, mit dem Worte Klang, der Klang aber, insofern er
hoch
och oder tief ist, mit dem Worte Ton bezeichnet wird. Man sagt nie, ein hoher oder tiefer Klang, sondern
Ton. In Ansehung der Reinheit, sagt man zwar von einer einzelnen Saite, sie habe einen reinen Ton (besser
Klang) aber von einem Instrument berhaupt, einer
einer Violin oder einen Klavier, sie habe einen guten Klang.
Klang.
15
Eberhard 1789, pp. 243-262.
262. Afora este artigo de Eberhard, dois outros textos publicados no
Philosophisches Magazin esto na origem das demais anotaes de Kant reunidas nos Vorarbeiten
zur
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exatamente no intervalo entre as pginas 251 e 253 [as mesmas da anotao de Kant],
Eberhard introduz um argumento em forma de exemplo musical, no qual se encontram
os mesmos termos, o mesmo enredo e a mesma concluso metafrica presentes naquela
nota do filsofo. Na verdade, tendo-se em mente os vocbulos musicais empregados por
um e por outro, os termos comuns a ambas as passagens reduzem-se a dois: tomfundamental e tons-secundrios.16 J com relao s respectivas concluses, ver-se-,
elas equivalem-se medida que se reportam ao exclusivo objeto do exemplo musical
indicado por Eberhard, mas no, evidente, medida que tal exemplo tem por objetivo
ltimo a prpria filosofia crtica, alcance que, porm, no , em tal anotao, tido em conta
por Kant.
Com relao s expresses musicais utilizadas pelo filsofo neste seu apontamento,
parece que tons afins [Verwandte tne [sic]] e tons-secundrios [Nebentne] no
foram mais empregues por ele. Com respeito a tom-fundamental [Grundton], parece
haver somente sete outros registros de emprego dela por Kant, 17 sempre em contexto
fsico-musical. Por outro lado, os dois ltimos daqueles termos [tom-fundamental e
tons-secundrios] aparecem, por exemplo, em traduo alem publicada em 1781 do
tratado Do Sublime, obra ento ainda atribuda ao Pseudo-Longino. A passagem em
questo, muito antes de Eberhard, de Kant e do inteiro sculo XVIII [estima-se hoje que o
Do Sublime seja do sculo I d.C.] constitui um claro exemplo de metfora musical,
estabelecida, porm, neste caso, em proporo com a retrica.18 Registre-se tambm que
tons afins [verwandte Tne, bem como anverwandte Tne], tom-fundamental e
tons-secundrios so expresses razoavelmente encontradias em obras escritas
originalmente em alemo e publicadas no sculo XVIII, no s no mbito da msica.19
Com respeito a Nebentne, por fim, tons-secundrios expresso utilizada no
vernculo como referncia aos sons harmnicos [tal como respectivamente ocorre, por
exemplo, em espanhol, francs e italiano: sonidos secundarios; sons secondaires;
suoni secondari 20 ]. Nas passagens destacadas de Eberhard e de Kant, tons afins
Schrift gegen Eberhard: Anonym. 1788, pp. 150-174 [cf. Kant, Vorarbeiten zur Schrift gegen Eberhard,
AA 20: 357-359]; Anonym. 1789, pp. 263-289 [cf. Kant, Vorarbeiten zur Schrift gegen Eberhard, AA 20:
359].
16
Conforme a ordem na qual no seu texto aparecem, Eberhard emprega os seguintes termos musicais:
Grundton, Ton, Dreyklange, Quinte, Nebenton / Nebentne, Duodecima, Tertie e Decima
septima. Kant, por sua vez: Verwandten [sic] tne [sic], Grundton, Nebentne.
17
Cf. Kant, Refl, AA 14: 394 [Grundton [uma ocorrncia]; Grundthon [quatro ocorrncias]]; id., AA 29:
149 [Grund Ton [duas ocorrncias]].
18
Cf. Longin 1781,pp. 181-182: Da die Umschreibungen viel zum Erhabenen beytragen, wird niemand
lugnen. Denn so wie in der Musik der Hauptton durch die Verbindung mit seinen Nebentnen lieblicher und
harmonischer wird: so kann die Umschreibung den Hauptgedanken auch lieblicher und geflliger machen,
wenn sie anders nicht zu schreyend und unharmonisch, sondern gefllig und angenehm eingeflochten worden
ist.
19
Entre outras referncias, cf. Meiner 1748, p. 6: Die Figuren der Nebentne [...] nennt man Vocales,
welche Benennung, ob sie gleich nicht die beste ist, wir deswegen behalten mssen, weil sie einmal
eingefhret ist. Cf. Marpurg 1757, p. 8.
20
Em espanhol, francs e italiano utilizam-se tambm, respectivamente: armnico; harmonique;
armonico e ipertono. Em ingls, por outro lado, so empregados os vocbulos overtone, harmonic e
partial tone. Em alemo, ao menos cinco outros termos ainda designam os sons harmnicos:
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2. A estrutura da metfora
O problema musicalmente exemplificado no escrito em pauta de Eberhard aponta
para a suposta subjetividade psicolgica no, pois, transcendental, em sentido kantiano
das representaes fenomnicas. Neste caso, a soluo proposta por ele para a dificuldade
contida no exemplo musical
usical oferecido servir para encarecer a sua postura acerca do
problema de fundo que o preocupa; a saber:
Nos
Nos objetos internos das representaes h [...] algo de permanente que no
pensado como imaginrio ou sensvel. Mas alguns destes objetos so
s simultaneamente
pensados como externos. Entre os objetos das nossas representaes, portanto, h tambm
alguns, de fato, externos? Podemos com alguma certeza atribuir-lhes
atribuir
uma realidade
externa uma possibilidade ou efetividade para alm da nossa capacidade
cap
de
conhecimento?22
Aliquottne; Harmonische;
; Obertne,
Partialtne, Teiltne.
. Por outro lado, creio muito provvel
que Kant tivesse conhecimento da teoria da vibrao simptica, embora, assim parece, a ela no tenha feito
referncia em contexto musical. Cf. Kant, Anth, AA 07: 176: wir
wir keine Kenntni vom Gehirn und den
Pltzen in demselben haben, worin die Spuren der Eindrcke aus Vorstellungen sympathetisch mit einander
in Einklang kommen mchten, indem sie sich einander (wenigstens mittelbar) gleichsam
berhren.Einklang tambm unssono.
unssono
21
Forkel 1788, p. 30: Der
Der betrchtlichste Vortheil, den die Musik durch die
die Akustik erhalten hat, grndet
sich auf die Entdeckung der Sympathie der Thne. Da kein einziger Klang ganz einfach, und ohne eine
gewisse eigene innere Vollstimmigket ist; da jeder Ton ausser dem Haupttone auch noch die ihm zunchst
verwandte Tne mittnt,
t, worunter die Quinten, Octaven und grossen Terzen die merklichsten sind; so hat
man aus dieser Sympathie die Grnde genommen, nach welchen sich Tne und Accorde aus einander
entwickeln mssen.
22
Cf. Eberhard, 1789, p. 244: In
In den innern Objekten der Vorstellungen
Vorstellungen ist also etwas Denkbares, das nicht
als etwas Bildliches oder Sinnliches gedacht wird. Einige dieser Objekte werden aber zugleich als ussere
gedacht: sind also unter den Gegenstnden unserer Vorstellungen einige auch in der That ussere, knnen
wir ihnen eine ussere Realitt eine Mglichkeit oder Wirklichkeit ausser unsererErkenntnisskraft mit
einiger Gewissheit beilegen? Das ist die Frage, zu der wir nun vorrcken drfen, ohne zu besorgen, dass wir
im geringsten etwas bereilt haben.
haben.
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Eberhard 1789, p. 251: eine blosse Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, oder eine wirkliche Empfindung
sey.
24
Cf. Eberhard 1789, p. 252-253: Nach dem Gesetze der erstern [der Einbildungskraft] erregt eine
Vorstellung andere, die mit ihr vergesellschaftet sind. Wenn also mit der Empfindung des Grundtones die
Vorstellung der brigen Tne, die zu dem harmonischen Dreyklange gehren, kann erregt werden: so kann
man fragen, warum die Quinte des Grundtones nicht als Nebenton mit ihm gehrtwird, da sie eben so genau
und noch genauer mit ihm vergesellschaftet ist, als die Duodecima; nicht die Tertie, die eben so genau und
noch genauer mit dem Grundtone vergesellschaftet ist, als die Decima septima? Der Grund von dieser
Erscheinung ist also nicht subjektiv, er ist in keinem Gesetze des empfindenden Subjektes; er muss also
objektiv seyn; das heisst: wir mssen uns die Nebentne nicht bloss einbilden, wir mssen sie empfinden, wir
mssen sie wirklich hren. Wir haben also Recht zu schliessen, der Grund der Vorstellungen, der kein
subjektiver seyn kann, muss ein objektiver seyn.
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portanto,
razo para concluir que o fundamento das representaes no pode ser subjetivo, [mas] tem
de ser um [fundamento] objetivo.
objetivo
Tal concluso, que desmetaforiza o exemplo escolhido, remete questo
q
que
levava a este; a saber:
Entre
Entre os objetos das nossas representaes, [...] h tambm alguns, de fato, externos?
Podemos com alguma certeza atribuir-lhes
atribuir
uma realidade externa uma possibilidade ou
efetividade para alm da nossa capacidade
capacida de conhecimento?
25
58
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imaginao, fosse a srie subjetivamente composta, devesse por si prpria suprir a falta da
tera e da quinta.
Por outro lado, na mesma concluso desmetaforizada do exemplo de Eberhard,
reencontramos o Leitmotiv de tanta crtica sua filosofia transcendental, presente na
prpria sequncia do seu mesmo artigo, e, obviamente, o mote que o anima.28 No por
outra razo que, na Resposta a Eberhard, referindo-se a este texto [mas nada ali dizendo
a respeito da metfora musical neste presente], Kant afirma:
Na pgina 258 [nos nmeros 3 e 4], o Senhor Eberhard diz: Espao e tempo, alm dos
fundamentos subjetivos, tm tambm fundamentos objetivos, e estes fundamentos
objetivos no so nenhuns fenmenos, mas coisas verdadeiras, cognoscveis. Na pgina
259: Os seus fundamentos ltimos so coisas em si. Tudo o que a Crtica igualmente
afirma, literal e repetidamente.29
Evidentemente, s se poder anuir com que ali se encontre [t]udo o que a Crtica
igualmente afirma, literal e repetidamente, se se puser de lado a equivocidade filosficoterminolgica de subjetivo e objetivo. Noutras palavras: se os significados de um e
outro valessem univocamente para os dois autores, se estes conflussem com o novo
conceito de experincia operado pela filosofia transcendental.
28
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Schnen
Knste,
Leipzig
61
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The principle of equality governing the actions and counteractions in Kants Practical Philosophy
JEAN-CHRISTOPHE MERLE
University of Vechta, Germany
Abstract
Kants principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions (8:26) belongs not only to
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences (1786), but also to his practical philosophy.
Kants Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784) and On the Common
Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice (1793) may contribute to the
understanding of the principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions in the latter
writing, and vice-versa. Referring to all three, this paper tries to show that, in the context of his
concept of right, Kant understands the principle of the equality of action and reaction in two
different senses, which he combines: a dynamic one and a legal one.
Key words
Equality of action and counter-action; Nature; Rights; Natural Sciences
Resumen
El principio de igualdad que gobierna acciones y reacciones (AA 08: 26) pertenece no solo a
Principios metafsicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza (1786), sino tambin a su filosofa prctica.
Idea de una historia universal en clave cosmopolita (1784) y Acerca del dicho comn: algo puede
Full time Professor at the University of Vechta (Germany). Email contact: jean-christophe.merle@univechta.de .
[Recibido: 9 de octubre de 2015
Aceptado: 30 de octubre de 2015]
62
ser vlido en teora, pero no es vlido para la prctica (1793) de Kant pueden contribuir a la
comprensin del principio de igualdad que gobierna acciones y reacciones en el ltimo escrito, y
viceversa. Teniendo en cuenta los tres, este artculo intenta mostrar que, en el contexto de su
concepto de derecho, Kant entiende el principio de la igualdad de accin y reaccin en dos sentidos
distintos combinados: uno dinmico y otro legal.
Palabras clave
Igualdad de accin y reaccin; naturaleza; derechos; ciencias naturales
Kants principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions (IaG, AA 08: 26)
belongs not only to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences (1786), but also to
his practical philosophy. One finds a practical version of this principle in his Idea for a
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784), in On the Common Saying: That
may be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice (1793) and in his Doctrine of
Right (1796). The two former shorter writings of his practical philosophy may contribute to
the understanding of the principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions
in the latter longer writing, and vice-versa. Referring to all three, I would like to show that,
in the context of his concept of right, Kant understands the principle of the equality of
action and reaction in two different senses, which he combines: a dynamic one and a legal
one.
In the Doctrine of Right, Kant defines the concept of right as [] the sum of the
conditions under which the choice (Willkr) of one can be united with the choice of
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom. (RL, AA 06: 230) In the
schematization that immediately follows the presentation of his concept of right, Kant
offers two analogies which help considerably understanding whatthe sum of the
conditions arein this formulation of his concept. One is a physical and more precisely a
dynamic analogy, while the second is a geometrical one. Kant claims that the second one
underlies the first.
1. The dynamic analogy
[First analogy] The law of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with the
freedom of everyone under the principle of universal freedom is, as it were, the
construction of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure intuition a priori,
by analogy with presenting the possibility of bodies moving freely under the law of
the equality of action and reaction. (RL, AA 06: 232)
This analogy is physical, because it combines elements of geometry that rely on space as a
condition a priori of experience, as shown in the Transcendental Aesthetics, with a
category, i.e., with a concept a priori, which is the category of reciprocal action.
[Second analogy] A right line (rectum), one that is straight, is opposed to one that
is curved on the one hand, and to one that is oblique, on the other hand. As opposed
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Jean-Christophe Merle
to one that is curved, straightness is that position of a line toward another
intersecting or touching it such that there can be only one line (the perpendicular),
which does not incline more to one side than to the other and which divides the
space on both sides equally. Analogous to this, the doctrine of right wants to be
sure that what belongs to each has been determined (with mathematical
exactitude). (RL, AA 06:233)
Interestingly enough, at first sight, the geometrical analogy does not seem to coincide with
the dynamic analogy. In fact, the geometrical representation of action and counter-action or
power of resistance if one puts aside any friction forces and any force of gravity are
segments located on the same line; action and counter-action are differentiated only by
their opposite direction as well as by the length of the segments. In the dynamic analogy,
there is no perpendicular line. Transcribed in legal concepts, the two analogies have
different meanings.
The physical analogy takes as a starting point a certain distribution of mine, i.e.,
of the rights allocated to individual persons.This can be represented as one of the two end
points of a line segment, on which the possibility of body moving freely under the law of
equality of action and reaction (RL, AA 06: 222) is represented. One can interpret the
analogy in at least two different ways. A first interpretation corresponds to the case of the
authorization to coerce who infringes upon right (Befugnis, den, der ihm Abbruch tut, zu
zwingen). In the Doctrine of Right, this case is mentioned in D, that is, just before the two
analogies. The legally wrong action violates this distribution, and its effect is represented
by the second end point of the line segment. According to the D of the Doctrine of Right,
the reaction corrects the violation so that the status quo ante is restored and the cursor is
brought back to the first end point.
Now, one should notice two aspects of the analogy.
The first one is that, in the Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Sciences, the
principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions does not mean that any
time a body A hits another body B located at a position x1 and moves it to the position x2, a
reaction will follow this action and relocate the body B at the position x1. In fact, according
to the Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Sciences, the final position after the reaction
has occurred depends on the mass of the bodies. More precisely, the movement of the
bodies after the choc stands in reverse proportion to the mass of the bodies (in inverse
ratio to their masses, in umgekehrtem Verhltnis der Masse, MAN, AA 04: 545). Both
aspects are absent from the dynamic analogy of the Doctrine of Right. Thus, one should
adopt a second interpretation: According to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Sciences, each immobile distribution is constantly the result of opposite forces exercised
by bodies of unequal masses. Now, whether there is a hit or impact or not, that is, whether
the first or the second interpretation is valid, neither in the Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Sciences nor in the first analogy does Kant assume in the merely dynamic
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principle of equality of action and reaction the existence of an equality of the persons and
of their physical and intellectual capacities to act. On the contrary, like non-human bodies,
human beings do not have an equal mass, i.e., strength. Such an inequality exists also in
the civil state, as is shown by Kants characterization of the federation of peoples which
he considers as the law-governed external relationship (IaG, AA 08: 24) between states
in the Idea:
[] a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest [my emphasis,
JCM], could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power [my
emphasis, JCM], but solely [] from a united power and the law-governed
decisions of a united will. (IaG, AA 08: 24)
The second remarkable aspect of the physical analogy is that the human persons are
presented as bodies moving freely (DR, AA 06: 232). This contrasts with the
presentation of the way unsocial sociability exercises its action. In the state of nature,
unsocial sociability inspires the desire for honor, power or property (IaG, AA 08: 21)
(Ehrsucht, Herrschsucht oder Habsucht), and leads the human being to expect resistance
all around, just as he knows of himself that he is in turn inclined to offer resistance to
others. (IaG, AA 08: 21) However, unsocial sociability results in what the Common
Sayingcalls thewill to subjugate one another or to diminish what belongs to another, i.e.,
to destroy another. Now, when either subjugation or destruction occurs between two
persons, there are no longer two bodies moving freely (DR, AA 06: 232) in their
relationship to one another, and there is no longer any impact nor any touch. This situation
is incompatible with the analogy of the principle of equality governing the actions and
counter-actions. In fact, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences, Kant
develops a concept in which each body has a force of extension, so that body B hit by body
A is not inert, but resists body A:
[In an impact,] it is clear that the resting body does not, merely as resting, acquire
motion lost by the impacting body, but that, in the collision, it exerts actual forces
on the latter in the opposite direction, so as to compress, as it were, a
springbetween the two, which requires just as much actual motion on its part (but
in the opposite direction) as the moving body itself has need of for this purpose.
(MAN, AA 04: 549)
In the concept of right, the force of the individuals is moved by freedom, but this freedom
acts on other free individuals in the same way as any body acting freely. On the contrary, if
the individual is subjugated, she no longer moves freely, but only as dependent on another
body, on which she cannot not longer hit or impact. The same applies in the case of the
destruction of other individuals, for instance in war. Now, both subjugation and war are
opposed to the concept of right in the Idea of a Universal History because they contradict
the free coexistence of individuals:
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All wars are accordingly so many attempts [] to bring about new relations
between states, and, by the destruction or at least the dismemberment of old
entities, to create new ones. (IaG, AA 08: 24f.)
Also the prerogative of the rank contradicts the concept of right and the principle of
equality between action and reaction, as Kant explains in the Common Saying:
[A member of the commonwealth] may bequeath anything else, whatever is a
thing (not pertaining to personality) and can be acquired as property and also
alienated by him, and so in a series of generations produce a considerable
inequality of financial circumstances among the members of a commonwealth (of
hireling and hirer, landowners and agricultural laborers, and so forth); but he may
not prevent their being authorized to raise themselves to like circumstances if their
talent, their industry, and their luck make this possible for them. For otherwise he
could coerce without others in turn being able to coerce him by their reaction, and
would rise above the level of a fellow subject. Again, no one living in a rightful
condition of a commonwealth can fall from this equality otherwise than by his own
crime. (VATP, AA 08: 293)
If we summarize the two aforementioned points, the elements of the analogy are (1) that
the concept of right guarantees the conservation of the bodies against mutual danger, and
(2) that the danger that equality of action and reaction may lead to situations contrary to the
return to the status quo ante after the impact because of the difference of forces between
the individuals, is overcome by legal constraint exercised by a universal law of freedom
into a restoration of the status quo ante, so that the only possible movements are free
movements in the sense in which they are freely intended or accepted by all agents
involved. The only way to reconcile the dynamic principle of the equality of action and
reaction with the legal equality of action and reaction is the following: Through the
constraint (Zwang) exercised by the state, the stronger individual diminishes his freedom
of action to the extent needed for the weaker individual to enjoy the same freedom of
action. In other words, the dynamic analogy has to be backed by an analogy expressing the
legal equality of action and reaction. The latter is the geometrical analogy. Three years
before the Doctrine of Right, the Common Saying expresses this in a more concise form:
For all right consists merely in the limitation of the freedom of every other to the
condition that it can coexist with my freedom in accordance with a universal law,
and public right (within a commonwealth) is merely the condition of an actual
legislation in conformity with this principle and joined with power, by virtue of
which all those belonging to a people as subjects are in a rightful condition (status
iuridicus) as such, namely a condition of equality of action and reaction of a choice
limiting one another in conformity with a universal law of freedom (which is called
the civil condition). (VATP, 08: 293)
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Let us now inquire into the geometrical analogy. It does not take a certain distribution as a
starting point. Instead, the geometrical analogy determines the distribution between two
choices, that is, external freedoms: [] to be sure that what belongs to each has been
determined (with mathematical exactitude). (RL, AA 06: 233). The choices common
realm of action is represented by one unique segment on which both choices may collide,
which is expressed by Kant as the position of two lines cutting or hitting another (die
Lage zweier einander durchschneidender oder zusammenstoenden Linien, AA 06: 233;
or to clarify the English translation: It is that position of a line toward another intersecting
or touching it). One of the end points represents the full implementation of the choice of
one individual against the choice of another, whereas the other end point represents the
reverse situation. The mathematical analogy determines the distribution by a line
perpendicular to the segment, cutting it into two equal segments. Two aspects of the
geometrical analogy are noticeable.
First, the equality of the two resulting segments shows the legal equality of the
choices despite them being different regarding physical and intellectual strength. This
infringes the merely dynamic principle of equality between action and reaction. In other
words, any time person A collides with person B, the concept of right will result in the
restoration of the initial location, i.e.,in distribution being restored, no matter how different
the respective mass of persons A and B may be. Second, there is not only a point cutting
the segment into two equal segments, but a full line, which is more than a unique point.
This is confirmed by the fact that the perpendicular line divides not only the segment, but it
also [] divides the space (RL, AA 06: 233)
In order to explain the first remark, I suggest interpretingin a literal and strong way
the fact that the perpendicular line intersects with the initial segments, in which it
operatesas a strict separation between two segments and between two spaces. And, in fact,
law exercises the force needed for all individuals to be equality limited in their freedom in
spite of their different respective strength, which implies that law exercises a coercion
proportionate to the strength of the actual or potential perpetrator. In this regard, the law
behaves in another way than a spring C being interposed between a spring A and a spring
B, because such a spring does not modify the relationship of strength between the springs
A and B, as is explained in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences (see 4:549,
footnote **). In other words, unlike the spring C, the legal order backed by its power of
coercion exercises an irresistible force.
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Now, what does the fact that the perpendicular line separates not only two lines, but also
two spaces mean? Here, I suggest referring to the famous metaphor of the forest apparently
used for explaining the just civil constitution in the Idea of a Universal History:
The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of
establishing a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to
the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a
perfectly just civil constitution. [] there inclinations make it impossible for them
to exist side by side for long in a state of wild freedom. But once enclosed within a
precinct like that of civil union, the same inclinations have the most beneficial
effect. In the same way, trees in a forest, by seeking to deprive each other of air and
sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they grow
beautiful and straight whereas those who put branches at will, in freedom and
isolation of others, grow stunted, bent and twisted. (IaG, 08: 22)
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In the following, I would like to sketch the potential progress regarding the
dynamic and legal equality between action and reaction, as opposed to a merely dynamic
equality. This potential progress consists in developing an established civil constitution
into a fully just civil constitution. By the potential progress of a civil constitution, I
understand more precisely that not only freedom of contract is respected, but also that the
legal order may remedy circumstances that modify the outcome of the fulfillment of the
contract in a way that diverges from the one intended at the time at which the contract has
been concluded. In other words, an improved rule of law can prevent contingency to
collide with the legal equality between action and reaction. I see this potential progress in
the concept of equity exposed in the Doctrine of Right that is absent from the Idea of a
Universal History and from the Common Saying, but that, as an at first sight ambiguous
right, immediately follows the dynamic and geometrical analogies in the Doctrine of Right.
Before doing this, I would like to emphasize that the Idea of a Universal History handles
civil constitution in reference to the issue of the historical process of the establishment of a
just historical constitution, whereas the Doctrine of Right also (although not only)
considers an ideal, and metaphysical framework, independent of any legal act.Kants
concept of equity is in accord with his examination of this ambiguous right, eventually a
true right, although a right without coercion. (RL, AA 06: 234).
Here is an example of equity given by Kant:
[] suppose that a domestic servant is paid his wages at the end of a year in
money that has depreciated in the interval, so that he cannot buy with it what he
could have bought with it when he concluded the contract. The servant cannot
appeal to his right to be compensated when he gets the same amount of money, but
it is of unequal value. He can appeal only on grounds of equity (a mute divinity
who cannot be heard); for nothing was specified about this in the contract, and a
judge cannot pronounce in accordance with indefinite conditions. (RL, AA 06:
235)
Unlike what most of the commentators assume, the reason why the judge cannot decide in
accordance with equity is not because equity did not provide any exact criterion for
deciding the case. In fact, statistical means make it quite possible to calculate the exact
depreciation of money as compared to other goods, and such a calculation is actually often
used in tort law for calculating compensations for damages. The only obstacle for applying
equity is the absence of an adequate proviso in the contract, and more generally of any
legal proviso, whether of contractual origin or of another origin like statute law. Now, why
does Kant choose as an exact criterion for equity as a right without coercion what [the
servant] could have bought [with the amount of money set in the contract] when he
concluded the contract? This criterion (1) clearly refers to the purposive use of the amount
of money, and (2) it does not determine this use, which the mention of the real purpose of
the servant at the time of the conclusion of the contract would do, that is, that this criterion
leaves the servants choice (Willkr) fully open. Unfortunately, Kant does not mention
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whether the same criterion applies in the case of the appreciation of the money as
compared to other goods i.e., the case of deflation. The likely reason for not mentioning
this is that deflation seldom happens, while inflation is the most frequent price evolution.
Yet, in the case of deflation, the same criterion should apply. In my view, equity is
represented by the aforementioned perpendicular. In fact, the perpendicular line that cuts
the segment into two equal segments takes into consideration the open choice of both
contracting parties, whereas deciding for not compensating inflation would incline the
intersecting line more in one direction that of the employer than in the other.
One may object that Kant stipulates only the enforcement of the real contract, and
not of the equitable contract that should have been put in writing instead of the real
contract. Yet, Kant explicitly mentions in the first paragraph of the Introduction to the
Doctrine of Right that the doctrine of natural rights, as opposed to positive law, must
supply the immutable principles for any giving of positive law. (RL, AA 06: 229)
Admittedly, Kant assumes that, since the innate rights to freedom and equality
imply the freedom of contract, the provisos adopted in free contracts are valid. A free
action also leads to liability for its consequences. The validity of free contracts is expressed
by the famous legal principle volenti non fit iniuria. Since the labor contract between a
server and his or her employer, for instance, is a free contract, and does not definitively
suppress the formers freedom unlike free enslavement, which Kant prohibits , this
contract is valid, and it is handled as such in the body of the Doctrine of Right. (cf. RL, AA
06: 282f.)
Thereby, Kant considersneither any possible depreciation of the amount of money
regularly paid by the employer to the servant nor such empirical circumstances as poverty
or weakness that may constrain the person to accept the contract even on unequal or
unbalanced terms that do not fulfill the criterion for equity. This leads to the frequent
critique against Kant that he accepts the existence of a status, such as that of a servant, of
which he himself admits that it creates dependence, which apparently contradicts the innate
rightto freedom and the legal equality of action and reaction. If one considers only
enforceable law, one can say that, if Kant did take into consideration the aforementioned
circumstances that lead to unequal terms of free contracts, he would have defined legal
provisos that are much more adequate for protecting each persons choice (Willkr), since
equity is predominantly favorable to the expectations of the weak who is endangered to
become dependent or to die. Now, if one considers that the concepts of law and equity
should guide positive legislation, one can see in equity a clear direction for a progress of
the positive rule of law. And, in fact, Kant repeatedly stresses the requirement that reason
makes positive law progress.
To conclude, the dynamic analogy of the Doctrine of Right must be distinguished
from the merely dynamic analogy of the trees in the Idea of a Universal History. In fact,
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only the former entails both the dynamic principle of the equality of action and reaction
and the legal principle of equality of action and reaction, the latter being emphasized in the
Common Saying. The dynamic analogy of the Doctrine of Right entails anequality between
persons that is missing in the analogy of the forest in the Idea of a Universal History. This
equality is backed by the geometrical analogy of the perpendicular and one can see in
equity a potential progress in regard to this legal equality. In the comparison of these
analogies and metaphers to another, one can see how Kant gradually combines and
differentiates although not with full clarity different conceptual elements and the way
these elements build upon another.
Bibliography
Kants works are indicated with the abbreviation given by Kant-Studien guidelines,
followed by volume and page number of the Akademie Ausgabe (AA): I. Kant,
Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Kniglich-Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie
der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1900-.
Watkins, E. (2000): Kants Justification of the Laws of Mechanics. In: Id. (Ed.), Kant
and the Sciences. Oxford University Press, pp. 136159.
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FRANCESCO VALAGUSSA
Universit Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Italia
Riassunto
Partendo dallanalisi del criticismo proposta da Simmel, si pu dire che Kant abbia infranto
larmonia tra essere e pensare sul piano metafisico e quella tra virt e felicit sul piano morale. Ci
non significa abbandonare definitivamente la teoria di un sistema delle nostre facolt, ma piuttosto
porre questo tema al centro pensandolo come compito. Sotto questo aspetto la Critica del Giudizio
pu essere letta come il tentativo di riannodare i fili spezzati: da questo testo emerge in modo
peculiare il problema della natura. La natura non pi intesa come oggetto sottoposto alla
legislazione dellintelletto, bens come elemento chiave che d la regola allarte.
Parole chiavi
Sistema; Critica del giudizio; Simmel; trascendentale; natura
Abstract
Starting from Simmels analysis of the criticism, we can say that Kant has broken the harmony
between being and thinking from a metaphysical point of view and the harmony between happiness
and virtue concerning the moral point of view. It does not mean that Kant left definitely a theory of
the system of our faculties, rather he focuses on this problem, thinking about it as a task. In this
sense the Critique of Judgement could be read as the attempt to knot again these broken wires: in
Ricercatore di filosofia teoretica presso la Facolt di Filosofia dellUniversit San Raffaele. E-mail di
contatto: valagussa.francesco@hsr.it .
[Recibido: 15 de septiembre de 2015
Aceptado: 26 de octubre de 2015]
72
this context the nature plays a leading role. The nature is no more an object subjected to the
legislation of our intellect, rather the nature gives the rule to the art.
Key words
System; Critique of Judgement; Simmel; transcendental; Nature
1. Armonie infrante
Nella terza delle sue Lezioni berlinesi dedicate alla filosofia kantiana Simmel parla
della fede appassionata nellarmonia naturale di tutto lessente quale carattere chiave
dellepoca illuminista. Il clima culturale allinterno del quale Kant trascorre i propri anni
di apprendistato considerava ancora pienamente lecito gettare questo ponte tra
lobiettivamente valido e lo psicologico: verit fondamentali erano disposte in modo tale
che ogni spirito dovesse esserne consapevole (Simmel 1918, 27).1 Da questo punto di
vista limpostazione costitutiva del criticismo kantiano segna una discontinuit radicale e
ineludibile rispetto al proprio tempo:
Questo ponte fu spezzato da Kant, sennonch le verit, anzich sprofondare
nellabisso sottostante, come sarebbe stata conseguenza di quel presupposto, egli le
dot nel loro significato di a priori di una solida dimora, e ci proprio
delimitandole rispetto a qualsiasi elemento di natura psicologica (Simmel 1918,
27).
Simmel si era espresso in maniera ancora pi incisiva nel primo di una serie di
articoli apparsi verso la fine del XIX secolo come supplemento domenicale sul Vossische
Zeitung, dal titolo piuttosto significativo Was ist uns Kant? e che rappresentano di fatto
un primo abbozzo delle sue ricerche attorno al pensiero del filosofo di Knigsberg.
Nellarticolo apparso il 2 agosto 1896, per sottolineare come nella Critica della ragione
pura il mero pensiero non produca per noi alcuna conoscenza, Simmel ascrive a Kant una
vera e propria soluzione di continuit sul piano metafisico rispetto alla tradizione
precedente:
Viene reciso ogni filo mediante cui i metafisici hanno creduto di legare insieme in
unarmonia arcana il pensiero e lessere (Simmel 2008, 787).
Sul rapporto tra Kant e Simmel si vedano in particolare due contributi (Marini, 1986, 7-43 e Vigorelli 1986,
45-60).
2
Cfr. KrV, AA 03: B XVI-XVII.
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Francesco Valagussa
tutte queste cose, in quanto apparenze, non possono esistere in se stesse, ma esistono
soltanto in noi. Di che cosa possa trattarsi, riguardo agli oggetti in se stessi, separati da
tutta questa recettivit della nostra sensibilit, ci rimane perfettamente ignoto (KrV, AA
03: B60 / A43). In tal senso, ogni tentativo di costruire un ponte capace di collegare le due
opposte sponde il pensare e lessere viene dichiarato sostanzialmente vano e illusorio.
Allinterno delle lezioni berlinesi, Simmel esprime lesito di questa frattura con
unimmagine particolarmente efficace: Il mondo la mia rappresentazione la sua realt
effettuale, la nuda verit delle cose per me eternamente irraggiungibile, sono confinato
nellangustia del mio rappresentare, davanti allo spirito, che si protende verso lessere,
questo si ritrae come i frutti davanti alla mano di Tantalo (Simmel 1918, 59-60).
Tale operazione riguarda lambito prettamente metafisico, ma comporta profonde
ricadute sul piano ontologico ed epistemologico, che si possono riassumere facendo
appello, di nuovo, a un passo della prima Critica: Le proposizioni fondamentali
dellintelletto sono semplicemente principi dellesposizione delle apparenze, e il nome
orgoglioso di una ontologia, la quale presume di fornire in una dottrina sistematica
conoscenze sintetiche in generale [] deve fare posto al nome modesto di una semplice
analitica dellintelletto puro (KrV, AA 03: B304 / A247).
Restando ancorati allanalisi di Simmel, peraltro, questarmonia arcana tra essere e
pensiero non la sola ad essere infranta nel corso dellindagine kantiana. In ambito morale
assistiamo a unanaloga frattura, dagli esiti certamente non inferiori alla prima:
Kant ha rivelato in tutta la sua insostenibilit la vecchia credenza secondo cui una
necessit psichica, oppure lordine stesso degli esterni destini, fornirebbero
inevitabilmente alla bont morale una gratifica di felicit (Simmel 1918, 148).
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Volendo rintracciare altri percorsi connessi allarchitettonica delle facolt, si
potrebbero individuare correlazioni molto precise tra le tre massime del sensus communis
presenti nella Critica del giudizio (pensare da s, pensare nella posizione di ogni altro e
pensare sempre in accordo con se stessi) 6 e le partizioni presenti in alcuni scritti coevi
per esempio in rapporto ai principi a priori di libert come uomo, eguaglianza come
suddito e indipendenza come cittadino (cfr. UdG, AA 08: A 236), presenti nel saggio Sul
detto comune: questo pu essere giusto in teoria, ma non vale per la prassi, edito nel 1793;
la medesima struttura si ripresenter poi nella tripartizione dei diritti presente nello scritto,
ben pi celebre, dal titolo Per la pace perpetua, pubblicato nel 1795, ossia il diritto statalecivile degli uomini in un popolo, il diritto delle genti negli Stati nei loro reciproci rapporti
e il diritto cosmopolitico in quanto uomini e Stati che stiano in rapporti di reciproco
influsso come cittadini di un universale Stato di uomini (cfr. ZeF, BA19). Le
esemplificazioni potrebbero continuare, ma otterrebbero soltanto leffetto di una mera
casistica in cui vengono affastellati una serie di correlazioni: quanto di pi contrario si
possa immaginare rispetto allo spirito kantiano (cfr. Centi 1999).
Rimane da precisare, dunque, quali siano i termini in cui si configura listanza
sistematica: ogni nostra conoscenza possiamo leggere nella Dialettica trascendentale
prende inizio dai sensi, di qui procede verso lintelletto e finisce nella ragione (KrV, AA
04: B355 / A298). Se i sensi forniscono intuizioni e lintelletto si occupa di concetti, il
prodotto peculiare della ragione viene indicato con il nome di Schlu (cfr. KrV, AA 03:
B360-361 / A303-304) in quanto la ragione letteralmente tira le conclusioni di un
ragionamento e lo riconduce ai minimi principi possibili.
La ragione lavora in vista dellunit, alla luce della quale si pu appunto
concludere un ragionamento. Di regola Giorgio Colli non traduce Schlu con
sillogismo, bens assai pi spesso e giustamente con inferenza:7 ci consente, in
effetti, di rendere sul piano di una sfumatura terminologica la differenza che passa tra Kant
ed Hegel.
Se per il filosofo di Stoccarda la dialettica direttamente la forma in cui trova
espressione il vero, non dunque come sostanza bens come movimento del soggetto (Hegel
1970, III, 23), agli occhi di Kant la dialettica viene definita esplicitamente come logica
dellillusione (KrV, AA 03: B86 / A61) e pi precisamente come unarte sofistica che
cerca di fornire il colorito della verit alla propria ignoranza, anzi persino alle proprie
intenzionali costruzioni illusorie (KrV, AA 03: B86 / A61). La ragione kantiana non
sillogizza nel senso dello Schlu hegeliano che svuota ogni morto Aldil e dunque si
riflette in se stessa costituendo lidentit compiuta (Vollendung) di razionalit e realt,8
6
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la Wissenschaft der Logik si rinvia a Lugarini 1998, 277-323. Cfr. inoltre Chiereghin 1998, 170-171, in
particolare la nota 15 in cui si esemplifica landamento speculativo con la curva periodica che descrive la
cicloide.
9
Su questa problematica appare ancora centrale il contributo presente in Scaravelli 1980. Di fondamentale
importanza rimane E. Garroni 1976.
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Per restare allesempio di Benjamin, laffresco contemplato dal monaco allinterno
della propria cella lungo larco di unintera vita si trasforma nel cartellone pubblicitario
che in un istante fa colpo sul passante (Benjamin 1991, I,2, 500-501).
3. Larmonia come problema
Proprio nella sua radicale smentita dellarmonia delle facolt, levoluzione
contemporanea, tuttavia, consente anche di scorgere nel criticismo kantiano una
straordinaria anticipazione del problema. Lassillo kantiano per larchitettonica e
larmonizzazione dipende proprio dalla consapevolezza della fragilit che caratterizza il
passaggio tra le facolt, lunico ponte che allepoca pareva ancora reggere. Per dirla con
Simmel, tolta limpalcatura su cui si reggeva ledificio del mondo (Simmel 1918, 64), tutto
si risolve nella prestazione e nella funzione dellio: lio la vitalit del processo del
mondo, che consiste nel collegare quegli elementi in modo comprensibile, costruttivo di
oggetti, e capace di dar forma al caos della sensibilit (ivi, 124).
Questa stessa attivit dellio, nondimeno, si rivela ben diversa da quella stabilit e
permanenza che si soliti attribuirgli. Simmel intravvede il suo inquieto procedere per
salti (ivi, 55), ma certamente il problema non era sfuggito allideatore dello Ich denke. Al
contrario, sin dalla tormentata stesura della Critica della ragione pura possibile scorgere
il dramma di Kant, ossessionato dalla tenuta complessiva del sistema: in seguito al totale
rovesciamento della prospettiva metafisica per cui non saranno pi le facolt a doversi
accordare alloggetto, ma saranno gli oggetti a doversi accordare al nostro modo di
conoscere (KrV, AA 03: B166-167), la natura come complesso regolato di leggi cessa di
avere unesistenza autonoma e lintelletto diventa condizione di possibilit della natura
stessa (KrV, AA 03: A126-127). 10 Dopo aver operato questo strategico arretramento di
posizione, o forse si dovrebbe dire un rovesciamento di posizioni, Kant si preoccupa di
sondare continuamente la tenuta del nuovo fronte.
Larmonia corre il pericolo di infrangersi a vari livelli: partendo per cos dire dal
limite superiore, certamente il problema investe il rapporto tra le diverse facolt, ma appare
senzaltro pi interessante intraprendere la strada opposta e risalire a partire dal limite
inferiore. Qui possibile esporre soltanto in estrema sintesi quali siano i rischi maggiori
dincrinatura:11
1) Il problema dellomogeneit tra la cosiddetta materia greggia e la nostra
capacit di conoscere in generale determina appunto quel rovesciamento di
fronte appena menzionato.
10
Lintelletto viene considerato condizione di possibilit della natura stessa, intesa come sistema regolato di
apparenze. Non si tratta certo di un hapax, bens piuttosto di un Leit Motiv del criticismo. Il medesimo
ragionamento si trova in KrV, AA 03: B263 / A216.
11
Per unanalisi delle strutture e delle implicazioni presenti nella Deduzione in particolare con riferimento
alla facolt del giudizio qui si pu soltanto rimandare a R. Brand 1991. Qui si offrir solo una tripartizione
schematica.
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12
Sulla differenza tra le due edizioni con specifico riferimento alla deduzione trascendentale il contributo
fondamentale rimane quello di Heidegger 1973, 123-124.
13
Cfr. Schopenhauer 1988, I, 575-576: Deve potere: questa unenunciazione problematico-apodittica;
per esser chiari, una frase che prende con una mano ci che d con laltra.
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Del fiume carsico mediante cui opera la capacit di immaginazione nulla
conosciamo se non leffetto (Wirkung)14, ossia il risultato di quel lavorio sotterraneo che
associa tra loro le intuizioni, trasformandole in rappresentazioni, avendole gi concatenate:
tale risultato si presenta dunque nei termini di un flusso esperienziale gi configurato,
costante e continuo.
4. La Critica del giudizio: per riannodare i fili spezzati
Abbiamo visto come la Critica della ragion pura si costituisca a partire dalla
rottura dellarmonia tra essere e pensiero, cos come la Critica della ragione pratica
prende avvio dallinfrangersi di ogni nesso capace di legare virt e felicit. Di fronte al
crollo di tale impalcatura, lo io penso si vede destinato a farsi carico di un ruolo
decisivo nelleconomia del criticismo. Nella terza Critica Kant prova a recuperare i fili
spezzati, tessendoli nuovamente secondo un ordito trascendentale e una trama che viene
affidata interamente allo statuto del giudizio riflettente (cfr. Garroni, 1990, 7-19).
LAnalitica del bello per un verso e lAnalitica del sublime per laltro svolgono un
ruolo decisivo in rapporto alle disarmonie emerse a partire dalle prime due critiche.
Kant sottolinea come il secondo momento dellAnalitica del bello costituisca la
chiave per risolvere lintera critica del gusto (KU, AA 05, B27 / A27). Nel 9 si discute il
ruolo del piacere in rapporto alla valutazione delloggetto: soltanto facendo precedere la
valutazione delloggetto rispetto allinsorgere del sentimento di piacere si pu assicurare al
giudizio riflettente una caratura trascendentale. Il problema riguarda lo statuto soggettivo e
insieme oggettivo del giudizio: Kant costretto a elaborare una strategia che consenta di
assegnare a un giudizio apparentemente del tutto soggettivo un certo profilo di
oggettivit. Si tratta di trovare un criterio doggettivit, ossia un orizzonte di
condivisibilit, senza che ci si trasformi in un contenuto universalizzabile e necessario
(che risulterebbe appannaggio del giudizio determinante).15
Tale contenuto, a un tempo condiviso senza essere universale, in un certo senso
accomunante senza essere riconducibile a un concetto determinato, coincide unicamente
con la situazione in cui le facolt si trovano reciprocamente disposte nella maniera
migliore in vista di una conoscenza in generale. Si noti che un simile contesto comporta
esattamente una condizione di armonia tra la facolt dellintelletto e la facolt
dellimmaginazione.
In queste pagine larmonia ritorna potentemente come fondamento trascendentale
dellintera dinamica di funzionamento delle facolt. Il rapporto che si instaura tra
immaginazione e intelletto viene descritto icasticamente come un libero gioco (ein freies
14
Cfr. KrV, AA 03: B152: la sua sintesi devessere la sintesi trascendentale della capacit di
immaginazione: cio un effetto (Wirkung) che lintelletto produce sulla sensibilit (e al tempo stesso
fondamento di tutte le altre).
15
Sul rapporto tra giudizio determinante e giudizio riflettente, e in particolare sui loro rapporti allinterno
della terza Critica, possiamo soltanto rinviare a Deleuze1963, 109-111. Sullo stesso problema si veda
Desideri 2003.
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Spiel) (KU, AA 05: B28 / A28): la celebre espressione era gi stata adoperata da Lessing
nel suo Laocoonte (Lessing 1961, 179), dove si afferma gi a chiare lettere che fruttuoso
solo ci che d libero gioco allimmaginazione. Quanto pi vediamo, tanto pi dobbiamo
rifletterci. Tale formula viene ripresa nella Critica del Giudizio nellobiettivo, per, di
conferire al giudizio riflettente un sostrato trascendentale.
Lincapacit da parte dellintelletto di recuperare un concetto sotto il quale
sussumere lintuizione apre il campo a una sorta di vuoto legislativo, che viene riempito
dallimmaginazione, la quale si scopre non soltanto ricettiva, ma anche spontanea,
assumendo un ruolo per cos dire creativo: di fronte allimpasse in cui si trova lintelletto
nel fornire la regola determinata, limmaginazione scopre non un nuovo territorio cui
imporre la propria legislazione16, bens la propria autonomia (di giudizio).
La possibilit di unarmonia tra le due facolt per un verso viene avvertita
soggettivamente, per laltro verso accomuna su un piano oggettivo e si pone quale
condizione per il funzionamento stesso dellio penso come attivit che accompagna ogni
rappresentazione. Larmonia tra facolt costituisce una sorta di margine che Kant residua
dallillusione di unarmonia tra le cose del mondo e lintelletto conoscente.
Analogamente, nellanalitica del sublime si tenta di ricomporre i cocci prodotti
dalla Critica della ragione pratica: loperazione kantiana risulta uguale e contraria rispetto
a quella messa in campo nellanalitica del bello. Invece di sottolineare larmonia delle
facolt, coinvolgendo intelletto e immaginazione, il sublime si caratterizza come momento
in cui lanimo avverte una profonda e irrimediabile disarmonia, che concerne il rapporto
tra ragione e immaginazione. Se limmaginazione era riuscita a coinvolgere lintelletto in
un libero gioco, ora si trova invece a patire unincolmabile distanza rispetto al desiderio
dellincondizionato che caratterizza la ragione. Nessuna immagine pu essere adeguata a
rappresentare la totalit della serie:
il compiacimento per il sublime della natura non che negativo, cio un
sentimento del privarsi, da parte dellimmaginazione, della sua propria libert, in
quanto essa viene determinata finalisticamente secondo una legge diversa da quella
delluso empirico. Con ci essa acquista una potenza che pi grande di quella che
sacrifica, ma il cui fondamento nascosto a lei stessa, che invece sente il sacrifico
o la privazione cui sottoposta (KU, AA 05: B 117 / A115-116).
16
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Francesco Valagussa
negatives Wohlgefallen):18 la stessa espressione si trova nella Critica della ragione pratica
(KpV, AA 05: A 212) in riferimento alla Selbstzufriedenheit come consapevolezza di non
aver bisogno di nulla.
Se per un verso il sentimento suscitato dal dovere nome grande e sublime
(KpV, AA 05: A 154), come si legge nella seconda Critica si alimenta
dellincomparabilit che sussiste tra sensibile e sovrasensibile, per un altro verso la pura e
semplice possibilit di avvertire tale distanza risveglia lidea di una superiorit rispetto alla
natura. La distanza che contrassegna il dovere rispetto allempirico si trasforma in
sentimento dindipendenza e di autonomia: la disarmonia per cos dire leffetto provocato
dallinsufficienza dellempirico rispetto allincondizionato. Tramite il sentimento del
sublime si ridesta la destinazione sovrasensibile dellanimo umano: lintero ambito
fenomenico si raccoglie e si annoda attorno a un punto pi alto.
Larmonia, nel caso dellanalitica del bello, e la disarmonia, nel caso dellanalitica
del sublime, devono essere intese come occasioni di collaborazione tra le facolt: per un
verso rivelando momenti di coerenza tra immaginazione e intelletto nel libero gioco, per
laltro verso mostrando il sacrificio dellimmaginazione dinnanzi alla ragione, la Critica
del giudizio rappresenta un luogo di dialogo tra le facolt dellanimo (cfr. Hohenegger
2004, 166-177). Anche linadeguatezza percepita nel sentimento del sublime si rivela
funzionale alla cooperazione: larmonia perduta sul piano del rapporto tra oggetto e facolt
viene dunque riconquistata allinterno di un margine trascendentale.
5. Dare la regola: arte e natura
La lettura della Critica del giudizio con particolare riferimento ai paragrafi
dedicati allarte del genio costringe ad assistere a unultima inversione di marcia, che
prende in contropiede lintero sistema del criticismo e pone nuovamente in discussione lo
statuto dellarmonia tra le facolt.
Si visto come nellottica kantiana si debba rinunciare alle armonie prestabilite.
La radicalit della cosiddetta rivoluzione copernicana conduce Kant a una sorta di
trasvalutazione delle leggi dellintelletto,19 sino al punto di affermare che lintelletto
dunque non semplicemente una facolt per costruire regole con il raffronto delle
apparenze; esso stesso il legislatore della natura, ossia, senza intelletto non vi sarebbe
assolutamente una natura, cio ununit sintetica del molteplice delle apparenze secondo
regole (KrV, AA 03: A 126-127).
Nella Critica della ragione pura lintelletto assegna regole alle apparenze e cos si
costituisce come legislatore e condizione di possibilit della natura stessa. Analogamente
nella Critica della ragione pratica, la celebre massima Agisci in modo che la massima
della tua volont possa sempre valere, insieme, come principio di una legislazione
universale (KpV, AA 05: A 54) dipende da una costruzione tutta interna alle facolt
18
19
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20
Sullautentico significato del formalismo kantiano allinterno dellimperativo categorico si veda Heidegger
1982, 279.
21
Pensare in senso tecnico, ossia riflettere senza lapporto di concetti e dunque senza comportare
conoscenza.
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di giudizio, Quodlibet, Macerata.
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Laocoonte. Ovvero sui confini della pittura e della poesia, in Opere filosofiche, G. Ghia (a
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OSCAR MEO
Abstract
Im ersten Teil des Aufsatzes diskutiere ich die Bedeutung des Syntagmas Erkenntnis berhaupt,
das Kant im 9 der KU einfhrt, um sowohl das Problem der allgemeinen Mitteilbarkeit des dem
Geschmacksurteil zugrundeliegenden Gemtszustandes, als auch das Problem der Natur der
sthetischen bereinstimmung zwischen Verstand und Einbildungskraft aufzulsen: Whrend der
sthetischen Erfahrung ist es zwar notwendig, dass sie sich miteinander verbinden, als ob sie auf
die Gegenstandserkenntnis ausgerichtet wren, aber ihre Beziehung besteht in einem freien Spiel
auf dem vortheoretischen Niveau der reinen Erkenntnisform. Ich erforsche auch eine interessante,
wenn auch zu wenig studierte, Folge der Vermgensharmonie: das Entstehen eines besonderen
Zeitbewusstseins im Betrachtungssubjekt. Im zweiten Teil, auf der Basis von einigen Textstellen
bewerte ich die mglichen Antworten auf einen von einigen Auslegern erhobenen Einwand,
nmlich dass aus Kants Lsung des Problems der Vermgensharmonie die Notwendigkeit folgt,
alle Erfahrungsobjekte als schn zu definieren.
Schlsselwrter
Kant; Vermgensharmonie; Erkenntnis berhaupt; Geschmacksurteil
Prof. an der Philosophischen Fakultt der Universitt Genua. E-Mail fr Kontakt: oscar.meo@teletu.it .
86
Abstract
In the first part of this paper I discuss the meaning of the syntagm cognition in general,
introduced by Kant in the 9 of the KU to solve the problem both of the communicability of the
mental state underlying the judgment of taste and of the aesthetic harmony between
understanding and imagination: during the aesthetic experience it is necessary that they join as if
they aim at object knowledge, but their relationship consists in a free play at the pre-theoretical
level of the pure cognitive form. I also investigate an interesting, but too little studied, consequence
of the harmony between the cognitive powers: the emergence of a specific time-consciousness in
the observer. In the second part I examine, on the basis of some text passages, the possible answers
to an objection made by some scholars, i.e. that from Kants solution of the problem of the
harmony between the cognitive powers arises the necessity to define all objects of experience as
beautiful.
Key words
Understanding; Imagination; Harmony; Cognition in general; Judgment of taste
Eine der grten Schwierigkeiten in der Auslegung des letzten Teils vom zweiten Moment
des Geschmacksurteils ergibt sich aus dem Verhltnis, das Kant zwischen der
Mitteilbarkeit und der Verallgemeinbarkeit des individuellen Geschmacksurteils einerseits,
und dem Thema der Erkenntnis andererseits herstellt.1 Im 9 erklrt er, dass die Lust der
Beurteilung des Gegenstandes nicht vorhergehen kann, weil die unauflsbare
Verbindung zwischen Lust und Sinnenempfindung das Verbleiben am Niveau der
Privatgltigkeit nach sich ziehen und das Erreichen der gesuchten Allgemeingltigkeit
verbieten wrde2. Es gibt aber ein groes Hindernis, das der allgemeinen Mitteilung des
dem Geschmacksurteil zugrundeliegenden Gemtszustandes im Wege steht: Es kann
[] nichts allgemein mitgetheilt werden als Erkenntni und Vorstellung, sofern sie zum
Erkenntni gehrt.3 Kant schliet seinen komplizierten Gedankengang in einer ziemlich
kryptischen Weise:
Soll nun der Bestimmungsgrund des Urtheils ber diese allgemeine Mittheilbarkeit der
Vorstellung blo subjectiv, nmlich ohne einen Begriff vom Gegenstande, gedacht
werden, so kann er kein anderer als der Gemthszustand sein, der im Verhltnisse der
Vorstellungskrfte zu einander angetroffen wird, sofern sie eine gegebene Vorstellung auf
Erkenntni berhaupt beziehen.4
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Der logisch-theoretischen Bedeutung von berhaupt in der Philosophie Kants
gem, abstrahiert die Erkenntnis berhaupt von jeglicher Bestimmung: Sie ist die reine
Erkenntnisform, ohne einen besonderen Inhalt und ohne Bezug auf besondere Begriffe.6 Es
gibt also eine gewisse (wenn auch schwache) hnlichkeit mit der logischen Struktur des
Geschmacksurteils, das von jedem Begriff absieht. Das Problem wird klar genug an der
folgenden Stelle aus der R 988 (1783-84) errtert:
5
Wenn sich das Urtheil aufs obiect bezieht, gleichwohl aber kein bestimter Begrif von
irgend einem obiect, noch auch von irgend einer nach Regeln bestimmbaren Beziehung
aufs Subiect das Urtheil desselben nothwendig macht: so mu es sich auf obiect
berhaupt durch Gemthskrafte der Erkentnis berhaupt beziehen. Denn da ist kein
bestimmter Begrif, sondern blos das Gefhl der durch Begriffe berhaupt einer
Mittheilung fhigen Bewegung der Erkentniskrfte das, was den Grund des Urtheils
enthalt.7
Zur Erklrung vom semantischen Feld des Adverbs vgl. De Vleeschauwer (1976, Bd. 2, S. 464-465).
Die Rtselhaftigkeit vom Syntagma, das in der Vernunftlehre von Georg Friedrich Meyer (d.h. im
Handbuch, das Kant zu seinen Logikvorlesungen verwendete) auftritt, wurde schon von Basch (1896, 237)
hervorgehoben. Es erscheint in vielen Stellen der Werke Kants. Was betrifft die KU, s. 12, 222 u. 21, AA
05: 238. Mit Bezug auf den alten Begriff von der sthetischen Vollkommenheit, s. R 1800 u. 1894. Zu einem
auersthetischen Kontext s. R 2162 u. 4934, die den formalen Charakter der logischen Wahrheitskriterien
behandeln u. also in Verhltnis zu einem Thema der Einl. in die Transz. Logik der KrV sind). Auf die
Vermgensharmonie zu einer Erkenntnis berhaupt weisen die R 1931 u. 1935 hin.
7
AA 15: 432. Zur Wichtigkeit der Refl vgl. Dumouchel (1994, S. 429-430).
8
Vgl. das harte Urteil ber die Geniesthetik Herders und der Vorromantik berhaupt in den 47 u. 57 der
KU.
9
Das besttigt, dass die Rolle der Analogie zentral in der sthetik Kants ist, wie brigens die Einl. zeigt. Vgl.
dazu Meo (2004, S. 120-143). Nach Bartuschat (1972, S. 24), insofern die Erkenntnis berhaupt unbestimmt
ist, transzendiert sie die besonderen Erkenntnisse, sieht von irgendeinem Objekt ab und wendet sich nur an
sich selbst. Diese letzte Behauptung ist zwar kompatibel mit der Heautonomie der reflektierenden
Urteilskraft (und also mit der sthetischen Haltung), sondern nicht mit Kants Erkenntnistheorie.
6
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Kant weist auch terminologisch auf den Unterschied zwischen der Situation des
uninteressierten Wohlgefallens und der der Strukturierung der Erfahrungsmannigfaltigkeit
zum Erkenntniszweck hin: Whrend der sthetischen Betrachtung bleibt der Gegenstand
unabhngig vom Subjekt; dagegen erscheint dem Erkenntnissubjekt ein Objekt, das kraft
seiner Ttigkeit ist, was es ist. Aber das Element, das diesen Gegensatz eigentlich
charakterisiert, ist die verschiedene Funktion der Erkenntnisstrukturen: Einerseits aktiviert
sich ein sthetischer (diesmal im etymologischen Sinne, in dem das Wort in der KrV
verwendet wird: zur asthesis gehriger) Prozess, der den inneren Sinn und die
Empfindung betrifft; andererseits betrifft der kognitive Prozess Einbildungskraft, Verstand
und bestimmende Urteilskraft.13 In diesem Kontext, der reich an expliziten und impliziten
Hinweisen auf die KrV ist, zeigt Kant die Entgegensetzung zwischen dem Prozess des
inneren Sinnes einerseits und dem der Einbildungskraft und des Verstandes andererseits,
wenn sie verknpftet sind und der Schematismus sich verwirklicht.
Diese ist eine der wenigen Stellen der Kritik der sthetischen Urteilskraft, an der es
einen, wenn auch elliptischen und marginalen, Bezug auf die Zeit gibt, d.h. auf die Form
des inneren Sinnes, die in der KrV die Prozessstruktur der Schemen charakterisiert. Ohne
Zweifel tritt die Zeit auch im ersten Moment des Geschmacksurteils auf, wie Kants kurze
10
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Diskussion der sukzessiven Auffassung und der Synthesis (oder der Zusammenfassung)
des Mannigfaltigen in einer Gestalt zeigt14; aber im zweiten Moment, wo das Thema von
der Vermgensharmonie zum kognitivem Zeck oder zum zweckfreiem Spiel zentral ist, ist
die Funktion der Zeit noch wirkungsvoll. Das Problem ist nicht, die Weise des bergangs
von einem Begriff zu einem Bild und umgekehrt (nach der bidirektionalen Bewegung top
down und bottom up, die das Schematismuskapitel beschreibt) zu bestimmen, sondern zu
verstehen, wie Verstand und Einbildungskraft sich in ihrem Spiel einer Zeitlichkeit gem
harmonisieren, die die der Schemen nicht sein kann,15 weil keine objektive Erkenntnis und
kein Unterordnen vom Gestaltungs- und Vorstellungsprozess der Objekte nach
bestimmten, von Verstand und Einbildungskraft gegebenen Regeln stattfindet. Hier handelt
es sich um die Zeitlichkeit des inneren Sinnes, d.h. die Subjektstruktur, die wesentlich auch
zum Bewusstsein der eigenen Identitt (oder auch: des empirischen Ichs) beitrgt16 und
zu der Kant in der KrV sagt, dass sie die Art ist, wie das Gemt durch eigene Thtigkeit,
nmlich dieses Setzen seiner Vorstellung, mithin durch sich selbst afficirt wird.17
Zwar ist das psychologische Erlebnis leicht zu beschreiben: Ich kann nicht bewusst
sein, bei der Betrachtung vom sthetischen Gegenstand zu weilen (wie Kant im 12
sagen wird), und kann nicht wnschen, in meinem gegenwrtigen Gemtszustand zu
bleiben, ohne ein paralleles Bewusstsein der Zeitlichkeit von meinem Akt zu haben; der
Gegenstand kann meine Aufmerksamkeit nicht erwecken, ohne dass sozusagen eine
Selbstaffektion, eine Modifikation meines inneren Sinnes auftritt; 18 meine Vermgen
knnen nicht frei spielen und miteinander bereinstimmen, ohne dass ich ein paralleles
Bewusstsein der Zeitlichkeit meiner sthetischen Haltung habe. Nicht nur auf Grund der
Definition von innerem Sinn in der KrV, aber auch der in der KU verwendeten
Terminologie ist es notwendig, von einer Gemtsttigkeit zu sprechen: Kant selbst
behauptet im schon zitierten 12, dass die Betrachtung sich selbst whrend der
Verweilung bei dem Gegenstand strkt und reproducirt, wenn auch das Gemt passiv
in dieser Situation ist.19 Und, wenn auch die starren Regeln und die auf die Erkenntnis
ausgerichtete Vermgensharmonie den Prozesscharakter meines sthetischen Gefhls (das
14
19
Nach Bartuschat (1972, S. 95) ist die Subjektttigkeit die Voraussetzung des Geschmacksurteils.
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Makkreel (1994, S. 93) betont den Unterschied zwischen kognitiver und sthetischer Zeit: Der Fluss
der Zeit verlangsamt sich whrend der Verweilung beim Schnen. S. auch Kaulbach (1984, S. 113-114).
Kontemplation (der Latinismus, der als Synonym von Betrachtung im 2 auftritt) ist nicht identisch mit
Aufhebung der Zeit: Wenn auch Kant einer alten und reichen berlieferung im ersten Moment folgt, indem
seine Deutung vom Verhltnis zum sthetischen Gegenstand als uninteressiert nicht nur dem delectare des
Horaz, sondern auch dem frui Augustins als freiem geistigem Genuss von einem geistigen Gute nahesteht,
haltet er die sthetische Erfahrung nicht fr ein ekstatisches Erlebnis, ein mystisches Auer-Sich-Sein.
21
Das Thema tritt schon in der KrV A auf: vgl. die Unterscheidung zwischen empirischem Bewusstsein der
eigenen Identitt in der Zeit und stehendem oder bleibendem Selbst whrend der Behandlung der
Synthesis der Rekognition im Begriffe. Es wird jedoch explizit behandelt in FM, AA 20: 270 u. ApH, 4,
AA 07: 134, Anm. Zur Beziehung zwischen Psychologie und Transzendentalphilosophie in Kants sthetik
vgl. die wirkungsvollen berlegungen Brandts (1994, S. 37-40) zur Zeitlichkeit des freien Spiels.
22
Soweit ich wei, fehlt noch ein Gesamtstudium zum Raum- und Zeitproblem in der KU. In ihm sollte man
Kants Beobachtungen nicht nur zur sthetischen berlegenheit der Form (und also zum Moment der Qualitt
des Geschmacksurteils vgl. dazu Meo (2011, S. 34-43) und zum inneren Sinn, sondern auch zu den der
Einbildungskraft gesetzten Grenzen in der Analytik des Erhabenen ( 26-27) untersuchen: Whrend die
Auffassung ins Unendliche gehen kann, wird die Zusammenfassung immer schwerer und gelangt bald
zu ihrem Maximum (KU, AA 05: 251-252).
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der subjektiven Deduktion der KrV A.23 Dagegen, scheint von der fraglichen Stelle der KU
eine Abzweigung der Anordnung der Vermgen (ihrer subjektiven Einheit)
stattzufinden: Indem sie sich zu einer der zwei Richtungen wenden, rufen sie ein
sthetisches zweckfreies Spiel ins Leben; indem sie sich zur anderen Richtung wenden,
verwirklichen sie ein von starren Gesetzen geregeltes Unterordnungsverhltnis zum
Erkenntniszweck.
Man kann sich von dieser vermutlichen Aporie befreien, wenn man, abgesehen von
den Betrachtungen Kants und von seinem elliptischen und verschlungenen Gedankengang,
eine Trennung zwischen einer Synthesis, die zum Vorteil der Konstruktion des
phnomenalen Objekts, aber nicht in einer bestimmten Weise, wirkt, und einer
Erkenntnissynthesis, die der Orientierung des Subjekts in der Erscheinungswelt dienlich
ist. In der Diskussion des 9 findet man einen Beleg dafr, dass die Ebene sozusagen noch
roh ist: Kant whlt das Wort Vorstellungskrfte, dessen semantisches Feld unbestimmt
ist, um die Gesamtheit von Einbildungskraft und Verstand zu bezeichnen. Nicht nur gilt
dieses Wort sowohl fr die kognitive als auch fr die sthetische Vorstellung (deren
Unterscheidung bei Kant jedoch sehr klar ist), sondern vor allem bezeichnet es die
subjektive Seite des Erkenntnisvermgens berhaupt24.
Also meint Kant die Einbildungskraft und den Verstand sowohl in ihrer
spielerischen als auch in ihrer nach der Erkenntnis ausgerichteten Ttigkeit, aber vor ihrer
Spezialisierung in einem dieser Sinnen. Damit sich ein sthetischer Bezug auf den
Gegenstand verwirklicht, gengt es, dass diese noch kognitiv unvollkommene
bereinstimmung erreicht wird, in der die Vorstellung sich zur Erkenntnis berhaupt
bezieht.
Eine fragwrdige Deutung behauptet, dass es mglich ist, das Syntagma
Erkenntnis berhaupt durch einen Vergleich mit dem 12 von der KrV B zu
erklren.25An dieser Stelle kritisiert Kant die vermeintlich transscendentalen Prdicate der
23
Zur Rolle der figrlichen Synthesis innerhalb des Erkenntnisprozesses s. Meo (2004, S. 78-90).
Kant verwendet Vorstellungskraft (die vis repraesentativa Baumgartens) gelegentlich in seinen
vorkritischen Schriften und fter von der KrV A aus. Unter Bercksichtigung des semantisch weiten Feldes
des Wortes Vorstellung, das die Gemtsttigkeiten berhaupt (Wahrnehmungen, Empfindungen,
Phantasien, Begriffe, usw.) bezeichnet, nimmt Vorstellungskraft nie eine technische Bedeutung an.
Wichtiger aus einem theoretischen Standpunkt ist das semantisch verwandte Wort Vorstellungsvermgen,
das die subjektive Voraussetzung der Erkenntnis bezeichnet. Die Vermehrung seiner Verwendung und die
Przisierung von seinem subjektiven Charakter stehen im Zusammenhang mit der Verteidigung vom
Kritizismus gegen Reinhold, der das Vorstellungsvermgen fr den Grund der Erkenntnisvermgen hielt und
daher Kants Dualismus, d.h. die Notwendigkeit der Verbindung zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand und die
Unterscheidung zwischen Erscheinung und Ding an sich, bekmpfte.
25
Vgl. Fricke (1990, S. 58-64) u. Ameriks (1998, S. 438). Auch in der Vergangenheit wichen einige
Deutungen von jener der meisten Forscher ab. Nach Cohen (2007, S. 175), betrfe die Erkenntnis
berhaupt einen bestimmten Gegenstand. Dieser aber wre nicht der Gegenstand selbst, sondern nur ein
Vertretungsgegenstand oder eine Vertretungsvorstellung: Er vertrte ein nicht genauer dargestelltes
Allgemeines, dessen er als Zeichen oder Spur nur der Schatten wre. Diese Deutung der Beziehung
zwischen Allgemeinem und Einzelnem hat eine vage metaphysische (oder quasi-metaphysische) allure, die
jedoch in Kants Text nicht auftritt. Was die Deutung des Gegenstands als ein Zeichen des Allgemeinen
24
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Sowohl zur sthetischen als auch zur theoretischen Vorstellung fordert man eine
Erkenntniseinheit; aber, whrend man vom theoretischen Standpunkt den Akzent auf das
Erkenntnismoment legt, so ist vom sthetischen Standpunkt das Einheitsmoment zentral.
Drei unter den vielen theoretischen und philologischen von dieser Deutung gelegten
Probleme sind hier hervorzuheben. Erstens tritt die Formulierung Erkenntnis der Objekte
berhaupt nie an der fraglichen Stelle auf: Kant spricht immer nur von Erkenntnis
berhaupt (wie gesehen, nur im 12 von der KrV spricht er von einer Erkenntnis der
Dinge berhaupt); nie tritt darum die Idee einer allgemeinen, von einer bestimmten oder
individuell unterschiedenen Erkenntnis auf. Zweitens fhrt die These von einem Verzicht
auf die Klassenaufteilung und auf die Bestimmung der Objekte durch ihre Unterscheidung
betrifft, die die Beziehung Erscheinung-Noumenon widerspiegelt, gelten dieselben Einwnde, die man gegen
die modernen einseitig semiotisierenden Lektre Kants erheben kann (vgl. z.B. Schnrich 1981, S. 122-126.).
Zur Thesis, dass die Erscheinung, als objektiv ausgemacht, das semantische Korrelat vom Erkenntnisakt ist,
vgl. meine Diskussion der Standpunkte Schnrichs und Hogrebes (1974) (Meo 2004, S. 69).
.
26
KrV B 97-98.
27
Der sowohl logisch als auch chronologisch vorbereitende Charakter des freien Spiels im Vergleich mit der
bestimmten Erkenntnis wird von Brandt kraftvoll hervorgehoben: Es ist in der Tiefensphre des NochNicht-Bestimmten und in der Primrzone der Ttigkeit des Vernunftwesens anzusiedeln (1994, S. 46).
28
Vgl. auch KU, 73, 394, wo die Aussage, durch die die bonitas von einem Ding behauptet wird, als ein
Kinderspiel bezeichnet wird. Zur Rolle der Seinsprdikate bei Kant, s. Meo 2001.
29
Vgl. Fricke (1990, S. 61). Jedenfalls muss man einrumen, das Kant immer schwankend war, was den
Begriff Vollkommenheit betrifft, die untrennbar verbunden mit der Transzendentalientheorie ist und eine
wichtige Rolle im dritten Moment des Geschmacksurteils spielt (vgl. dazu Meo 2011, S. 121-132). Ein
Zeichen hierfr ist die hufige terminologische Vernderung der Bezeichnung der Vollkommenheitsarten
(vgl. Marc-Wogau 1938, S. 170): Das knnte Hinweis auf eine gewisse Schwierigkeit Kants sein, sich von
dem zu befreien, was er als nutzlosen Kram in der KrV betrachtet hatte.
30
Cassirer (2001, S. 303).
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wieder zur Unbestimmtheit der von Kant abgewiesenen Seinsprdikate: Nach der
Abschaffung der bestimmenden Prdikate der Dinge bleiben noch die allgemeinsten, von
denen er sich befreit hatte, insofern er sie als bloe logische Erfordernisse (d.h. als nicht
zureichende, vor allem von ihrem tautologischen Charakter angefochtene
Erkenntnisbedingungen) betrachtet hatte. Es htte darum keinen Sinn gehabt, sie
unverndert in der KU wieder aufzugreifen. Drittens ist die sthetische Vorstellung weder
auf die allgemeine noch auf die besondere oder einzelne Erkenntnis ausgerichtet. Die
eigentmliche Vermgensharmonie in der sthetischen Erfahrung, als subjektiv
angemessene Bedingung im Hinblick auf die Erkenntnis,31 kann also nicht als ein Beleg
ihrer Anordnung zum kognitiven Zweck betrachtet werden. Andererseits wird Kant spter
erklren, dass der Gemthszustand, d.i. die Stimmung der Erkenntnikrfte zu einer
Erkenntni berhaupt, sich auch im Geschmacksurteil allgemein mittheilen lassen
muss.32
Jedenfalls ist es unbestreitbar, dass die drei Prdikate (mit einem vierten, das mit
ihnen in der Geschichte der Metaphysik eng verbunden ist: dem pulchrum) in der KU
vorkommen und auch eine bedeutende Rolle haben, insofern sie die Einteilung der
zusammenfassenden Tafel der Einl. aus einem metaphysischen Standpunkt ergnzen: Das
Wahre entspricht der Erkenntnis im Naturgebiet, das Gute der Handlung im
Freiheitsgebiet, das Schne der Betrachtung im sthetischen Feld, die Einheit dem Ganzen
der Natur als System in der Mannigfaltigkeit seiner Erscheinungen, das uns erscheint, als
ob es auf unser subjektives Ordnung- und Harmoniebedrfnis ausgerichtet wre. Die
subjektive Harmonie und die Freiheit der Vermgen whrend der sthetischen Ttigkeit
scheinen also ein Mikrokosmos zu sein, der der ebenso vielen subjektiven (d.h. von uns
zugeschriebenen) Harmonie und Freiheit der Natur in der Hervorbringung ihrer Formen
entspricht.
Gegen die im 9 vorgebrachte These ist ein tckischer Einwand erhoben worden:
Wenn eine Vorstellung Verstand und Einbildungskraft in ein freies Spiel versetzt und
dieses in eine bereinstimmung mndet, die 1. zur Lust fhrt und sich im
Geschmacksurteil ausdrckt, 2. die Bedingung von jeder bestimmten Erkenntnis ist,
knnen wir nicht vermeiden, alle Erfahrungsobjekte als schn zu definieren.33
31
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Darum handelt es sich nicht um einen Gemtszustand, in dem das freie Spiel sich
verwirklicht. Einige Forscher wundern sich jedoch darber, dass der Einwand eine
Untersttzung in einigen lteren Refl, wie z.B. in der 672 (vielleicht 1769-70), wo der
implizite Bezug auf die Einheit in der Mannigfaltigkeit und auf die perfectio naturae eine
Reminiszenz an der alten Theorie der Vollkommenheit einer geordneten Welt ist:
Nun Gelten die Verhaltnisse des Raumes und der Zeit vor iederman, welche
Empfindungen man auch haben mag. Demnach ist in allen Erscheinungen die Form
allgemein gltig; diese Form wird auch nach gemeinschaftlichen Regeln der coordination
erkannt; was also der Regel der Coordination in Raum und Zeit gem ist, da geflt
nothwendig iederman und ist schn. Das Angenehme in dem Anschauen der Schonheit
komt an auf die Faslichkeit eines Gantzen, allein die Schnheit auf die allgemeine
Gltigkeit dieser schiklichen Verhaltnisse.35
Es ist unleugbar, dass die berlieferung eine wichtige Rolle an dieser und anderen
Stellen auch der kritischen Periodespielt, 36 aber es ist notwendig, den Kontext der
Beobachtungen zu der Erkenntnis berhaupt in Betracht zu ziehen. Im 9 besteht Kant
darauf, dass die Einbildungskraft (das Vermgen, das die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der
Anschauung bewirkt) und der Verstand (das Vermgen, das die Synthesis der
Vorstellungen im Begriff bewirkt) nicht zugunsten einer bestimmten Erkenntnis, sondern
zugunsten der Subjekt-Lust miteinander bereinstimmen. Die Erkenntnis kommt ins Spiel,
insofern es notwendig ist, eine Rechtfertigung fr die Mitteilung vom Gefhl zu finden,
(2006, S. 205-206). Bemerkenswert ist der von Allison vorgeschlagene Ausweg (2001, S. 116-117). Er
unterscheidet zwischen Harmonie und freiem Spiel der Vermgen: Whrend dieses sich auf ihre Verbindung
im Akt der reinen Reflexion bezieht, so ist jene ein Produkt der Reflexion. Seine Deutung rechtfertigt auch
die Mglichkeit vom Scheitern der Reflexion, d.h. von einer Disharmonie und einem negativen
Geschmacksurteil. Also: So wie ein freies Spiel ohne Harmonie stattfinden kann, so spricht nichts dagegen,
dass eine Harmonie ohne ein freies Spiel stattfindet; und eben dieser wre der Fall der Erkenntnis.
34
KU 187.Vgl. auch die Allg. Anm. zum ersten Abschn. der Analytik, ebd. 242.
35
AA 15: 298. (Kulenkampff 1994, S. 207, Anm. 4) behauptet plausiblerweise, dass Kant diese Stellung
aufgab, weil sie ungeeignet war, das Problem der Rechtfertigung der Forderung des Geschmacksurteils nach
der Allgemeingltigkeit aufzulsen. Er fgt hinzu, dass sich hieraus die Unzufriedenheit ber den
empirischen Ursprung dieser Forderung ergibt. Vgl. auch die zeitgenssischen R 639, 646, 648, 683, 702,
711, 715, 743 e 764 u. die spteren 1895 u. 1907. Was die Vorlesungen betrifft, s. V-Met-L1/Plitz (AA 28:
252-253). Das Thema der Vermgensharmonie tritt ausdrcklich in der V-Anth/Pillau (1777-78) AA 25:
759-760) u. in der V-Anth/Mensch (1781-82 ebd. 997) auf. Im ersten Text ist das noch nicht reife Denken
Kants schon nach der endgltigen Auflsung der KU ausgerichtet.
36
Was die objektivistische Deutung des Schnen in der vorkritischen Zeit betrifft, zitiert Brandt (1994, S. 2223) eine Stelle aus dem Aufsatz BDG, in dem das Thema der kosmischen Ordnung und der
bereinstimmung und schner Verknpfung der Naturdinge auftritt (AA 02: 110). Vgl. auch NTH (z.B.
AA 01: 222 u. 306).
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das in das Geschmacksurteil mndet. Zwar ist jede bestimmte Erkenntnis mitteilbar, aber
sie hat ihren Grund eben in jenem Verhltnis zwischen den Vermgen, das der subjektive
Gemtszustand ist, in dem ihr freies Spiel sich entwickelt. Also hat die Absicht, keinen
Bezug auf einen bestimmten Erkenntniszweck zu nehmen, Kant erst zur Einfhrung jener
Erkenntnis berhaupt gebracht, die so viele Zweifel geweckt hat. Um diese Deutung zu
bestrken, kann man sich auf eine im 39 gegebenen Przisierung berufen: Die
bereinstimmung zwischen den Vermgen ist die (subjektive, aber nichtsdestoweniger
logisch-transzendentale) Bedingung der Mglichkeit sowohl der sthetischen Lust als auch
der Erkenntnis berhaupt.37
Im 9 kommt eben diese subjektive Bedingung ins Spiel38, die den Vermgen
eine kognitive (objektiv-intersubjektive) und eine sthetische (subjektive-intersubjektive)
Richtung zugesteht, wenn auch die Unterscheidung zwischen bestimmender und
reflektierender Urteilskraft (derer sich Kant hingegen im 39 bewusst ist) noch nicht
aufgetreten ist:39 Wir sind uns darber bewusst,
da dieses zum Erkenntni berhaupt schickliche subjective Verhltni eben so wohl
fr jedermann gelten und folglich allgemein mittheilbar sein msse, als es eine jede
bestimmte Erkenntni ist, die doch immer auf jenem Verhltni als subjectiver
Bedingung beruht.40
Wenn ein der mglichen Ergebnisse (das kognitive) mitteilbar ist, wird das auch das
andere sein, weil die Bedingung dieselbe ist.
Eine Betrachtung, die der zuvor zitierten Stelle aus der VI der Einl. folgt, scheint
diese Deutung zu bestrken:
Zwar spren wir an der Falichkeit der Natur und ihrer Einheit der Abtheilung in
Gattungen und Arten, wodurch allein empirische Begriffe mglich sind, durch welche wir
sie nach ihren besonderen Gesetzen erkennen, keine merkliche Lust mehr: aber sie ist
gewi zu ihrer Zeit gewesen, und nur weil die gemeinste Erfahrung ohne sie nicht
mglich sein wrde, ist sie allmhlig mit dem bloen Erkenntnisse vermischt und nicht
mehr besonders bemerkt worden.41
37
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BIBLIOGRAPHIE
Allison, H.E. (1998): Pleasure and Harmony in Kant's Theory of Taste: A Critique of the
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Ameriks, K. (1982): How to Save Kants Deduction of Taste. The Journal of Value
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(1998): New Views on Kant's Judgment of Taste. In: Parret, V.H. (Hrsg.), S.
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Basch, V. (1896): Essai critique sur lesthtique de Kant.Paris: Alcan.
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Brandt, R. (1994): Die Schnheit der Kristalle und das Spiel der Erkenntniskrfte. Zum
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Budd, M. (2001): The Pure Judgment of Taste as an Aesthetic Reflective Judgment.
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Cassirer, E. (2001) (11918): Kants Leben und Lehre. In: Ders.: Ges. Werke. Hamburger
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Cohen, H. (2007) (11889): Kants Begrndung der sthetik. Berlin: VDM.
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De Vleeschauwer, H.J. (1976) (11934/37): La dduction transcendantale dans luvre de
Kant. 3 Bde. New York/London: Garland Publ., Inc.
Dumouchel D. (1994): La dcouverte de la facult de juger rflchissante. Le rle de la
Critique du got dans la formation de la Critique de la facult de juger. KantStudien, 85, S. 419-442.
Elliott, R.K. (1968): The Unity of Kants Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. British
Journal of Aesthetics, 8, S. 244-259.
Fricke, C. (1990): Kants Theorie des reinen Geschmacksurteils. Berlin/New York: de
Gruyter.
Ginsborg, H. (1990): The Role of Taste in Kants Theory of Cognition. New York:
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Guyer, P. (1997) (11979): Kant and the Claims of Taste. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge
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Hogrebe, W. (1974): Kant und das Problem einer transzendentalen Semantik.
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Iber, C. (2006): Warum bedrfen Geschmacksurteile nach Kant einer Deduktion. In
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Kulenkampff, J., (1994) (11978): Kants Logik des sthetischen Urteils. Frankfurt/M.:
Klostermann.
Longuenesse, B. (2000): Subjet/Objet dans l'Analytique kantienne du beau. In:
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(2006): Kant's Leading Thread in the Analytic of the Beautiful. In: Kukla, R.
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99
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
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Correspondencia o armona
La literatura en la distincin kantiana de las bellas artes
Correspondence or harmony
Literature within Kantian distinction of fine arts
Resumen
La Crtica del Juicio concede a la poesa una distincin entre las bellas artes que no encuentra
fundamento en la crtica del juicio esttico: si la Analtica vincula el sentimiento de placer propio
de lo bello al reconocimiento de una relacin armnica entre las facultades del conocimiento, la
literatura se distingue por la afinidad que mantiene su medio representativo con la facultad del
entendimiento. El primado de la poesa en la CJ obedece pues necesariamente a una teora esttica
previa que equiparaba el gusto a la correspondencia entre sensibilidad y razn consustancial a todo
juicio de conocimiento. El presente trabajo destaca la continuidad de la potica clasicista en la obra
kantiana confrontando la nocin de correspondencia (bereinstimmung) asumida por su primera
teora esttica con la delimitacin respecto al concepto de armona que introduce la tercera crtica.
Palabras Clave
Esttica; potica; racionalismo; clasicismo; correspondencia
Profesor del Dpto. de Filologa alemana de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid. E-mail de contacto:
gegarrid@pdi.ucm.es .
[Recibido: 15 de septiembre de 2015
Aceptado: 16 de octubre de 2015]
100
Correspondencia o armona
Abstract
The Critique of Judgment provides poetry with a distinction within fine arts that finds no basis in
the critique of aesthetic judgment: if the Analytic relates the feeling of pleasure, typical of the
beautiful, to the harmonic relationship among the faculties of knowledge, the very thing that
distinguishes literature is the affinity that its representative medium holds with the faculty of
understanding. The primacy of poetry in the CJ needs to obey a prior aesthetic theory that equates
the taste with the correspondence between sensitivity and reason consubstantial to any judgment of
knowledge. This work outlines the continuity of the classicist poetics in Kants work confronting
the notion of correspondence (bereinstimmung) adopted by his first aesthetic theory with its
delimitation in regards to the notion of harmony introduced by the third critique.
Key words
Aesthetics ; Poetics ; Rationalism ; Classicism ; Correspondence
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cualquier juicio de gusto, al menos para cualquiera inspirado por un producto de las bellas
artes. Quiere respaldar Kant la supremaca de la literatura afirmando que:
Sie erweitert das Gemt dadurch, da sie die Einbildungskraft in Freiheit setzt und
innerhalb den Schranken eines gegebenen Begriffs unter der unbegrnzten
Mannigfaltigkeit mglicher damit zusammenstimmender Formen diejenige verknpft,
der kein Sprachausdruck vllig adquat ist, und sich also sthetisch zu Ideen erhebt
(AA 5 326).
Sobre la controvertida cuestin de la relacin simblica entre gusto y moral ver entre otros Paul Guyer
(1998, pp. 338-35), Gundula Felten (200, p. 4 200 y ss) o Birgit Recki (2001).
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hubieran convenido en extraer de ella una inaudita revaloracin filosfica de la poesa.
Ms atento a la clausura de su sistema que a las inquietudes artsticas, Kant no repar en
que asuma una concepcin de la literatura difcilmente conciliable con su teora crtica del
gusto, pero tambin con la dimensin demirgica que encontrara en el romanticismo.
Entre un corte y otro de la historia potica, la Crtica del Juicio nos ofrece el mudo
testimonio de la revolucin que estaba propiciando.
Compilacin que Frank incorpor a una edicin de la tercera crtica donde con atinado criterio reuna los
textos kantianos dedicados a la teora del gusto y a la filosofa de la naturaleza (1996). Recientemente ha
aparecido una edicin traducida de los escritos estticos dispersos en las Reflexiones y las Lecciones de
Antropologa (Snchez Rodrguez 2015).
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Adoptamos esta acepcin de bereinstimmung por ser la que mejor permite establecer un paralelismo con
la terminologa kantiana divulgada por la traduccin de Manuel Garca Morente, sin dejar por ello de reparar
en lo que tiene de provisional y hasta cuestionable (basta reparar en que el propio Baumgarten emplea el
trmino consensus con idntica finalidad en las Meditationes).
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esttica, donde lo bello funciona siempre a modo de representacin. La Esttica confirma
de este modo lo que ya adelantaban tanto las Meditationes como los pasajes de la
Metafsica comentados en las Reflexiones: el ideal de perfeccin por el que se rige el
conocimiento sensible no es finalmente otro que su grado de disposicin a la inteleccin
racional.
En conformidad con la doctrina artstica mayoritaria del siglo XVIII, lo bello se
ajusta a la perfeccin esttica propiciando la adecuacin de una materia sensible a su
abstraccin conceptual. Si el arte cobra especial protagonismo para Baumgarten es porque
proporciona la representacin ms acorde a dicha perfeccin. La doble premisa de que el
conocimiento sensible obedece a un concepto especfico de perfeccin, pero que este se
ajusta indirectamente a la inteleccin racional, condicionar la estimacin kantiana de la
literatura como haba secundado la discusin potica de la poca. As lo atestigua el uso
que recibe un concepto tan caro a la esttica de Baumgarten como el de correspondencia en
las Reflexiones. Las anotaciones a la Lgica de Meier de los aos setenta insisten en trazar
una ntida separacin entre una perfeccin lgica acorde a las leyes de la razn y una
esttica acorde a las de la sensibilidad (AA 16 Refl. 1812 a 125); entre una perfeccin
lgica entendida como correspondencia con las leyes objetivas del conocimiento y una
esttica como correspondencia con las leyes subjetivas (AA 16 Refl. 1845 135). Al mismo
tiempo, las reflexiones destacan tres formas de correspondencia (con las reglas de unidad,
forma y sensibilidad) que la perfeccin esttica comparte con la lgica, (AA 16 Refl. 1793
117 Refl. 1801 121). Dando continuidad a la senda marcada por Baumgarten, Kant no se
limita a identificar la belleza formal (frente a la material) con el ideal de perfeccin
esttica, sino que va un paso ms all superponiendo ese ideal a las condiciones que
posibilitan una correspondencia entre la experiencia sensible y el conocimiento racional:
Schnheit der Erkenntnis ist die bereinstimmung der Freiheit der Einbildungskraft mit
der Gesetzmigkeit des Verstandes in Darstellung der Begriffe. (AA 16 Refl. 1923 158).
Durante este periodo Kant entendi en efecto el sentimiento de placer propio de lo bello
como indicio del enlace entre imaginacin y entendimiento que faculta todo juicio de
conocimiento. Ms all del testimonio aproximativo que aportan sus anotaciones a Meier y
Baumgarten, las lecciones sobre lgica de 1772 arrojan una evidencia concluyente del
parecer inicial adoptado por Kant respecto a la perfeccin que orienta al juicio de gusto.
Tras referirse sintomticamente a la perfeccin esttica como vehculo de la lgica (AA
24.1 361) Kant evidencia hasta qu punto la autonoma de la primera no descarta una
supeditacin a los primados de la segunda:
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conocimiento solo puede ser una mutua suspensin de la actividad judicativa que Kant
califica como armona. Se evidencia as la ruptura con una teora del gusto que pretenda
reservarse un mbito legislativo propio entre los objetos de la naturaleza cifrando
implcitamente su fin ltimo en la adecuacin de una representacin imaginativa a los
conceptos del entendimiento.4
Fundamental para lo que aqu nos ocupa es que una concepcin del conocimiento
sensible regida por un principio de perfeccin que persigue la adecuada correspondencia
con el conocimiento racional ofrece motivos suficientes para promover el lenguaje
representativo ms afn al entendimiento. Recuperando la tercera forma de
correspondencia que Baumgarten asigna a la perfeccin sensible, los signos representativos
se ajustan mejor a la cosa pensada si sealan directamente conceptos del pensamiento,
como sucede con el lenguaje verbal, en lugar de remitir a impresiones sensibles, como
ocurre con los lenguajes visuales o sonoros. De este modo, las Reflexiones conceden al
trmino bereinstimmung un sentido distinto del que recibir en la Crtica del Juicio,
como ratifica el 9 cuando aborda la cuestin de si el sentimiento placentero propio de lo
bello mantiene una relacin de continuidad o simultaneidad con el juicio de gusto. Kant
habla ahora de correspondencia (bereinstimmung o Zustimmung) para referirse al acuerdo
entre imaginacin y entendimiento que da lugar a un juicio de conocimiento. Pero en lugar
de identificar dicho acuerdo con el sentimiento consustancial al juicio de gusto, reserva
este al reconocimiento de la armona (Harmonie) que resulta de una relacin especfica. La
dimensin trascendental del Juicio introduce as una cesura en el alcance e implicaciones
de bereinstimmung como sucede con otras muchas entradas del lxico kantiano. Mientras
el sistema de la filosofa crtica proporciona el marco en el que contraponer la
correspondencia genrica de imaginacin y entendimiento al libre juego armnico entre las
facultades del conocimiento, su presencia en los escritos previos exige una interpelacin a
las autores que mayor impronta dejaron en el primer Kant.
La discrepancia entre la teora esttica heredada por Kant y su crtica del gusto se
deja resumir pues en las acepciones acumuladas por el trmino bereinstimmung desde
que designa la posibilidad de correspondencia entre representacin sensible y comprensin
racional descubierta por el gusto, hasta que la tercera crtica circunscribe el juicio de la
belleza formal a la correspondencia armnica de imaginacin y entendimiento. El primado
de la poesa entre las bellas letras encaja obviamente antes en la primera variante, el grado
en que una representacin sensible se pliega al conocimiento racional, que en la segunda,
el espacio de libertad inaugurado por la Crtica del Juicio con el juego entre facultades,
donde la equilibrada participacin de ambas descarta de antemano que un lenguaje
representativo destaque por su mayor proximidad respecto a cualquiera de ellas: si la
asociacin entre poesa y entendimiento cuestiona la armona del libre juego entre
facultades suscitado por el juicio de gusto en la tercera crtica, enlaza en cambio con la
4
Mientras el Kant de las primeras Reflexiones asume de este modo la existencia de una belleza objetiva y del
procedimiento que presume su representacin artstica, la tercera crtica limita el placer de lo bello a una
subjetiva apreciacin formal del objeto, deslegitimando cualquier doctrina normativa de las bellas artes.
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Como las denomina Dagmar Mirbach en el estudio introductorio a su edicin crtica (2007 LVI).
Baumgarten no llega con todo a establecer una comparacin valorativa entre las bellas artes. La deuda con
el ut pictoris horaciano que acusa su defensa de la mmesis simultnea frente a la secuencial asumira de
hecho una implcita distincin de las artes plsticas.
6
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sensible a un orden intelectivo que se sustrae a la verificacin emprica. La poesa legitima
de este modo la perfeccin esttica como la ms acabada manifestacin de lo inteligible, y
es en el orden representativo de la manifestacin donde Baumgarten fundamenta en efecto
su potica primero y su Esttica ms adelante.
Entendiendo la representacin artstica como manifestacin del principio perfectivo
que rige al conocimiento sensible, Baumgarten descubre su deuda con la potica clasicista.
Como Boileu y Gottsched, su principal divulgador en la cultura alemana, asume el credo
horaciano que legitima la literatura en ltima instancia como representacin de las ideas y
verdades generales atesoradas por razn. Coincide tambin con ellos en la defensa de una
concepcin potica sujeta a las reglas de sencillez, claridad y buen gusto que garanticen la
ms acabada y completa representacin del objeto y con ello la plena manifestacin del
concepto al que este se asocia. As, vemos que aunque Baumgarten no solo admite, sino
que recomienda el libre ejercicio de la fantasa y el consiguiente efecto de admiracin (
XLIII), rechaza la recreacin de mundos quimricos o utpicos con el mismo nfasis que
desaconseja un registro expresivo oscuro y rebuscado ( LV). Las coincidencias con el
credo clasicista continan sucedindose hasta encontrar su razn de ser en la confrontacin
final entre una facultad superior y una inferior del conocimiento. Baumgarten no necesita
adivinar las implicaciones que extraer su Esttica de esta dicotoma para entender aqu ya
la perfeccin de la poesa como variante discursiva que dispone plenamente una materia
emprica a su aprehensin cognitiva proporcionando sus ejemplos ms ilustrativo (
LVIII). Sin dejar de defender un criterio propio en la perfeccin del conocimiento sensible,
Baumgarten no puede ocultar que los fundamentos del discurso potico revelan una
adecuacin parcial de su principio perfectivo al conocimiento lgico. As lo entiende
tambin el Kant de las primeras Reflexiones cuando el sentimiento de placer propio del
gusto una manifestacin de la perfecta correspondencia entre entendimiento e imaginacin
que posibilita nuestro conocimiento del mundo. Conviene resaltar en todo caso la
coherencia de esta postura con el gusto artstico (habitualmente tildado de clsico y
formalista) que acusan tanto las primeras aseveraciones de la obra kantiana como las
valoraciones dispersas en la tercera crtica.
El magisterio de Horacio en la doctrina potica del siglo XVIII corre parejo a una
determinada recepcin de la mmesis aristtelica que encuentra en Averroes su principal
valedor. Su Parfrasis (1993) proporcionar a los portavoces del clasicismo una
interpretacin tico-moral de la Potica que supedita el concepto de mmesis a un enfoque
tico-moral. Averroes legitima una reedicin ilustrada del exemplum retrico relegando la
vertiente compositiva de la mmesis aristotlica a un segundo plano. Su lectura determinar
la discusin potica de la poca desde la posicin privilegiada que encuentra en la
Poetische Dichtkunst de Gottsched, que subordina tambin la mmesis a los fines marcados
por un normativismo instructivo. El oficio potico buscar pues la traslacin ejemplar de
los conceptos que la razn tiene por adecuados, y a la consecucin de ese objetivo
respondera el rigorismo prescriptivo de la potica. Menos dogmtico de lo que juzgaron
muchos de sus contemporneos, Gottsched revela en todo caso una clara sujecin al
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pensamiento ilustrado haba dado su visto bueno a la promocin del medio literario como
el ms afn a los propsitos instrumentales de la razn y, por tanto, el ms acorde a sus
aspiraciones formativas, Kant adopta de entrada una teora esttica que encuentra la
perfeccin del discurso sensible en la poesa. Solo su limitado inters por las cuestiones
artsticas explica que no llegara a revisar posteriormente ese privilegio desde la instancia
judicativa inaugurada por la filosofa crtica. Sern sus primeros lectores romnticos
quienes pretendan ver superada esta contradiccin conciliando la preeminencia de la poesa
entre las bellas artes con la dimensin trascendental inaugurada por la facultad del Juicio
(Kuypers 1972, p. 152 y ss.). Schelling entender la poesa como culmen de la libertad
imaginativa alumbrada por la belleza artstica, cancelando de ese modo la terica
incompatibilidad entre la preeminencia de un lenguaje artstico y las condiciones impuestas
por una relacin armnica entre las facultades del conocimiento (Biemel 1959, pp. 147165). La armona pasa as a respaldar aquello que en un principio sustentaba la
correspondencia al precio de que el Juicio vea enteramente trastocados su alcance y
principios constitutivos para ponerse al servicio de una filosofa del arte. Ajeno al vuelco
que estaba provocando en la historia de las ideas artstico-literarias, Kant nos remite en la
Crtica del Juicio al momento inaugural que engendr una especfica concepcin literaria
como poda haber dado lugar a otras.
Referencias bibliogrficas
Averroes (1999), Parfrasis del libro de la Potica, Revista Espaola de Filosofa
Medieval 6, pp. 203-214.
Bateaux, C. (2010), Las bellas artes reducidas a un mismo principio, trad. de Carlos
David Garca Mancilla,
http://www.reflexionesmarginales.com/docs/Traduccionlasbellasartes.pdf, acceso
26/09/2015.
Baumgarten, A. G. (2007), sthetik, Hamburg, Felix Meiner.
(1975), Reflexiones estticas acerca de la poesa, Buenos Aires, Aguilar.
Biemel, W. (1959), Die Bedeutung von Kants Begrndung der sthetik fr die Philosophie
der Kunst, Kant-Studien, Ergnzungshefte, 77.
Guyer, P. (1998), The Symbols of Freedom in Kants Esthetics, en Kants sthetik. Kants
Aesthetics. Lesthtique de Kant, Herman Parret (ed.), Berln-Nueva York, de Gruyter.
Felten, G. (2004), Die Funktion des sensus communis in Kants Theorie des sthetischen
Urteils, Munich, Fink.
Frank, M. (ed.) (2009 -1996-), Inmanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraf. Schriften zur sthetik
und Naturphilosophie, Manfred Frank y Vronique Zanetti (eds.), Frankfurt am Main,
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag.
(1990), Kants Reflexionen zur sthetik. Zur Werkgeschichte der Kritik der
sthetischen Urteilskraft, Revue internationale de philosophie, 175, pp. 552-580.
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GERARDO CUNICO
Universit di Genova, Italia
Riassunto
Larticolo tratta la concezione dellarmonia di Kant nel suo significato ontologico fondamentale,
ossia nel senso di quella concordanza teleologica che era al centro della metafisica dogmatica e che
Kant intende decostruire criticamente e ricostruire su un piano non pi teoretico-speculativo, ma
teleologico-morale. Gli argomenti fondamentali di questa ricostruzione vengono presentati e
discussi esaminando il modo in cui Kant rielabora il concetto di mondo come unit degli enti finiti
concepibile solo come concordanza finalistica.
Parole chiavi
Kant; cosmologia; concordanza; teleologia morale
Abstract
The paper deals with Kants conception of harmony in its fundamental ontological meaning, i.e. in
terms of that teleological harmony which was central for the dogmatic metaphysics and Kant will
critically deconstruct and reconstruct not in a speculative-theoretical, but in a moral-teleological
way. The basic arguments of this reconstruction are presented and discussed by examining the
manner in which Kant re-elaborates the notion of the world as the unity of finite beings,
conceivable only as a purposive harmony.
Key words
Kant; Cosmology; Harmony; Moral Teleology
Professore Ordinario del Dipartimento di Antichit, Filosofia e Storia dellUniversit di Genova. E-mail di
contatto: cunico@nous.unige.it .
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I. Kant, NTH, AA 01: 310 ss. [trad. it., pp. 120 ss.]. Le opere di Kant vengono citate, per lo pi con lausilio
delle sigle dei KS, secondo lindicazione di volume e pagina dellAkademie-Ausgabe: I. Kant, Gesammelte
Schriften, Berlin, Reimer (poi: de Gruyter), 1900 ss., l dove questa non riporta la paginazione originale. Gli
altri scritti (gli abbozzi e gli appunti tratti dalle lezioni) vengono citati con il riferimento allAkademieAusgabe. Le indicazioni relative alle traduzioni italiane compaiono tra parentesi quadre.
5
Cos nella formulazione di Baumgarten, Metaphysica, 17574, 17797 [reprint: 1982], 354: MUNDUS
([] Universum, ) est series (multitudo, totum) actualium finitorum, quae non est pars alterius .
6
I. Kant, MSI, AA 02: 385-419 [, pp. 419-461], 13, 16, 20, 22.
7
V-Met/Heinze, AA 28: 195 s., 211 ss. Cfr. anche Refl. 6210, AA 18: 496 s.
8
KrV B 391, 434 s., 447 s., 532 s., 724.
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Il concetto di mondo (la categoria di totalit applicata alla sintesi dei fenomeni o di tutti gli
enti possibili) viene perci risolto in unidea trascendentale della ragione, che ha una funzione
puramente regolativa, quella di unificare il molteplice delle conoscenze empiriche secondo la
massima unit sistematica possibile e di orientare a tale unit tutte le ricerche scientifiche.9
Come schema di un principio regolativo, lidea di mondo ha una valenza teleologica,
perch ogni unit sistematica retta da uno scopo ultimo a cui subordinata ogni conoscenza
particolare; implica cio una connessione finalistica delle singole cose e dei loro influssi reciproci,
anche se questa solo una presupposizione soggettiva che risponde al bisogno di ordine e
sistematicit della nostra ragione (teoretica).10
Ci significa che lidea razionale di mondo non pu mostrare la propria realt oggettiva
(cio la sua pensabilit concreta) neppure come concetto critico-trascendentale. Ci connesso
proprio col fatto che la ragione teoretica stessa non pu andare oltre la richiesta di un fondamento
incondizionato della sintesi del condizionato dato, ossia di unanalisi regressiva, che prospetta la
totalit assoluta dei fenomeni soltanto dal lato delle condizioni (degli antecedenti).11 Il concetto di
totalit come unit sistematica regolativa richiede invece, per il suo carattere teleologico, anche una
sintesi progressiva, unanticipazione del condizionato conseguente, ossia dellesito risultante
dallapplicazione delle condizioni; il tutto delle conseguenze andrebbe pensato allora a sua volta
come incondizionato, come condizione assoluta, come compimento che presiede idealmente a tutto
il processo del divenire fenomenico.
Ma se irrilevante (oltre che arbitrario e inattuabile) per la ragione teoretica, il
compimento di questa sintesi progressiva richiesto necessariamente dalla ragione pratica, che
attraverso la legge morale prescrive uno scopo assoluto come esito dellagire. Ed su questa logica
progressiva che pu innestarsi la riflessione teleologica (come si vedr nel prossimo paragrafo).
Nelluso pratico della ragione, infatti, lidea di mondo intelligibile diventa un correlato
indispensabile della legge morale, lo schema della sua possibile attuazione (praticamente
necessaria) come mondo morale e il presupposto della sua possibilit (come insieme e come
rapporto reciproco degli esseri razionali dotati di libert). Anzi proprio tale applicazione pratica
dellidea di mondo quella che procura realt oggettiva a tale concetto (e quindi allidea di assoluta
unit/totalit e connessione teleologica sistematica) e che riempie di contenuto razionale lo schema
vuoto del principio regolativo.
Le analisi kantiane del Giudizio teleologico nella seconda parte della Critica del Giudizio
mirano a valutare, in ultima istanza, la possibile validit di asserzioni sul mondo come totalit
teleologica, cio come oggetto (o prodotto finale) non come precondizione (o prodotto originario)
del Giudizio; asserzioni che nella Critica della ragion pura erano state definitivamente escluse
come proposizioni teoreticamente oggettive, e che nella terza Critica vengono ammesse soltanto
sul piano dellapplicazione riflessiva del principio di finalit, s, ma neppure qui direttamente, sul
piano del Giudizio teleologico-teoretico (teleologia fisica), bens solo indirettamente, attraverso
limplicazione teoretica (ultima) del Giudizio teleologico-pratico (teleologia morale).
KrV B 379 s., 434 s., 446, 647, 699 ss., 712 ss.
KrV B 714 ss., 719 ss., 724-729.
11
KrV B 435-437.; cfr. B 393-394).
10
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Per un approfondimento devo rimandare al mio testo: G. Cunico (2001, parte II ( 3) e parte III).
Physische Teleologie a partire dal 85 (KU, AA 05: 437) fino alla fine, moralische Teleologie a
partire dal 86 (KU, AA 05: 444). La problematica era stata toccata gi nel corso di Teologia razionale del
1783/84, in cui compaiono i due concetti teleologia practica e teleologia physica (V-Th/Plitz, AA 28: 12011205, 1302-1307 1099-1103 [trad. it. (sigla: LFR), pp. 246-251]). In altre lezioni e riflessioni Kant usa il
termine teleologia pratica, come fa anche nel saggio GTP, in Teutscher Merkur, 1788, AA 08: 182 s.
[trad. it., p. 58].
14
KU, AA 05: 181-186.
15
KU, AA 05: 426, 431, 434-435, 443.
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a questo punto che interviene la teleologia morale, definita come la relazione della
nostra propria causalit a scopi e addirittura ad uno scopo finale a cui dobbiamo mirare nel mondo
(KU 87, AA 05: 447). Questo scopo finale della ragione pratica (al pari del dovere morale in
generale) deve ricevere attuazione nella natura, e cio non solo in un soggetto (luomo) che
anche un essere sensibile, ma anche in un ambito pi vasto di cose, rapporti e circostanze, cio in
un mondo, che deve inoltre essere necessariamente pensato come cooperante a tale attuazione,
sebbene il corso naturale delle cose e linsieme delle leggi della natura non consentano n di
prevedere n di concepire questo concorso.16
La necessit di questa cooperazione risulta dal fatto che lo scopo finale delluomo, inteso
come sommo bene completo, deve includere non solo linsieme delle intenzioni, degli atti interiori
e degli effetti immediati della moralit, ma anche linsieme dei suoi effetti mediati, riassumibili nel
concetto di felicit che il sommo bene fisico possibile nel mondo e quindi rientra di diritto sotto la
legislazione della natura, sebbene debba essere pensato come subordinato (mediatamente) anche
alla legislazione della libert e sebbene questa concordanza con la moralit non sia concepibile in
base alle leggi naturali (KU, AA 05: 449-450).
Solo alla luce della teleologia morale (KU, AA 05: 444, 447) luomo pu essere
considerato allora come scopo finale della creazione, ossia dellesistenza della natura e di tutto
luniverso, giacch solo un tale essere morale incondizionatamente degno di esistere e pu
costituire la ragione sufficiente per la creazione del mondo.17
Il concetto di scopo finale ha per un legame ancora pi stretto e diretto con quello di
mondo, un legame che lo rende decisivo per la comprensione riflessiva dellunit sistematica
integrale di questultimo. Lo scopo finale delluomo quello che Kant nella Critica della ragion
pratica designa come il sommo bene di un mondo possibile, intendendolo come la sintesi
(proporzionata) di moralit e felicit dellessere razionale finito (KpV, AA 05: 110).
Gi nella prima Critica, nel Canone della ragion pura, il concetto di sommo bene era
stato introdotto a partire da quello di mondo morale, che indica una unit sistematica ovvero
teleologica, identificata con lidea pratica di un mondo che sia conforme a tutte le leggi
morali, idea che acquista realt oggettiva in quanto congiunta con le condizioni di un sistema
della felicit connessa e proporzionata alla moralit (KrV B 835-845). Un concetto corrispondente
quello del regno dei fini, introdotto nella Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi per designare
il tutto sistematico degli enti razionali reso possibile dalla legge morale, che viene pensato in
analogia con un regno della natura, inteso come sistema di cause finali reali, subordinate agli
scopi degli esseri razionali (GMS, AA 04: 433-438). Ai concetti di mondo morale e regno dei
fini corrisponde nella Critica della ragion pratica quello del regno dei costumi (KpV, AA 05:
262) che potrebbe essere realizzato mediante unosservanza universale delle leggi morali, ossia
procurando al mondo sensibile, in quanto natura sensibile (per quanto riguarda gli esseri
razionali), la forma di un mondo intelligibile, ossia di una natura soprasensibile (KpV, AA 05:
43), e cio proprio quel nesso comunitario sistematico che pu fare del rapporto interattivo tra gli
uomini un insieme di tutti gli scopi (KpV, AA 05: 87), vale a dire un vero e proprio sistema
teleologico.
16
17
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concetto di scopo finale inclusivo (o sommo bene completo), anche la somma del
raggiungimento di tutti gli scopi, che dipende anche da condizioni fisiche e che coincide con il
concetto complessivo di felicit (AA 27: 1324), comprendendo anche lattuazione o il
conseguimento dellinsieme degli scopi perseguiti in concomitanza con ladempimento della
condizione della moralit, e quindi implicando anche il concorso teleologico della natura.
Solo la ragione pratica sede legittima del concetto di scopo finale (KU, AA 05: 455),
perch solo la morale determina ci che rende possibile il sistema di tutti gli scopi, la condizione
incondizionata della possibilit degli scopi di essere concordanti in assoluto. Cos la morale termina
nella teleologia morale, che va oltre il piano dei doveri in senso stretto prescrivendo uno scopo
finale inclusivo e prospettando la sua attuazione. La teleologia (in generale) ricava il suo principio
necessario (il concetto di scopo finale) dalla morale, che sola pu determinarlo e legittimarlo,
mostrandone la realt oggettiva (pratica); ma a sua volta la teleologia morale implica anche una
teleologia fisica, che per parte sua trova anche attestazioni indipendenti, per quanto insufficienti
a costituirla come un sistema autonomo.
Il giudizio riflettente pratico fornisce anzitutto una interpretazione teleologica21 della legge
morale: esso considera la legge come orientata verso uno scopo finale inclusivo (eccedente, per
quanto conforme allo scopo morale) che la ragione pratica prescrive alluomo di perseguire e
promuovere (KU ix, AA 05: 251-252). Il secondo passo di tale giudizio linterpretazione
teleologica della natura e del mondo intero, ossia quella che Kant designa come inferenza
(sintetica) dallo scopo finale delluomo allo scopo finale della creazione (KU 88), che unifica il
sistema di tutti gli scopi mediante libert col sistema di tutti gli scopi mediante natura,
fondando il sistema globale di tutti i fini in assoluto, la concordanza finale della natura con la
moralit, ossia la teleologia globale della ragione.22
Sul giudizio teleologico come interpretazione rinvio al mio lavoro (Cunico 2007, pp. 359-371).
22
AA 28: 1099 s., 1102 [LFR 246 s., 250], 1201 s., 1204 s.
23
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Ivi, p. 121.
Ivi, p. 124.
26
Ivi, pp. 129, 142, 161-171.
27
Secondo il modo in cui il corpo organizzato definito nel 66 della Critica del Giudizio e in cui la Critica
della ragion pura caratterizza il sistema in analogia con un corpo animale (KrV, B 860 s.) e lOpus
postumum addirittura la macchina (OP, AA 21: 185, 547 ss., OP, AA 22: 568 ss.).
25
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costituzione interna e neppure la loro esistenza in assoluto, ma semmai solo la loro esistenza in
quanto utile (degli uni per gli altri).
Questo rapporto esterno, nel contesto di tutto il paragrafo, indica la relazione funzionale di
un ente organizzato (singolo o classe) con altri, ma non necessariamente una relazione
rigorosamente e propriamente reciproca (bidirezionale), per cui luno sia mezzo per laltro e
viceversa, bens di regola e primariamente una relazione unidirezionale, in cui luno mezzo per
un altro e questo per un altro ancora e cos via, fino a un (ipotetico) scopo ultimo. Qui dunque la
domanda (finalistica) per che cosa? (wozu) non significa in funzione di che qualcosa si trova
internamente connesso con altro in un composto sostanziale che si d a riconoscere come sistema,
ma a vantaggio di chi (o che cosa) qualcosa si trova interconnesso con altro in un composto di
sostanze che si presenta anzitutto come aggregato e non evidente che costituisca un sistema
(KU, AA 05: 427-428).
Senza uno scopo ultimo non si pu affermare che sussista un sistema teleologico nel
rapporto esterno tra gli enti organizzati, secondo Kant. Ma perch non basta la reciprocit relativa
della funzionalit dellesistenza di un ente per laltro, quella che resta da ammettere dopo aver
riconosciuto che nessun ente organizzato (neppure luomo che a noi appare il pi titolato o lunico
titolato) pu essere attestato dallesperienza come scopo ultimo della natura?
Introducendo il concetto di finalit relativa o esterna (KU 63, AA 05: 368-369), Kant
dice che non siamo autorizzati a giudicare come finalit reale (e cio come scopo della natura) la
relazione funzionale che possiamo ipotizzare tra qualche ente naturale e qualche altro, a meno che
non si possa asserire che lesistenza di ci a vantaggio di cui ipotizziamo il rapporto funzionale
sia fine a se stessa, e quindi per se stessa scopo della natura, ovvero che tale esistenza sia
necessaria in assoluto e quindi per la natura stessa (che linsieme di ci che esiste di fatto); ma
questo equivarrebbe ad asserire che quellesistenza sia scopo finale, non pi condizionato e
subordinato ad altri scopi (naturali) (cfr. KU 84, AA 05: 435). Ora una simile asserzione
impossibile sul piano della conoscenza teoretica della natura (e anche della riflessione teleologicoteoretica).
Parafrasando il passo del 63 in parallelo a passi dei 82 e 83, si potrebbe dire, in sintesi,
che per Kant, nella Critica del Giudizio, la finalit esterna potrebbe configurarsi come un sistema
teleologico solo se lipotetico scopo ultimo potesse convalidarsi come scopo finale (ossia come un
ente che ha in se stesso lo scopo della sua esistenza), perch solo allora saremmo autorizzzati a
giudicarlo come uno scopo (ultimo) della natura nel rapporto esterno tra enti naturali.28
Possiamo pensare un organismo come fine in se stesso, e perci giudicarlo come un
sistema teleologico (tra altri analoghi), in virt della sua forma che ci data (ossia di cui possiamo
comprendere la possibilit) solo come organizzata, cio come articolazione di parti funzionale al
suo tutto, e quindi a lei stessa; ma non possibile giudicarlo un fine in senso assoluto (e quindi uno
scopo finale), perch si pu sempre domandare: a che scopo esiste? e non si legittimati (non si
hanno motivi sufficienti) a rispondere: per se stesso ovvero in vista di se stesso ( 67). La
natura nel suo insieme (considerata come un tutto), invece, non ha una forma che ci sia data come
28
O meglio tra enti organizzati, come precisa il 82 (KU, AA 05: 425), argomentando che degli altri, degli
enti inorganici, escluso a priori che possano essere giudicabili come scopi naturali.
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Il mondo come un tutto sistematico lorizzonte di senso che si apre nella riflessione sulla
destinazione etica delluomo. La teleologia morale offre infatti, come Kant si esprime nel saggio
del 1791, Sullinsuccesso di ogni saggio filosofico di teodicea, linterpretazione autentica della
creazione, ossia quellunico senso che la nostra ragione (pratica) pu attribuire al libro del
mondo, che altrimenti rimarrebbe per sempre sigillato e inintelligibile.32
In quanto idea teoretica di totalit assoluta dellente, il mondo preformazione di un
orizzonte formale di conoscibilit e intelligibilit. Ma solo in quanto idea teleologica riempita di
valenza e protensione pratico-morale il mondo diventa orizzonte pieno, come progetto e
anticipazione materiale di senso, ossia di unintelligibilit che insieme (sia pure su un piano di
postulazione anzich di certezza assertoria) appaga tutti gli interessi della ragione umana: come
autorizzazione a interpretare i rapporti e gli eventi in un arco teso da ultimo al bene anzich al
nulla.
Il tutto del mondo fondato sullo scopo finale che il sommo bene finito, il sommo bene
possibile nel mondo: questo mondo non soltanto il mondo sensibile o fenomenico (come si
talora equivocato)33, ma la totalit della realt finita, nel senso indicato: linsieme degli enti dotati
di esistenza derivata, non autosufficiente, in quanto costituiscono un sistema connesso da una
articolazione di senso che la concordanza con lorizzonte del bene. Ed precisamente questa
concordanza, a cui il mondo deve essere giudicato destinato solo in base al legame della nostra
autocomprensione umana con il dover essere morale, che costituisce larmonia del tutto nellunico
senso ammissibile dalla riflessione critica.
Bibliografia
Baumgarten, G. A. (1982 [17574, 17797] Metaphysica, Halae Magd. [reprint: Hildesheim:
Olms].
Cunico, G. (2001) Il millennio del filosofo: chiliasmo e teleologia morale in Kant. Pisa:
ETS.
(2007) Comprensione del senso e Giudizio riflettente. Sulla teoria
dellinterpretazione di Kant. In AA.VV. Etica, religione e storia. Studi in memoria di
Giovanni Moretto. A cura di D. Venturelli, R. Celada Ballanti, G. Cunico. Genova: Il
Melangolo, pp. 359-371.
Dsing, K. (1968) Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff. Bonn: Bouvier.
Fink, E. (1986) Einleitung in die Philosophie. Wrzburg: Knigshausen & Neumann.
Heidegger, M. (1969) Essere e tempo. Trad. it. di P. Chiodi, Torino: UTET.
Kant, I. (1993) Critica del Giudizio. Trad. it. a cura di A. Bosi: Torino: UTET.
(1991) Sullimpiego di principi teleologici in filosofia. In Id., Scritti sul
criticismo. A cura di G. De Flaviis. Roma-Bari: Laterza, pp. 33-60.
32
33
I. Kant, MpVT, AA 08: 253-272, qui 264 [trad. it. qui p. 59 s.].
Cfr. G.B. Sala (1993, spec. 378-384).
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(1989) Scritti di filosofia della religione. Trad. it. di G. Riconda, Milano: Mursia.
(1988) Lezioni di filosofia della religione. Trad. it. a cura di C. Esposito. Napoli:
Bibliopolis (sigla: LFR), pp. 246-251.
(1987) Storia universale della natura e teoria del cielo, trad. it. di S. Velotti,
Roma-Napoli: Theoria.
(1984) Logica, trad. it. di L. Amoroso, Roma-Bari: Laterza.
(1982) La forma e i principi del mondo sensibile e intelligibile, trad. it. di A. Pupi,
in I. Kant, Scritti precritici. A cura di R.Assunto. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
(1970a) Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi, in Id., Scritti morali, trad. it. di P.
Chiodi, Utet, Torino, pp. 39-125.
(1970b) Critica della ragion pratica. In: Id., Scritti morali. Ed. cit., pp. 127-315.
(1967a) Critica della ragion pura. Trad. it. di P. Chiodi. Torino: UTET.
(1967b) Prolegomeni ad ogni futura metafisica che si presenter come scienza.
Trad. it. di P. Carabellese. Bari: Laterza.
La Rocca, C. (1999) Esistenza e Giudizio. Linguaggio e ontologia in Kant. Pisa: ETS.
Sala, G. B. (1993) Wohlverhalten und Wohlergehen. Der moralische Gottesbeweis und die
Frage einer eudmonistischen Ethik. In: Theologie und Philosophie, 68, n. 3, pp. 368398.
Simmel, G. (1918) Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysische Kapitel. Mnchen-Leipzig:
Duncker & Humblot [(1997) Intuizione della vita. Quattro capitoli metafisici, trad. it. a
cura di G. Antinolfi, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli].
Triebener, I. (2009) Zusammenstimmung. Das philosophische Problem der Harmonie im
Hinblick auf Kant. Bonn.
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with a non-scientific naturalist monism (weak naturalism), as a suitable channel for a coherent
picture of the world. The second part is dedicated to Kant. It emphasises that the Critique of
Judgement, through a perception of nature and the place of man in it, ensued as a biological
organism, achieves, from a thoughtful judgement, an image of man as a natural being in harmony
with freedom. We, therefore, may characterize Kants proposal as a harmony in duality.
Key words
Habermas; Kant; Dualism; Freedom; Harmony; Naturalism
El contexto en el que Habermas defiende un dualismo en este escrito es el de las actuales tentativas de
aplicar al problema de la libertad los resultados de la investigacin sobre el cerebro (concretamente, en los
experimentos de Libet). Nosotros vamos a prescindir de ese contexto para centrarnos en las cuestiones de la
libertad, el dualismo y una imagen coherente del mundo.
2
Kant pudo conciliar la causalidad dimanante de la libertad con la causalidad de la naturaleza nicamente a
costa de un dualismo entre el mundo de lo inteligible y el mundo de los fenmenos. Hoy da nos gustara
arreglarnos sin tales suposiciones metafsicas de fondo (Habermas 2006, pp. 160-161).
3
Habermas 2006, p. 160.
4
Habermas 2006, p. 174.
5
Habermas 2011, pp. 32 ss.
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14
Habermas 2006, p. 169. Sobre su oposicin a un dualismo de carcter ontolgico vid. tambin ibid., pp.
161, 170.
15
Habermas 2006, 161. Es un dualismo de perspectivas explicativas y juegos del lenguaje (ibid. p. 170).
16
Habermas 2006, p. 170.
17
Habermas 2006, pp. 171-172.
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De este modo, Habermas intenta unir a Kant con Darwin33. De Kant toma, frente a
un planteamiento empirista, la idea de condicionamientos trascendentales del
conocimiento; como se ha visto, un trascendentalismo no idealista, segn el cual nuestro
conocimiento objetivo sobre el mundo (causas observables) y nuestras formas
socioculturales de vida, en las que se inscriben nuestros procesos deliberativos, surgiran
de procesos de aprendizaje en nuestro trato con la realidad.
El profano mundo de la vida ha venido a ocupar el lugar transmundano de lo noumnico (Habermas 2011, p.
27). En lugar de la subjetividad transcendental de la consciencia aparece la intersubjetividad
detranscendentalizada del mundo de la vida (ibid., 40).
27
Un concepto que Habermas contrapone al naturalismo estricto, riguroso o cientificista de Quine,
segn el cual: Todo conocimiento debe poder remitirse, en ltima instancia, a procesos cientficoexperimentales (Habermas 2011, p. 33).
28
Habermas 2011, p. 38.
29
Habermas 2011, p. 38.
30
Habermas 2011, p. 39
31
Cf. Habermas, 2011, p. 39.
32
Habermas 2006, p. 174.
33
Cf. Habermas 2006, pp. 161, 178.
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KU, AA 05: 185. En la heautonoma de la facultad de juzgar insiste especialmente Cubo 2012.
KU, AA 05: 181.
54
Cf. sobre ello McFarland 1970, p. 78. Cassirer, por su parte, remite este concepto de finalidad o
adecuacin a fin al concepto de armona de Leibniz (Cassirer 1978, p. 337).
55
Cf. KU, AA 05: 235-236.
56
A esta clase de finalidad, referente a la forma interna de un ser organizado, la denomina Kant finalidad
interna, distinguindola de la finalidad relativa o externa, que se refiere a las relaciones de medios y fines
entre los seres de la naturaleza: La experiencia no conduce nuestro Juicio al concepto de una finalidad
objetiva y material, es decir, al concepto de un fin de la naturaleza, ms que cuando se ha de juzgar la
relacin de causa a efecto, que solo nos encontramos capacitados para considerar como legal porque
ponemos la idea del efecto de la causalidad de la causa, como la condicin de la posibilidad del efecto
mismo, contenida a la base de la causa misma. Esto, empero, puede ocurrir de dos maneras: o considerando
el efecto inmediatamente como producto del arte, o considerndolo slo como material para el arte de otros
seres posibles de la naturaleza, es decir, o como fin o como medio para el uso, conforme a fin, de otras causa.
La ltima finalidad se llama utilizabilidad (para los hombres), o tambin la aprovechabilidad (para cualquier
otra criatura), y es meramente relativa; en cambio, la primera es una finalidad interna del ser natural (KU,
AA 05: 366-367). En el pargrafo 63 Kant niega que las relaciones de utilizabilidad entre los seres de la
naturaleza justifique un juicio teleolgico sobre la naturaleza; sin embargo, ello no significa que la rechace
definitivamente. Veremos ms adelante que Kant recupera la finalidad relativa o externa del el concepto de
fin natural y que dicha recuperacin es muy importante de cara al objetivo sistemtico de la tercera Crtica.
53
57
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Por finalidad externa entiendo aquella en que una cosa en la naturaleza sirve a otra de medio para un fin
(KU, AA 05: 425); se llama utilizabilidad (para los hombres), o tambin la aprovechabilidad (para cualquier
otra criatura) (KU, AA 05: 367).
67
[] la nocin de fin natural entraa no tanto un rechazo, cuanto un reexamen de la nocin de finalidad
externa (Lebrun 2008, p. 473).
68
KU, AA 05: 367. Ntese la diferencia entre las expresiones Naturzweck y Zweck der Natur. En la primera
expresin se trata del concepto de fin natural y se refiere a su forma interna, en el segundo caso se trata de la
existencia de un ser como fin de la naturaleza. La finalidad externa es un concepto totalmente distinto del
concepto de la interna, que est enlazado con la posibilidad de un objeto, prescindiendo de si su realidad
(Wirklichkeit) misma es un fin o no (KU, AA 05: 425).
69
KU, AA 05: 378.
70
Cf. KU, AA 05: 425.
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Con ello, la Crtica del Juicio parece retomar el motivo que la desencaden: fundar
la posibilidad del fin final como fenmeno en el mundo sensible.78 Pero, al mismo tiempo,
tambin parece que vuelve a hacer acto de presencia el dualismo entre los dos mundos,
pues el fin final, por su carcter incondicionado, no es algo que podamos conocer en la
naturaleza:
[] cuando repasamos la naturaleza entera no encontramos en ella, como naturaleza,
ningn ser que pueda tener pretensiones al privilegio de ser fin final de la creacin, y hasta
se puede demostrar a priori que lo que quiz aun para la naturaleza pudiera ser ltimo fin
(letzter Zweck) con todas las determinaciones y propiedades imaginables con que se le
pueda proveer, no puede ser nunca un fin final (Endzweck).79
Por supuesto, no es poco que la reflexin sobre la naturaleza desde los organismos
d pie a la pregunta por el fin final.80 Pero es verdad que la dualidad entre los dos mundos
persiste.
En segundo lugar, dentro de la naturaleza, la jerarqua se establece entre: los fines
naturales y un fin ltimo de la naturaleza, esto es, un ser natural para el cual existen todos
los dems o en relacin con el cual todos los dems son medios.
Es el hombre el fin ltimo de la naturaleza? Pues el hombre, por su entendimiento,
es el nico ser en la tierra capaz de hacerse un concepto de fines y, mediante su razn, un
sistema de fines de un agregado de cosas formadas en modo final.81 Pero si nos atenemos
a una concepcin meramente mecanicista de la naturaleza, la respuesta tambin podra ser
que el hombre es un mero medio para el mantenimiento del equilibrio82 de la naturaleza.
Sin embargo, este segundo argumento supone aceptar que los seres organizados no tienen
ms origen que el mecanismo de la naturaleza; en cambio, una de las grandes posiciones de
77
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Kant establece esta posicin en la solucin a la Antinomia del Juicio teleolgico (Cf. KU, AA 05: 387388).
84
KU, AA 05: 429.
85
KU, AA 05: 430.
86
KU, AA 05: 431.
87
Anth, AA 07: 119.
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[5] Dado que en su discurso sobre el hombre como fin ltimo, Kant sita al
hombre, con su capacidad racional, entre otros seres organizados en la naturaleza, es decir,
como perteneciente a una de las especies animales, podra deducirse, a partir de ello, que
su voluntad libre es una cualidad que le pertenece en tanto que ser natural organizado? Por
otro lado, Kant remite la libertad, como pusimos de relieve ms arriba, a la causalidad de la
razn. En este sentido, cabe traer aqu un problema al que aludimos ms atrs pero que
dejamos para este momento.
Decamos que la analoga de la tcnica, si bien constituye el nico modo como
nosotros podemos hacernos comprensible la posibilidad de la forma interna de los seres
organizados de la naturaleza, en cambio, dicha analoga no es adecuada para dar cuenta de
un fenmeno caracterstico de los mismos, que es su capacidad productiva y
autoorganizativa.88 En la analoga de la tcnica situamos el fundamento de la organizacin
interna en una causa racional exterior. Pero en un fin natural, en la medida en que es un
producto natural y no un producto del arte, la organizacin debe ser producida por las
partes, por la materia. De manera que habra que atribuir a la materia organizada una
capacidad organizativa intrnseca.
A mi modo de ver, la posicin de Kant en este punto podra sintetizarse aludiendo a
dos pasos de la Crtica del Juicio teleolgico, pertenecientes a la Metodologa del Juicio
teleolgico.
Por un lado, en el pargrafo 80, Kant expresa su simpata por el intento de los
arquelogos de la naturaleza, de indagar las causas mecnicas que podran conducir a un
sistema de las naturalezas organizadas.89 Sin embargo, Kant se opone a conceder que la
materia organizada pueda proceder de la materia bruta, a partir de leyes meramente
mecnicas. La tesis de Kant es que el arquelogo de la naturaleza tiene que atribuir a esa
medre universal una organizacin, puesta, en modo final, en todas esas criaturas. 90 Y,
segn Kant, esta organizacin originaria no podemos pensarla ms que como procedente
de un entendimiento arquitectnico.91
Pero, por otro lado, en el pargrafo 81, dentro de las teoras teleolgicas
(ocasionalismo y pre-estabilismo, en la que distingue entre la teora de la preformacin
individual y la teora de la preformacin genrica), Kant se inclina hacia aquella que
concede un mayor protagonismo a la naturaleza: el sistema de la epignesis o sistema de la
88
89
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Fin ltimo significa el concepto de un ser respecto al cual todos los dems seres
pueden ser considerados como medios. Y fin final significa en este contexto de las
relaciones externas entre los seres organizados de la naturaleza el concepto de un ser que
tiene en l mismo y no en otros seres naturales el fin de su existencia.102 Pero se nos dice
(justamente en el texto recin citado) que el fin final no debe ser, de ningn modo,
buscado en la naturaleza.103
De acuerdo con el pargrafo 84, fin final es el hombre, pero en cuanto sujeto de
moralidad y, por tanto, como nomeno104. Por tanto, en la Crtica del Juicio persiste la
dualidad entre la naturaleza y la libertad como lo prctico-moral.
Ahora bien, que persista la dualidad no significa que no sea posible la armona
entre la condicin natural del hombre y su dimensin prctico-moral. Destacar dicha
armona constituye, a mi juicio, el objetivo central de la doctrina kantiana sobre el hombre
como fin ltimo de la naturaleza; y se pone de relieve en dos aspectos.
Por un lado, porque el hombre tiene una constitucin natural, su aptitud para
proponerse fines y conformar la naturaleza a ellos, que concuerda con la posibilidad de ser
fin final. En este sentido, la naturaleza ha preparado al hombre para poder ser fin final.105
Por otro lado, porque dicha armona constituye el sentido de la cultura. En la
medida en que consista en la armona de la naturaleza con la moralidad, la cultura es el
aspecto por el que el hombre puede ser el fin ltimo de la naturaleza.106 Precisamente por
eso introduce Kant, en el concepto del hombre como fin ltimo de la naturaleza, la
condicin de ser fin final: el hombre podr ser el fin ltimo de la naturaleza en la medida
en que la conforme a sus fines; pero no a cualquier clase de fines, que podran hacer de l
un medio ms, sino a sus fines morales, los nicos respecto a los cuales no depende de la
naturaleza.107
102
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animalidad, el hombre depende en buena medida de la naturaleza. En lo que concierne al fin natural de la
felicidad, el hombre es siempre slo un anillo en la cadena de los fines naturales (KU, AA 05: 430).
108
KU, AA 05: 432.
109
Cf., por ejemplo, IaG, aa 08: 17, 21. Sobre la armona de la poltica con la moral en Kant, vid., Andaluz
1998.
110
Estoy de acuerdo con Lebrun cuando subraya la diferencia de origen entre cultura y moralidad: Kant
instituye la diferencia esencial entre fin ltimo (letzter Zweck) y fin supremo (Edzweck) para subrayar mejor
esta diferencia de origen (Lebrun 2008, pp. 486-487). Pero no comparto el juicio de que en la tercera
Crtica no haya reconciliacin (Cf. ibid., p. 486). La cultura no lleva necesariamente a la moralidad; pero, de
acuerdo con Delbos, prepara al hombre para el ejercicio del gobierno de la razn; si bien la cultura no
constituye el fin supremo, ella le proporciona, al menos en el orden del mundo sensible, una imagen de lo
que es este fin, y le invita por ello a tender a l (Cf. Delbos 1969, p. 467). Conciliacin no significa, a mi
juicio, un origen comn; en tal caso, estaramos en un monismo; conciliacin significa ms bien una
predisposicin y orientacin de la constitucin natural del hombre hacia la moralidad y, con ello, la
posibilidad de llevar a la naturaleza su armona con la moralidad.
148
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150
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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
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JANA SOKOVA
University of Preov, Slovakia
Abstract
The paper analyses three concepts of aesthetics of arts in Slovak aesthetics in the first third of the
19th century based on the ideas of three Slovak authors (Michal Gregu, Andrej Vandrk and Karol
Kuzmny) who all shared creative reading of Kant and transformation of the process of
harmonization as a foundation of defining possible aesthetic potentiality of art.
Key words
Kant; Aesthetics; Harmonization; Michal Gregu; Andrej Vandrk; Karol Kuzmny
Resumen
Este artculo analiza tres conceptos de la esttica artstica en la esttica eslovaca del primer tercio
del siglo XIX, a partir del pensamiento de tres autores eslovacos (Michal Gregu, Andrej Vandrk
and Karol Kuzmny), que comparten una lectura creativa de Kant y la transformacin del proceso
de armonizacin como fundacin para definir la potencialidad esttica del arte.
Palabras clave
Kant; esttica; armonizacin; Michal Gregu; Andrej Vandrk; Karol Kuzmny
Prof. PhDr. Jana Sokov, CSc., Institute of Aesthetics, Art and Cultural studies in Faculty of Arts,
University of Preov in Preov, Slovakia. E-mail contact: jana.soskova@ff.unipo.sk .
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Jana Sokova
The tradition of aesthetic thinking in Slovakia has not been long. In theory, it has been
developing from about the beginning of the 19th century. Its specific feature is that from its
outset it has been linked with the European theoretical thinking and that is has responded
to the state of the art in the world as well as in Slovakia. In the first third of the 19th
century, three forms of designing the aesthetics accommodated in Preov, incurred by the
different reading of I. Kant and his followers (F. Bouterweck, W. Krug, and F. Fries). They
were M. Gregu in his work Compendium Aestheticae1 (1826, the first guide to aesthetics
in Slovakia written in Latin) and A. Vandrk in the work Elements of Philosophical Ethics2
(1842) and Karol Kuzmny in his work On Beauty3. Both of them differently perceived the
possibilities of aesthetics to give an account on art and perceived differently even the sense
of art itself.
Gregu, M. (1793-1838), after studying at the Bratislava Lutheran Lyceum, he completed his university
education at the universities of Gttingen and Tbingen. He also visited the famous educational centres in
Jena, Halle, Leipzig, Berlin, and Dresden. From the year 1817, he took over the post of Professor at the
Preov Lutheran College after . Carlowszky. He lectured in philosophy, history, mathematics, physics,
philosophy of religion, and aesthetics. In the years 1831-32 he was the Director of the Preov Lutheran
College. From 1832 he served on the Lutheran Lyceum in Bratislava, lecturing on philosophy, history, and
aesthetics. At the time of his establishment in Bratislava in the same Lyceum, there studied prominent Slovak
thinkers such as . tr and J. M. Hurban, who considered him the most philosophical head among their
professors, praising his philosophical and aesthetic competence, his freedom of thought, and tolerance as a
representative of the Hungarian nationality. He wrote in Latin (Logic 1833, Metaphysics 1834, Practical
Philosophy 1835) and in Hungarian (Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1835, Philosophy of History 1836). All of
his works remained in manuscript. The only released work is the book written in Latin in Preov,
Compendium Aestheticae in the year 1817 and published in the year 1826. (Cf.: ervenka, J.: Preovsk
evanjelick kolgium v dejinch filozofie. In: Zbornk prc profesorov evanjelickho kolegilneho gymnzia
v Preove. Preov 1940, pp. 125-126)
2
Vandrk, A. (1807-1884), graduated from the Preov Lutheran College, continued in Jena and also visited
other university centres in Germany. After returning to Preov, he worked at the Lutheran College and
together with Gregu they created a liberal, free-thinking spirit there. After Gregu had left for Bratislava, he
assumed his post of Professor, later became the Rector of the College of Preov, where he remained for the
rest of his life despite various other offers. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences appointed him a membercorrespondent for his scientific merit in the year 1847, in the year 1858 he was granted honorary doctorate
from the University of Jena, he was honoured for lifetime achievement in the year 1882 by having been
awarded the Small Cross of the Order of Francis Joseph I. He published a wide variety of works in the
Hungarian language: Enchiridion Antropologiae Psychicae; Philosophiai elemei ethica; Tiszta Logika,
Llektan, Blcseleti Jogtan. (Cf.: Knya, P.: Andrej Vandrk. In: Antolgia z diel profesorov preovskho
evanjelickho kolgia. Eds. R. Dupkala-P. Knya, pp. 168-169)
3
Kuzmny, K. (1806-1866): On Beauty, 1836: In: Estetika. The Central European Journal of Aesthetics.
XLVII (New Series: III), 2010, Issue 2, pp. 226-237; See: Sokov, J.: Karol Kuzmnys Pilosophy of Art.
In: Estetika. The Central European Journal of Aesthetics. XLVII (New Series: III), 2010, Issue 2, pp. 215225)
4
Gregu, M.: Compendium Aestheticae. In: Studia Aesthetica I. Kapitoly k dejinm estetiky na Slovensku.
FF PU Preov 1998, pp.155-157
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Ibid., p. 158
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simply, aesthetic involvement is an endeavour of man to remain in the aesthetic condition
and in the condition of assessing the freed needs, thinking, and feeling. Gregu reasons that
such an assessment is also possible in relation to artistic works, because not only nature,
but also works of art are capable of releasing ideas and feelings, therefore the way of
exerting their effect on man can be aesthetically assessed.
According to Gregu, what is specific for the aesthetic are three symptoms
justified in Kants Critique of Judgement: the feeling of harmonisation, the feeling of
heading toward the infinity and perfection, and the feeling of free play of fantasy, thinking,
and feeling. If we identify three of these symptoms in the perception and evaluation of
works of art, then the aesthetic analysis of art becomes possible. In Gregu Guide to
Aesthetics we find parts which are directly devoted to and named by the term Aesthetics of
Art. Gregu differentiates the three aesthetic principles from moral, practical,
psychological, art-scholarly and art-critical assessment of the art. Aesthetic exploration of
the art should, according to Gregu, explain not only the division of fine arts, clarification
of the concept and the essence of art (which, in essence, is made by the history and theory
of art and art criticism), but, in particular, to explore, to show, and to explain aesthetic
perfection as such. The aesthetics of art, by Gregu, is to explore how we achieve aesthetic
perfection in specific kinds of art, how it is possible to achieve aesthetic perfection in the
method of artistic creation. In his Special Aesthetics, Gregu defines the aesthetic
principles, for which he considers the following: the principle of harmonisation, the
principle of idealness and transcendence, and the principle of compliance. In order to
clarify how the co-operation of the aesthetic principles, the content, and the artistic
expression works, Gregu uses the concept of sign (Zeichen). The principle of compliance
and the one of sign are those factors which, according to Gregu, allow one to
aesthetically explore the art. The explanation of the ideational content of art, its moral
implications, or social functions is not principal in it, but how in the particular artistic work
(its type and genre) all of these aesthetic principles are carried out. He considers the
principle of compliance and the principle of sign the most important. The principle of
compliance relates, according to Gregu, to an integral human nature, which, according to
him, lies in the basis of the feeling of the beautiful. Gregu says:
The feeling of the beautiful comes from the indivisible human nature, thus it
manifests the idea of compliance; it is, however, not less focused on the idea of
perfection and is related to the feelings of truth, goodness, and divinity. Therefore,
the objects in which we effortlessly find compliance or harmony, and which, as
completed, give impetus to the realization of infinity, operate on a spirit in such
a way as to lead the state of his nature to the absolute and forward-oriented, thus they
invoke a feeling of pleasure (11 Compendium Aestheticae).6
The term of compliance is therefore related to the integral human nature, with recognition
of harmony in perceived objects, but also to the state of spiritual forces, which is called for
6
Ibid., p. 161
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by the perception of objects. Compliance relates to the ability of the integral human nature
to get into a state of concentration on knowing perfection, the infinity, forward-looking,
into overlapping the borders of man... The principle of compliance, according to Gregu,
manifests itself as an aesthetic principle in creating the idea of the beautiful in the
consciousness of the perceiving subject. Perception depends on the sensory abilities of
man, but Gregu speaks of the outer and the inner senses, by which we perceive beauty,
and which have to be in compliance. Therefore, its not just about watching, looking at,
physical listening to, and the mechanical response to the same in perception. It is not only
about the perception of the form by external senses.
As one of the few readers, interpreters, and followers of Kant, Gregu does not
derive formalism from Kants aesthetics as the main principle of aesthetics, nor external
sensuousness as the main principle of aesthetics. Gregu recognizes the difference between
internal and external senses, but also their possible unification. In the external senses, he
sees the focus of man on external objects. By perceiving the external senses we recognize
the quality of objects. Mental states, released by perception through the external senses, are
considered internal senses by Gregu. He also applies this division in relation to the
concept of Stoff (substance) and Inhalt, i.e. the content. The concept of form (in the
interpretation of Gregu this is the German notion of Gestalt, not Form!) is referred to by
Gregu to the mode of perception, i.e. to the manner in which it is perceived as a whole
and the unity. He includes the notion of expression (Ausdruck) within the outer sense,
and he includes the notion of sign (Zeichen) within the form of the internal sense. We
need to achieve aesthetic compliance in perceiving, according to Gregu. In 14 he
explains that aesthetic compliance should be distinguished from logical compliance. He
understands aesthetic compliance 7 as compliance in diversity, and this is manifested in
three components: (a) compliance of the signs of the object, i.e. the harmony of its internal
form; (b) compliance of the object with the status of our spirit its forces are brought into
harmonious activity it is a harmony of the external form, i.e. that of relationship; (c)
compliance of ideas and feelings during perception this belongs in the content (Inhalt) or
expression (Ausdruck). Its actually the unity of expression. Gregu adds one more note on
the interpretation, which explains the whole process of the aesthetic operation of the art.
He says: because a particular expression (signing) is connected with certain shapes (as
signs), experience is necessary, which teaches that mental states are linked to certain
statements. Gregu further makes a distinction between absolute aesthetic perfection (the
idea of absolute beauty) and the relative aesthetic perfection (relative beauty). The ideals
of absolute beauty may not be found, in his opinion, in the nature or in the arts, but only in
the mind. In the artists mind, these ideals form a kind of a protomodel (Urbild), which the
artist then reflects in a specific work of art.8 The art by Gregu embodies the aesthetic
principles in different ways and by different means.
Gregu reacts, among other things, on 8 and 9 of Kants Critique of Judgement in
which Kant explains how and why the harmonization of the states of mind is possible and
7
8
Ibid., p. 163
Ibid., p. 165
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what its consequences for the feeling of pleasure and aesthetical judgement are. I would
claim that Gregu grasped the implications of Kants reasoning very well. Going back to
Kants Critique of Judgement and the abovementioned paragraphs, Kant deals there with
the universability of pleasure and its subjectivity, and investigates the question whether
the feeling of pleasure precedes the judgement of taste or is its consequence. In 8 he
explains that the judgement of taste, by which we describe anything as beautiful, has a
claim to the universal validity and without this claim it would fail, nevertheless it is
subjective. According to Kant, aesthetic judgements of objects rest upon concepts of the
object and the validity of the reference of a representation is connected to the feeling of
pleasure and displeasure. Universality of this type of judgement is then not logical, but
aesthetic, i.e. it does not involve any objective quality of the judgement, but only one that
is subjective as Kant calls it universal validity. This validity does not denote the
validity of the reference of a representation to the cognitive faculties, but to the feeling of
pleasure or displeasure for every subject. Judgements are, according to Kant, subjective,
but with the possibility of universal agreement. In the following 9, Kant more closely
specifies what the key to the critique of taste is and emphasises that it is the universal
communicability of the state of mind in the given representation, which as the subjective
condition of the judgement of taste, must be the basis, with the pleasure in the object as its
consequence. Kant emphasises that what is communicated is only the representation that
pertains to cognition. This representation brings into a free play the cognitive powers, and
hence, the state of the mind in this representation must be one of a feeling of the free play
of the cognitive powers, and, it must be universally communicable. This state of mind is
not based on cognition, however, it is involved in the free play of imagination and
understanding. According to Kant, only this purely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the
object, or of the representation through which it is given, is antecedent to the pleasure in it,
and is the basis of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. Kant warns that
the natural propensity of mankind to sociability, which is given empirically or
psychologically, is not sufficient for explaining the harmony of the cognitive faculties.
How is it then possible that the man is conscious of mutual accord of the powers of
cognition in a judgement of taste? In the next part of 9 Kant points out the more
lightened play of both mental powers (imagination and understanding) enlivened by their
mutual accord and says that a representation which is singular and independent of
comparison with other representations, and, being such, yet accords with the conditions of
the universality that is the general concern of understanding, is one that brings the
cognitive faculties into that harmonic accord which we require for all cognition and
which we therefore deem valid for everyone. In this connection Kant uses the terms accord
and concord. Gregu understanding of Kant was mainly aimed at emphasising
harmonization, concord, accord among cognitive faculties, consideration, conditions of
universability and subjective judgements of the way of imagination and harmonization of
the spirit and mind. It is exactly the realization of harmonization of cognitive powers that
liberates the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, followed by the feeling of accord and
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concord between the object being judged and our state of mind. Here is the source of all
subjective validity of pleasure which is attributed to the representation of an object which
we later call beautiful. What is beautiful is not the object itself, but our representations of
the object. That is why Gregu talks about accord, compliance (of our representation
of the object with a universally possible representation of the object), and that is why he
talks about harmonization of all spiritual powers.
A. Vandrk offers another explanation of aesthetics. In his work Elements of
Philosophical Ethics (1842) he includes aesthetics in the philosophy of objectives.
Vandrk says:
In respect of the objectives lurking in the concept of philosophy, the wise life is the
philosophy: with regard to its mission and function, it is a guideline for this wise life;
due to the way of its functioning, it is then philosophizing, i.e. rational examination
of the being and its final objectives (Analysis); with regard to its results and content,
it is by pure reason looked for and set up system of the main truths (principles and
ideas), thus the science (Synthesis).9
Vandrk, A.: Prvky filozofickej etiky. In: Antolgia z diel profesorov Preovskho evanjelickho kolgia. I.
Filozofia. Eds. R. Dupkala, P. Knya. Preov 1999, ISBN 80-85668-89-0, p. 178
10
Ibid., p. 175
11
Ibid., pp. 174-175
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is delimited the theory of State and law, politics, philosophy of law as the application of
the general ethics on the external conditions of life, and doctrine of virtues, focused on the
inner virtues of man, i.e. the sentiments, feelings, desires, aspirations, will, and virtues. In
the doctrine of virtues, aesthetic themes are also contained. Vandrk says that what is
required by wisdom is in part duty or moral, i.e. it is necessary this way and partly the
unforced spiritual beauty. The aesthetic theme is subordinate to the ethical base, its
meaning and results in the consequences. Without aesthetics (spiritual beauty), the science
of the dignity and beauty of the soul would not be fulfilled; dogmatics is learning about the
value of the real objectives of human life.12 Aesthetics and dogmatics is part of ethics,
according to Vandrk.
Vandrk did not understand the beauty either sensually or hedonistically. He
perceived it as a selfless sentiment creating a humanistic dimension of man. Even his
definition of beauty is in a similar vein: We call beautiful what is pleasing in itself from
the very self and for itself.13 Only selfless beauty, unrelated to selfish individual interests,
may be liked. But it rises in the soul of man, is predominantly a mental beauty, which is
dependent on the dignity and virtues of the soul. Vandrk wants to reconnect what Kant
separated and distinguished (sensuousness, customs, and common sense). Spiritual beauty
is characterized by the idea of honour, mental charm, mental health, mental emotion, and
obedience to God. All of the above ultimately result in the moral and beautiful life.
Intellectual, aesthetic and moral abilities are associated in the soul of man as the basis of
moral action. The task of the virtue is, according to Vandrk, to form life ... in such a way
that it be beautiful, i.e. spiritually healthy.14 It is the selfless and from egoism delivered
dimension of the aesthetic (beauty) that can cause that moral duty will not become a
command by compulsion (which I. Kant favoured), but from the free inner willpower.
According to him, the aesthetic fundamentals also embrace such moral values as love,
friendship, dignity of the human being, that is, his true honour. It is right here where,
according to Vandrk, not only the duty has to function (compulsion), but the virtue of the
intellectual beauty, the nature of the personality.15
Vandrk follows and quotes Fries work Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung16 (Jena 1805),
in which Fries explains that he wants to link being and thinking, that does not want to
depart solely from one or the other, because being has the superiority, and anything
thought is already being. Fries Wissen (knowledge) applies to matter, spirit, and belief
(Glauben) that relates to the purpose, eternal good, intelligible world, eternity, human
sojourn (Dasein) and freedom of will. By clarifying the concept of retribution (Ahndung)
relating to the secrets of the teleology of nature and the possibility of its assessment under
the laws of beauty and sublime, Fries offered to Vandrk the opportunity to overcome
Kants understanding of the aesthetic world as the possible, the probable, and anchor it in
12
Ibid., p. 176
Ibid., p. 179
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid., p. 183
16
Fries, J. F.: Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung. Jena 1805.
13
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piety (Andacht), which through subsequent enthusiasm allows one to imagine the secret of
being as the path to divinity. Aesthetics becomes part of ethics as the philosophy of
objectives. What is then at stake in the aesthetics is not merely simple assessment,
sensuousness, but for the mental beauty as a virtue its an overlap of the terrestrial to the
extraterrestrial. Neither aesthetics nor art as creation that embodies the creative power of
the spirit have any purpose in themselves, it is rather in practical humanity.
Different readings of Kants critique by Gregu are also apparent in relation to the
understanding of aesthetics and the meaning of art. Gregu tends more to the understanding
of aesthetics as a descriptive science, which arrives at the knowledge of what is going on in
the aesthetic assessment with the subject of assessment, and what the object of assessment
is, i.e. art and the relaxed state of feeling and thinking of the person appreciating the art.
Gregu names the object of aesthetics and the way this should be done. I have already
pointed out that his contribution is conceptualizing the aesthetics of art. According to
Gregu, the sense of art lies in the fact that it creates images, artworks, in which Stoff,
Inhalt, Gestalt, and Ausdruck are manifested. On the basis of the above, the aesthetic
compliance of the object and the state of the spirit manifests itself. Works of art are signs
and notices of these aesthetic compliances. Therein lies the ethos of art by Gregu.
Vandrk subsumes aesthetics under ethics and his exploration of art leads toward the
definition of the purposes of art it is a mental beauty as the quality of goodness and
piety, it is a cultivating and moral consequence of the works of art, it is attaining the
eternal through the final.17 Vandrk pushes the understanding of the aesthetics (and of the
art) towards pragmatic outlet of the moral-religious-aesthetic disposition of man, which is
reflected both in assessment and in making of art. The meaning of art is identifiable
through pragmatic and practical goals which the art has to perform.18
In Slovak Kantian tradition, K. Kuzmny 19 continues in Fries and Fichtes
modification of Kants explanation of harmonization and its influence on a perception of
art and a beingness of art.20 He differs from Kant in his attempt to achieve a synthesis of
cognition, aesthetic judgement, and moral action in the form of the unification of thinking,
feeling and the will, and also a great acceptance of mystically conceived final sense of art.
Art and beauty are, for him, the knowledge, moral action and judgement. In Kuzmnys
conception, the unity of all faculties of man (feeling, thinking and will) does not have such
a radically mystical outcome as the one we find in Fries.21 Kuzmny is inspired by Fries in
17
Although both of these works were written in Preov, their impact soared across Slovakia, since M. Gregu
was a lecturer in aesthetics from 1832 until the end of his life and A. Vandrks disciples works, although
having stayed in Preov, were mainly known in the Lutheran milieu at colleges all over Slovakia, more
precisely, the former Upper Hungary.
18
In addition to the aesthetics following the line of I. Kant, the aesthetic thought in that time in Slovakia
developed in the line of Hegels and Schellings ideas. Particularly attractive is Hegels idea of the art, whose
purpose is to elucidate sensually the idea of beauty, identical with the idea of goodness and truth, as well by
Hegel defined limits of art.
19
Kuzmny, K.: On Beauty. In: Estetika. The Central European Journal of Aesthetics. 47 (2010), Issue 2.
20
Sokov, J.: Karol Kuzmnys Philosophy of Art. In: Estetika. The Central European Journal of Aesthetics.
47 (2010), Issue 2.
21
Jacob Friedrich Fries: Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung. Jena: Gopferdt, 1805. Also in idem: Smtliche
Schriften, vol. 3; pp. 413-755 (Aalen: Scientia, 1968)
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that he considers feeling to be a cognitive faculty. But whereas Fries considers feeling to
be the equal of intuitive awareness, Kuzmny sees it as something distinct and puts it into a
hierarchy. There is, according to Kuzmny, only one essence, but it exists in three forms,
as truth, beauty, and moral good. It is known, felt, desired, and ultimately intuited by the
mind and internally observed as stripped bare, that is, beyond time and space. The
connection between truth, beauty, and moral good is, according to Kuzmny, in the one
essence, in the indivisibility of the human spirit, in three forms of idea, which is created by
the unmediated consciousness of mans mind and intuitive awareness. Kuzmny points out
that: a) science investigates, and makes known the truthfulness of truth, beauty, and moral
good; b) art represents, and makes one feel the beauty of truth and moral good; c) religion
leads to consciousness of the moral good, truth, and beauty. Kuzmnys feeling by the
mind is an intuitive awareness, which, in seeing beauty, surmounts the limits of reason,
and, in the form beauty, sees essence revealed, not veiled by time and space. Feeling by the
mind is not a sensory phenomenon; it is the world of beauty rooted in art, which provides
the first possibility of seeing the essence of the object in front of it. The second act of the
workings of the spirit is observing that the aesthetic world is present, that we catch
ourselves seeing the essence of the object by means of beauty, that is, we have an intuitive
awareness. Only in that culmination, that is, by means of sublime, which is fully dependent
on stripping away time and space, which veiled the essence of the object, we do have
naked essence, that is, revealed, unveiled essence before our minds. We cannot
understand this essence by reason, but we can feel it with our minds in intuitive awareness.
This essence felt by the mind in intuitive awareness cannot even be explained by
reason, nor can it be ascribed meaning that has been justified by reason.
Kuzmnys philosophical and aesthetic position is consistently projected into his
conception of art. This conception often makes his conception of aesthetics more precise
and more comprehensible. According to him, the aim of all arts is the creation and
representation of the beautiful, or creation and representation of certain objects in a way
that makes it possible to feel their essence, that is to say, that which is a value in and of
itself and is the supreme aim of all endeavours of the soul. 22 Art is therefore not an
imitation; it is creating and presenting something beautiful so that by means of beautiful it
is possible to feel, and then have an intuitive awareness of essence itself, that is, the truth
and the value of the object created and presented by the artist. In this way the aesthetic, the
artistic, and, ultimately, also the philosophical come into harmony in Kuzmnys
conception. With art we create the Being itself, we reveal its truth by means of the
beautiful, and by its increase into a form of the sublime we cross the boundary of our own
subjective existence.23
22
23
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Bibliography
Fries, Jakob Friedrich (1805), Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung. In Smtliche Schriften, Vol.
3, pp. 413-755. Aalen: Scientia Verlag 1968.
Gregu, Michal (1998), Compendium Aestheticae. In: Studia Aesthetica I. Kapitoly
k dejinm estetiky na Slovensku. FF PU Preov, pp. 155-157.
Kant, Immanuel (1975), Kritika soudnosti (Critique of the Power of Judgement). Praha.
Kuzmny, Karol (2010), On Beauty. In: Estetika. The Central European Journal of
Aesthetics XLVII (New Series III). 2010, Issue 2, pp. 226-237.
Sokov, Jana (2001), Od teoretickej ku aplikovanej estetike. Problmy filozofie dejn
estetiky na Slovensku. Preov 2001.
___________ (2010), Karol Kuzmnys Philosophy of Art. In: Estetika The Central
European Journal of Aesthetics XLVII (New Series III). 2010, Issue 2, pp. 215-225.
Vandrk, Andrej (1999), Prvky filozofickej etiky. In R. Dupkala P. Knya (eds).
Antolgia z diel profesorov preovskho evanjelickho kolgia. I. Filozofia. Preov.
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Abstract
In this paper, I address the theme of harmony by investigating that harmony of person necessary for
obtaining wisdom. Central to achievement of that harmony is the removal of the unstable, unharmonious presence of self-deception within ones moral character.
Keywords
Kant; Harmony; Self-deception; Self-knowledge; Wisdom
Resumen
Este artculo plantea la cuestin de la armona de la mano de la investigacin de la armona que la
persona precisa para obtener sabidura. Sostengo que la supresin de la presencia inestable y no
armnica del autoengao en el marco del carcter moral de cada cual es central para alcanzar tal
armona.
Palabras clave
Kant; armona; autoengao; autoconocimiento; sabidura
162
I have, in the past, argued versus Onora ONeill that knowledge of oneself (and not just
right action) is a central moral concern for Kant, suggesting that a balanced amount of
introspection was not only permissible but obligatory even to hope to fulfill ones duties to
others.1 In this paper, I further my thoughts on this topic by considering what one might
take to be the direct opposite of self-knowledge: self-deception. To deceive oneself is not
only to fail in self-knowledge, but also to seek actively to avoid it. I have come to believe
that Kant not only believes self-deception is possible but also that it is the most
characteristic obstacle to successful expression of finite practical reasoning. If this is true,
the obvious conclusion that follows is that the removal of self-deception, that is, selfknowledge is, in Kants words, the First Command of All Duties to Oneself.
(6:441/191)2 Indeed, if we accept Kants related point that duties to self are previous to all
duties to others, then we arrive at the interesting conclusion that self-knowledge is the first
of all duties simpliciter. I accept these strong claims, and seek here to defend them.
1. Self-Deception in the Metaphysics of Morals
Kant investigates self-deception in his discussion of lying in the Metaphysics of Morals.
There, he seems perplexed by the phenomenon. On the one hand, [i]t is easy to show that
man is actually guilty of many inner lies. (6:430/183) Kant accepts as obvious that lying
to oneself is prevalent in humanity, and that such a tendency is easily observable. He
quickly raises a problem, though: it seems more difficult to explain how [inner lies] are
possible; for a lie requires a second person whom one intends to deceive, whereas to
deceive oneself on purpose seems to contain a contradiction. (6:430/183). The implicit
contradiction is that I need at once to know my intention to lie (as the liar) but also not
to know my intention to lie (as the lied-to). So the perplexing thing about self-deception
is that inner lies occur, but the very notion of an inner lie involves a contradiction which
seems to make it impossible for them to occur.
Although Kant lays out this difficult question, he does nothingat least in the
Metaphysics of Moralsto resolve it. Instead, he dwells on the unquestionable
phenomenon of self-deception in several examples. Im not certain whether all his
examples really are examples that fit the model he gives, viz., that each of these persons
both knows and does not know his intention to lie. For example, he suggests that one who
professes belief in a future judge of the world, although he really finds no such belief
1
See: Grenberg, Jeanine. Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
2
All reference to Kant will first reference the Akademie edition page numbers, followed by the page
numbers of the following Cambridge translation of Kants works:
Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, trs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor, trs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998).
The Metaphysics of Morals. Mary Gregor, trs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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within himself is someone who is deceiving himself. But this person seems more of a
straight-forward prudential reasoner than a self-deceiver. He persuade[s] himself that it
could do no harm [to profess a belief in God] and that it might even be useful to profess
in his thoughtsa belief in such a judge, in order to win his favor in case he should exist.
(6:430/183, emphasis added) This describes someone who knows very well that he does
not believe in God, but who is going to pretend to believe in God just in case God does
exist. This is just prudential reasoning (and outright deception of others), not selfdeception. Mind you, it is bad prudential reasoning, since if God really were to exist, He
would be the first one to see through this little charade. Nonetheless, this is not a good
example.
Kants second example is better: Someone also lies if, having no doubt about the
existence of this future judge [i.e., God], he still flatters himself that he inwardly reveres
his law, though the only incentive he feels is fear of punishment. (6:430/183, emphases
added) Here, the lie to oneself is that one feels reverence toward God when in fact one
only feels fear of punishment, not reverence.
Lets speculate now on the motives for this self-lie. Why would one want to
believe that one is a reverent and religious person when in fact one is only a fearful,
sycophantic panderer to a powerful being? Put that way, the motive for self-deception is
screamingly obvious: one simply does not want to believe that one is as horrible a person
as one has turned out to be. In Kants words, this person wants to avoid the descent into
the hell of self-cognition. (6:441/191) (He also calls this the abyss of self-knowledge
6:441/191) None of us likes admitting parts of ourselves that are less-than-good. So,
instead of admitting we are less-than-good and then working at making ourselves better,
we hide from ourselves that we are less-than-good and then present ourselves as even
better than we are! This tendency toward false, arrogant self-presentation is one of the
most frequent fruits of self-deception. Self-deception becomes a tool whereby we construct
an image of ourselves more pleasing to ourselves. We then go out into the world with that
constructed image, building an entire reality around us that supports the original self-lie. I
may really not have reverence toward God, but I ostentatiously present myself to everyone
as though I do; I even come to believe that I am truly reverent toward God. If Im lucky,
people start saying of me that I am an exceedingly reverent person. More likely, people
will think I am a very hypocritical person. But the hypocrisy at the basis of my character is
exactly what I am preventing myself from knowing about myself.
This tendency to live the lie is one reason Kant thinks self-deception is such a
bad thing. He states:
[S]uch insincerity in his declarations, which a human being perpetuates upon
himselfdeserves the strongest censure, since it is from such a rotten spot (falsity, which
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seems to be rooted in human nature itself) that the ill of untruthfulness spreads into his
relations with other human beings as well (6:430-431/182)
Once we lie to ourselves we cannot help but to lie to others (in the sense of falsely
presenting ourselves to them), and what started as one wrong perpetuates a whole series of
wrongs, indeed, for some, a whole lifetime of wrongs towards oneself and others.
An excellent example of Kants point about how self-deception perpetuates wrongs
can be found in Jane Austens novel, Emma.3 Emma is in a good situation at her family
estate, Hartfield. Her mothers early death assured that she became lady of the manor early
on. She is handsome, clever and rich, and lives comfortably with her affectionate,
indulgent father. (Austen, 5) Mr. Knightley is a frequent visitor and close friend of the
family, so Emma has everything she needs.
All this inspires Emmas main motive for self-deception: because she is frightened
to lose her happy situation at Hartfield, she constructs a belief that she never wants to
marry. Marrying would, after all, require her to leave Hartfield, her father and visits from
Mr. Knightley. She thus deceives herself into believing both that she is not in love with
Mr. Knightley, and that she does not want to marry. Emma also falsely believes, and takes
great pride in the belief, that she is an accomplished match-maker, a false belief rooted in
her unwillingness to admit to herself that she is a rather lazy person, and isnt good at the
sort of thingslike painting or music-makingwhich actually do take time, hard work
and discipline. Emma thus constructs a world around her which supports all these false
beliefs.
Emmas self-deception on these points leads her utterly to misunderstand expressions
of affection toward her from men. One of my favorite passages for appreciating this point
is when Emma, in matchmaking mode, is trying to convince her friend Harriet that a riddle
written by Mr. Elton is in fact about his love for Harriet:
She cast her eye over it, pondered, caught the meaning, read it through again to be quite
certainand then passing it to Harriet, sat happily smilingMay its approval beam in that
soft eye! Harriet exactly. Soft, is the very word for her eyeof all epithets, the justest that
could be given. Thy ready wit the word will soon supply. Humph Harriets
ready
wit! All the better. A man must be very much in love indeed, to describe
her
so
(Austen, 58).
The reader is clearly meant to realize this poem about a woman with a soft eye and
ready wit is Emma. But Emmas self-deception about her own interest in love leads her
to misinterpret it as being about Harriet, one more with dull eyes than soft ones and a dull
wit (rather than a ready one) to match them.
3
All references to Emma come from: Austen, Jane. Emma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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Emmas self-deceptions have exactly the results Kant suggests: they are a
falsitythatspreads into [ones] relations with other human beings, (6:430-431/182)
which guarantees that wrongs are brought upon others. Not only does Emma inadvertently
present a mistruth to Harriet about Mr. Eltons affections. Beyond that, Emmas
encouragements raise Harriets hopes. So, when the truth of his affections is revealed,
Harriets pain is intense, and Emma has been the cause of that pain.
So, if self-deception is rooted in human nature itself and has this huge moral
consequence of grounding a false life, injurious to ourselves and others, we can see why
getting to know oneselfand especially uncovering deceptions at the basis of ones selfpresentationis a central moral task. In a section titled the First Command of All Duties
to Oneself, (6:441/191) Kant affirms:
Moral cognition of oneself, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of ones
heart which are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom. For in the
case of a human being, the ultimate wisdom, which consists in the harmony of a human
beings will with its final end, requires him first to remove the obstacle within (an evil will
actually present in him) and then to develop the original predisposition to a good will within
him, which can never be lost. (Only the descent into the hell of self-cognition
can pave
the way to godliness.) (6:441/191)
If we were not the sort of persons to deceive ourselves, then self-knowledge might not be
so important. Getting to know ourselves would be like getting to know anything we have
not yet understood, like calculus or flute-playing. But the duty to self-knowledge is a duty
to know evil things about you which you have actively sought to avoid knowing, things
which require moral attention, not avoidance. Acquisition of self-knowledge puts us on the
road to wisdom (and not just knowledge) because it removes that internal obstacle
which prevents us from developing the goal of a wise, moral person: a will in harmony
with a good will (instead of one actively opposed to that end). Self-deception is a tool for
false character building. But self-knowledge is an act of wisdom because, through it, we
uncover that false character. It brings out into the open our self-incurred obstacles to
morality, our efforts to hide from ourselves what really needs to be worked on to become a
moral person.
Scrutinizing our motives and character is not, however, an end in itself. The whole
point of admitting who one has been is to become who one was meant to be. All those lies
to oneself turned back on the world as arrogant self-assertions must be undermined so that
new, self-aware motives can provide the basis for a new character in harmony with a
good will. The wisdom here is of one who knows that the unexamined self is the first and
worst obstacle to becoming moral. Indeed, Kant would, with Socrates, not only agree that
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the unexamined life is not worth living, but also add that the unexamined life is guaranteed
to be an immoral life.
2. Explaining How We Deceive Ourselves
2.1 Step One: Groundwork I
Yet, even as we draw this picture of self-deception, we still dont know how it is possible.
There remains this apparent contradiction that the same person is both liar (and thus
aware of her intention to deceive) and lied-to (and thus unaware of her intention to
deceive).
Although we get no resolution of this contradiction in the Metaphysics of Morals,
one brief hint in his discussion there points us forward. After raising the problem of
contradiction, Kant distinguishes between [m]an as a moral being and man as a natural
being, suggesting that, like all persons, [m]an as a moral beingcannot use himself as a
natural beingas a mere means (a speaking machine)but is bound to the condition of
using himself as a natural being in agreement with the declarationof his moral being and
is under obligation to himself to truthfulness. (6:430/183) The implied thought here is that
self-deception somehow involves one person having two selves: the moral being and the
natural being, with the former admonished not to treat the latter as a mere means toward
the end of his lying.
Kant gives no further hints of how to make sense of the interaction between these
two beings within one person. But, if we turn to Groundwork I, we find a story of
attentiveness, and failure thereof, which constructs a clearer picture of the interaction of
two internal selves. Along the way, well find that self-deception is deeply embedded in
the nature of human practical reasoning itself and is thus the defining, characteristic
challenge to becoming a moral person.
At the very end of Groundwork I, Kant provides an account not only of why we
deceive ourselves about moral obligations, but also hints of how we do so:
The human being feels within himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of
duty, which reason represents to him as so deserving of the highest respect the
counterweight of his needs and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up
under the name happiness. Now reason issues its precepts unremittingly, without thereby
promising anything to the inclinations, and so, as it were, with disregard and contempt for
those claims, which are so impetuous and besides so apparently equitable (and refuse to be
neutralized by any command). But from this there arises a natural dialectic, that is a
propensity to rationalize against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their
validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and where possible, to make them better
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suited to our wishes and inclinations, that is, to corrupt them at their basis and to destroy all
their dignity (4:405/17-18).
This person is in the process of deceiving himself about the authority of moral demands.
The truth of the matter is that moral demands are categorical. But, here, he begins to turn
them into something elselaws that are perceived not to hold with categorical purity or
strictnessvia self-deception.
First, lets think about why the person engaged in this natural dialectic wants to
deceive himself. He wants to place happiness above morality when the two conflict; so
deceiving himself about the strictness of the moral law becomes an attractive option. This
prioritizing of happiness over morality is just the most general characterization we can give
of the motives of any case of self-deception. The man who wants to believe himself
reverent toward God even though hes not wants to avoid the injury to his happiness that
admitting his baser motives would involve. All Emmas self-deceptions are pointed
toward retaining her happiness at Hartfield. Now, we see the same desire for happiness
encouraging this man to deceive himself about the strictness of moral demands.
How though does this man deceive himself? The crucial moment for understanding
the mechanics of self-deception is when this man cast[s] doubt upon [moral laws]
validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and where possiblemake[s] them
better suited to [his] wishes and inclinations. To make sense of this move, lets go back
just a page earlier in Groundwork I to remind ourselves that Kant first affirms the capacity
of common human understanding to get things right here, that is, to see clearly the
strict, categorical nature of moral laws:
[C]ommon human reasonknows very well how to distinguish in every case that comes up
what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity with duty or contrary to duty, if, without
in the least teaching it anything new, we only, as did Socrates, make it attentive to its own
principle; and that there is accordingly, no need of science and philosophy to know what one
has to do in order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous0 (4:404/16, emphases
added).
As long as one pays attention to the presence of moral demands within ones moral
consciousness, their strictness is very clear. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant
confirms this import of attentiveness. There he notes: [w]e can become aware of pure
practical lawsby attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and
to the setting aside of all empirical conditions. (5:30/27, emphasis added) Here, not only
do we appreciate that the person of common reason attends to the moral law; we also learn
more about how he does it: by setting asideall empirical conditions, that is, by not
letting desire-based or happiness-focused interests interfere with ones perception of the
moral law.
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Now, back in the Groundwork, the person of common human reason (Kant now
simply calls him the human being 4:405/17) starts to attend rather differently to
things. If he looks clearly at the moral law, setting aside all concerns about happiness, he
knows it for exactly what it is. But our human being is now engaged in a conflict between
happiness and morality, and he wishes happiness could win. Well, then, lets not look at
morality so clearly. Lets attend to something else so that the law looks differently to us.
That something else, of course, is our own happiness and whatever oddly colored lens it
provides through which to see the moral law. Of course one shouldnt lie, but maybe just
this one time for the sake of paying my debt off (which will make me happy). Ill even
make other people happy because Ill stop pestering them with further requests for loans.
Yeah, thats it: Im really helping other people if I lie now. It really is the right thing to
do. If I attend to my happiness as primary instead of attending to the strict demand of the
law, the law starts looking, well, less strict. I may still (in some sense to be considered
later) know that the moral law holds strictly, but I no longer believe that. I no longer
attend to that knowledge, so it recedes quietly into the back of my mind and a new belief
emerges: the moral law isnt totally strict; it admits of exceptions in the name of my
happiness. Kant had told us the attentive human being needed only to set asideall
empirical conditions to see the moral law clearly. But this person does exactly the
opposite: he welcomes empirical conditions into his perception of the law, and thus
deceives himself about it.
To summarize: our person reflecting on the moral law does not stop knowing that
it holds categorically; but he develops techniques to stop looking attentively at that
knowledge. He looks elsewhereto his own hopes for happinessto gain a new, and
corrupting, perspective on the moral law. Doing so allows him, eventually, perhaps over a
long period of time, to begin believing the precise opposite of what he already knows to be
true (viz., the categorical authority of the moral law). So, this person believes both a and
~a: the moral law holds categorically, and the moral law does not hold categorically. But
he develops a disposition, or way of being, in which he attends only to ~a (the moral law
does not hold categorically). And he attends to that so regularly over time that he begins to
lose his conscious memory of a (the categorical authority of the moral law).
2.2 Step Two: Analyzing Two Selves via Emma and Groundwork I
Can we, then, appeal to these shifting objects of attentiveness to explain how the same
person is both the liar (who knows the intention to deceive) and the lied-to (who doesnt
know that intention)? Well, in fact, weve uncovered in this belief of a and ~a story a
slightly different contradiction within self-deception than the original one Kant had
suggested. Nonetheless, investigating further how the construction and management of
this contradiction in knowledge claims occurs will allow us to affirm, to a certain extent,
the other two selves story Kant suggested in the Metaphysics of Morals. We need, then,
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to investigate further this person contradictions in beliefs and with that, construct a clearer
account of the two selves involved in self-deception.
First, the knowledge we attribute to this person of a (the moral law holds
categorically) is only implicit. He doesnt claim the moral law holds categorically; indeed,
he might become a defender of the idea that one must adjust the strictness of moral laws in
light of happiness. But he can hold this claim implicitly only within a carefully
constructed world maintained by a careful segmenting of himself into two. We had been
saying these two selves are the liar (who knows the intention to lie) and the lied-to (who
does not). But the self does not segment exactly along these lines. Rather, there is, first,
the self able to look at truths directly and know the strictness of the moral law; lets call
him the Honest Self. Then there is the self who wants to satisfy the demands of happiness
over those of morality. This is the Devious Self. The interesting thing, though, is that the
Honest Self doesnt become the lied to and the Devious Self doesnt know himself
constantly as the liar. Something different occurs. Lets investigate each of these points in
turn.
First, the Honest Self is not told a lie by the Devious Self. Rather, the Honest Self
just gets ignored, sort of lost in this persons overall consciousness: he has his knowledge,
but he has a curtain placed over him by the Devious Self, who wont pay attention to him.
He is no longer involved in the choice process of the self, at least not directly.
On the flip side, the Devious Self, who puts the curtain over the Honest Self, cannot
be said to be continually aware of the intention to deceive. Thats why I call him the
Devious Self instead of the Lying Self. If we think of self-deception as a process through
which one eventually comes to believe the opposite of what one knows, then the Devious
Self, instead of maintaining a continual awareness of his intention to deceive, looks more
like this: initially, he has an intention to lie (i.e., to claim ~a instead of a). But stated
so baldly, this is too much: make moral laws bend to the demands of my happiness?? That
would be wrong!! So, the Devious Self starts to build a world within which that obviously
wrong thing no longer looks so obviously wrong. Now, ~a doesnt look so bad. It
doesnt even look like a lie anymore. So the Devious Self claims ~a, but he doesnt
claim it (even to himself) as a lie; it is just his way of seeing the world. So, he does not
maintain a conscious intention throughout this process to lie to the Honest Self, or to
anyone else. It might have begun like that, but by the time the deception is complete, it no
longer looks like that.
And yet the Devious Self does attendand attend very carefullyto the beliefs
of the Honest Self, i.e., to a (the moral law holds categorically). How? Only in the
back-handed sense of assuring vigorously that the truth of the Honest Self not be revealed,
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especially in those circumstances in which such outing appears immanent. Lets look again
at Emma to appreciate this point.
A dangerous possibility of outing Emmas false beliefs occurs when Mr. Knightly
tries to call out the Honest Emma, insisting that she is in fact not a successful
matchmaker at all:
I do not understand what you mean by success;Success supposes endeavor. But if,
which I rather imagine, your making the match, as you call it, means only your planning
it, your saying to yourself one idle day, I think it would be a very good thing
for Miss
Taylor if Mr. Weston were to marry her, and saying it again to yourself every now and
then afterwards, --why do you talk of success? Where is your merit? what are you proud
of? you made a lucky guess; and that is all that can be said (Austen, 11).
Here is an excellent opportunity for the Honest Emma to come out: oh, alright, Mr.
Knightly, my matchmaking is all just a front for my failure to admit that I am lazy. Well,
she doesnt say that in response to Mr. Knightley. Instead, when Mr. Knightley concludes
you made a lucky guess; and that is all that can be said, Emma responds:
And have you never known the pleasure and triumph of a lucky guess?I pity you.I
thought you clevererfor depend upon it, a lucky guess is never merely luck. There is
always some talent in it. And as to my poor word success, which you quarrel with, I do
not know that I am so entirely without any claim to it. You have drawn two pretty
0picturesbut I think there may be a thirda something between the do-nothing and the
do-all. If I had not promoted Mr. Westons visits here, and given many little
encouragements, and smoothed many little matters, it might not have come to anything
after all (Austen, 11).
This is Emmas Devious Self attending to her Honest Selfs knowledge, and coming to
protect it from being revealed. To admit to Mr. Knightley that she is lazy and
unaccomplished would be too much. But her Devious Self is well-trained in such matters,
and gets right to work. First, she speaks in an arrogant, almost insulting, tone (I pity you
and I thought you were cleverer), hinting at some defensiveness underneath her words.
She tries, furthermore, to claim there was hard work behind her match-making success,
thereby affirming the world the Devious Self has constructed.
This arrogant assertion of the world of the Devious Self confirms, then, one sense
of the self-deceived persons knowledge of the denied fact: Emma knows that she is
lazy and unaccomplished in the sense that she assiduously prevents this fact from coming
to light, either to herself or others. When circumstances threaten to out that fact, her
Devious Self is immediately aware of the threat and fiercely protects that fact, keeping it in
its safe hiding place deep within her curtained Honest Self. The denial of the guarded fact
finds its strength in the intense desire to keep hidden what one wants to hide. As such,
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knowledge of the denied thing must be admitted as a condition for the very need for, and
the resulting strength of, the denial.
This knowledge of the underlying truth when it presents itself thusly is, however,
a complex state psychologically. Long ago, Emma just knew that she was lazy and
unaccomplished. But now, at the same time, she holds all the following:
1) She unconsciously, but accessibly, knows that she is lazy and unaccomplished.
2) She believes she is not lazy and unaccomplished.
3) She fears she is lazy and unaccomplished.
4) She does not want to believe she is lazy and unaccomplished.
5) She fiercely denies any claims that she is lazy and unaccomplished.
Emma holds all these states, but attends differently to each, depending upon
circumstances. When Mr. Knightly suggests she is not accomplished in matchmaking, she
most likely starts, internally, to attend to #3 (her fear that she is lazy and unaccomplished),
leading to conscious assertion of #5 (her denial that she is lazy). In this state, her
knowledge of #1 (that she is lazy and unaccomplished) remains unconscious.
Ironically, though, the knowledge of the Honest Self, despite being unconscious, is
at the very basis of the plotting of the Devious Self, acting as that part of the self which
must never be explicitly revealed. That truth is known in the sense of being that which
must always be denied. The man of Groundwork I thus knows in his Honest Self that the
moral law holds strictly, but it is too painful a fact to admit to himself or others. His
Devious Selfs way of knowing this fact is to fiercely protect it, keeping it in its safe
hiding place deep within his curtained Honest Self. The contradiction here is not that he
both knows and does not know the intention to lie. The contradiction is that, in different
ways, he believes both a (the moral law holds strictly) and ~a (the moral law does not hold
strictly); it is not the contradiction that he both knows and does not know the intention to
lie.
But, although we thus reject the contradiction within the self-deceived person Kant
had originally suggested, we affirm Kants other Metaphysics of Morals distinction
between a moral self and a natural self. More precisely, the Devious Self fails to attend to
the moral admonition the moral self was given. Kant had said the moral being must not
use the natural being as a mere means. Im not sure my Devious Self and Honest Self are
perfectly parallel to his moral being and natural being. Nonetheless, the Devious Self is
using the knowledge of the Honest Self as a mere means to his end of securing his
happiness. Whether he intends to lie or not, the Devious Self is using another part of
himself as a mere means instead of accepting that part of himselfthe part that knows the
truth of thingson its own terms, or as possessing its own end of truth-telling.
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We see here the other sense in which we can say the self-deceived person knows the
denied truth: given the right circumstancesand especially given circumstances in which
the efforts of the Devious Self are foiledthe truth that has been denied by the selfdeceiving person comes naturally to light. Of course she has always known that she
loved Mr. Knightley; she just couldnt admit it to herself. Her knowledge of the previously
hidden fact is now clear: she simply has conscious knowledge of it.
I suspect that if our Groundwork I man rejecting the strictness of moral laws for the
sake of his own happiness were, ironically, presented with a similar sort of situationone
within which holding that claim (that moral laws are not strict) were to undermine his
happiness, then hed abandon his constructed world and admit that moral laws do hold
strictly. Suppose, for example, that someone else uses an non-strict reading of moral laws
to cheat him. Our man would vociferously object that moral laws do hold strictly! I do not
mean to suggest this man will become moral (certainly not for the right reasons), but he
does see his original project of self-deception failing; there is a collapse of the structure of
the world he had created for himself because he now has to admit, for the sake of his own
happiness, that moral laws do hold strictly!
So, we have two examples of the senses in which we can say that the self-deceived
person knows the truth of the thing about which hes been deceiving himself, either
indirectly through vigorous denial of the truth, or directly, leading to the collapse of selfdeception. And what we have accomplished in analysis of Emmas self-deception, instead
of a resolution of the original contradiction at the basis of self-deception, is an affirmation
of the existence of a slightly different sort of contradiction hiding underneath an unstable
state of self-deception. The self-deceiving person is not both a liar who knows the intention
to lie and a lied-to who does not know that intention. Rather, the same person believes
a&~a, but manages those contradictory beliefs so as to efface the power of the
contradiction. This management is accomplished by segmenting the self into the Devious
Self and the Honest Self, where the Honest Self becomes used as a mere means by the
Devious Self.
In this management of selves, we also see the management of various knowledge
claims and beliefs. Some beliefs (as, e.g., the belief that Emma is not lazy and
unaccomplished) are conscious; other beliefs (as, e.g., the underlying belief that Emma is
lazy and unaccomplished) are normally unconscious, but accessible, depending upon
circumstances. Usually, though, this underlying knowledge/belief is relegated to the realm
of the forbidden, that of which one does not speak and does not even consciously know.
As long as the Honest Self enters into the Devious Selfs projects only in the way the
Devious Self wants, management of ones contradictions succeeds: the same person can
indeed successfully believe both a & ~a! There is a contradiction at the basis of selfdeception.
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But this need for complex management of ones contradictions is also what makes
self-deception such an unstable state. Once one has to deny the ~a claim of the Devious
Self (as Emma is forced to do when she is forced to admit her love for Mr. Knightley), the
whole managed structure of self-deception comes crashing down: without a contradiction
carefully held and managed, there is no self-deception.
We thus do not so much resolve the contradiction inherent to self-deception, as instead
affirm it. The difficult work of the self-deceived person is to manage her holding of
contradictions in belief in a way that makes them less obviously contradictions. It is too
simple merely to say that one part of the person is the liar who knows the deception, and
the other part is the lied-to who is deceived. The liar turns out to know her intention to lie
only before she turns that intention into something else; and the lied-to is never really the
lied-to but only the ignored, yet protected and used.
3. Conclusion
There is, however, a final point to make about self-deception, and ultimately, selfknowledge, for Kant. When discussing self-deception in Groundwork I, Kant spoke of it as
a natural dialectic, a phrase that should prick the attuned ears of a Kant scholar. Recall
that a natural dialectic is exactly the phrase Kant used in the Critique of Pure Reason
when speaking of the unavoidable tendency of theoretical pure reason to fall into illusions
about things beyond its limits. Even after one learns the lessons of Transcendental
Idealism, we still cannot help but to fall into this natural dialectic which pushes us
toward illusions about metaphysics:
[T]here is a natural and unavoidable dialect of pure reason, not one in which a bungler
might be entangled through lack of acquaintance, or one that some sophist has artfully
invented in order to confuse rational people, but one that irremediably attaches to human
reason, so that even after we have exposed the mirage it will still not cease to lead our
reason on with false hopes, continually propelling it into momentary aberrations that
always need to be removed (A298/B354, emphasis added).
A natural dialectic is, then, a sort of disease to which reason is prone, one that cannot so
much be cured as managed via constant vigilance. I apply all of this to Kants discussion of
the natural dialectic of practical reason as well. We will never not be tempted to selfdeception about the strictness of moral laws. Rather, we must maintain a vigilance which
assures we will recognize when this natural tendency kicks in. This pervasiveness of the
possibility of self-deception reaffirms again Kants original point, viz., that knowledge of
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oneself is the first command of all duties to oneself. This duty is as central as it is because
of the nature of finite practical reason itself.4
Self-deception is the human failure with which one needs to come to terms in order
to become moral. And self-knowledge is the first of all duties to oneself overall: if it is in
human nature to engage in the sorts of deception we have analyzed here, then it is
impossible to be a moral person (or even to understand the nature of the duties to which
one is held) without removing that obstacle to morality that is the Dear, Deceiving,
Devious Self.
Bibliography
Kants writings
All reference to Kant will first reference the Akademie edition page numbers, followed by
the page numbers of the following Cambridge translation of Kants works:
Critique of Pure Reason (1999). PaulGuyer and Allen Wood, trs., Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1998). Mary Gregor, trs., Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
The Metaphysics of Morals (1996). Mary Gregor, trs., Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Other references
Austen, J. (2008). Emma, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grenberg, J. (2013). Kants Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological
Account. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
(2005). Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption
and Virtue. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
It is this inextirpable tendency toward self-deception that inspires my phenomenological reading of Kant
(see: Grenberg, Jeanine, Kants Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013]). Attentive phenomenological reflection is the antidote to
this inextirpable tendency toward self-deception. Seeing well how moral reasons press themselves on us is
the first step in becoming a moral agent. Choice is a second step that is accomplished most successfully by
prefacing choice with this moral attentiveness.
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Kants Enlightenment1
La Ilustracin de Kant
SAM FLEISCHACKER
University of Illinois-Chicago, USA
Abstract
I urge here that Kants essay What is Enlightenment? be read in the context of debates at the time
over the public critique of religion, and together with elements of his other writings, especially a
short piece on orientation in thinking that he wrote two years later. After laying out the main
themes of the essay in some detail, I argue that, read in context, Kants call to think for ourselves
is not meant to rule out a legitimate role for relying on the testimony of others, that it is directed
instead against a kind of blind religious faith, in which one either refuses to question ones clerical
authorities or relies on a mystical intuition that cannot be assessed by reason. Both of these ways
of abandoning reason can be fended off if we always submit our private thoughts to the test of
public scrutiny: which is why enlightenment, for Kant, requires both free thinking, by each
individual for him or herself, and a realm of free public expression in which individuals can discuss
the results of their thinking.
Key words
Enlightenment; Testimony; Public/Private distinction; Public Reason; Enthusiasm
Resumen
This piece is adapted from Fleischacker, S. (2013), What is Enlightenment? Kants Questions, London:
Routledge, New York. Chapter 1.
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Sam Fleischacker
Propongo en este artculo leer el ensayo de Kant Qu es la Ilustracin? en el contexto de los
debates de su tiempo sobre la crtica pblica de la religin, junto con elementos de otros escritos de
Kant, especialmente un opsculo sobre la orientacin en el pensamiento que escribi dos aos
antes. Tras desplegar los temas principales del ensayo con algn detalle, argumento que, leda en su
contexto, la exhortacin de Kant a pensar por nosotros mismos no debe entenderse llamada a
descartar la funcin legtima de confiar en el testimonio de los otros, sino que est dirigida ms
bien contra un tipo de fe religiosa ciega, en la que o bien rechaza cuestionar las propias autoridades
clericales, o bien descansa sobre una intuicin mstica que no puede ser evaluada por la razn.
Ambas maneras de abandonar la razn pueden esquivarse si sometemos en todo momento nuestros
pensamientos privados a la prueba del escrutinio pblico. Por ello, la Ilustracin para Kant requiere
tanto el libre pensamiento, de cada individuo por s mismo, cuanto un espacio de expresin pblica
libre, en el que los individuos puedan discutir los resultados de su pensamiento.
Palabras clave
Ilustracin; testimonio; distincin pblico/privado; razn pblica; entusiasmo
And it names just a process, not a historical period, until quite late in the 19th century. Hegel seems to have
been the first to use Aufklrung to designate the 18th century as a stage in intellectual history, and it was by
way of translations of his works that the term came into English use. But Aufklrung was generally translated
as Illumination (and sometimes as Clearing Up!) until the end of the nineteenth century. See Schmidt, J,
Inventing the Enlightenment: Anti-Jacobins, Hegelians, and the Oxford English Dictionary, pp.421-443.
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Kants Enlightenment
phenomenon we call today the Enlightenment, and responding to its specific challenges,
not necessarily representing what characterized that period in, say, Edinburgh or Paris.3
What specific challenges did Kant face? Kant really wrote two pieces in defense of
enlightenment, the famous one of 1784, and What is Orientation in Thinking?, in 1786.
At that time, the long reign of Frederick the Great was drawing to a close and the
intellectual circles to which Kant belonged were worried about what might happen next.
Frederick was beloved by intellectuals for the free rein he gave to scholarly discussion, but
there was reason to fear that his successor would not follow him in that respect. The future
Frederick William II had joined a series of secret societies and was purported to believe that
he had mystical visions; he was also close with a certain Johann Christof Wllner, who
harbored hopes of suppressing the open discussion of religion and bringing back the ...
country to the faith of Jesus Christ (Frederick William II 1910, p. 64). 4 And indeed,
immediately after coming to the throne, Frederick William would appoint Wllner to high
position, Wllner would attempt to shut down the public expression of heretical views, and
Frederick William would use his personal conversations with Jesus as a basis for further
restrictive policies.5 When Kant calls for the supreme importance of freedom of the pen,
then, even in 1784 and especially in 1786, and when in 1786 he adds that being guided by
personal religious experience can lead to the greatest of despotisms, we need to hear him as
in part making a case for the policies of Frederick the Great, and warning his fellow
intellectuals against giving aid to the repressive tendencies in Frederick William. Kant was
reluctant to write the 1786 piece on orientation, which required him to intervene in a dispute
among friends, but was eventually convinced that he had to do it in order to help fend off
the political threat looming on the horizon (Beiser 1992, p. 52).
2. So much for historical background; lets turn now to the texts. What was
enlightenment, for Kant? Kants piece on the topic is extremely short, but it contains a
number of different elements and it is worth making sure we are clear about them. I'd like
Intellectual historians today tend to be leery of the very idea that there is a single period or movement
properly called the Enlightenment. There is no single or unifiable phenomenon describable as the
Enlightenment, says John Pocock, although he adds that it is the definite article rather than the noun which
is to be avoided. In studying the intellectual history of the late seventeenth century and the eighteenth, we
encounter a variety of statements made, and assumptions proposed, to which the term Enlightenment may
usefully be applied, but the means of the term shift as we apply it. (Pocock, J, Historiography and
Enlightenment: A View of their History, p.83). See also the thoughtful discussion in Oz-Salzberger, F,
New Approaches towards a History of the Enlightenment: in place of Gays monolithic anti-religious
Enlightenment, she says, contemporary intellectual historians have given us a moderate Presbyterian
Enlightenment in Scotland, a Latitudinarian Enlightenment in England, a radical Enlightenment of Spinozists
and freemasons, a conservative Enlightenment which was largely Socinian, [and] a Jesuit Enlightenment,
among others (p.175).
4
See also Schmidt, Introduction, What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and TwentiethCentury Questions, pp. 6-7.
5
In June 1791 Kiesewetter wrote Kant to inform him that attempts were being made in the Wllner ministry
to prevent him from publishing. Kiesewetter explained that the king, who was prone to mystical visions, had
seen Jesus again, so that even more edicts could be expected. Frederick C. Beiser, Enlightenment,
Revolution and Romanticism, p.50.
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to lay out five major themes of his famous essay, and then elaborate and defend two of
them.
Enlightenment, Kant tells us in the opening line of his famous piece, is the exit of
human beings from their self-incurred immaturity. And at the end of the first paragraph,
Kant says that Dare to know!, or Have the courage to use your own reason!, is the
watchword of enlightenment. So we have two themes right off the bat. First, the opposite
of enlightenment is not a state of ignorance a mere lack of information but an
emotional weakness, a state of immaturity; we cure this immaturity by taking responsibility
for our own knowing, not by simply acquiring information. And second, our immaturity is
self-incurred, and the way out of it is an act we must perform ourselves. Other people
cannot enlighten us; we must enlighten ourselves. And we do that by using our own
reason whatever exactly that means.
We should pause to note that this is not the most obvious view of enlightenment.
Many other thinkers in Kants time saw enlightenment as coming about when scientific
knowledge, is cultivated and used to solve chronic human problems, or when the baleful
rule of priests, enslaving the population by way of superstition, is brought to an end.6 For
Moses Mendelssohn, enlightenment consisted in theoretical knowledge, especially about
religion (Mendelssohn in Schmidt 1996, pp. 54-55). For Karl Reinhold, it lay in the
clarification of concepts, especially those concepts which have a considerable influence on
human happiness. Mendelssohn, in Schmidt 1996, pp. 65-6). Christian Daniel Erhard,
writing a few years after Kant, held that enlightenment consists in the abolition of
prevailing prejudices and errors among individuals and... peoples (Knudsen in Schmidt
1996, p. 270). Kant too thought that enlightenment will improve science and lead us away
from prejudice and superstition, but it was the courage to use our own reason, and not the
improvement of science or the overcoming of prejudice and superstition, that he identified
with enlightenment. It follows that he did not think people need the help of others, even
scientific experts, to enter enlightenment he regarded our reliance on others, including
scientific experts, as precisely what keeps us from enlightenment and he didnt blame
others, even clerics, for our lack of enlightenment. People with a great deal of theoretical
knowledge, or skill in clarifying concepts, or understanding of what makes for human
happiness or underpins prejudice, might be the source of enlightenment for Mendelssohn
and Reinhold and Erhard, but not for Kant. The source of enlightenment lies within each of
us, for him, not in any set of scholars. He puts the onus on each of us for achieving
enlightenment, and he blames us for the immaturity that blocks us from doing so. He
implies, thereby, that enlightenment is within reach of everybody.7
6
For a modern account of the Enlightenment that sees it as primarily concerned to solve long-standing social,
political, and economic problems, see Robertson, The Case for Enlightenment. For a modern account that
sees the Enlightenment as primarily concerned to challenge traditional religious beliefs, see Israel, Radical
Enlightenment.
7
I believe that Kants enlightenment, for all that he talks at one point about a public realm in which
scholars (Gelehrten) have the freedom to write what they will, is meant to be a very egalitarian affair
something that everyone, whether well-educated or not, can carry out for him or herself. This is, after all,
what the admonition, Think for yourself! would seem to imply, and Kant condemns unquestioning reliance
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3. What, now, is the immaturity that blocks our enlightenment? Kant describes it as
the inability to use ones understanding without the direction of another. He attributes
this condition to everyone who thinks I have a book which understands for me, a pastor
who has a conscience for me, a doctor who decides on my diet. We should stop and
wonder at this. Does Kant mean to say we should never rely on authority? Am I to figure
out everything on my own, ignoring even my doctors advice about diet? Surely not. But
then what does Kant mean? Perhaps just that I must always stand ready to question my
authorities, if what they say seems to me ill-considered or ill-informed. I need to have
enough understanding of my own, and trust my understanding enough, that I can say, This
doctor seems to me a charlatan in certain cases, and blame myself, rather than just the
doctor, if I continue nevertheless to rely on him. Moreover, Kants main point doesnt have
to do with our attitude towards medical experts, or other experts on scientific matters. The
pastor, not the doctor, is the main character in his list of examples. As well see, Kant is
concerned above all with the way we rely on authorities in matters of religion an arena
on any authority: its hard to imagine that why he wouldnt include scholarly authority in this polemic. Kant
also himself contrasts his notion of enlightenment with one on which it would consist in acquiring
information, in the footnote from WDO AA 08. He says there that there is less to his notion of
enlightenment than to one that identifies it with the acquisition of information, that everyone can carry it out
for himself, and that a good educational system will ensure that everyone is trained in it from a young age.
There is other textual evidence that Kant sees enlightenment as something everyone, not just
scholars, can and should accomplish. First, Kants rule for enlightenment is one of three maxims that he
identifies with the common understanding a mode of thought that all human beings share. Second, in his
Reflexionen Kant says that while it can be good for people to be trained, for a while, by way of coercion,
authority or prejudice, eventually all these evils must have an end (RGV 528 AA 15:229-30); he also
says, in the same place, that philosophy, if it shall have a use at all, must give the principles by which
immaturity can be ended everywhere. Moreover, he bitterly condemns the infantilization of the populace by
kings and clerics, making no distinction between scholars and other members of the populace: One first
renders the people unable to govern themselves, and then excuses ones despotism on the grounds that they
cannot govern themselves. (RGV 532 AA 15:231) And he compares academics to despotic rulers, saying
that they make the people immature (RGV 1508-9 AA 15:820-26).
So I think there is good reason to say that for Kant enlightenment is something that all human beings
can and should carry out, regardless of their scholarly training. Indeed, throughout most of WA Kant talks
about how anyone can and should enlighten him or herself; he uses the term scholar quite rarely, although
those occurrences are located, unfortunately for my purposes, in the midst of his central discussion of the
right to a public use of reason. But I think we can make good sense of this fact: the occasional references to
the right of scholars to address one another freely in WA have to do with the context in which it was
written, in which there was considerable danger that scholarship was about to be put back under censorship.
So in context Kant may either be saying that the writings of scholars at least, or especially, should be wholly
free. He may also regard be using the word scholar in a loose, broad way by which anyone speaking or
writing for the purpose of inquiry alone counts as a scholar. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that
Kant thinks free speech should be limited to scholars, or that he regards enlightenment as something that
flows from scholars to the people at large. Indeed, on his conception of enlightenment, that would be
impossible.
Several commentators on Kants notion of enlightenment accept this egalitarian view of WA, but
argue that Kant moves to a more elitist model in RGV and SF: see, especially, Laursen, The Subversive
Kant, Lestition, Kant and the End of the Enlightenment in Prussia, and Deligiorgi, pp.76-7. I am not
convinced that Kant drops his egalitarianism as much as these writers suggest, but I do think his RGV and SF
offer a somewhat different model of enlightenment (see my What is Enlightenment? chapter 2).
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where, he thinks, scientific knowledge is not available and relying on someone elses words
is morally inappropriate.8
And what about the second idea, that our immaturity is self-incurred? We are
responsible, according to Kant, for the very unwillingness to question that makes us
vulnerable to manipulation by authorities. Many other people, in Kants own time and
since, would rather blame those authorities for the threats and manipulative ways of
teaching that make it difficult for people to think for themselves. Kant blames us for our
own mental slavery. Why? Well, Kants fundamental principle of morality is based on the
idea that we are all free: we have the ability, at all times, to follow a law we lay down for
ourselves, and not to be led around by outside pressures. It follows that we bear
responsibility even for the occasions on which we renounce our own responsibility, that we
can be regarded as having in some sense freely taken on even conditions by which we are
mentally enslaved. We are wrong to do this, of course, but it is nevertheless something we
do, and not something that just happens to us. As applied to our failure to think for
ourselves, the idea is that we ourselves attribute the aura of authority to others that enables
them to shape our beliefs. Kant says in a later text that the public surreptitiously
attributes a magic power to experts in medicine, law, and theology, regarding them as
miracle-workers who will help them get what they want (SF AA 49-50). So we are the
true source of the authority that others wield over us. If we but question that authority, it
will disappear: we will see that there is nothing magical about experts, and that we have
reason to rely on their authority only insofar as it is based on grounds we can accept. We
will realize that we can and should see authority only in those to whom we are freely
willing to grant it, that we never have reason to accept their word blindly.9
4. The third major point in the essay is a political one. Kant tells us that it is difficult
for an individual to pull himself out of immaturity on his own it is all too comfortable to
recite statutes and formulas instead of thinking for ourselves but that an entire society
Kants essay, throughout, is about pushing off responsibility for decisions about how to guide my own life
and the warning not to rely unthinkingly on the doctor has to be understood in that context. It is not that I
should think that I know as much as the doctor, but that I have to take responsibility for the way the doctors
advice affects my own life, for the actions I take on the basis of what he or she says. This is not a matter
simply of knowledge but of values: the value I place on having certain pleasures at the cost of shortening my
life, for instance, or, by contrast, on extending my life at the cost of financial and emotional burdens I place
on others, or of my own dignity or mental health. It is a shirking of responsibility, a mark of immaturity, to
blame my doctor for these uses of the information she offers me.
9
It is also a source for some important later ideas. Marx will try to show us how oppressed classes are
themselves the source of the power that the ideology of the ruling class has over them. Nietzsche will say
that our belief in God, and in traditional forms of morality (including Kantian morality) is a projection of our
own fears and hatreds, and that these beliefs will fall away as soon as we have the courage to get rid of our
childish feelings about them. Freud will locate the source of what he calls the illusion of religion in a
projection of our relationship to our fathers. For all of these figures, and their many followers, enlightenment
will involve something more than Kants mere willingness to question radical social change, for Marx;
radical psychological change, for Freud and Nietzsche but the core idea that we have enslaved ourselves,
and can consequently redeem ourselves from our own slavery, remains the same.
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can move towards enlightenment if only it allows freedom of expression. 10 Then the
freedom of thought shown by some may inspire others to throw... off the yoke of
immaturity.
And now, as Kant clarifies what he means by freedom of expression, he introduces
what is probably the best-known element of the essay: a distinction between the private and
the public use of reason. Everywhere we hear Dont argue!, he says. Officers in the
military tell their soldiers not to argue with their orders; tax collectors say, Dont argue;
just pay! Kant thinks that some sort of argument should be permissible in all these realms:
even soldiers in the army should be allowed to raise doubts about the orders they receive.
But they need not be permitted to raise those doubts when and where they receive these
orders. We need to obey superiors in various spheres, even if we should also be allowed to
dispute their orders in the public realm. The realm of argument, of free debate, must be
separated from the realm of obedience. Making use of a slightly odd understanding of the
words private and public, Kant says that in ones private capacity ones role in a
specific job or other limited aspect of society one may not always have a right to speak
freely, but that one should always be allowed to do this when addressing the public: when
writing or speaking as a scholar. Those who have an official role are required to carry out
the duties assigned to them in that role, Kant thinks, but he also calls for a realm of free
public discussion in which everyone can criticize the duties assigned to them.
There is a great deal more to be said about this version of the public/private
distinction, but before we get there, I want to add points 4 and 5 to the summary I have been
giving of Kants essay. The fourth point is that no church may fix its doctrines forever,
binding future generations to accept without question the views it proclaims at one
particular time. One age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire to place the succeeding age
in a situation in which it becomes impossible to broaden its knowledge. Even the
unanimous consent of a churchs members to such an arrangement would not make it
legitimate: [T]o renounce [enlightenment, says Kant to renounce the free questioning
of dogmas is to wound and trample underfoot the holy rights of humanity. Again we
see that enlightenment is a moral act, for Kant even a moral obligation. We also see that
voluntary groups as well as the government can offend against this obligation, and that it
should not be overridden even by communal consensus. It is, rather, a condition for any
acceptable social contract, a condition without which no society can be seen as reflecting its
members choices.
Which brings us to the fifth and final main thesis of the essay: the priority of
intellectual over civic freedom. Governments should never forbid the free discussion of
politics, says Kant. Such discussions are helpful to the government itself, as well as a
condition for policies to be legitimate. Kant indicates that nothing more than public
discussion is necessary, in the long run, to effect political change. Absolute rulers, he
thinks, will eventually reform everything in a constitution that needs reforming even
10
Whether freedom of expression was necessary for enlightenment was a recurring topic in the German
literature on this subject. See the contributions of Mhsen, Klein, Bahrdt, Moser and Fichte, in Schmidt
(ed.), What is Enlightenment?
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their own absolute powers in the face of public criticism. Indeed, Kant suggests that it
may be helpful to intellectual freedom if civic freedom is restrained for a while. Then ideas
can be played out without leading to rash political changes, and the people can come to
mental maturity before they rule themselves.
I think there is a nugget of truth to Kants separation of public discussion from
practical politics, but on the whole I dont want to defend Kants political views here. What
I do want to defend is 1) the idea that every human being everywhere has a duty to think for
him or herself and not merely accept doctrines on authority, and 2) Kants intriguing,
complex picture of how this individual duty is interwoven with a realm of public debate.
These theses do not constitute all that people have meant by enlightenment, but they are
central aspects of it, and aspects that have been central to the opposition that the term has
aroused, in conservative circles and non-Western cultures. I am myself sympathetic to the
religious and cultural groups who feel threatened by Western secularism. But I think the
enlightenment Kant defined and urged in his famous essay is something more minimal than
that. Kantian enlightenment, I want to say, is something we all can and should accept
even if some of us continue to resist what else and what more marches under the banner of
secularism and modernity.
5. Half the battle in defending something is explaining clearly what it means. Lets
begin by trying to make clearer sense of the distinction Kant draws between the private and
the public realms. That distinction is less puzzling if we look at the way Kant uses the word
private in other contexts. Private derives from a Latin word meaning set apart,
lacking, or deprived: the private person was deprived of public office. Kant takes the
term out of this political context and uses it to describe individuals insofar as they are
deprived of their common humanity insofar as they are limited to some specific aspect
of themselves, which links them to just one community among others, rather than to
humanity at large. Thus he distinguishes in his Logic between an absolute or universal and
a private horizon of thought, identifying the latter with what we think as particular and
conditioned beings and the former with what we think as, simply, human beings. The
determination of the private horizon, he tells us, depends on various empirical conditions
and special considerations, e.g., age, sex, position, way of life and the like (46) features
of what today we might call our identity, which can limit our thought or guide it towards
limited aims.11 From the absolute or universal horizon, by contrast the public horizon
we are concerned with the question, What can the human being, as a human being, ...
know? (41). And this question is not limited by any aim. It is the response of a shallow
mind, says Kant, to ask of this kind of knowledge, What is that good for? (47).
Elsewhere, in his lectures on Anthropology (AA 07: 219), Kant contrasts a private sense
(sensus privatus) with a communal sense (sensus communis). We have a sense for ideas
peculiar to ourselves as well as a sense for ideas that are common to all, he says, and we
11
Onora ONeill also stresses the connection between private and deprived, for Kant, but understands a
bit differently than I do: ONeill, Constructions of Reason, pp. 17, 50.
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correct the former by the latter; it is indeed insanity to rely on our private sense when it is
contradicted by the communal one. The person who does that is the person who sees things
in broad daylight that people next to him do not see, or hears voices that no-one else hears
( 53; AA 07: 219). Relating our understanding to the understanding of others is a
subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments, and we are on our
way to madness if we merely isolate ourselves within our own experiences. Moreover,
our private sense or understanding gets better the more we are able to test it against the
judgments of others. For that reason, censoring books is not merely bad politics, but a
serious obstacle to the growth of knowledge: In this way we are deprived of ... the greatest
and most useful means of correcting our own thoughts.
If we plug all this back into the enlightenment essay, we see that the public realm is
not a political realm for Kant, but a realm in which all our specific, historically located
projects and identities including our political projects and identities are suspended
and we are therefore able to think generally about them. And he wants to suggest that it is
important even for our private identities themselves our identities as lawyers or doctors,
or representatives of a specific religious group that we have a public realm in which we
can suspend those identities and scrutinize them: in which we can check the judgments we
make in our private capacities against the touchstone of a more broadly human kind of
judgment, a sensus communis. In the public realm, Kant tells us, we write for a society of
world citizens, for human beings in general. As scholars, as people interested in
knowledge for its own sake, we are not bound by any specific role or limited community:
and we all need to see ourselves this way some of the time.
Now Kant is not out to deny that scholarly writings, like other writings, always
respond to the questions and pre-suppositions of a specific historical context. Kants own
essay was written for a Berlin journal read by a limited set of scholars, and he filled the
piece with allusions to local concerns and events of which only that community was likely
to be aware. Kant could also not have expected, at this point in his life, that any literal
society of world citizens would read his work. His reputation had begun to grow in
Germany since the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason, three years earlier, but he
was still fairly obscure, and he could not have expected his writings to reach an
international audience. So by saying that the scholar writes for a society of world citizens,
Kant does not mean to deny that the scholar also writes for a more local community: of
Germans or Frenchmen, Christians or Jews, professors or clerics. The point is that anything
written as a piece of scholarship12 is implicitly opened up by that fact to the judgments of
all humanity, even if it is also directed to the judgments of a particular group. When
considering a piece in our capacity just as beings who pursue knowledge, we implicitly
regard our local norms of judgment as open to correction by the sensus communis of all
human beings. As pure inquirers members of the public, in Kants sense we
recognize that the standards of argument that our intellectual community employs, to be
standards of argument at all, must be capable of being corrected by more general tests of
12
Which here means anything written as a contribution to human knowledge at large, rather than to meet the
needs of a specific institution.
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epistemic adequacy. As Germans or Christians or lawyers, we may place limitations on
what our fellow group members may say. But we cannot limit what they, or we, will count
as true. To do that is to act like the person who sees things that no-one else sees to drift
towards a kind of group madness.
We can make ready sense of these points. As the contemporary Kantian, Christine
Korsgaard, has stressed, we need to be able to ask, from a place beyond each of our specific
identities, why we are committed to each one, what its limits are, and which of the demands
it makes on us are legitimate. If I occupy a specific civil post or office, to take one of
Kants examples, I need to be able to ask myself why I have been willing to accept that post
what purposes I think it serves and why I support those purposes and in what
circumstances I might feel obliged to renounce it, or to challenge the requirements that go
with it. And this is good for my specific identity itself. It is good for the civil service it
makes the civil service less prey to corruption if its employees think independently about
its rules and practices, if they can evaluate those rules and practices from an independent
perspective.
Similarly, if I adhere to a specific way of life, to take another of Kants examples
the way of life of a specific culture or religion, say I need to be able to ask myself,
from a position beyond that of the way of life, why I find it worthwhile or in line with my
moral duties. Again, it will be good for my culture or religion if its members can think out
of the box like this it is most likely to live up to its own ideals if its members can think
about what they are doing on their own. And the position making such assessment possible
is that of a human being in general, in which neither the questions we ask nor their answers
are limited by any private specific ends.
More broadly, Kant thinks that the public or general point of view can serve as a test
for the correctness of our beliefs even on ordinary empirical matters. It can of course
happen that everyones views on a certain subject are mistaken or corrupt, and we shouldnt
overlook the importance of individuals like Copernicus, who defy common sense correctly
on some issue. But for the most part Kant is surely right that the understanding of those
around us is a healthy corrective for our private judgments, and that one who refuses to
check in with the judgments of others, when he thinks he sees or hears something, is on the
way to madness.
6. How does all this go with Kants demand that we think for ourselves? In the first
place, as Ive already noted, by think for yourself, Kant cannot and does not mean that we
are to figure everything out on our own. The subject of testimony has become a
philosophical topic of great importance, in recent years; philosophers have become very
interested in the fact that much of what we know comes from other peoples testimony.
Thats the source of your beliefs about your name and birthplace, as well as the vast
majority of your other common-sense and scientific views. If belief based on testimony had
to be excluded from knowledge, we would know hardly anything: we would not even have
the premises from which we could readily find out anything. Consequently, we must regard
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the word of others as an independent source of knowledge, right up there with perception
and our various modes of reasoning.13
Now, partly because of what he says in What is Enlightenment?, Kant is often
represented as a philosopher who didnt grasp this point. But that turns out to be false. In a
brilliant essay called Kant on Testimony, Axel Gelfert has shown that Kant put testimony
on a level with perception as a source of knowledge. Drawing on texts from Kants logic
lectures that are rarely read even by Kant scholars, Gelfert brings to light passages like the
following: [W]e can just as well accept something on the testimony of others as on our
own experience. For there is just as much that is deceptive in our experience as in the
testimony of others. ... To be sure, the testimony that we accept from others is subject to just
as many hazards as our own experience is subject to errors. But we can just as well have
certainty through the testimony of others as through our own experience.(V-Lo/Weiner
AA 24.2 895-6 in Gelfert 2006, p. 633).14 Testimony is subject to hazards: the people
giving it to us may be lying or misinformed. But what we see and hear is also subject to
error. So in both cases, we need to use our cognitive faculties critically. Kant says that
[h]istorical belief is reasonable if it is critical, in this sense (Gelfert 2006, p. 641).
But Kant limits the appropriate epistemic place for testimony to empirical matters.
Truths of reason are a different matter. [S]omething [may] be considered historically true,
he says, purely on the strength of testimonies, as in the belief that there is a city called
Rome. By contrast, a purely rational belief can never be transformed into knowledge by
any natural data of reason and experience and hence cannot rightly be held on the basis of
testimony (WDO AA 8: 141).15 When it comes to truths of reason, Kant thinks, there is
something deficient in our understanding if we merely accept what others tell us (Gelfert
2006, pp. 627, 637, 641). The person who doesnt work out claims of logic or mathematics
for him or herself doesnt properly grasp them, and cant be said to know them in the way
that someone who has worked through the proofs does. If a cognition is constituted in
such a way that it can ... be made out by ones understanding, says Kant, then the
authority of others is no genuine ground of holding [it to be true] (Gelfert 2006, p. 641).
13
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This point takes a yet sharper form when it comes to moral issues. Not only are
moral claims matters of reason, for Kant, but they are the direct expression of our
autonomy. It follows that accepting moral claims merely on authority is not just a cognitive
failing but a moral one as well: we betray our autonomy when we do that.
This brings us back to What is Enlightenment? When Kant admonishes us to think
for ourselves, he has in mind moral issues in particular: the examples he gives are almost
entirely political or religious ones, and religion, for Kant, is at bottom a form of morality.16
That is why reliance on testimony, here, is inappropriate.
We may still think Kant has gone too far, however, and forgotten his own wise
comments on testimony in the logic lectures. One of his examples, remember, is that of
relying on doctors when it comes to diet, yet medicine is surely an empirical science to
which testimony is appropriate. He also urges soldiers to scrutinize military discipline, and
all of us to take a critical stance towards the system of taxation under which we live but
many of the questions that arise about taxation and military discipline are empirical ones.
And even as regards religion, surely there is a place for expertise, hence testimony, when it
comes to, say, the historical claims that various religions make; surely religion is not only a
moral matter.
Kants point, I believe, is that even as regards empirical facts, we must at some point
think hard about which authorities we can reasonably rely on and which we should suspect
or reject. As well see in a bit, Kant eventually translates think for yourself into a
principle to seek grounds we can uphold universally for each source of belief we accept.
That means we need to think through the sorts of reasons we have for relying on perception
or testimony, or for rejecting both in favor of a priori argument. It also means, as regards
testimony in particular, that we need to figure out the features that make one source of
testimony more reliable than another. Modern philosophy begins with Descartess doubts
about the church authorities from whom he learned astrophysics, and Descartes was right to
harbor such doubts. More generally, we all must choose among authorities, and assess
them, accordingly, for trustworthiness. Some authorities are more reliable than others, and
there are at least some general guidelines we can use to sift out the former from the latter.
But that means that we can think for ourselves about the grounds on which we accept
authoritative claims, and how those grounds favor some authorities over others. This is
already not to rely on authorities in virtue of an instinctive or socially-inculcated fear or awe
of them: it is already to rely on them in an enlightened way. And I think that that is all
Kant wants, when he calls on us to think for ourselves. We should not be cowed by the aura
of superiority with which certain people or institutions appear to us. We should realize
instead that we are responsible for the power that that aura has over us, and have the
courage to resist that power.17
16
Compare Anthropology 43 (Anth AA 7:200): [T]o require that a so-called layman should not use his
own reason in religious matters, particularly since religion is to be appreciated as moral is an unjust
demand because as to morals every man must account for all his doings.
17
We do have such good reason, of course: indeed, for me to rely on my own individual experience over that
of scientific experts when it comes to matters of, say, astrophysics or ancient history would be for me not to
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There is a further point that could be made. Kants main concern in his
enlightenment essay, as Ive noted, is with religious questions: with the views we hold
about what, overall, we should be doing with our lives. It is here, above all, that Kant
thinks each of us needs to think for him or herself, and here he is surely right. It is one
thing to rely on experts for factual information, but quite another to borrow ones
fundamental values from other people.18 There are at least three deep problems with relying
on testimony for our beliefs about our ultimate goals and orientation in life. One is that
there is very limited expertise to be had in such matters: the questions about them are
unlikely to be settled by empirical facts, or by the sorts of abstract reasoning in which some
people excel over others. A second is that the reasons by which we differentiate between
where we will and where we will not rely on authorities, and determine what sorts of
authorities to accept, are very likely to depend significantly on our ultimate values, on the
over-arching goals by which we orient our lives. A person with a religious orientation may
treat scientific authorities far more skeptically than a person of secular orientation would, at
least when they issue proclamations on religious subjects. And a person with one kind of
religious orientation may accept very different authorities from a person with a different
religious orientation. So authority cannot reasonably settle the question of which authorities
on value to accept, or whether one should rely on authorities, here, at all.
Finally, when it comes to truths on which the shape of my entire life may depend, I
am responsible for the answer I give myself in a way I am not for many of my other beliefs.
I can decide to delegate responsibility for determining the right answer to many factual
questions, and even some moral ones, after I determine how on the whole I will orient my
life. But I cant (responsibly) delegate responsibility until I first take responsibility for the
decisions by which I figure out what to delegate and to whom. I cant decide to trust
authorities, as opposed to trusting them blindly, until I first figure out what, for me, will
count as good reason to trust someone. At some point, as Wittgenstein might have said,
trusting must come to an end.
7. I hope it is beginning to become clear that think for yourself, for Kant, can go
along with a great deal of respect for the thought of other people. This is even clearer if we
look at Kants use of that phrase outside of the enlightenment essay. Kant describes think
for yourself as the motto of enlightenment in several places, but elsewhere it goes along
with two other maxims: Think in the position of everyone else and Think in accord with
have good (universalizable) grounds for these beliefs: not to think for myself, as Kant understands that idea.
Well see later that Kant regards think for yourself as a motto that should keep us from relying unduly on
our own private feelings and experience: think for yourself is meant as an antonym to, among other things,
rely on your personal feelings. Often, thinking for myself not only allows me but requires me to rely on the
thoughts of others.
18
In the words of Carl Friedrich Bahrdt, a contemporary of Kants, If ... I tried to verify every report of a
flotilla, ... I would act absurdly, wasting too much time and effort on things that are unimportant for me. But
when we are talking about truths that ... [affect my civil welfare or] decide the salvation of my soul, that is
quite a different case. There I must examine the truth with the greatest obstinacy if I do not wish to gamble
foolishly with my well-being. On the Freedom of the Press and its Limits ..., in Schmidt, What is
Enlightenment?, p. 103.
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yourself. Collectively, Kant calls these three the maxims of the common human
understanding (KU AA 05: 294-5). 19 He also has specific names for each maxim. The
first is the maxim of enlightenment, although he also calls it the maxim of a reason that
is never passive, the maxim of unprejudiced thought, the maxim that opposes the
heteronomy of reason, and the maxim that liberates us from superstition. He equates
enlightenment, that is, with active thought or autonomy, and contrasts it with prejudice and
superstition.
The other two he calls the maxim of broad-minded thought and the maxim of
consistency. The maxim of broad-minded thought, says Kant, requires us to put
[ourselves] into the standpoint of others (CJ 40). This echoes Adam Smith, who held
that moral judgment requires us to project ourselves into other peoples situations. For
Kant, such projection enables us to attain the universal or public horizon described
earlier, and to communicate with others.20
Finally, the third maxim dont contradict yourself which seems the most
obvious of the maxims, is in fact the hardest, Kant says, and can be achieved only if we
develop long habits of thinking in accordance with the first two.21 The idea seems to be that
a motley of prejudices can easily contain all sorts of contradictions, so if we simply mouth
what we hear from others we will contradict ourselves without knowing it, while a merely
private kind of thought isolated within our own experience will also lead us to think
now one thing, now another, depending on our moods and the different things we seem to
see or hear at different times. So only an active attempt to adjust the opinions we receive
from others to our own experience, and vice versa, will keep us from inconsistency.
We should now see more clearly how Kant means to bring private and public
thought together. I am to think for myself I am never to allow my reason to be merely
passive, always actively to apply my own conception of good argument to any claim
proposed to me but I am also always to aim this thinking towards standards I can share
with all other human beings. I am to take the modes of reasoning that I share with other
human beings as human beings, not as fellow Germans or Christians or lawyers to be
a touchstone for my own thought, even while never allowing what other people tell me to
become my own beliefs just on their say-so. This double-sided guide for thinking directs us
to respect general modes of reasoning we share with other people without necessarily
respecting any particular shared belief: the fine line between taking on a belief as a
prejudice, and failing to respect the common understanding of the world, can be found by
focusing on methods of justification rather than particular claims that purport to be justified
by those methods.
19
See also Anth AA 7:57, Introduction VII; Anth AA 7:200 43; and R AA 15: 715,1486 and R AA 15:
820-22, 1508.
20
To set [ourselves] apart from the subjective private conditions [Privatbedingungen] of the judgment
KU AA 5:295. On the importance of communication, see Anth AA 7: 200, 219, 43, 53.
21
The third maxim, namely that of the consistent way of thinking, is the most difficult to achieve, and can
only be achieved through the combination of the first two and after frequent observance of them has made
them automatic. (KU AA 5:295)
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Which is pretty much what Kant himself says, when, at the end of his essay on
orientation, he translates think for oneself into a concrete guide for thought:
Thinking for oneself means seeking the highest touchstone of truth in oneself (i.e.,
in ones own reason), and the maxim of always thinking for oneself is
enlightenment. Moreover, there is less to this maxim than those who locate
enlightenment in information imagine, since it is instead a negative principle in the
use of ones capacity for knowledge, and often a person rich in information is the
least enlightened in his use of it. Employing ones own reason means nothing
more than always asking oneself, about everything one is supposed to accept,
whether one finds it possible to make the ground on which one accepts it, or the
rule that follows from accepting it, into a universal principle for ones use of
reason. Everyone can apply this test for himself, and he will see superstition and
enthusiasm immediately disappear with this examination, even if he is far from
having the information with which to refute them on objective grounds. For he is
simply using the maxim of the self-preservation of reason (WhDO? AA 08: 1467n).
Its worth noting that Kant here explicitly rejects the notion of enlightenment as a mere
spread of information, as if it could be showered down on an unthinking populace by
brilliant and well-educated experts; he even says that one can be well-informed and still not
enlightened. Kantian enlightenment is egalitarian, focused on how we know rather than
what we know.22 But the main point of interest in this passage is that it gives us a sort of
cognitive equivalent to Kants famous basic moral rule, the Categorical Imperative: accept
only claims whose grounds you could use universally as a basis of belief.
What might this mean? Well, to begin with, it doesnt mean, accept only those
specific claims that everyone else might accept. Kants basic rule is not aimed at the
content of what we believe, but at its form: the grounds on which we believe it. We are
supposed to ask whether the grounds on which we accept something as true are the sort of
grounds we would use for any other belief; this is the maxim of reasons self-preservation
presumably because it fends off contradiction, the greatest threat to reasoning. In practice,
what Kant seems to have in mind are two sorts of cases: first, cases in which you are
inclined to believe something just because some strong emotion inclines you to believe it, or
on the basis of a set of sensations a dream or mystical vision, perhaps that no-one else
shares. And second, cases in which you are inclined to believe something because you have
heard it from a religious teacher or read it in a supposedly sacred text. These are what Kant,
earlier in the orientation essay, calls enthusiasm and superstition. Enlightenment views
of religion were resisted on the one hand by people committed to a personal, mystical faith,
in which direct experience of God rather than reason is supposed to let one know what God
wants, and on the other hand by people committed to a traditional religion, in which sacred
texts and creeds rather than reason were supposed to represent the will of God. Kant finds
22
The charge of elitism often brought against Kants notion of enlightenment seems to me misplaced: see
above, note 9.
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both these sorts of religious commitment a threat to reason, and therefore to true freedom,
and the paragraph to which the note above is appended appeals to all friends of the human
race and what is holiest to it for Kant, of course, freedom is what is holiest to human
beings to accept what appears worthy of belief after careful and sincere examination of
facts or rational grounds, rather than rejecting reason as the test of truth.23 Given this
context, it seems clear that Kant expects his cognitive universalization test to rule out claims
to knowledge that depend either on unshareable personal experience or on authoritative
texts. We will recognize that we could not make such grounds of belief into a universal
principle for [our] use of reason. I couldnt generally get around the world by accepting
my private experiences as true even when everyone around me thinks I am wrong. That
way lies seeing lamps in broad daylight that nobody else sees, and hearing voices that
nobody else hears. Nor could I get around the world in general by accepting without
question everything I read or hear from others: that way lies buying the Brooklyn bridge
from friendly strangers.24 So both the maxim for grounding a belief that runs, This is the
way things look to me; hence it must be correct and the maxim for grounding belief that
runs, This is what an impressive person said to me; hence it must be correct cannot be
universalized.
Now it is not clear from all this whether Kant believes we will necessarily give up on
the content of a religious claim that we had hitherto held on enthusiastic or superstitious
grounds, once we apply his cognitive universalization test. Kant says a person can apply
the test who is far from having the information to refute superstition and enthusiasm
objectively, but this leaves open whether such a person, after applying the test, will reject
everything that a superstitious or enthusiastic religion claims as false, or merely cease to
believe in that religion superstitiously or enthusiastically. Suppose I am a lapsed or halfhearted Lutheran and you, a fervent Lutheran who thinks you have experienced Gods
presence, try to bolster my faith by appealing to your mystical experiences or inducing
experiences of that sort in me. I respond, much to your dismay, by applying Kants
cognitive universalization test even to rhapsodies I myself experience. Now what
happens? Do I give up on Lutheranism, or do I simply refuse to come to the faith on an
enthusiastic basis? I think the casual quality of Kants treatment of this issue, and the
assumption that we will see his test as something obvious, indicates strongly that he did not
regard it as a means of refuting traditional religious faiths, just of dismissing a certain way
of holding them. I think it is clear, that is, that in the scenario just sketched, I could remain
23
The context here is a debate over the nature of freedom: Kant is arguing against those who think freedom
requires a willingness to suspend reason itself that we need freedom, among other things, from reason
itself, and can find that in the fancies of a poetic or religious genius.
24
These quick pragmatic arguments are of course not all that Kant would say in defense of the claim that
private experience and authority cant be universalized as grounds for belief. The first Critique shows,
rather, that we cannot so much as distinguish between the subjective and the objective unless we bring our
private sensations in line with rules for organizing experience that others can share as well. There is also a
social analogue to this claim: we cannot, as a society, regard propositions as true simply because they are
upheld by people invested with authority without losing all grip on the distinction between what we hold true
and what really is true.
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a Lutheran, even become a more believing one, and still be quite enlightened, for Kant: as
long as I did not rest my religious beliefs on enthusiastic or superstitious grounds. Perhaps
I have other grounds for my belief rational ones that I can easily universalize. Perhaps I
even believe that private experience of some sort has a legitimate role to play in the
religious life: but my grounds for that belief, for my very view of private experience, are
ones I regard as shareable with others, and try in fact to share with others, in order to be
corrected if I am mistaken or confused. In that case, I would still count as enlightened for
Kant.
These points get at the core of what Kant means by think for yourself. Thinking
for yourself is not for Kant the adoption of any specific mode of argument it does not, in
particular, require one to adopt Kants own critical theory. It is just a refusal to accept any
mode of argument, in one case, that one would reject elsewhere. The enlightenment Kant
describes in his journal pieces of 1784 and 1786 is a broad and a thin one an attitude
towards knowledge that practically anyone could accept and not, like his full critical
theory, a method thick enough to rule out many specific beliefs. 25 The rule of Kantian
enlightenment is that one must always pull ones private thoughts toward a publicallyshareable touchstone, not that one has to have any particular set of such thoughts or endorse
any particular public standard.
8. To sum up. Kants notion of enlightenment has two central components. On the
one hand, it requires of each of us that we seek reasons for what we believe that we can
expect everyone else to share that we never accept beliefs blindly, or on a basis, like our
private sensations, which we could not regard generally as a reason for believing. On the
other hand, it requires of the society in which we live that it permit, and to the extent
necessary foster, a public realm of debate to which people can bring anything they are
inclined to believe for examination. We each have a duty to our societies and our societies
have a duty to each of us. We must aim to be publically reasonable regardless of what we
privately feel; our society must allow us to say what we want, regardless of whether it is
based on public reason. And a public realm structured by these reciprocal duties, Kant
thinks, will eventually be free of fanaticism and dogmatism. If society keeps its part of the
bargain, no powerful institution or elite will be able to block good new ideas from coming
forward, or preserve bad old ones, and if each of us keeps our part of the bargain, mass
hysteria will be unable to squelch new ideas, and the popular hold of bad ones will wither
away. Taken together, the two sides of this vision of enlightenment should ensure that the
public realm remains both lively and thoughtful.
This vision of enlightenment the two complementary sets of responsibilities, on
each of us to our societies and on our societies to us is something that can I think be
25
Many other commentators, including Michel Foucault, draw a distinction between enlightenment and
critique in Kants writings: see, for instance, Foucault, What is Critique?.
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defended as a good for all human beings in all cultures. It is a minimal conception of
enlightenment, one that doesnt require us to accept Kants critical system, or purely moral
reading of religion, or rationalistic understanding of morality. There are more maximal
notions of enlightenment, to which Kant himself was tempted in some moods, and on which
later figures insisted notions on which nobody can count as enlightened unless they give
up traditional religion, for instance, or rise beyond merely conventional morality, or live in
a radically egalitarian society. But these ideas are far more problematic than the minimal
notion of enlightenment to be found in Kants journal pieces of 1784 and 1786. Kant was
quite right, I think, to present enlightenment, there, as something that people could
endorse despite deep differences over the overall human good. The freedom that comes of
thinking for oneself in Kants sense simply insures that all our views, including the ones on
which we most profoundly differ, are accepted freely, and kept open to further discussion.
Any community with a view of the human good can gain by endorsing such freedom, and
will flourish only in a world where that freedom is secured. Far from offending against
them, Kantian enlightenment is the precondition for a healthy proliferation of cultures,
political movements, and religious faiths.
Bibliography
Addison, J. (1837), The Works of Joseph Addison, Vol. I, Harper & Brothers, London.
Berkeley, B. (1803), Alciphron, Increase Cooke & Co, New Haven.
Beiser, F.C. (1992), Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism, Harvard Univ. Press,
Cambridge.
Coady, C.A.J. (1995), Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford.
Hume, D. (1975), Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 3rd ed., in PH Nidditch
(ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
(1983), History of England vol.I, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis.
Foucault, M. (1996), What is Critique?, in Schmidt (ed.), What is
Enlightenment?Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, University
of California Press, Berkeley.
Gelfert, (2006), Kant on Testimony, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 no.
4.
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Schmidt, J. (1996), Introduction, inWhat is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers
and Twentieth-Century Questions, University of California Press, Berkeley.
(2003), Inventing the Enlightenment: Anti-Jacobins, Hegelians, and the Oxford
English Dictionary, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 64, no. 3.
(1910), Frederick William II, Encyclopedia Britannica vol.XI, 11th ed., Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
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CLAUDE PICHE*
Abstract
It is puzzling to notice that in his 1784 essay on Enlightenment, Kant addresses every human being
with his watchword Have the courage to use your own understanding! , while at the same time
he seems to restrict the access to the public discussion of matters of common interest to the learned
persons (Gelehrte). This begs the question: Is the participation in the public debate part and parcel
of Kants conception of Aufklrung? A positive answer to this question is given by Katerina
Deligiorgi in her Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment. A critical assessment of this book will
lead us however to consider that Kant has a differentiated approach to enlightenment depending on
whether someone is educated or uneducated. Following Rousseau, Kant has come to recognize as a
matter of fact this inequality toward the products of culture. Now the two-level conception of
enlightenment entailed by this inequality becomes explicit in the 1790s, especially in the very last
work Kant has published: The Conflict of the Faculties (1798).
Key words
Kant; Enlightenment; Culture; Scholars; Common Understanding
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Claude Pich
Resumen
Es sorprendente advertir que en su ensayo de 1784 sobre la Ilustracin, Kant se dirige a todo ser
humano con la consigna Ten el coraje de usar tu propio entendimiento!, mientras que al mismo
tiempo parece restringir el acceso a la discusin pblica de cuestiones de inters comn a los
doctos (Gelehrte). Esto propicia la pregunta siguiente: La participacin en el espacio pblico
forma parte de la concepcin kantiana de la Aufklrung? Una respuesta positiva a esta pregunta es
ofrecida por Katerina Deligiorgi en su Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment. Un comentario
crtico de este libro nos conducir, sin embargo, a considerar que Kant muestra un acercamiento
diferenciado a la Ilustracin dependiendo de si la persona en cuestin cuenta con educacin o no.
Siguiendo a Rousseau, Kant llega a reconocer como un hecho esta desigualdad en relacin con los
productos de la cultura. La concepcin en dos niveles de la Ilustracin que comporta esta
desigualdad se vuelve explcita en los aos 90, especialmente en la ltima obra publicada por Kant,
El conflicto de las Facultades (1798).
Palabras clave
Kant; Ilustracin; cultura; doctos; entendimiento comn
In her fascinating book Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment, Katerina Deligiorgi
seeks to demonstrate the intrinsic interest and continuing relevance of Kants concept of
enlightenment. As was to be expected, she begins her investigation with the famous essay
of 1784 An Answer to the Question : What is Enlightenment? and subsequently draws from
many other sources from across the Kantian corpus in order to provide a full picture and a
cohesive account (Deligiorgi 2005,p. 1) of Kants appropriation of this well-known
theme. We all remember the definition Kant gives of Enlightenment, in a wording that has
almost become a commonplace: Enlightenment is mankinds exit from its self-incurred
immaturity. And the path to follow in order to leave this condition of immaturity is
indicated in the watchword: Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own
understanding!1
One of the most important aspects to stress in this motto is, according to Deligiorgi,
the fact that it excludes no one. It makes no restrictions. In effect, everyone is invited to
heed the call to think for oneself, to reject while thinking any form of tutelage. This leads
however Deligiorgi to claim that Kantian enlightenment must be conceived as essentially
egalitarian (p. 76) in the sense that everyone is equally invited to take part in the public
discussion. To this statement we might reply that enlightenment certainly calls upon
everyone, upon every human as a rational being, but does this mean that everyone is
involved in the process at the same level? I would like to argue that Deligiorgis
egalitarian approach is sound, but that in order to be maintained it needs to be qualified. In
* Professor at the Department of Philosophy of the Universit de Montral. E-mail contact:
claude.piche@umontreal.ca .
1
Kant, Beantwortung der Frage : Was ist Aufklrung ?, 8:35 ; trans. J. Schmidt, p. 58.
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fact, the critical examination of her approach will lead us to realize that Kant has a
differentiated concept of enlightenment. In order to address the questions left open by her
exposition, the following thesis will be defended: for Kant, the real target of the
enlightenment is culture. The word culture is understood here in the sense that J.-J.
Rousseau gave it in his first Discourse (1750), namely as the sciences and the arts. Once
we recall the decisive lessons that Kant learned from the citizen of Geneva, we will be in a
better position, leaving Deligiorgi aside, to assess the precise tasks awaiting the
enlightened person, tasks which are specified in much more detail in Kants works of the
1790s.
In what follows, we will first examine some aspects of Deligiorgis interpretation
pertaining to the egalitarian character of Kantian enlightenment. In addition to What is
Enlightenment? we will focus on two other sources also analysed by her: What does it
mean to orient oneself in thinking ? (1786) and section 40 of the Critique of the Power of
Judgment (1790). Both are considered standard sources by commentators,2since each one
contains an explicit definition and concise explanation of enlightenment. Secondly, we
will measure the impact on Kant of Rousseaus severe criticism of the culture of his time in
his two Discourses, the first on the progress of the sciences and the arts and the second on
inequality. This influence led Kant to undertake an enlightenment of the enlightenment,3
so to speak, forcing him to reconsider the role of knowledge in the moral progress of
humankind and to present a twofold conception of enlightenment that took into
consideration both the educated as well as the uneducated. Thirdly, with the help of the
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793) and especially the Conflict of the
Faculties (1798), we will find concrete examples of the manner in which the educated and
the uneducated, in their own specific ways, have to behave towards the products of culture.
In the final analysis, we will see that culture is the real issue of enlightenment for Kant, as
it represents both the problem as well as part of the solution.
Let us mention for instance Allison 2012 (228-235), and Ferrari 2001 (252).
I borrow the expression Aufklrung de lAufklrung from my colleague Luc Langlois 2009 (56).
4
J. G. Hamann, Letter to C. J. Kraus, 18 December 1784, in Hamann, Briefwechsel, vol. 5. A. Henkel (ed.)
(Frankfurt-am-Main: Insel, 1965), pp. 289-292. Quoted in Deligiorgi 2005, p. 93.
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which she left aside but which I deem important. I will single them out, since they call for
the further developments that are to be found in the writings of the 1790s to which we will
turn in the last part of this presentation.
Deligiorgi stresses two main features of the Kantian conception of Enlightenment:
the use of ones own reason and the use of this reason in public. Both aspects are brought
together in the formula that describes the gist of her reconstruction: Enlightenment places
people in a position in which [they] are free to make public use of their reason (p. 71).
Deligiorgi gives importance especially to the second aspect of the definition, i.e., that
enlightenment involves access to public discussion. To be sure, the individual must always
think for herself, but she is also invited to think with others and to submit her opinion to a
public forum. Enlightenment entails a constant process of criticizing and revising
opinions. This process can be characterized as agonistic and dynamic (p. 8). On
Deligiorgis account, two formal requirements are set at the basis of this public discussion:
inclusion and publicity. As we have seen, enlightenment is inclusive in the sense that
everyone is enjoined to think for oneself and is therefore, according to Deligiorgi, entitled
on that very basis to have access to the public forum. This is a very important point in her
reconstruction: the public sphere is in principle accessible to the common mass of
people.(p. 56) Enlightenment involves a communicative dimension that makes it possible
to test the universalizability of the arguments that have been aired. This public aspect of
the process of enlightenment is most explicit in What is Enlightenment? but, as we will
soon see, it is not without certain difficulties. Let us start with the two other sources, i.e.,
the Orientation essay and the Critique of the Power of Judgment. In these texts, the
reference to the public sphere may not be as explicit as Deligiorgi might wish, but she
manages anyhow to locate it in order to maintain the coherence of her reconstruction.
Enlightenment is treated in the last footnote of the Orientation essay. This note is
often quoted because it contains the passage in which Kant contends contrary to a
widespread opinion at the time that enlightenment does not consist in the possession of a
great amount of information (Kenntnisse), nor in the acquisition of knowledge. 5
Deligiorgi takes this denial of the contemporary conception as a confirmation of the
egalitarian character of enlightenment. And she is right. One does not need to know much
to be enlightened. The motto of the enlightenment in the footnote simply takes the form of
the maxim: always think for yourself, and this accords well with What is Enlightenment?
But here Kant gives a reason for his reservations about knowledge. He argues, albeit
elliptically, that the people who possess a great deal of knowledge are very often those who
use it in the least enlightened manner. He does not give any further details; consequently
we may leave this question open and come back to it at a later stage. At any rate,
Deligiorgi does not attend to it. On the other hand, with respect to the second feature of her
model, i.e., access to the public sphere, we must admit that the only evidence that she finds
in the footnote is a reference to the universality of the principle a person should adopt in
5
Deligiorgi 2005, p. 56, 64; Kant, Was heisst : Sich im Denken orientieren ?, 8:146 n.
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order to be enlightened. Kants maxim is the following: when one is about to accept
something as true, one has to ask oneself if the rule on the basis of which one makes this
admission could become a universal principle of the use of ones reason. As we can see,
the universality of the principle concerns only my whole personal attitude when it comes to
admitting something as true. It does not yet appeal to a universal consensus involving all
rational beings, as Deligiorgi would like to see it.6 The fact is that here Kant remains
monological, as Habermas would say. So in order to maintain her thesis, she is forced to
refer to the main text of the essay, which unequivocally states that it is impossible to think
exclusively on ones own. To think involves confronting our opinions with those of others,
it implies thinking with others. Deligiorgi thereby succeeds in making her point, albeit
indirectly.
Again, her case regarding the public dimension of enlightenment is no easier to
state when she turns to section 40 of the third Critique in which Kant enumerates the three
maxims of the common understanding. They read as follows (5:294): 1. To think for
oneself; 2.To think in the position of everyone else; and 3. Always to think in accord with
oneself. The first maxim, it goes without saying, explicitly pertains to enlightenment,
which is not the case for the two others. The maxim of enlightenment is about a reason
that is never passive (5:294). Now if Deligiorgi is to maintain her reconstruction of
Kants conception, she must find a reference to the second feature of her model, the public
sphere. Yet no trace of it is to be found in Kants short description of the first maxim.7 But
this does not seem to be a problem, since she moves to the second maxim, which urges one
to think while placing oneself in the position of someone else. This is a fair solution for
getting at something like a public discussion, even though the second maxim does not deal
with enlightenment per se. Indeed this strategy of linking the second maxim with the first
has been adopted lately by Otfried Hffe, and it seems to be a legitimate way to complete
the picture (Hffe 2012, p. 23). To think while adopting the position of someone else
implies that one takes a certain distance from ones private opinion, and it at least suggests
the readiness to submit oneself to the test of universalizability through a confrontation with
others. The full concept of the enlightenment is reached, on this interpretation, once we
read the first maxim together with the second. But what remains puzzling is that Kant does
not in fact include the public dimension in the first maxim the only one dealing explicitly
with enlightenment which leads us to suspect that this dimension does not belong to the
core of his conception of enlightenment.
6
Although he usually provides a careful and nuanced reading of Kants texts, Henry Allison defends here a
position very close to Deligiorgis. See his Kants Conception of Aufklrung, p. 233. In my opinion, the
text of the footnote does not support this reading. In order to maintain it one has to extrapolate from a
principle adopted for my personal use and transform it into the principle of every other rational being. Here
is what the footnote stipulates: To make use of ones own reason means no more than to ask oneself, for
whatever one is supposed to assume, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground of the
assumption, or also the rule following from the assumption, into a universal principle for the use of ones
reason. This test is one that everyone can apply for oneself []Was heisst :Sich im Denken orientieren ?,
8:146-147 n. (my italics); trans. A. Westra.
7
In the footnote related to the first maxim (5:294) there is in fact a furtive allusion to the public dimension
of Aufklrung, but it is a mere parenthesis, and Deligiorgi does not pay attention to it.
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Before leaving the Critique of the Power of Judgement and returning to What is
Enlightenment? I would like to focus on a point raised in the short description of the first
maxim. What I have in mind is the definition of superstition. Deligiorgi mentions the word
in passing but does not pay attention to it. She sees that the maxim of enlightenment is
characterized by Kant as the maxim of the absence of prejudice and that the greatest
prejudice of all is superstition. In Deligiorgis defense, it must be said that the definition
of superstition offered by Kant immediately afterwards is quite compressed and
convoluted: superstition means: to represent nature to oneself as not being submitted to
the rules that the understanding puts at its basis through its essential law.8 To be sure, this
is quite abstract, but the basic meaning of the formula might be reformulated in the
following way: never accept to interpret phenomena of nature as if they escaped the laws
of the understanding. In other words, I am not allowed to bypass the formal laws of nature
prescribed by my mind. Any and every natural phenomenon must comply with them. This
is an implicit prohibition against introducing the supernatural into nature. One must not
allow the presence of mystery in nature and if I may complement this observation with
the footnote of the essay on Orientation: I am not obliged to oppose an objectively
grounded refutation to someone who tries to make me accept something like a mysterious
phenomenon; I merely have to rely on my understanding, on my sound understanding. It is
the guarantor of my intellectual autonomy. And in this sense the maxim of enlightenment
is no more than a negative principle in the use of ones faculty of cognition.
At first sight, this description of enlightenment contained in section 40, i.e.,
resisting superstition, may seem quite standard. Yet it must be recalled that this
formulation of the maxim of enlightenment especially concerns the common
understanding, an attribute of ordinary people. Earlier in the same section, Kant claims that
this common human understanding, also designated as a sound understanding, is the least
that we can expect of someone who lays claim to the name of a human being.
Nevertheless, such an understanding, while not scientifically trained, is not deprived of
implicit knowledge of the main laws of nature since, for instance, the principle of causality
in its most basic form, according to the first Critique, is already present and operative in
the most common understanding.9 Therefore, the depiction of the task of enlightenment
Kant, Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 5:294, mytranslation. Guyers and Matthews translation is not accurate
here.
9
Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B3; see also thefollowingpassage on the Typik in theKritik der
praktischen Vernunft, 5:69-70, trans. M. J. Gregor and A. Wood: If the maxim of the action is not so
constituted that it can stand the test as to the form of a law of nature in general, then it is morally impossible.
This is how even the most common understanding judges; for the law of nature always lies at the basis of its
most ordinary judgments, even those of experience. Thus it has the law of nature always at hand, only that in
cases where causality from freedom is to be appraised it makes that law of nature merely the type of a law of
freedom, because without having at hand something which it could make an example in a case of experience,
it could not provide use in application for the law of a pure practical reason.
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contained in section 40 is not intended for the learned, but rather for the uneducated. The
description remains cryptic but, as we will see, it will be fleshed out in Kants later works.
What can we conclude from the two short passages of 1786 and 1790 on
Enlightenment? We have noticed that Deligiorgi was forced to refer to other parts of these
texts in order to maintain her interpretation, in particular the second feature of her model
(access to a public forum). Once again, could it be that this component does not belong to
the core of Kantian enlightenment? I am afraid that we will have to come to this
conclusion. But for now, let us consider What is Enlightenment? in which this feature is
prominent.
From the outset, the essay What is Enlightenment? emphasizes the inclusive
character of enlightenment. No one is left aside when it comes to autonomous thinking;
and the same goes, according to Deligiorgi, for access to public discussion. She makes her
point in the following way:
Kant defines the public use of reason as that use which anyone may make of [reason] as
a man of learning addressing the entire reading public (AA 08: 37, What is
Enlightenment? 55). It possesses two key features: it is public and it is inclusive.
Irrespective of rank or occupation, all are equally invited to participate. (Deligiorgi 2005,
p. 62)
It is interesting to notice that in the explanations she gives following this quote, Deligiorgi
does not pause on the persons of learning who are, according to Kant, the only ones who
seem allowed to take part. Hence the three examples of enlightened people mentioned in
the essay, namely the army officer, the tax inspector and the priest. If the three of them are
authorised, when they are not on duty, to play a part on the public stage in order to express
their thoughts on military command, tax legislation and religious dogmas, it is in virtue of
their status as scholars. Kant uses the word Gelehrter here in order to indicate that these
men have received an education (a higher education, in fact) and can therefore be
considered to be erudite persons, men of learning, or in a word, scholars. Tellingly, the
term Gelehrter occurs no less than seven times in this short essay.
Deligiorgi may thus have overlooked the reference to scholars in the quoted
passage, but she comes back to this problem in the following section of her chapter when
she raises the question of who takes part in the public discussion. On her account, the
requirement to be a learned person in order to participate in the public debate is, despite
first appearances, no real obstacle to the inclusive character of enlightenment:
Those who express their thoughts in public are invited to speak as men of learning or as
learned individuals who address the reading public. These qualifications appear to
restrict the public use of reason to a small circle of educated individuals and thus to revise
downward, so to speak, the real reach of the domain of application of the requirement of
inclusion. (Deligiorgi 2005, p. 71-72)
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To be frank, it seems to me that this restriction on the participation in Enlightenment does
not only appear to narrow the access to public discussion, but that it actually does just
that. If Kant indeed reserves the public forum for the scholars, then participation definitely
concerns a small circle of educated individuals. And the defense that Deligiorgi goes on
to provide just after this passage is not entirely convincing. She argues that we must
interpret this qualification as inclusive since nothing more is expected of the participants
than being educated. This minimal requirement would then contribute, according to her, to
overcoming the traditional barriers of birth, wealth, standing, or professional
specialisation (p. 72). This might be true; and if it were, it would show the modernity of
Kants approach to society. However, this requirement nonetheless excludes the masses.
Discussion in journals of matters of public interest is clearly reserved to the educated
classes. Kant seems to think that the citizens as scholars are the best suited to express their
thoughts, especially in their respective fields of competence.
At any rate, Deligiorgi maintains her position on inclusion by reading Kants essay
in ways that are sometimes questionable. Let me give two examples. First, she writes that
soldiers (p. 71; see also p. 97) could publicly voice their thoughts concerning the military
command. But the fact is that Kant does not speak of the ordinary soldier, but of an army
officer who has received an education. We know, for instance, that early in his career
Kant himself had occasion to teach Russian as well as Prussian officers. 10 Second,
Deligiorgi rightly notes that it is not the tax inspector who expresses his thoughts on tax
legislation, but the citizen, the overtaxed citizen, (p. 71) as she says. Again, a few
remarks are in order here. The overtaxed individual cannot be just any citizen since, as
Deligiorgi knows (p. 73), a citizen who pays taxes is likely to be what Kant calls in his
philosophy of right an active citizen, that is : a citizen with the right to vote. To be
entitled to this status, one has to be ones own master a criterion that excludes for
instance the children, the housewives and the private tutors, who are all dependent on
someone else for their subsistence and, on that account, are considered passive citizens.
Furthermore, the citizen who complains about the level of taxation cannot be any
independent citizen: the requirement of being a scholar (8:37) applies here as well. So
even here, we remain within the higher classes of society, and it seems that Kant takes this
state of affairs for granted.
What is fruitful about Deligiorgis discussion of the three sources we have
examined along with her is that she puts her finger on issues which are crucial for Kant but
which are nevertheless not systematically developed by him. For instance, she is right to
complain that in What is Enlightenment? Kant only cursorily touches the question of
who can intervene on the public scene. Whence her praise worthy efforts to reconstruct a
10
Kuehn 2001, p. 114: He [Kant] not only taught many officers in his lectures, especially in mathematics,
but also gave them private instructions (or privatissima), which were, as he himself points out, very well
paid.. See also Gouliga 1985, p. 44, 65.Samuel Fleischacker, who is sympathetic to Deligiorgis egalitarian
approach, also trusts soldiers to scrutinize military discipline. See his otherwise excellent book What is
Enlightenment ?2013, p. 20.
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coherent argument. Yet in the end we are left with an important question: If access to
public discussion is reserved for a small circle of educated persons, to the people of
culture, does that mean that the person of mere common understanding is excluded from
enlightenment altogether? We have seen in section 40 that this is not the case, since the
maxim of enlightenment also concerns the person of common understanding. So we are
compelled to conclude that participation in public discussion is only one element of a
differentiated concept of enlightenment. In sum, we are left with one model of
enlightenment in the third Critique aimed at a common understanding prone to
superstition, and another model, promoted by Deligiorgi, centered on the requirement of
public discussion, but with limited accessibility.
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to attain any goal whatsoever good, bad, or morally neutral. It becomes evident that the
full vocation of humanity is defined only in the following section (84), in which
noumenal freedom and the specifically moral vocation of humankind are introduced. And
in this regard, the theoretical autonomy vindicated by enlightenment can be interpreted as a
kind of mediation between the two sections, between culture and morality.
It goes without saying that Kant was very receptive to Rousseaus first Discourse,
in which the progress of the sciences and the arts is associated with the growth of evils,
vices and ills of all kinds. In the following passage Rousseau establishes a link between his
two Discourses:
It follows from this exposition that inequality, being almost non-existent in the state of
nature, owes its strength and its growth to the development of our faculties and to the
progress of the human mind, becoming stable and legitimate with the establishment of
property and laws. (Rousseau 1755, p. 193)
It is in statements such as this one that the young Kant began to distance himself from the
value of science; until then, he had thought that the development of science was the sole
source of the highest dignity of humanity.11No wonder, then, that the Orientation essay
claims that real enlightenment does not have to do with the acquisition of knowledge.
Knowledge for its own sake belongs precisely to the Lumires legitimately fought by
Rousseau (1755, p.170). If Kant is to maintain a conception of enlightenment, it will have
to include are flexive stance toward science and culture. It will have to be an
enlightenment of the enlightenment. Cultural progress does not necessarily go hand in
hand with moral progress, as the seventh Proposition of the essay on Universal history
(1784) reminds us: We are cultivated in a high degree by art and science. [] But very
much is still lacking before we can be held to be already moralized. (8:26)Culture remains
the main concern here, and anyone transitioning from the state of bare common
understanding to culture is then exposed to the danger of using the products of civilisation
as a smokescreen to hide moral misconduct and to produce the illusion of virtue.12
This means that Kant was led to distinguish two strands in the process of
enlightenment: 1) an enlightenment for the learned designed to critically assess knowledge
and culture in general, and 2) an enlightenment for the underprivileged class, fighting
superstition. In the first case, we can think of What is Enlightenment? Where the priest,
the army officer and the taxpaying citizen adopt a critical stance toward church dogmas,
military orders, and fiscal legislation. Kant does not, however, give a clear view of the
orientation their critique must take. In the second case, there would be an enlightenment
for the lower class, for the common people. And in the latter case Kant would reiterate the
11
See the famous passage on Rousseau in the Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen ber das Gefhl des
Schnen und Erhabenen, 20:44.
12
Such a dialectic is likely to arise in an age of culture. See the following passage from the Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals (4:405, trans. A. Westra): So there develops unnoticed in common practical
reason as well, when it cultivates itself, a dialectic [],.
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Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 6:88 n.
See Kittsteiner 1995, pp. 22, 51, 55, 303-312. It is interesting to notice that in his investigation of the
Modern Times, Kittsteiner comes to establish a distinction between the Gelehrtenkultur and the Masse der
Bevlkerung, p. 17.
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and be an autonomous agent in each of these realms. That is to say, first, that if someone
wants to be pleasing to God, nothing more is expected from her than to scrupulously
perform all of her moral duties; second, if someone desires to be a decent member of civil
society, she simply has to abide by the law; and third, if someone wants to live a long and
healthy life, she must take personal responsibility for her health and show due moderation
in everything.
These preliminary considerations set the stage for a very interesting discussion of
the attitudes of the masses toward religion, law and medicine. Surprisingly, it is
superstition that comes to the fore here, although it is not the kind of superstition that
brings us back to the dark ages. On the contrary, Kant envisages another form of
superstition, turned this time not toward the occult powers present in nature but toward
culture, toward the sciences, and more precisely toward the specific disciplines of the
higher faculties. It must be remembered that Kant wrote the Conflict at the very end of the
eighteenth century, i.e., the century of the Encyclopdie whose goal was to diffuse
knowledge on a large scale in order to promote the extensive application of recent
scientific breakthroughs. Kant himself writes in the third Critique, just after having taken
notice of the unavoidable fact of social inequality, that the benefits of these advances
gradually spread to the lower classes again, the classes that provide the higher ones
with the leisure to develop the arts and sciences, i.e., the products of high culture (5:432).
To be sure, in Kants times, there were certainly some people still prone to interpret
thunder and lightning as an expression of the divine wrath. But, after the invention of the
lightning conductor by Benjamin Franklin in the middle of the century, for instance, people
were gradually led to consider that those phenomena might very well be natural after all.
The lightning conductor is in reality a fairly simple device which, together with other
experiments on electricity, proves that lightning is ultimately nothing more than a natural
phenomenon. As we can see, this is the classic theme of the disenchantment of the world:
there seems to be no more place within nature for the supernatural.
According to Kant, however, the supernatural and the magical that constitute the
essence of superstition are likely to take on new forms. There are other ways of shortcircuiting the laws of nature even within the phenomenal world, and this is precisely what
the common understanding does when it transfers the supernatural from the physical world
to the domain of culture, or more precisely, when it attributes magical virtues to religion,
law and medicine. This is the most important point in the Conflict of the Faculties for our
understanding of Kantian enlightenment. If, as we have seen, superstition used to allow the
common person to dodge her guilt and shirk her moral responsibility, the same pattern
might very well reoccur when this person comes into contact with the professionals
educated in the higher faculties, that is, with the priest, the lawyer and the doctor. There is
a great temptation to confer magical powers on them and to expect them to perform
miracles of sorts. In the eyes of the common person, these professionals very often appear,
as Kant writes, like Wundermnner, miracle-men, if I may use this term. Now that
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As we can see, the professionals to whom the people turn are asked to neutralize, or better,
to erase the consequences of their misconduct and to discharge them of their moral
responsibility of leading a virtuous life. But if the people are deaf to the summons of
philosophy, then the higher faculties on the other hand should be open to the remarks of
the philosopher, because otherwise they run the risk of encouraging superstition, the
greatest prejudice, as we know, that enlightenment must combat. Here the superstitious
character of the peoples demands could not be more explicit. Let us read Kants
comments:
But now the people are approaching these scholars as if they were soothsayers and
magicians, with knowledge of supernatural things; for if an unlearned person expects
something from a scholar, he readily forms exaggerated notions of him. But we can
naturally expect that if someone has the effrontery to give himself out as a such a miracleworker, the people will flock to him and contemptuously desert the philosophy faculty. But
the business people [Geschftsleute] of the three higher faculties will always be such
miracle-workers, unless the philosophy faculty is allowed to counteract them publicly not
in order to overthrow their teachings but only to deny the magic power that the public
superstitiously [aberglubisch] attributes to these teachings and the rites connected with
them as if, by passively surrendering themselves to such skilful guides, the people would
15
In the Religion, Kant describes this sorcery [Zauber] as an art of achieving a supernatural effect through
entirely natural means, 6:177. See also on superstition, Der Streit der Fakultten, 7:64, 65 n. For the
intelligible character of the human being, see Kritik der reinenVernunft, A 538/B 567.
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be excused from any activity of their own and led, in ease and comfort, to achieve the ends
they desire.16
Here superstition takes on a very definite shape, that nevertheless reminds us of the formal
definition that we read earlier in the third Critique. The phenomena in the sensible world
are all subject, without exception, to the laws of nature, and it is not permitted to attribute
them supernatural properties. The laws of nature are basically the laws of the
understanding common to all individuals, and hence we can appreciate why the maxim of
the enlightenment in the Orientation essay is characterized as the maxim of the selfpreservation (8:147n.) of reason. Invoking the miraculous is not permissible because one
thereby forfeits ones own reason. As we can see, the sound common understanding is
clearly concerned by the call to enlightenment in that it must resist overestimating and
overburdening the products of culture and their repositories.
But we must admit that the professionals, the business people as Kant calls them,
are also intimately concerned by enlightenment since they are themselves often at fault by
accepting to play the role the people urge them to play. There is indeed a strong
temptation on their side, too. Through their very functions they exercise a certain authority
over the people, and so they must be careful. If we turn for instance to Kants book on
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, we discover that there is room for what
Kant calls a true enlightenment in religious matters. It consists in considering things in
their proper order: what the priest has primarily to teach are the fundamentals of the
religion of reason, which simply amount to the fulfilment of all moral duties (as if they
were commands originating from God). And then there is the part that Kant calls church
belief. It consists of statutes and observances which were revealed in ancient times and
have been transmitted to further generations through historical documents. Now what
matters here is that the simple precepts of the religion of reason must maintain precedence
over the statutes and the rituals, because the authentic manner to be pleasing to God lies
exclusively in the first part of the teachings, the purely rational part to which everyone has
access. However, if the priest gives precedence to the second part as the means for
salvation, he becomes the proponent of a false cult (Afterdienst).17 This reversal of the
16
Kant, Der Streit der Fakultten, 7:30-31. On this topic, see Norbert Hinske 1980, p. 78-80.
Kant, Religion, 6:153, 165, 170. J. B. Schneewind (2006, p. 345-347) explains Kants conception of
enlightenment with the help of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, which is in itself
perfectly legitimate. He interprets the reversal of the order between the moral effort and the ritualized service
leading to fetishism in terms of radical evil, according to which the egoistic motives are taking precedence
over the moral ones. Now he transposes to religion the perversitas (7:30) proper to radical evil in such a
strict manner that he considers that the religious practices (observances and rituals) that gain precedence over
the ethical conduct have to be in themselves immoral, if the parallel is to be maintained. And this would also
apply to three of the examples of What is Enlightenment?: Perhaps our pastor directs us to prosecute
members of a group he thinks ungodly and despicable ; perhaps our commanding officer tells us to kill the
wives and daughters of the enemy as well as their soldiers ; perhaps our physician urges us to bribe the
pharmacist to give us priority for some important medicine in very short supply Enlightened agents can,
however, accept church ceremonies or political directives or medical advice as long as these do not require
overruling morality. The agent is free to decide by using prudential reason whether to accept or reject
17
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order of priority is very tempting for the clergyman because in this way he gains a form of
control and domination 18 over his parishioners, a dominion that may easily become
despotic. 19 In principle, the priest is a servant [Diener], (6:152-153) but this is an
empty word if he claims to be the exclusive depositary of rites and statutes that lead to
salvation. Kant notes for instance that Protestantism as a historical religion is based on an
impressive amount of erudition (Gelehrsamkeit) in order to maintain access to the
historical sources of revelation, i.e., extensive knowledge of ancient languages, of
geography and history. So this means that historical religions are viewed as sophisticated
objects of positive knowledge, of erudition in a word: of culture. And because this
specialized knowledge is accessible only to the learned priests, the risk of responding to
the superstitious demands of the people, fascinated by this esoteric knowledge, by this
erudition to which they do not have access, is all the greater.
We are now in a position to re-examine some aspects of the texts of the critical
decade that appeared somewhat elliptical in the first part of this paper. By considering
what we have just learned from the temptation facing the clergyman, it becomes easier to
understand why Kant could argue in What is Enlightenment? that the guardians are always
prone to accept the authority conferred on them by the people. The erudition possessed by
the priest, a knowledge that ought to be put in the service of the faithful for the
accomplishment of their moral duties, is instead turned into an instrument of domination,
provided that the learned person consents to play this role. This is surely what Kant meant
in the Orientation essay when he argued that enlightenment does not have to do with the
acquisition of information and that the people who possess a great wealth of knowledge are
often the ones who make the least enlightened usage of it. In this regard, the person of
learning has to answer the call to sapere aude! as much as the uneducated person. The
latter was characterized in What is Enlightenment? by his laziness and cowardice. We can
now interpret this to mean that the sound human understanding should not abandon its
intellectual autonomy, nor its ethical responsibilities. Reason must never be passive, as
we have learned from the third Critique, in the sense that it must never sink into magical
thought. The simple laws of the understanding apply without exception everywhere in
nature. They are the safeguard against superstition whose specific form we came to
know and the basis of ones autonomy: a theoretical autonomy that is closely linked to
practical autonomy.20Finally, we can answer a very relevant question raised by Deligiorgi
concerning the refusal to listen to the advice of the doctor mentioned at the very beginning
directions from any authority, insofar as their directives concern the use of means that lie within the bounds
of morality. And he can decide simply to take the authoritys advice without trying to think for himself about
it any further than to see that it is morally permissible. According to Kant however, in religion church
ceremonies can be good in themselves if they come in the second place, and even when they gain precedence
over the exercise of virtue, they can remain per se morally perfectly neutral (see Religion, AA 06, 169, 172).
It is not because they overrule morality that they have to be rejected. The rituals and observances become
condemnable by the mere fact they are used as substitutes that replace the moral conduct by taking
precedence over virtue.
18
Kant, Religion, 6:165; Der Streit der Fakultten, 7:33.
19
Kant, Religion, 6:180; Der Streit der Fakultten, 7:28.
20
On this difficult question, see Kubsda 2014, p. 35, 155; and Zller 2009, p. 90.
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of What is Enlightenment? In this particular passage, the individual who is enjoined by
Kant to disregard the advice is not characterized as learned, but simply as someone who
has to resist the authority of the spiritual advisor, of the doctor and of the book. Here
an ordinary individual is faced with what we have characterized as persons or products of
culture. And these people and products of learning have an authority that one is warned to
approach with caution. In the case of the doctor, Kants demand certainly seems to
border on the foolhardy, as Deligiorgi concedes (p. 61). Why resist the advice of such a
learned person? But it must first be reminded that, for Kant, taking care of ones own
health is an ethical duty. The Metaphysics of Morals, under the heading Mans duty to
himself as an animal being, mentions only three prohibitions (committing suicide,
mutilating ones body and immoderately consuming food and alcohol), yet taken together,
these prohibitions conversely entail an implicit command to take responsibility for ones
own health.21 This is the sense in which we must interpret the example of the doctor in
What is Enlightenment? When it comes to choosing my diet or lifestyle, I should be my
own best judge as well as my own best doctor. Or at least so claims Kant in the Conflict of
the Faculties, in which he presents a philosophical, albeit idiosyncratic, approach to
health that mobilises the power of reason in order to become master of ones sensible
feelings with the help of a principle determined by oneself. 22 This proactive attitude
toward the care of his own health was already present in Kants correspondence with his
friend Markus Herz in the 1770s and 1780s.23
What should we conclude from all this about Katerina Deligiorgis account
according to which Kant is the proponent of an egalitarian conception of enlightenment?
On the one hand, we can easily subscribe to this reading to the extent that it pertains to the
core of Kants conception: Have the courage to think for yourself in all circumstances! It
is obvious that this call does not exclude any human being. Everyone is equally concerned.
On the other hand, through our critical assessment of the sources to which Deligiorgi
refers, we have been led to consider that the concept of enlightenment in Kant has two
branches, or two different ways of making use of ones understanding. This is incidentally
confirmed by the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, where we learn that both
the common person and the learned person need enlightenment (6:181), although in a
differentiated manner. In both cases, however, the central concern or target is, as I have
tried to demonstrate, culture. For the sound common understanding, the injunction means
to refrain from magical thinking. The individual of common understanding is urged to
decide once and for all to cease seeing in the products of culture physical means to exempt
21
Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, 6:421. See for the interpretation of prohibitions as implicit prescriptions:
Hffe 1993, p. 106.
22
Kant, Der Streit der Fakultten, 7:100-101; see also Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Section 54, 5:332 where the
soul is said to be the doctor of the body. For a critique of Kants idiosyncratic approach to medicine, see
Unna 2012.
23
See for example Kants letters to M. Herz of June 7, 1771, of the end of 1773, of August 20, 1777, of the
beginning of April 1778, of August 28, 1778 and of May 11, 1781, in Briefwechsel, 10:123, 143, 212-213,
231, 241, 270.
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herself from fulfilling her ethical duties. Physical means like religious rituals are no
substitutes because they cannot produce effects in the supersensible realm of morality and
freedom. To be sure, the decision to elevate oneself to intellectual autonomy can only be
taken by the individual. In fact Kant envisages this decision as a real personal
revolution.24 In this regard, Kant could definitely not agree with Hamann, who strongly
criticised the main thesis of What is Enlightenment? According to Hamann, it is not
permissible to accuse the masses of being responsible for their immaturity. 25 They are
literally held in a state of submission by an absolutist regime and they cannot be accused of
not breaking the chains in which the guardians hold them. Immaturity cannot be said to be
self-incurred; it is imposed from the outside. But Kant cannot agree. If enlightenment in
the end amounts to intellectual autonomy, one cannot emancipate an individual without her
participation or against her will. Enlightenment is precisely a matter of courage and
personal decision, and therefore it cannot be understood as a top-down process for Kant.
As for the learned, on the other hand, enlightenment means adopting a critical attitude
toward the products of culture and especially toward the sciences taught in the higher
faculties in order to prevent this knowledge from being fetishized by the people.
That being said, the following question comes to mind: why did Deligiorgi not
exploit the important passages of the Conflict of the Faculties concerning enlightenment?
To be sure, this is not an oversight on her part. Leaving this later work aside is a deliberate
and understandable choice. In fact, the developments of the Conflict do not fit well with
the image of enlightenment that she tries to extract from the texts of the critical decade,
according to which Aufklrung should entail a free and open access to public discussion for
everyone and without censorship. Her project of showing the present-day relevance of this
approach to enlightenment is certainly legitimate, especially in view of the new channels
that have recently opened up, if only for what Kant calls the world of readers
(Leserwelt). The public sphere has expanded to proportions that were totally unimaginable
for Kant. And in this regard Deligiorgi is right when she sees in Kants last published
work a narrowing down of the scope of public argument (p. 77). In 1798 Kant was in
fact led to revise26 his position of 1784 in that, from then on, he confers the status of men
of learning (Gelehrte) exclusively upon the university teachers, not anymore upon the
professionals who come out of their faculties. This means that the priests, lawyers and
doctors are no doubt learned persons, but they now deserve the title of mere
literates.27Because they are appointed by the government to apply a definite corpus of
religious dogmas, laws or medical prescriptions, they do not, in Kants view, enjoy the
freedom to adopt a reflexive critical stance vis--vis these doctrines a marked demotion,
so to speak, compared to the priest, the army officer, and the tax inspector in What is
Enlightenment? whom Kant did deem capable of stepping outside of their civic functions
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and making a public use of their reason. This change is perhaps related to the limited scope
of the Conflict of the Faculties, as Deligiorgi thinks, but it becomes clear that the public
discussion from then on takes place between the faculty of philosophy and the teachers of
the higher faculties, in order to incite the latter to continually question their scientific
knowledge for the benefit of truth and for Kant, that means for the benefit of the citizens
freedom.
While we are accustomed to understanding enlightenment as a struggle against
obscurantism, we have discovered that with Kant it is rather turned against the Lumires
themselves. This, Kant has retained from Rousseau. But he feels the need to go beyond
the two Discourses, in which culture is severely criticized against the background of the
state of nature. For Kant, culture is here to stay and is in reality a crucial condition for the
attainment of the moral vocation of the humanity. Yet he knows that culture is still at an
early stage, that is, in a phase involving its lot of hardships for individuals. In an essay
published the same year as the Orientation article, the Conjectural Beginning of Human
History, he even writes that culture has not yet really begun, even though he remains
confident that it will one day come to its full completion (8:116,121). Meanwhile
enlightenment has to play a role of supervision toward culture. Enlightenment must bring
about what Gerhard Krmling calls a critical concept of culture (Krmling 1985, p. 294;
see also 135,141, 163, 296). Or If I may allow myself to invert the title of Deligiorgis
book, rather than speaking of Kant and the culture of enlightenment, we should say
Kant and the enlightenment of culture.
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ffentlichen und gemeinschaftlichen Gebrauchs der Vernunft, in Kant und die
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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
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Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.33971
Abstract
In his answer to the question What is Enlightenment?, Kant argues that we must have the
courage to use our own reason and imputes failure to do so on laziness and cowardice. Why exactly
does the call for emancipation require resolve? This paper follows Foucault in defining
Enlightenment as a modern ethos that adopts the ephemeral as a way of being. Contrary to the
French philosopher, however, we argue that this permanent critique of oneself and of the world
creates a void that leaves us trembling before nothingness. If Enlightenment requires courage, then,
it is precisely to urge us to remain steadfast in the practice of freedom and to not shy away from the
dangers it imposes. Courage, in short, is resolve before the abyss of freedom. Too long have we
confined Kant to an ossified, rationalistic framework, thankfully impervious to human anguish for
some, regretfully incapable of it for others. If anything, this paper wants to uncover the deep,
existential tones of his conclusions on modernity, and it will do so through an examination of his
account of courage.
Key words
Kant; Enlightenment; Courage; Foucault; Baudelaire; Despair; Freedom; Modernity.
Resumen
En su respuesta a la pregunta Qu es la Ilustracin?, Kant argumenta que tenemos que tener
coraje para usar nuestra propia razn e imputa la incapacidad para ello a la pereza y cobarda. Por
qu exactamente la apelacin a la emancipacin requiere esta resolucin? Este artculo sigue la
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definicin de Foucault de la Ilustracin como un ethos moderno que adopta lo efmero como modo
de ser. Contrariamente al filsofo francs, sin embargo, argumentamos que esta crtica permanente
de uno mismo y del mundo crea un vaco que nos deja inermes ante la nada. Si la Ilustracin
requiere coraje, ello equivale a aconsejarnos ejercitar con entereza la libertad y no amilanarse ante
los peligros que esta impone. El coraje, dicho brevemente, resuelve ante el abismo de la libertad.
Hemos confinado durante demasiado tiempo a Kant a patrones osificados, racionalistas,
considerndolo afortunadamente impermeable a la angustia humana para algunos,
desgraciadamente incapaz de ello para otros. Este artculo pretende de manera principal
desencubrir los tonos profundos y existenciales de sus conclusiones sobre la Modernidad, de la
mano de un examen de su abordaje del coraje.
Palabras clave
Kant; Ilustracin; coraje; Foucault; Baudelaire; desesperacin; libertad; Modernidad
INTRODUCTION
As the duty of distancing ourselves from experience in order to formulate and abide
by a law that is by definition a priori and unconditionally binding, Kantian ethics is often
portrayed as obdurate and inflexible, if not altogether impracticable. It has all the makings
of a scene from Babettes Feast, where the austerity of life and the characters exertions to
repress their most basic desires is so absurd it appears comical to the viewer. In other
words, Kants morality is universal and rigorist to the extent that he seems to be asking us
to abstract not only from our inclinations, but from our humanity as well, almost as if he
articulated its formal conditions outside of the human condition.
Widespread, this view is nevertheless inaccurate as it fails to account for Kants
sustained meditation on what it is to be a human being, which we know from his Logic to
be the underlying query of his critical philosophy. One of the various tangible
manifestations of this concern in his works may be found in his essay: What is
Enlightenment?.1 Kants characterization of both the process and the period in this piece
is well-known: enlightenment is the release from our self-incurred tutelage, that is, from
our inability to use our reason without the guidance of an external authority (8:35).What
remains obscure is the cause he gives for this self-inflicted servitude: a lack of courage. At
first sight, this only serves to confirm the above impression of intransigence, if not to
portray Kant as downright abrasive in his call for emancipation, as he brusquely imputes
failure to cowardice and laziness.
These remarks, however, deserve much more scrutiny. Why is it, precisely, that
enlightenment requires courage? It cannot be for the sake of freedom itself, for Kant has
made abundantly clear in his writings that it is self-sufficient, in that no incentive or any
other device is necessary to recognize what our duty is or to impel its performance
(RGV, 6:3-4). It is not freedom that requires resolve, then, but the subject exercising it. Of
1
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eventually published with Vrin in 1964. He was equally absorbed with the essay on the
Enlightenment, dedicating a paper on the subject in 1978 at the Socit franaise de
philosophie2 as well as part of his 1983 seminar at the Collge de France. We also find a
more detailed study of the piece in The Foucault Reader, which he wrote just before his
death. Foucault has of course been a fierce critique of the German philosopher, accusing
him of having provided the tools of oppression with his all-encompassing reason and
separated history from philosophical investigations or truth claims. Still, as Fleischacker
suggests, the sincerity of his admiration for Kant should not be doubted, and his treatment
of the Aufklrung is nothing short of an example in hermeneutical brilliance
(Fleischacker 2013, p. 108).
An intriguing remark made by Foucault in his 1983 seminar hints at the novelty of
the Enlightenment: it is noteworthy, he says, that the Aufklrung was self-identified, that it
became conscious of itself by naming itself (Foucault 1994, p. 679).It is this same type of
reflexivity that we find at work in Kants essay, where the originality of his thought lies
not so much in what he says about his own epoch as in how he decides to treat it, that is,
the manner by which he weaves a new rapport to the immediate. Obviously, other
philosophers have sought to reflect on their own present, but their point of view remained
situated or connected to a specific age and concrete society they attempted to understand.
Such reflections were often meant to uncover the uniqueness of a particular community,
anticipate its impending doom or predict its forthcoming glory (Foucault 1984, p.
33).Kants project in WE is different: he is not looking to understand the present for the
sake of some other end, but on its own behalf. He is looking for a difference, says
Foucault. What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday? (Ibid.)
Foucault does little to unpack this rather sibylline formula, although a clue as to
what he means can be found in his working hypothesis: This little text [i.e. WE] is located
in a sense at the crossroads of critical reflection and reflection on history. It is a reflection
by Kant on the contemporary status of his own enterprise (p. 38). We know that the said
enterprise critical philosophy is supported by three pillars that have taken the form of
the following questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What can I hope for? In
each case, Kant sets out to explore the potentialities of reason as well as its limits, for
instance what it can and cannot know, what it can and cannot hope for, among other
inquiries. The innovation of critical philosophy, then, consists not so much in using reason
to decipher the mysteries of the universe, but to meditate upon the use of reason itself; it is
not just reason that reflects, but reason that reflects on the conditions of its own possibility.
In this way, Kant provides us with the most achieved form of modernity: what persists in
human existence, its Grund as it were, is neither provided by history in the form of
tradition, nor revealed by nature as a divinely orchestrated cosmos. This ground is not even
the product of reason. Indeed, if Descartes methoduses doubt as a magnifier in his
2
The conference was later published in the Bulletin de la Socit franaise de philosophie, t. LXXXIV,
1990, 84, 2.
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modern ethos seems to be at odds with what has just been said. Yet in his seminar of 1983,
we learn that it is not at all linked to a particular doctrine or tradition, nor is it a question of
belonging to a human community in general (Foucault 1994, pp. 680-681).What we have
here, instead, is an attachment to detachment, to the practice of liberty that consists in the
permanent critique of ourselves.3Hence, with both Baudelaire and Kant, we witness the
emergence of a modern ethos that does not merely accept oneself as one is in the flux of
the passing moments, but takes oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration
(Foucault 1984, p. 41).
Foucault 1984, p. 43. On page p. 44, Foucault insists that at the heart of the historical consciousness that
the Enlightenment has of itself is the principle of a critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our
autonomy.
4
In the above definition, he does speak of a difficult attitude, but adds very little if anything at all to
explain why this should be the case.
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Baudelaire, Spleen, LXXVIII. All translations are from William Aggeler (1954), which I have found to be
the most accurate and poetic: The Flowers of Evil (Fresno, CA: Academy Library Guild). I have occasionally
modified the translation, indicating such instances. The poems will be quoted by their title followed by their
number as established by Claude Pichois, Paris, Gallimard, 1964.
6
See in particular Chapter XXIV of Poes Les aventures dArthur Gordon Pym, translated by Charles
Baudelaire, Roger Asselineau (ed.), Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1973.
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dtre. Yet he also measured with disquieting lucidity this immense gulf, which appears
before us as soon as we embrace this posture. We have another illustration of this
nothingness in his draft for a preface to the Flowers of Evil where, looking back on his
poems, his creation, he writes: I aspire to an absolute rest and to a never-ending night.
() To know nothing, to teach nothing, to will nothing, to feel nothing, to sleep and sleep
again, such is today my only wish. A vile and disgusting wish, but sincere.7To be clear,
modern attitude not only presupposes emptiness, it creates the void itself by accepting as
sole foundation the continual exercise of critical reflection. This permanent creation of
ourselves, this freedom as practice and as way of being, is now part of the modern
landscape. Vertiginous, it takes the shape of an abyss that appears as stirring as it is
frightening.
Does Kants tableau of modernity also depict the act of emancipation as a deep
precipice, an open space of transfiguration experienced simultaneously as exhilarating and
forbidding? Imputing the persistence of tutelage on laziness and cowardice, it seems at first
sight that his sketch of freedom has emphasized the details of the act at the expense of the
individual performing it. Yet a careful examination of his writings might suggest
otherwise. A first hint is uncovered in the celebrated formula, Sapere aude! Quoted from
Horaces Epistles, the full passage reads as follows:
For why do you seek to remove with such haste that which hurts your eyes, when you
defer from year to year from curing that which gnaws your soul? He has the deed half
done, who has begun. Dare to know: begin. He who postpones the time for righteousness,
is like the peasant who waits for the river to flow by: yet runs and will continue to run,
flowing forever. (Epistles, I, 2, 37-43)8
If anything, these lines highlight the adversity that is inherent to rectitude, hence the spur
to overcome ones hesitation, which in Horace takes the form of the following imperative:
Begin! Were it a walk in the park, the first step would not necessitate such impellent
encouragement. Kant, then, does not quote this motto randomly: It is so easy not to be of
age, he admits, concomitantly (8:35). For anyone to work himself out of the life under
tutelage which has become almost his nature is very difficult. It is as if making only an
uncertain leap over the narrowest ditch because he is not accustomed to that kind of free
motion (8:36), he continues, in what is most probably an explicit reference to the above
verses.
This draft for a preface is found in Baudelaire (1964), Les Fleurs du mal, Projet de prface pour Les Fleurs
du mal, texte tabli et annot par Claude Pichois, (Paris: Gallimard), p. 222. I have translated the passage
myself. The italics are also mine.
8
I have translated this passage myself. The original reads as follows: Nam cur quae laedunt oculum festinas
demere; si quid est animum, differs curandi tempus in annum? Dimidium facti qui coepit habet: sapere aude:
incipe. Qui recte vivendi prorogathoram, rusticus exspectat dum defluatamnis; at ille labitur et labetur in
omne volubilis aevum.
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words of the philosopher, though they resonate of the poets angst. Their modernity has
been to uncover the abyss behind the ephemeral, and to measure themselves against it.
In light of this, we can better appreciate why human beings apparently foreswore
and decried as a crime the use of reason, which had been the cause of all these ills
(8:113), and would consequently wish for a return into permanent immaturity. In fact, the
discovery of reason may very well generate, concurrently, its hatred what Kant has called
misology , for we immediately realize it brings more trouble than it does happiness (GMS,
4:395). It is the concern for such an outcome that explains why the philosopher holds the
figure of Job in such high esteem, praising him as a moral exemplar. He is, of course, a
model of unqualified resilience in the face of utter affliction. For all his miseries and
torments, remarks Kant admiringly, he remains unwavering: Till I die, I will not remove
mine integrity from me. My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go: my heart shall
not reproach me so long as I live.11 The Book of Job, however, not only relates the story
of a just man who suffers; it also narrates an experience of nothingness. As Philippe Nemo
suggests, Jobs afflictions reveal more than the undeserved suffering of the righteous; they
also disclose his powerlessness before a situation he does not control. He finds himself
completely helpless before the hardships, the deaths, the betrayals, and the sickness that
suddenly plague his life. He represents neither their cause indeed, it is God himself who
wagers with Satan! nor their solution. Behind this impotence, argues Nemo, lies an excess
of evil [mal] that unhinges all human know-how and hurls it into the abyss, precipitating
the appearance a veritable apparition of the abyss in which the whole world sinks
(Nemo 1998, p. 86).
There is something acutely modern indeed contemporary about Jobs story, as
testify the numerous artistic, cinematic and philosophical works inspired by his plight. If
his experience is significant for Kant, it is because the Biblical hero epitomizes the
agonistic struggle against nothingness.What is most important, claims the philosopher, is
that Job is at first portrayed as a being at peace with himself in a good conscience
(8:265). What follows, however, is nothing less than the breakdown of order, that is to say,
the collapse of the logic that made sense of his world and, with it, of his life. Job discovers,
dramatically enough, that both the just and the wicked shall lie down alike in the dust, and
the worms shall cover them (Job, 21:26).His ontological markers fall to ruin, leaving him
trembling in his flesh (Job, 21:6) and unsettled before the meaninglessness of his
afflictions. Yet in the midst of his strongest doubts, praises Kant, he remains sincere and
resolute (8:267). In a peculiar passage, he adds:
There is little worthy of note in the subtle or hypersubtle reasonings of the two sides; but
the spirit in which they carry them out merits all the more attention. Job speaks as he
thinks, and with the courage with which he, as well as every human being in his position,
11
Job, 27: 5-6, quoted in MpVT, 8:267. In the text, Kant cites only the first part of this passage followed by
an ellipsis. I have simply added the last verse.
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can well afford; his friends, on the contrary, speak as if they were being secretly listened to
by the mighty one (). (8:265)
What both parties are saying is irrelevant. In the end, it is the fact that Job continues to
reason despite his distress that characterizes his heroism. Facing his torments, he has two
choices: he can disavow reason through misology or superstition (i.e. the belief by which
he thinks he can seduce God through rites and rituals into favouring him); or he can
embrace reason regardless of his sufferings, remain composed in the midst of his
afflictions. Job chooses the latter, as if his ultimate consolation was not an illusory
theodicy that would conveniently justify his misfortunes, but the critical ethos that refused
them the last word by getting the better of him. Herein lies his courage.
The reader will recall that in the very first paragraph of WE, Kant does not merely
suggest we should use our own understanding, he compels us to have the courage to do so
and frames this as the rallying call of the Enlightenment. Why such emphasis on
resolution? This was our initial question and we are now in a better position to articulate an
answer. On the first hand, with Foucault we have outlined enlightenment as a modern
attitude consisting in the perpetual transfiguration of the world and of oneself, an ethos we
adopt as a way of being. On the second hand, we have equally insisted that this critical
ontology reveals the void of existence. A permanent critique consistently exposes the
contingency of moral principles or the transience of traditions, in short, it reveals
groundlessness. It is true that it opens for the human being a space of creation; in doing so,
however, it confronts him with nothingness. As such, the practice of freedom is as stirring
as it is daunting. Courage, then, is the moral strength of the will, but of the human
beings will more specifically (MS, 6:405), confronted as he is with the fright of
emptiness. Anxiety, anguish, horror, and terror are degrees of fear, that is, degrees of
aversion to danger, says Kant. Courage, he continues, is precisely the composure of the
mind to take on fear with reflection (Anth., 7:256); it has he who in reflecting on danger
does not yield; brave is he whose courage is constant in danger (ibid.).In a word, courage
is rational resolve before the vertigo of the abyss; it is relief from preceding anxiety (MS,
6:440), as for Job who stands upright despite the weight of his afflictions, weary though
never trodden. In this sense, courage is the indispensable virtue of the being who wishes to
embrace freedom, and so it does not merely qualify the modern attitude, it defines it.
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Enlightenment, generally speaking, was to propose a solution to the brutal and murderous
violence that devastated Europe during the wars of religion. Now for all the considerable
differences between the Thirty Years War and current fundamentalism, religious militancy
today equally poses an urgent problem that begs immediate attention (Tampio 2012, p.
7).Enlightenment considered as an ethos is precisely what empowers us to construct
theories to envision a way out of the looming religious wars of the twenty-first century (p.
15).This is made possible by the kind of courage advocated by Kant in WE, which
demands that we reconceptualize political discourse to reflect the new religious diversity
on the ground (p. 29). In short, Kantian courage provides us with the kind of political and
moral elasticity to face and address the particular problems of our historical context, much
in the same way the European philosophers of the historical Enlightenment displayed the
necessary open-mindedness to overcome the religious violence of their own epoch (p. 40).
Despite obvious philosophical differences, Samuel Fleischackers What is
Enlightenment?, continues in a similar vein. He claims in his work that the thinking for
oneself articulated in WE simply ensures that all our views, including the ones on which
we most profoundly differ, are accepted freely, and kept open to further discussion
(Fleischacker 2013, p. 30).He acknowledges the strong Rawlsian and Habermasian
undertones behind this perspective, declaring that these schools of thought take up the
minimalist version of Kantian enlightenment, trying to find appropriate rules to foster a
free and responsible public discussion among people with very different religious and
philosophical doctrines (p. 39).Proposing a periodization of enlightenment, he sustains
that if for Plato the process involved an ascent towards a better way of leading ones life,
modern enlightenment came to be used for what happens once one replaces a trust in
religious leaders with a commitment to the science. Kants essay, however, is distinctive
for the strong freedom of the press that it advocates (), for its individualism, and for the
fact that it identifies enlightenment with a kind of act, rather than a kind of theory (p. 12).
At first sight, one of the most obvious points of discord between these two readings
would be the apparent Foucaldian position of the former, which connects enlightenment to
an attitude rather than an act. Yet by characterizing courage as tolerance before difference,
or the ethos that allows us to confront the singular problems of our day and then construct
new solutions (Tampio 2012, p. 31)12, Tampios interpretation seems as minimalist in
the same Rawlsian sense as Fleischackers. In both cases, the basic political imperative
extracted from WE is to adjust political discourse in order to address diversity, religious or
otherwise, so as to ensure civic harmony. This reading not only predicates social order
upon the neutrality of the state, it also defends the universal recognition and
accommodation of the entities that compose the community, each dissolved into equal
groups contributing their own opinion to public debate. This may outline the basis of a
liberal model of political integration, if not constitute an upfront apology of
multiculturalism, but does it succeed in highlighting the originality of Kants answer to the
12
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the concept of enlightenment undergoes in Kants interpretation, for it no longer means the
solitary struggle against error and superstition, but rather the effort to think with others
(p. 58, my italics). Having done so, she subsequently moves away from the Baudelairian
undertones of the modern ethos and intersects with the more pluralist one is tempted to
say Anglo-American position defended by the aforementioned commentators, depicting
enlightenment as a culture indeed, though one that describes a sphere of social interaction
that is not hierarchically structured in the manner of guardianship, but inclusive and
egalitarian because what vouchsafes this sphere are the freedoms of participation and of
communication (p. 76). Enlightenment is once more reduced to a mere space of free
speech based on the abstract equality of its members, thus overlooking the angst connected
with ones own use of his understanding. Of course, there is no denying the public
ramifications of Kants call for emancipation. Autonomy is not exercised in a vacuum, but
continually measured against the rationality of my peers I am consequently and
simultaneously asked to recognize as free and equal. Nevertheless, amplifying the
otherwise undeniable political dimension of the Aufklrung at the expense of its ethical
ground runs the risk of confusing the enemy at hand, the true foe that beckons our courage
in order to be defied and overcome.
To that effect, WE is unequivocally limpid in its very first paragraph as to the
immediate threat of enlightenment: not institutional repression such as censorship, but the
lack of resolution to use our own reason without direction from another (8:35).Cowardice
is the cause of our self-incurred minority and the reason so great a portion of mankind,
after nature has long since discharged them from external direction, nevertheless remains
under lifelong tutelage (8:35).Now to impute servitude on pusillanimity is a trenchant if
not obdurate verdict, and one is tempted here to remind Kant that other external factors can
stand in the way of ones emancipation. This being said, what exactly does he understand
by cowardice? It is none other than dishonorable despair (Anth., 7:256), he contends, an
aversion to fear we already know to be of anxiety, anguish, horror and terror. The opposite
of courage, then, is not merely a lack of discipline, as if the veritable trial merely
consisted in taming our natural inclinations through force of will (RGV, 6:57). It is, rather,
dejection before freedom, to shudder and vacillate before the irresistible constraints of
duty (MS, 6:405).If Kantian enlightenment is agonistic, then, it is because of an initial
struggle one might say institutive against the vices and the brood of dispositions
opposing the law. These are the monsters we have to fight, illustrates Kant (6:405).As
such, virtue does not speak of power against an unconcealed enemy, as the Stoics
mistakenly thought (RGV, 6:57); it is what galvanizes our spirits in our confrontation with
the holiness of the law and what strengthens the resolution to bring ourselves ever nearer
to conformity to that law according to this noble predisposition in us (6:184n-185n).Still
calibrating his position against the Stoics, Kant does concede that there is indeed courage
in taking ones life, such as they display when they choose to free themselves with peace
of soul from the pressure of present or anticipated ills (MS, 6:422).But there should
have been in this very courage, this strength of soul not to fear death and to know of
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See MAM, 8:115: For the individual, who in the use of his freedom is concerned only with himself, this
whole change was a loss; for nature, whose purpose with man concerns the species, it was a gain.
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empirical factors that might distort the universality of the moral law, that is, from whatever
precedes the subject, be it tradition, culture or revealed religion. Make no mistake: the
enlightened individual in Kant takes his first steps alone, even if this can imply eventually
walking towards a community of equals and social interaction, so to speak. Solitude, in this
case, should not be conflated with Capitalisms mythical self-made man, deluded into
thinking he is the sole author of his happiness or success. It echoes, rather, Zarathustras
loneliness, who exclaims as he returns to the mountains: But one day solitude will make
you weary, one day your pride will cringe and your courage will gnash its teeth. One day
you will cry I am alone! (Nietzsche 2006, p. 47). There has been considerable work
done as of late to highlight the role and place of the social in Kants writings, not only
within the Aufklrung text but also concerning radical evil, among other themes in his
philosophy. Again, the intention here is neither to belittle his anthropological and political
concerns nor the commentaries that investigate them. However, it seems irrefutable that
constituting a Kingdom of ends, resisting self-deception, or moving from innocence to
majority initially presupposes the subjective experience of freedom, i.e. reason that stirs
the subject from his slumber and opens before him the path of autonomy. To let the voice
of reason silence the tumult of experience, the call of instinct and the insinuations of the
guardians This is the sound of freedom, and it resonates of solitude before the unknown.
Severance from heteronomy, that is, emancipation from the external sources of
authority that legislated in our stead, is thus very unsettling. There is something reassuring
in being guided by someone else: not only does he set the itinerary, he can also be held
imputable should we err along the way. Hence, to be called to freely engage upon our own
path disturbs our peace and comfort. Herein lies a second cause of despair, one that leaves
us so discontented that we begin longing for a golden age where there is to be
contentment with the mere satisfaction of natural needs, universal human equality and
perpetual peace: in a word, unalloyed enjoyment of a carefree life, dreamt away idly, or
trifled away in childish play (MAM, 6:122).Freedom, the reader will recall, is the eye
opener that interrupts innocence and casts the human being into the wide world. As a
result, predicts Kant, the wretchedness of his condition would often arouse in him the
wish for a paradise, the creation of his imagination, where he could dream or while away
his existence in quiet inactivity and permanent peace (6:114-115).More than two centuries
before WE, tienne de la Botie wrote that servitude was not so much attributable to the
might of the tyrant as to our own free will. We like our chains and often prefer them to an
independence that brings with it toils and tribulations. This was also Dostoyevskys Grand
Inquisitors formidable insight, more appears more perceptive than his prisoner none
other than Christ himself when he asks:
Or did you forget that a tranquil mind and even death is dearer to man than the free choice
in the knowledge of good and evil? There is nothing more alluring to man than this
freedom of conscience, but there is nothing more tormenting, either. () Did it never occur
to you that he would at last reject and call in question even your image and your truth, if he
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were weighed down by so fearful a burden as freedom of choice? (Dostoyevsky 1998, pp.
298-299).
Kant had foreseen this outcome, and suspected that human reason, in its weariness, would
rather rest on the soft pillow of empirical satisfaction and in a dream of sweet illusions
(which allow it to embrace a cloud instead of Juno), than commit to virtue in her true
form (GMS, 4:426). Tampio is thus right to see self-love as the enemy of courage
(Tampio 2012, p. 38), though only to the extent it is equivalent to the selfish preference for
ones comfort over the exerting demands of freedom.14
We may identify a third and final reason behind despair in Kants writings: radical
evil. This is a particularly intricate problem for the philosopher and one that we have
examined at length elsewhere (2011).The underlying claim is that there is in even the
best of us a natural propensity to evil (6:30,32). Kants verdict there stands in stark
contrast with his defence of autonomy whereby the subject can abstract from empirical
determinism and choose his own principle of action. In the latter context, evil seems to be
nothing more than the mere subordination of duty to inclination, a sporadic mistake the
rational subject can keep from repeating. Kants contention however is that this lapse in
judgment is not as random as it seems, that it presupposes an initial accord with egoism
through which the subject constitutively favours his personal desires to the detriment of
duty. In other words, to prefer my needs to the law is itself conditional upon the operation
by which I belittle the impact of the former, and relativize the importance of the latter, that
is, upon dishonesty. As such, though the resulting action may appear innocuous, the
hypocrisy behind it is utterly deleterious, slowly turning into a habit that contaminates my
whole being. Propensity, in short, is a predisposition for self-deception, not only an
inherent vulnerability to temptation (weakness), but a penchant for seduction whereby we
convince ourselves of the virtue of vice.In very evocative terms, Kant thus depicts radical
evil as an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason and secretly undermines the
disposition with soul-corrupting principles (6:57).In sum, evil is radical because it gnaws
the very root (radix, in Latin) of our disposition; it is universal because it corrupts even
the best of us; and it is inextirpable because its very ruse is to outplay the tool free will or
Willkr that could otherwise be used to deracinate it. Framed in these terms, wickedness
drives a wedge between what is and what should be. In Kants words, the distance
between the goodness which we ought to effect in ourselves and the evil from which we
start seems infinite (6:66), and the subject begins to suspect he may never be able to
become quite fully what he has in mind (6:68n). Dispirited before an immeasurable gap
he cannot bridge by his own means, he is left hoping for an external succor bestowed
according to his efforts to remain steadfast in his ethical strivings. Kants account of
radical evil is not always coherent and leaves open a number of questions that deserve
further scrutiny, in particular the issue of divine grace. It is remarkable, however, for its
14
As suggests a footnote in Religion: Those for whom the merely formal determining ground as such
(lawfulness) will not suffice as the determining ground in the concept of duty, nonetheless admit that this
ground is not to be found in self-love directed to ones own comfort (6:3n).
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dramatic portrayal of human finitude, highlighting the potential despair that threatens us
all, and the necessary courage to not succumb to it.
Faced with solitude, distress and his permanent deficiency, one can understand
why the human being might be tempted to alleviate the burden that comes with the practice
of freedom, to falter in his resolution and surrender to laziness and cowardice. For Kant,
this capitulation has quite often taken the form of superstition, that is, the illusory belief of
fooling ourselves into thinking we can inflect Gods will or the course of Providence
through rites and rituals, thus blurring the lucid sobriety of reason with misleading
sophistry, such as is displayed in the rhetoric of Jobs companions. Once more, Kants
treatment of religious themes is somewhat narrow, yet the underlying intuition that we
should use such stratagems to remain under self-tutelage and postpone majority is most
pertinent. It is especially useful in understanding the following definition of Aufklrung,
which has puzzled a number of commentators: Liberation from superstition is called
enlightenment. () The blindness that superstition creates in a person, which indeed it
even seems to demand as an obligation, reveals especially well the persons need to be
guided by others, and hence his state of passive reason (KU, 5:294). To ward against such
blindness and keep our eyes open as we come of age, no matter how desolate this itinerary
appears before us, is one of the key imperatives of Kants ethics. Indeed, moral cognition
of oneself, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of ones heart which are
quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom, he declares (MS,
6:441).15
In other words, the officer, the tax collector and the cleric can only exercise
decisive influence over our conduct to the extent we have internalized their command as
the rightful authority, to the detriment of the voice of our own reason we alienate in the
process. Introspection is therefore instrumental in determining not only the integrity of the
legislation, but its origin as well. Its purpose is to continually validate the universality of
the law and authenticate its author. As such, it is intimately connected to the process of
enlightenment: Thinking for oneself means seeking the supreme touchstone of truth in
oneself (i.e. in ones own reason); and the maxim of always thinking for oneself is
enlightenment (WDO, 8: 146).When we take the time to measure the abyss that opens
before the practice of freedom, and the temptation that follows to turn our back on it, we
come to realize that Aufklrung does preclude the solitary struggle against superstition as
Deligiorgi and Foucault both hold; it is rather its condition, as Kant so acutely observes.
The culture of enlightenment may very well describe a sphere of social interaction, and
perhaps this space is more inclusive and egalitarian than the Athenian agora, the early
Christian ecclesiae, or even the early indigenous communities so beautifully described by
Claude Lvi-Strauss in Tristes tropiques, despite the complete absence of embodied,
institutional power that characterized them. Still, it seems that the modernity of Kantian
15
And as if to further tie introspection and enlightenment together, Kant explicitly associates wisdom with
moral strength and courage:MS, 6:405.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baudelaire, Charles (1964), Les Fleurs du mal, tabli et annot par Claude Pichois, (Paris:
Gallimard).Translation: William Aggeler (1954), The Flowers of Evil, (Fresno:
Academy Library Guild).
Deligiorgi, Katerina (2005), Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment (Albany: State
University of New York Press).
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor (1966), The Brothers Karamazov, translated by David Magarshack
(Penguin Books).
Fleischacker, Samuel (2013), What is Enlightenment?(London and New York: Routledge).
Foucault, Michel, What is Enlightenment?, in Paul Rabinow (ed.)(1984), The Foucault
Reader(New York, Pantheon Book).
Foucault, Michel, Quest-ce que les Lumires (1994), in Dits et crits 1954-1988, tome
IV, collection NRF, Daniel Defert et Franois Ewald (dirs), avec la collaboration de
Jacques Lagrange, (Paris: ditions Gallimard), pp. 679-688.
Kant, Immanuel (2007), Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, in
Anthropology, History and Education, translated by Robert Louden (Cambridge:
C.U.P.), pp. 227-428.
(2003), The Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor, Cambridge Texts in
the History of Philosophy(Cambridge: C.U.P.).
(2002), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor,
Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy(Cambridge: C.U.P.).
(1998), Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, translated by George
DiGiovanni, in George DiGiovanni and Allen Wood (eds.), Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of
Philosophy (Cambridge: C.U.P.), pp. 33-191.
On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy, translated by George
DiGiovanni, in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings,
pp. 17-30.
What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?, translated by Allen Wood, in
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, pp. 3-14.
(1987), Critique of Judgment, translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, Hackett).
236
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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
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JAY FOSTER
Abstract
At least two recent collections of essays Postmodernism and the Enlightenment (2001) and
Whats Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question (2001) have responded to postmodern
critiques of Enlightenment by arguing that Enlightenment philosophes themselves embraced a
number of post-modern themes. This essay situates Kants essay Was ist Aufklrung (1784) in the
context of this recent literature about the appropriate characterization of modernity and the
Enlightenment. Adopting an internalist reading of Kants Aufklrung essay, this paper observes
that Kant is surprisingly ambivalent about who might be Enlightened and unspecific about when
Enlightenment might be achieved. The paper argues that this is because Kant is concerned less
with elucidating his concept of Enlightenment and more with characterizing a political condition
that might provide the conditions for the possibility of Enlightenment. This paper calls this
political condition modernity and it is achieved when civil order can be maintained alongside
fractious and possibly insoluble public disagreement about matters of conscience, including the
nature and possibility of Enlightenment. Thus, the audience for the Aufklrung essay is not the tax
collector, soldier or clergyman, but rather the sovereign. Kant enjoins and advises the prince that
discord and debate about matters of conscience need not entail any political unrest or upheaval. It
is in this restricted (Pocockian) sense that the Enlightenment essay is Kants Machiavellian
moment.
Key words
Kant; Enlightenment; Aufklrung; post-modernism; modernism; modernity; Machiavelli; Pocock;
Foucault; Lyotard
Thanks to the editors of this volume for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks also
to B. Boddy, J. Webb and J. Barton for numerous comments and help. Professor of the Department of
Philosophy of Memorial University (Canada); e-mail: ajfoster@mun.ca .
[Recibido: 3 de octubre de 2015
Aceptado: 15 de octubre de 2015]
238
Resumen
Al menos dos recientes colecciones de ensayos, Postmodernism and the Enlightenment (2001) y
Whats Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question (2001), han respondido a las crticas
posmodernas de la Ilustracin aduciendo que los philosophes de la Ilustracin abrazaron una serie
de temas posmodernos. Este artculo sita el ensayo de Kant, Qu es la Ilustracin? (1784) en el
contexto de esta reciente literatura acerca de la caracterizacin apropiada de la Modernidad y la
Ilustracin. Adoptando una lectura inmanente del ensayo de Kant sobre la Aufklrung, sealo que
Kant es sorprendentemente ambivalente con respecto a quin podra ser ilustrado y no especifica
cundo podr alcanzarse la Ilustracin. Este artculo argumenta que esto se debe a que Kant est
menos preocupado por elucidar este concepto de Ilustracin que por caracterizar una condicin
poltica que podra suministrar las condiciones para posibilitar la Ilustracin. As, pues, la audiencia
del ensayo sobre la Aufklrung no es el recaudador de impuestos, el soldado o el sacerdote, sino
ms bien el soberano. Kant ordena y aconseja al prncipe que la discordia y el debate sobre
cuestiones de conciencia no comportan necesariamente inseguridad o conmocin social alguna. Es
en este sentido (Pockockiano) restringido que el ensayo sobre la Ilustracin acta como el
momento maquiaveliano de Kant.
Palabras clave
Kant; Ilustracin; Aufklrung; Posmodernidad; Modernismo; Modernidad; Machiavelli; Pocock;
Foucault; Lyotard
Everyone, it seems, should want to be enlightened. Perhaps thats just because the
alternative being unenlightened seems so ignominious. Shall you be daring and engage
in the autonomous use of reason? Or, shall you be cowardly and dwell in nonage and
tutelage? Put in just these terms Was is Aufklrung? seems to be a loaded question. Well
take Enlightenment, of course. There isnt much choice in the matter.
Even Enlightenments detractors among them Hamann, Herder, Heidegger and
Adorno and Horkheimer acknowledge that we always choose Enlightenment. As
Enlightenments critics, their concern is to anticipate, redirect or diagnose enlightenment
and its consequences. Whatever the specifics of their criticism, as critics they must
minimally take some position on what Aufklrung might or might not be, and perhaps also
some stance on its attainability. And, in turn, taking, holding, asserting and defending a
stance on Enlightenment can be (and has been) interpreted as itself being an enlightenment
commitment. That is, the willingness and capability to engage in processes of giving and
accepting reasons for some position or another is, if not a key tenet of enlightened, well
down the path toward Enlightenment. Grappling with the question Was is Aufklrung?,
would then imply not only a disposition towards Enlightenment but also an enlightened
disposition.
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From this vantage point, Enlightenment seems as ineluctable as Descartes cogito.
Positing the cogito implies a thinking thing that does the positing, and so doubting that
there are thinking things leads to self-contradiction. Likewise, if the willingness to engage
in critical discussion of Enlightenment is always already evidence of an enlightened critical
disposition, then Enlightenment cannot be rejected on pain of self-contradiction. To what
extent may Enlightenment values, procedures or aims themselves be subject to question by
Enlightenment precepts? To express the same question in loosely Nietzschean terms: is a
complete transvaluation of all values possible, or does such a transvaluation itself depend
on some enduring underlying values? Considered from this vantage point, the question
Was is Aufklrung? need not be about Enlightenment per se, but is instead much more a
question about the limits of analytical reflexivity.
A recent example of this form of argument is Jrgen Habermas famous question
posed to Michel Foucault. How can Foucaults self-understanding as a thinker in the
tradition of Enlightenment be compatible with his unmistakable critique of precisely this
form of knowledge, which is that of modernity? Foucault had just died so he could not
answer the question. Yet Habermas kept alive the reply that Foucault was embroiled in a
hopeless contradiction, albeit a productive contradiction and an instructive
contradiction. 1 An accusation of contradiction is attention grabbing as Habermas
continues to be. Anything, true or false, can follow from a contradiction, so it is a
potentially devastating objection to an argument. But, usually its quite hard to make such
an accusation stick. The easy cure for a contradiction is a distinction. If it really is the
case that attempting to put together a reasonable, well-argued and (therefore) convincing
critique of Enlightenment immediately implicates you in some tragic, misguided
contradiction, then something seems to be very much awry in our intellectual machinery.
We should be leery of arguments that suggest otherwise. Surely I can have my
Enlightenment and eat it too.
The question is not whether a distinction can be made but where to make the
distinction. As Richard Bernstein points out there are many ways to save Foucault and
others from accusations of self-contradiction. 2 Enlightenment is a philosophical and
historiographical concept that is both elastic and piecemeal. Elastic in the sense that the
scope of the concept shifts over time, and piecemeal in the sense that the relevant histories
that constitute it continue to shift over the course of inquiry. And so decisions, cuts, must
be made. The cut this paper makes, or begins to make, is between modernity and
Enlightenment. Modernity, I suggest, is a political condition that opens a possibility for
the pursuit of enlightenment; it is not the process or product of Enlightenment itself.
(Thus, contra Habermas, Foucault could work within the Enlightenment tradition and offer
1
See Jrgen Habermas, Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucaults Lecture on Kants What is
Enlightenment? in S.W. Nicholson, ed. and trans., The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the
Historians Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), 173-179 at 176 and 178.
2
See Richard J. Bernstein, Foucault: Critique as a Philosophical Ethos in Michael Kelly, ed., Critique and
Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate (Cambridge: MIT Press,1994), 283-314.
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a critique of modernity without any risk of contradiction.) I argue here that modernity is a
political condition which is achieved when there can be civil order alongside fractious and
possibly insoluble public disagreement about matters of conscience.
By contrast, enlightenment is a different creature. Enlightenment may be (and has
been) variously formulated. Sometimes Enlightenment is portrayed as an ongoing process,
as Adorno and Horkheimer famously suggested in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944). At
other times, Enlightenment is presented as a past achievement or future goal, and
sometimes even both. For instance, in the Preface to The Philosophy of Enlightenment
(1932), Ernst Cassirer reflected, the time is again ripe for applying ... self-criticism to the
present age, for holding up to it that bright clear mirror fashioned by the Enlightenment.
Cassirer wrote this at the Warburg Institute in Hamburg as the Nazi Party machinated to
achieve power. He went on to suggest that Enlightenment might be regained: the age
which venerated reason and science as mans highest faculty cannot and must not be lost
even for us. 3 As a product or outcome, Enlightenment may represent some achieved
consensus some universal agreement about the character of the good, the true or the
beautiful. So, for example, for a stereotypical (and inexistent) eighteenth-century
philosophe the enlightened consensus was that the rational is the good, the good is the
natural, and the natural is the rational. That is, of course, circular but, even today, many
take the circle to be virtuous rather than vicious. The very ability to debate these and other
conceptions of enlightenment, without any threat to civic order marks the achievement of
modernity.
This distinction between modernity and enlightenment was articulated, I suggest, in
Immanuel Kants Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklrung? (1784). The final section
of this paper argues that the Aufklrung essay was Kants Machiavellian moment in
which he argues for the indifference of princes to the free and public use of reason in
matters of conscience. In so doing, I shall suggest, Kant simultaneously makes an implicit
distinction between modernity and enlightenment. Of course, some Kant scholars read the
Aufklrung piece as anticipating positions articulated in the Critique of Judgement (1790)
and his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798).4 In the second section of
this essay, I point to several ambivalences in Kants Aufklrung essay. I think these are
unexpected if Kant was simply articulating positions developed in greater detail elsewhere.
I take these ambivalences to be part of Kants rhetorical strategy, signaling that the essay is
offering a distinct argument. Of course, the very attempt to distinguish enlightenment and
modernity may seem misguided, and perhaps even counter-intuitive. Are not the terms
synonymous? And so, I shall begin by suggesting that this synonymy is only a feature of a
very recent intellectual history.
See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove
(Boston: Beacon Press), xi.
4
For example, see Henry E. Allison, Essays on Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 229-235.
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2. A Postmodern Enlightenment?
See Jean-Franois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans G. Bennington and
B. Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 30.
6
See Keith M. Baker and Peter H. Reill, Whats Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2001), 1.
7
See Daniel Gordon, ed. Postmodernism and Enlightenment: New Perspectives in Eighteenth-Century
French Intellectual History (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1.
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See Richard Rorty, The Continuity Between the Enlightenment and Postmodernism, in Baker and Reill,
eds. Whats Left of Enlightenment?, 19,
9
See Roy Porter and Mikul Teich, eds., The Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), 217.
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(1958) as a model, Carl E. Schorske, T.J. Jackson Lears, Marshall Berman and Modris
Eksteins all offered book-length discussion of modernist movements in the period
between 1880 and 1930.10
Lears expressed the modernist sensibility as a rejection of a docile mass society
glutted by sensate gratification, ordered by benevolent governors, populated by creatures
who have exchanged spiritual freedom and moral responsibility for economic and psychic
security.11 In this sense, neither modernism nor modernity involves the expression or
realization of some identifiable body of eighteenth-century values or ideals. On the
contrary, modernism was an expression of an ongoing avant-garde reworking of
established artistic styles, musical forms and literary strategies. Various avant-gardists
Dostoevsky, Klimt, Schoenberg, Stravinsky, Cubists, Dadaists, Joyce, Miller and the
Bloomsburies subverted and rejected bourgeois values and traditions in art, literature,
music and life.
From this historiographic perspective, it is patently absurd to suggest that Foucault,
Lyotard and other French philosophers had just recently discovered a rejection of
Enlightenment values. Quietly ignoring the intellectual history of the modernist movement
of 1880-1930 serves the interest of contemporary French philosophy very well. As David
Hollinger puts it:
All those folks who thought everything had changed on or about December 1910 were
kidding themselves. There was a big break, all right, but it did not take place in
Bloomsbury on the eve of World War I. It took place in Paris 1968.12
The upshot is that when Foucault situates the emergence of modernity in the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment as he does in his College lectures as much as in Discipline and
Punish (1975)13 the effect is to consolidate the intellectual history of period from (say)
1750 to 1968 into a sufficiently uniform lump that it can be an object of a unified
philosophical critique. Lyotard polarizes intellectual history still more sharply. He is not
exhibiting greater historical sensitivity when he suggests (as we saw above) that the
metanarratives that inform modernity emerge piecemeal from the Renaissance, the
Enlightenment, and Romanticism, as well as from among the Annalists. In fact, he is
10
H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930
(New York: Vintage Books, 1977{1958]). Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture
(New York: Vintage Books, 1981 [1961]). T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Modernism and
Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). Marshall
Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1988 [1982]). Modris Ecksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (Toronto:
Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989).
11
See Lears, No Place of Grace, 300.
12
See David A. Hollinger, The Enlightenment and the Genealogy of Cultural Conflict in the United States,
in Baker and Reill, eds. Whats Left of Enlightenment?, 12. Harold Mah argued a very similar point in his
graduate seminar on Modernism at Queens University in 1992.
13
To be more specific, a sagittal or vertical (rather than longitudinal) modernity. See Michel Foucault, The
Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collge de France, 1982-1982 (), 12-15.
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showing less. All of history is suddenly divided into that time before 1968 when the
gullible credulously accepted metanarratives, and the time after 1968 when French
philosophers showed us the way of appropriate incredulity.
To be clear, none of this should be taken to suggest that either Foucault or Lyotard
maintain that nothing of significance happened after (say) 1789 and before 1968. The
much more restricted point on offer here is that taking a stand for postmodernism and
then identifying modernism with the Enlightenment is to draw lines in the sand. You
either fall into line behind those who wish to complete the unfinished project of
Enlightenment or you join ranks with those who declare the failure of the Enlightenment
project. Once the lines between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were just this
sharp, wars the Culture Wars, the Science Wars and the Freud Wars were inevitable.
The kinds of conflicts exhibited in the humanities in the 1980s and 1990s might
have been more subdued and more subtle if more attention had been paid to the fact that
categories of modernity and modernism might not be that tightly bound up with
Enlightenment. Modernist art, music and literature have exhibited a remarkable and
delightful iconoclastic propensity to break the rules and go about doing things the wrong
way. Mondrian's sudden break with landscape art, Schoenbergs dodecaphony and Joyces
Bloom-ing confusion of literary convention are all paradigms of modernism. These
iconoclasts have no obvious debts to Enlightenment ideals and values, nor are they merely
a vanguard for postmodernism. They are simply avant-garde modernists, mostly
dissatisfied with entrenched or bourgeois standards of taste. Likewise, arguments for the
social construction of science, or about the scientific and therapeutic benefits of
psychoanalysis, may be considered forms of avant-gardism. Given that modernism has
been identified with an avant-garde rejection of accepted standards of rightness, there is
little reason to closely identify modernity and Enlightenment. Moreover, given the
piecemeal character of Enlightenment and the differing accounts of modernity, we need
never have fever-pitched engagements with anything so grandiose and singular as either
the Enlightenment project or the modern project, whatever either of those might be.
3. What is Enlightenment?
Since 2000, at least three substantial book-length studies on Kant and Aufklrung
have been published along with a handful of journal articles. Now, Kant scholarship is
something of a briar patch, more suited to hedgehogs than foxes. From outside the briar
patch, it simply isnt clear how these new books fit within debates among Kant scholars.
That said, from the outside, these new contributions are obviously all timely meditations
on the postmodern critique of enlightenment. Given the tendentiousness of the concept of
Enlightenment in the 1980s and 1990s, it is perhaps not surprising that critical attention has
now turned to Kants famous essay. Kant scholars like to emphasize that when Kant talks
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about enlightenment in his essay he doesnt mean any kind of historical Enlightenment but
rather a process of enlightening. An answer to what is enlightening? is divorced from
eighteenth-century history and the history of knowledge in general (or, so it is argued).
The new literature on Kants Aufklrung essay tends to adopt a common opening
move: enlightenment (the process with a lowercase e) embraced otherness in ways
that belie stereotypes that portray it as being repressive, dominating, architectonic and
demanding the subordination of sensibility to universal reason. The work here is to find a
softer side of Kant, and in so doing, a kinder, gentler Kantian enlightenment. So, for
example, Diane Morgan casts her work as explicitly rejecting the institutionalised
orthodoxy that sees enlightenment reason as the product of censorship, resulting in the
repression of anything that is unpredictable and contingent, of anything that resists
totalitarian order. 14 Katerina Deligiorgi tells us that, a proper understanding of the
historical context and the real scope of Kants conception of enlightenment should help us
to resist the deflationary conclusions arising from one-sided accounts of the
Enlightenment.15 Sam Fleischacker opens his study with the expansive observation that
the Enlightenment is a more diverse period than one might suppose from the way its
opponents describe it, comprising advocates of sentiment as well as advocates of reason,
champions of community as well as individualists, critics as well as defenders of empire,
and a wide variety of other tendencies and views.16 Each of these authors opens their
argument by emphasizing that the concept of enlightenment can embrace sensitivities to
differences among opinions, cultural diversity and different ways of knowing. This
opening move prompts, in one way or another, a return to Kants original text in order to
inspect his specific conception of enlightening.
The trouble with returning to Kants original text, as it appeared in the pages of the
Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1784, is that it is exceedingly sparse in the sense of being very
short. This brevity invites a question that is at once textual and methodological: what
texts, if any, are to be read as supporting or elaborating Kants 1784 essay? There is no
consensus on this matter. Morgan and Deligiorgi both take a very expansive approach.
Kants essay should be considered as coextensive with much of his oeuvre as well as much
subsequent discussion of enlightenment. In contrast, James Schmidt situates Kants essay
mainly among the texts of other responses to the question of Enlightenment offered by
Mendelssohn, Mhsen, Reinhold and others.17 Sam Fleischacker and Claude Pich offer
14
See Diane Morgan, Kant Trouble: The Obscurities of the Enlightened (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1-2.
See Katerina Deligiorgi, Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New
York Press, 2005), 185.
16
See Samuel Fleischacker, What is Enlightenment? (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1.
17
See James Schmidt, ed., What is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century
Questions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
15
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largely internalist readings of the essay, demanding that the essay be interpreted largely
analytically.18
There is almost certainly no single right answer to the issue of interpretive
approach. Differences about the scope of appropriate evidence will undoubtedly produce
different characterisations of the main question, what is enlightening? That admitted, the
following takes an entirely internalist approach in order to highlight some of the deep
ambivalences in the Aufklrung essay, and to use those ambivalences to rethink the
orientation of the essays overall argument. Other than mere usefulness, this narrow
approach is motivated by two contextual considerations.
First and very simply, if we accept, as Henry Allison, Schmidt and Pich all agree,
that Kant is offering a new view of enlightenment, then this enjoins close attention to the
details of the text.19 The other reason for an internalist reading is that it allows for the
(admittedly controversial) possibility that the essay argues for a somewhat different
position than Kants other writings. After all, the Aufklrung essay was published in a
monthly magazine oriented towards the intellectual interests and concerns of the Berliner
Mittwochsgesellschaft. The question What is Enlightenment? had been posed by Johann
Friedrich Zllner in a footnote to another paper published in December 1783. As Schmidt
points out, that the question was posed by Zllner is likely a sign of the intense interest in
the question within the influential group of civil servants, clergy, and men of letters who
made up the Wednesday Society.20
Zllners question prompted at least two lectures in the Wednesday Society in late
1783 and early 1784, one by Johann Karl Wilhelm Mhsen (a personal physician to
Frederick the Great and scholar of the history of science) and another by Moses
Mendelssohn. Presumably, Mendelssohns lecture was the basis for his essay On the
Question: What is Enlightenment (1784) which appeared in September. When Kants
answer to Zllners question was published in December 1784, it appeared without Kant
having read Mendelssohns piece and likely without Kant having attended Society lectures.
Given this immediate context, Kant would not necessarily have any expectation that his
readers would be familiar with (much less convinced by) his previous philosophical
writings, like the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). As Schmidt further observes, Kants
essay could be readily understood by readers who knew little about Kants system as a
whole and it is unlikely that anyone at the time or that many in the decades that followed
would have pursued these links.21 For this reason too, there is little reason to think that
the Aufklrung essay must or ought to be considered against the backdrop of his future
18
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work, like the Critique of Judgement (1790) or his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point
of View (1798).22
Was is Aufklrung? begins on a stirring, almost heroic, note with its demand and
challenge: Sapere aude! For me, the famous passage that follows still prompts a frisson
even after many readings. Enlightenment is mans release from self-incurred tutelage.
Tutelage is mans inability to make use of his understanding without direction from
another.23 Enlightenment is the courage to use your own understanding, and in so doing,
shuck off self-incurred tutelage and achieve the adult autonomy that befits a mature human
intellect.
The original passage in Horace, which is alluded to when sapere aude is invoked,
may signal a second, different feature of enlightenment. Horace writes:
Why indeed are you in a hurry to remove things which hurt the eye, while if aught is
eating into your soul, you put off the time for cure till next year? Well begun is half done;
dare to be wise; begin! He who puts off the hour of right living is like the bumpkin waiting
for the river to run out: yet on it glides, and on it will glide, rolling its flood forever.24
Being wise or enlightened is not about possessing any particular knowledge, as Kant
scholars like to point out. But, for Horace, it isnt clear if being wise even involves the
possession of any particular skills or capacities either. Wisdom simply lies in undertaking
the journey or process of enlightenment, rather than deferring the decision to set out by
waiting for just the right moment. Simply to start is to be half-finished!
If sapere aude is just a prompt to start the process of enlightening, then it isnt
altogether clear what Kant means when he declares that the motto of enlightenment is,
Have courage to use your own reason!25 Does he mean that enlightenment is the simple
willingness to undertake using your own reason, for better or worse regardless of outcome?
Or, does he mean that enlightenment is, to borrow from Descartes, not just to use your
reason but to learn to use your reason rightly?26 This need not deny Kants precept that
enlightening demands no particular knowledge. The skill, capacity or wherewithal to
reason rightly would itself not be knowledge, if knowledge were construed simply as
propositional knowledge. In other words, there are two possible accounts of enlightened
22
Allison makes this very odd claim. It isnt at all clear why why Kants future work would be a backdrop
for the Enlightenment essay. See Allison, 229.
23
Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment? in Sylvere Lotringer, The Politics of Truth: Michel Foucault
(New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), 7. Henceforth, referred to as WA.
24
Horace, Satires. Epistles. The Art of Poetry, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb
Classical Library, 1978), 1.2.32-43,
25
WA 7.
26
Consider here Descartes Meditation IV at AT 55-57.
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reason, one permissive and the other restrictive. On the restrictive account, enlightened
reason is the use of reason to reach right or true conclusions. On the permissive account,
so long as I use my reason without direction from another then I am engaged in
enlightening.27
The Aufklrung essay also expresses a related ambivalence about the extent to
which the enlightening process itself is emancipatory. At the beginning of the essay, Kant
explicitly links the process of enlightening with freedom and the public use of reason. In
the essays middle, the free, public use of reason is then connected very briefly with
progress. There Kant tells us that the proper destination of human nature is the
progress in general enlightenment. 28 Yet, the essay ends on a note that seems more
restrictive than emancipatory: debate all you want, but obey! And moments later, Kant
continues: A greater degree of civil freedom appears advantageous to the freedom of
mind of the people, and yet it places inescapable limitations upon it; a lower degree of civil
freedom on the contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to
his full capacity. We are told that as people become capable of managing freedom this
will affect the principles of government, eventually at some undisclosed future point.29
A third ambivalence arises from the question: who might be enlightened? The
common answer to this question is: everyone who dares to use their reason. Allison,
Deligiorgi, Fleischacker are very much agreed about this point. They do not hold that
everyone is actually caught up in the process of enlightenment, but they agree that it is
possible that everyone has the capacity to engage in the enlightening process, at least in
principle. All three frame this inclusivity in terms of universalisability, though they dont
agree about what is universal.
Fleischacker tells us that it is the potential to self-legislate: we are all free: we
have the ability to follow a law we lay down for ourselves, and not be led around by
outside pressures.30 Allison describes it similarly in terms of reflexivity: to ask oneself
whether the ground of ones assumption can be regarded as suitable for all cognizers
which amounts to a cognitive version of the principle of the universality of reasons...31
This criterion by itself is almost certainly inadequate. It is all too open to the problem of
self-deception in which being acceptable to a specific group is confused with universal
validity. Recognizing this, Deligiorgi casts the universal communicatively: the freedom to
communicate with real interlocutors is essential, for without it we lose our capacity to even
think freely.32
27
WA 7.
WA 14.
29
WA 18-19.
30
See Fleischacker, 14.
31
See Allison, 233.
32
See Deligiorgi, 66.
28
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Yet, as Claude Pich suggests in his contribution to this volume, there is a note of
ambivalence in Kants attitude towards universality. Pich writes: enlightenment is
potentially open to everyone but at the same time there is a modulation in the degree to
which one has access to it.33 It is certainly true that eighteenth-century Europe saw a
rapid growth of literacy rates, particularly in cities and towns. But, Kants insistence that
ideas are communicated through writing suggests that more than rudimentary literacy is
required to undertake enlightenment. 34 For that matter, Frederick IIs 1763 Generallandschul-reglement was arguably more a means of instilling social discipline and political
authority than enlightened free-thinking.35
Pich draws specific attention to Kants hints that the pursuit of enlightenment is
not open to just anyone. Early in the essay, Kant explicitly states that, there are few who
have succeeded by their own exercise of mind both in freeing themselves from
incompetence and in achieving a steady pace. Thus, enlightening will depend on some
independent thinkers who shall disseminate the spirit of rational appreciation. 36
Traces of the modulation highlighted by Pich may be evident even in Horace. There
the bumpkins or rustics (what Scottish virtuosi would have called the rude sort and Kant
might have called the great unthinking masses) are forever waiting for the right time and
so never get to the work of enlightening.
The Aufklrung essay can be read as resonating with these uncertainties about
education and literacy. Those to whom enlightenment is available are not even Brgers or
town-dwelling citizens but very specifically Gelehrten or scholars. This, Pich suggests,
means that enlightenment may be more aristocratic than democratic. I think this
suggestion is right in spirit but wrong in detail. As we have seen above, enlightenment is
almost certainly unavailable to the illiterate, and it may not extend to farmers or labourers.
But, this does not mean that Kant is arguing for a literal aristocratic enlightenment. As the
next section of the paper will argue, Kant is arguing for an enlightening of what Daniel
Defoe called the middling sort he is calling for bourgeois enlightenment.
4. A Machiavellian Moment
Kants three examples the military officer, the tax collector, the clergyman
all occupy brgerlichen Posten or civic offices. The duty of any Brger while at their civil
post is to perform their official duties: to pass on the lawful orders of superior officers, to
collect the prescribed taxes and to convey church doctrine. A Brger without a civil post
33
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had the duty to pay his taxes. Holding a civil post has the benefit of being paid, in one way
or another, by the prince. The Brger engaged in commerce is also provided for by the
prince, since it is the princes army that ensures the safety and stability that makes trade
possible. Everyone has their civic duty.37 Civic duty demands no more and no less than
the efficient performance of the requirements of office, no criticisms and no complaints.
Pay taxes, collect taxes, follow orders, preach doctrine. Here argument is certainly not
allowed one must obey. Obedience may be demanded, Kant says, without
particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. Perhaps more ominously he adds:
impudent complaints about duties can, be punished as a scandal (as it could occassion
general refractoriness.)38
The requirement for obedience that comes with the performance of civic duty,
however, involves a privation that is, having something taken away, being deprived of
something properly possessed. It is in this sense that civil posts are for Kant private
offices, not public offices as we might say. The conduct of a civil office requires the the
private use of reason. This privated form of reason is required in the interest of the
community so government may direct people to public ends, or at least prevent them
from destroying those ends.39 The point here is that while a modicum of reason may be
required for civic duty, fulfillment of those duties may be incompatible with expressions of
personal conscience. The officer, taxman or clergyman cannot simultaneously perform
their duties and argue about what those duties are. And so, the deprivation involved in
private reason is the suspension of the free use of reason in matters of conscience.
Fully-fledged reason without privation what Kant calls the public use of
reason is the activity of Gelehrten or scholars. Scholars are entitled to publically
express disagreements about taxes and how they are collected, appropriate military service
and religious orthodoxies. Scholarly activity and the public use of reason are very much
the same thing. It is the scholar who publicly expresses his thoughts and the scholars
writings speak to his public, the world.40 The free or public use of reason is the use
which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public, and the public use of
reason enjoys an unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak in his own
person.41 Scholars are engaged in the public use of reason when they communicate to
the public carefully tested and well-meaning thoughts on that which is erroneous.42
This is all stirring stuff but we should be extraordinarily careful how we construe
Kants statements about scholarly activity. There is a temptation to read what Kant says
37
This is indebted to John Christian Laursen, The Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of Public and
Publicity in Schmidt, ed., What is Enlightenment?, 253-270.
38
WA 10-11.
39
WA 11.
40
WA 11 and 13.
41
WA 10 and 13.
42
WA 12.
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about scholarship as implying any number of liberal-democratic values. For example, it is
tempting to suggest something like: the public use of reason implies communicating with a
public so this, in turn, implies an absence of censorship, which, in turn, implies freedom of
the press. This is an enticing chain of reasoning as it would align Kant with our
contemporary political beliefs and sensibilities. But, notice that the use of implies here
suggests a deep logical connection where there simply is none. There is no modern logical
proof to show that freedom of the press may be derived from the public use of reason. To
suggest otherwise is to take a moral from logic, and since that doughty neo-Kantian
Rudolph Carnap, logicians have been agreed that in logic there are no morals (or politics
for that matter). The sense of implies involved in claims connecting the public use of
reason with freedom of the press is semantic not logical. This is the sense of implies that
one finds in an assertion like: that the house is red all over implies that the house is not
black all over.
So consider, for example, Kants claim that, One might let every citizen in the
role of scholar, make his comments freely and publicly, through writing, on the erroneous
aspect of the present institution.43 This particular passage might be read as implying the
broad claim that the status of scholar could be extended to every citizen. It might also be
read narrowly as implying merely that every citizen qua scholar can voice their public
opinion. Either or both of these readings might be correct. But, all of us who have
children also understand that the might can be used as a proxy for no. Even children
recognize that we mean no when we say: we wont order pizza today but we might later
in the week. The semantic problem is compounded once we acknowledge that the
meaning of many key philosophical concepts have shifted over time, even basic terms like
experience and objectivity.44 Given the shifting sands of concept-meanings, there is
just no certainty about what expressions like public use of reason and communicating
with a public may have entailed for Kant.
If, for a moment, we resist the temptation to reconstruct the semantic implications
of Kants concepts, then another and quite different reading of Was ist Aufklrung? might
be discerned. As has been shown, Kant is ambivalent about the universality of
enlightening as well as the sanctity of enlightening. That is, he doesnt make clear whether
everyone can become scholars, and he leaves open the possibility that some public uses of
reason might be quashed as inimical to civic order. Finally, he is silent about when
enlightenment will be achieved, as he reminds us that we live in an age of Enlightenment
but not an enlightened age. Given these and the other ambivalences noted above, it seems
unlikely that the main point of the Aufklrung essay is that: The public use of ones
reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men.45
43
WA 14.
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007). Alan W. Richardson,
Conceiving, Experiencing, and Conceiving Experiencing: Neo-Kantianism and the History of the Concept
of Experience, Topoi 22 (1) (2003), 55-67.
45
WA 10.
44
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Kant is clearly advancing this claim but he does so in a register that is strikingly
ambivalent about what this means, who is involved and its future prospect, as we have
already seen.
Note that there are just a few actors in the Aufklrung essay: the officer, the tax
collector, the clergyman, the scholar and prince. In our commentaries, we all too often
focus on the first four actors at the expense of the prince. Perhaps Kants intended
audience for the essay was not the world-community of scholars, or even the readership of
the Berlinische Monatsschrift. Perhaps the intended audience was aristocratic, namely the
prince. This, declares Kant, is the age of enlightenment, or the century of Friedrich.46
If Kant is trying to say something to the prince, then what is he trying to say? The point is
not to argue for greater civil freedom since Kant maintains without any hint of irony that,
a lower degree of civil freedom provides the mind with room for each man to extend
himself to his full capacity.47 Nor is the point to argue that a prince ought to respect the
capacity of all persons to become scholars and engage in the public use of reason. If this
point had to be argued for, then the argument would be futile! Why would a prince give up
any power whatsoever to the weak on the basis of anything so flimsy as an argument, a
mere collection of words? Assuming that power responds to reason is not merely naive, it
is question-begging. Thus, the essential point that Kant wishes to convey to the prince is
this: it is unbefitting the office of a prince to be concerned with the petty squabbles of
scholars.
If Kant can sustain this critical point, then the free public use of reason is
immediately assured. Towards the end of the essay, the focus of the argument shifts to the
prince and reaches its culmination. There we are told:
A prince who does not find it unworthy of himself to say that he holds it to be his duty to
prescribe nothing to men in religious matters but give them complete freedom while
renouncing the haughty name of tolerance, is himself enlightened.48
The enlightened prince the prince who will be honoured and glorified understands
that it is a duty of his office as prince not to legislate matters of religion, or the arts and
sciences. The reason for this, however, is not any specific kind of commitment to the form
of tolerance found in, for example, Lockes Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). Lockean
tolerance is inappropriate because the prince simply has no duty or requirement to maintain
toleration. If the prince did have such a duty, then this would demand a princely concern
about matters of religious conscience and proper care of the soul. In contrast with Lockes
46
WA 16.
WA 18.
48
WA 16.
47
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magistrate who has a deep interest in maintaining religious tolerance, Kants prince is
comparatively indifferent to such matters.
Princely indifference is also a benign indifference, since it leaves each man free to
make use of his reason in matters of conscience.49 The only concern the prince has with
matters of conscience is the prevention of civil strife, to prevent one of them from
violently hindering another in determining and promoting this welfare. 50 Any further
involvement in matters of conscience injures the princes majesty by supporting the,
despotism of some tyrants in his state over his other subjects. In general, to meddle in
these matters lowers his own majesty.51This does not, of course, prevent the prince from
considering the general and widely approved conclusions of scholarship that have been
brought forward as a proposal to the throne. The prince may even enact such proposals
if the suggested improvement stands together with civil order.52 The prince insists only
on civil order in the form of obedience to the prescribed duties of private office. Not only
is it unbefitting of a prince to worry about scholarly squabbles, Kant suggests, it is a rare
and worthy prince indeed who will permit the scholars to debate as much as they please, so
long as they obey. In a thinly veiled allusion to Friedrich II, Kant adds, Of this we have a
shining example wherein no monarch is superior to him who we honor.53
Kants crucial point in the Aufklrung essay is not that the aim of the process of
enlightening is to make every person a scholar, no matter how attractive and flattering
twenty-first-century academics might find this idea. Reading Was ist Aufklrung? through
the lens of Machiavelli's The Prince (1532) shows how Kant thinks of the prince as his
principal audience.54 This approach also makes sense of the early part of the essay. There
Kant shows that there is no threat to civic order if a person who holds a civic office also
engages in public expressions of conscience without infringing on their official duties.55
Having a brgerlichen Posten is not incompatible with being Gelehrten. The officer, tax
collector, clergyman and others who hold civic office can be free to pursue matters of
personal conscience when they are not discharging their duties. The precise demarcation
being drawn out by Kant is not between the oikos and the polis, or between the private and
the political. The demarcation being drawn is between the personal and the occupational.
We are all familiar with a more recent, and very bourgeois, form of just this distinction:
from 9A-5P on weekdays, I go to work and do my job and discharge my duties to the state
as an employee and taxpayer, but outside of those hours, what I say and do is my own
personal business.
49
WA 17.
WA 15.
51
WA 16.
52
WA 14-15.
53
WA 18.
54
And, of course, also through the lens of J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
55
WA 17.
50
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In the Postmodern Condition, Lyotard asks: Who has the right to decide for
society? Who is the subject whose prescriptions are norms for those they obligate? The
modern (rather than postmodern) way to answer these questions, he says, is to use the
model of scientific rationality:
The people debate among themselves about what is just or unjust in the same way that the
scientific community debates about what is true or false; they accumulate civil laws just as
scientists accumulate scientific laws; they perfect their rules of consensus just as the
scientists produce new paradigms to revise their rules in light of what they have
learned.56
On this account, progress in politics is achieved in much the same way as progress in
science, and both enterprises are conceived as a process of collective deliberation,
universal legislation and progressive accumulation. As we have already seen, Lyotards
strong suit is not historical nuance. All that is offered is a generic claim about the
character of scientific rationality and its homology with some account of political decisionmaking. It isnt evident that scientific rationality ever conformed to the pattern Lyotard
suggests, or if those rules have ever been deployed in politics. Even if Lyotard has offered
a description of what Kant and other philosophes aspired to as an ideal of enlightened
politics, it isnt clear that this is also a description of modernity.
In recent philosophical literature, modernity and modernism has been equated with
Enlightenment so that modernity and Enlightenment can be substituted salva veritate. The
historical moment of modernity was the Scientific Revolution and the subsequent Age of
Enlightenment. This is, so the usual story goes, when we became modern. The
philosophical movement called the Enlightenment project and the modern project is
the realisation of the ideals, values and ambitions given expression in this historical period.
The bringing together of the concepts of modernity and Enlightenment so that they are now
almost synonymous is the outcome of a quite recent turn in philosophy effected by the
work of Foucault, Lyotard, Habermas and others. This rethinking of the philosophical
project of Enlightenment and modernity invites reinterpretation of the history, just as
historiographic reimaginings of the Enlightenment period tend to adjust the aims of the
philosophical project.
The recent philosophical shift now reverberates in the
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historiography of the Enlightenment in the form of a new historiographic emphasis on the
so-called postmodern enlightenment.
There are, however, other historiographic resources that might help us doubt the
collapse of Enlightenment and modernity into each other. A slightly older and now
obscured historiography traces the ideas of modernism and modernity not to the
Enlightenment but to the avant-garde movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. These movements in art, literature and music push the boundaries of what is
established and accepted as appropriate conventions, ideals and values. As Clement
Greenberg wrote in the Partisan Review in 1939, a society, as it becomes less and less
able... to justify the inevitability of its particular forms, breaks up the accepted notions
upon which artists and writers must depend in large part for communication with their
audiences. The work of avant-gardists is to depart from a motionless Alexandrianism
and academicism to dissolve the precedent of the old masters.57
Pace Greenberg, we tend to identify avant-gardism with the achievements of new
paradigms in literature, art and music, and specifically, the historical moments of Eliot,
Joyce, Picasso, Braque, Schoenberg, Duchamp and Pollock. But, we could also argue that
the avant-garde sensibility has been at work in science and philosophy as well. Albert
Einstein, Niels Bohr and recently Ilya Prigogine are arguably avant-garde scientists, and
Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers their philosophical
exegetes. From this point of view, avant-garde modernity is a movement of movements.
As a movement, it is iconoclastic, irreverent and a little seditious. In its specific
movements, it variously resists the reification of norms, and even their sedimentation. In
so doing, it (by definition) opposes entrenched, bourgeois sensibilities and resists any fixed
conception of Enlightened values. The avant-garde rejection of enlightenment values
should not, however, be confused with a rejection of modernity. Avant-gardes embrace
modernity! They are modernists! How then should we explain how modernity and
enlightenment come apart? This becomes clearer in the analysis of Kants Aufklrung
essay.
On the close reading of Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklrung? offered
here, it is possible to discern an implicit Kantian schism between modernity and
enlightenment. If we look beyond the Aufklrung essay, as many Kant scholars
recommend and insist, we perhaps see Kants particular anticipation of what the process of
enlightenment could achieve. Allison takes Kants vision to be a principle of the
universality of reasons which is the idea that, if something justifies my belief, it must
also justify the belief of any other rational being under similar conditions.58Fleischacker
argues for what he calls a minimal Enlightenment which is a condition where, One is
enlightened if one holds ones beliefs as a result of thinking responsibly for oneself, rather
57
Clement Greenberg, Avante-Garde and Kitsch, Partisan Review 6:5 (1939), 34-49.
Allison, 233.
58
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than as dogma. Roughly, this means that one seeks reasons for beliefs, opens them to
correction by others 59
These are both compelling descriptions of Kants vision of Enlightenment, though
Kants articulation of it offered in the Aufklrung essay is noticeably equivocal. Whatever
he says elsewhere, in that essay Kant is strikingly ambivalent. While he clearly thinks that
the process of enlightening is underway in Friedrich's Prussia, the realization of
enlightenment is ongoingly thrust into a millenialist future. He also isnt clear to whom it
applies. At times, he says everyone, eventually, at some undisclosed future time. In the
meantime, enlightening is available only to select scholars who make free public use of
reason. The promise of enlightenment is also ambivalent. Whether or not it will
eventually lead to better government is described in caveated terms. If Kant has a quite
definite view of enlightenment in mind, as Kant scholars suggest he does, then it is
difficult to give an account of these equivocations. My suggestion is that the recurring
ambivalences makes sense if the aim of the Aufklrung essay is a defense of a specific
conception of modernity as a condition for the possibility of enlightening, not any specific
conception of enlightenment.
From this perspective, as Kant writes the Aufklrung essay he is speaking to the
readers of the Berlinische Monatsschrift but he is addressing the prince. In the way of
Machiavelli and Hobbes, Kant accedes that the concern of the modern prince the
official duty of the prince is to maintain civil order. The prince does this by
maintaining civil obedience. Maintaining civil order is no mean feat, and it requires the
judicious use of force. On the one hand, the prince cannot be a thug, like Agathocles who
created order by vicious executions. On the other hand, the prince cannot be weak and
make the mistake of the Florentines in Pistoia who granted clemency to rebels only then to
be faced with the bloody task of subduing an insurrection. While difficult to maintain, civic
order is essential for Gelehrten to go about their public work of enlightening; as Hobbes
highlighted, there can be no art, commerce or industry in the state of nature.
Kants specific advice to the prince is that it is a mistake to believe that civil order
requires consensus or agreement amongst those who are ruled. The maintenance of civil
order depends only on the efficient performance of civic duty and nothing else. So long as
the officer, tax collector, clergyman and other officials discharge their duties of office
without question, they can disagree on their own time about how taxes are distributed,
military aims are pursued, and ecclesiastic doctrines are preached. Order requires
obedience alone. Once this is recognized then it follows that it is unbefitting a prince to be
concerned with matters of conscience. Indeed, deigning to participate in public arguments
might lead to the dangerous misunderstanding that such issues even could have a bearing
on the matter of civil obedience. The princes overriding injunction is: Argue as much as
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you will, and about what you will, only obey! This command is backed up by the threat
of a numerous and well-disciplined army.60
A republic could not dare say such a thing, Kant whispers, recognizing that with
the separation of the personal and occupational the classical republican tradition has been
eclipsed.61 In the republican model, deliberation and consensus-building in the agora was
the basis of political authority. What Kant understands or perhaps better what Kant
built but Lyotard doesnt understand is that classical republicanism is not the model of
modernity. In modernity, political authority demands civil order, and it is organised
around the model of positive law (rules backed up by threats). Only once civil order is
guaranteed can there be a modernity in the form of the free public use of reason on all
matters of conscience. The modern allowance for the free public use of reason is
enlightening, and over time, a consensus about enlightenment values might be achieved.
By contrast, avant-gardists are arch-moderns, but they reject all claims to consensus about
enlightened values. Thus, modernity and enlightenment come apart in a strange modal
asymmetry. While modernity is necessary for enlightenment, enlightenment is merely
possible under conditions of modernity.
References
Allison, Henry E. (2012), Essays on Kant, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Baker, Keith M. and Peter H. Reill (2001), Whats Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern
Question, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Berman, Marshall (1988 [1982]), All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of
Modernity, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.
Bernstein, Richard J. (1994), Foucault: Critique as a Philosophical Ethos in Critique and
Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate, ed. Michael Kelly, MIT Press,
Cambridge, pp. 211-242.
Cassirer, Ernst (1955 [1951]), The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A.
Koelln and James P. Pettegrove, Beacon Press, Boston.
Deligiorgi, Katerina (2005), Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment, State University of
New York Press, Albany, N.Y.
Daston, Lorraine and Peter Galison (2007), Objectivity, Zone Books, New York.
Ecksteins, Modris (1989), Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern
Age, Lester and OrpenDennys, Toronto.
Fleischacker, Samuel (2013), What is Enlightenment?, Routledge, New York.
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WA 18.
WA 18.
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Foucault, Michel (2008), The Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collge
de France, 1982-1982, ed. Frdric Gros and trans. Graham Burchell, Palgrave Macmillan,
New York.
Gordon, Daniel, ed. (2001) Postmodernism and Enlightenment: New Perspectives in
Eighteenth-Century French Intellectual History, Routledge, New York.
Greenberg, Clement (1939), Avante-Garde and Kitsch, Partisan Review 6, no. 5, pp. 3449.
Habermas, Jrgen (1989), Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucaults Lecture
on Kants What is Enlightenment? in The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the
Historians Debate, ed. and trans. S.W. Nicholson, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp.173179.
Hollinger, David A. (2001), The Enlightenment and the Genealogy of Cultural Conflict
in the United States in Whats Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question, eds. Keith
M. Baker and Peter H. Reill, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp.7-18.
Horace (1978 [20-14BC]), Satires. Epistles. The Art of Poetry, trans. H. Rushton
Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass.
Hughes, H. Stuart (1977{1958]), Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of
European Social Thought, 1890-1930, Vintage Books, New York.
Kant, Immanuel (1997 [1784] What is Enlightenment? in The Politics of Truth: Michel
Foucault, ed. and trans. Sylvere Lotringer, Semiotext(e), New York.
Laursen, John Christian (1996), The Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of Public and
Publicity in What is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and TwentiethCentury Questions, ed. James Schmidt, University of California Press, Berkeley. pp. 253270.
Lears, T.J. Jackson (1981), No Place of Grace: Modernism and Antimodernism and the
Transformation of American Culture, Pantheon Books, New York.
Morgan, Diane (2000), Kant Trouble: The Obscurities of the Enlightened, Routledge, New
York.
Lyotard, Jean-Franois (1984), The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans.
G. Bennington and B. Massumi, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
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Con-Textos Kantianos, above.
Pocock, J.G.A. (1975), The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Porter, Roy and Mikul Teich, eds. (1981), The Enlightenment in National Context,
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Richardson, Alan W. (2003), Conceiving, Experiencing, and Conceiving Experiencing:
Neo-Kantianism and the History of the Concept of Experience, Topoi 22, no. 1, pp. 55-67.
Rorty, Richard (2001), The Continuity Between the Enlightenment and
Postmodernism, in Whats Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question, eds. Keith
M. Baker and Peter H. Reill, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 19-38.
Schmidt,
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Schmidt, James, ed. (1996), What is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and
Twentieth-Century Questions, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Schorske, Carl E. (1981 [1961]), Fin-de-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture, Vintage
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Van Horn Melton, James (1988), Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of
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Abstract
Recently Samuel Fleischacker has developed Kants model of enlightenment as a minimalist
enlightenment in the tradition of a relatively thin proceduralism focused on the form of public
debate and interaction. I want to discuss the possibility that such a minimalism, endorsed by
Fleischacker, Habermas, Rawls, and others, benefits from a metaphysics of critical individual
subjectivity as a prerequisite for the social proceduralism of the minimalist enlightenment. I argue
that Kants enlightenment, metaphysically thicker than much contemporary proceduralism,
constitutes a recovery and transformation of a subjective interiority deeply Cartesian in spirit and
central to the reciprocity of the community of subjects in What is Enlightenment. This opens a
space for a site of resistance to the social. Descartes solus secedo describes the analogical space of
such a resistance for Kants sapere aude. The Meditations thus point forward implicitly to how a
rational subject might achieve critical distance from tradition in its various forms, epistemic,
ethical, moral, and political.
Key words
Kant; Descartes; Enlightenment; Subject, Individual, Critical, Space, Reason, What is
Enlightenment; Meditations
Resumen
Samuel Fleischacker ha desarrollado recientemente el modelo kantiano de Ilustracin como una
Ilustracin minimalista, en la tradicin de un procedimentalismo relativamente dbil condensado
en la forma del debate e interaccin pblicos. Pretendo discutir la posibilidad de que tal
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Suma Rajiva
minimalismo, sostenido por Fleischacker, Habermas, Rawls y otros, dependa de una metafsica de
la subjetividad individual crtica como prerrequisito para el procedimentalismo social de la
Ilustracin minimalista. Discuto que la Ilustracin de Kant, metafsicamente ms densa que la
mayor parte del procedimentalismo contemporneo, constituye una recuperacin y transformacin
de una interioridad subjetiva profundamente cartesiana en espritu y central para la reciprocidad de
la comunidad de los sujetos en Qu es Ilustracin? Esto abre paso a un espacio de resistencia a lo
social. El solus secedo de Descartes describe un espacio de semejante resistencia anlogo al del
sapere aude de Kant. Las Meditaciones sealan as de manera implcita el modo en que un sujeto
racional podra ganar distancia con respecto a la tradicin en sus mltiples formas: epistmica,
tica, moral y poltica.
Palabras clave
Kant; Descartes; Ilustracin; sujeto; individuo; crtico; espacio; razn; Qu es Ilustracin?;
Meditaciones
Unless such specific items turn out to be prerequisites for public debate. As Fleischacker makes clear, one
could, on such a procedural definition have, for example, robust religious beliefs, and, presumably possible
skepticism about the scope of science.
2
I say actually to distinguish actual embodied human subjects who differ in many empirical ways from,
say, the different interlocutors who occupy Descartes Meditators internal conversation or even the different
perspectives a Kantian subject might consider while debating the validity of his or her maxims.
3
Another example would be the trial of Socrates. Presumably the cosmopolitan community of the minimalist
enlightenment would be, in its nature, immune to the problems surrounding such events but this is precisely
because a Cartesian synthesis, I will argue, both enacts and grounds the fundamental structure of an
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other such historical contexts in mind, I will argue further that Kants enlightenment,
metaphysically thicker than most contemporary proceduralism, constitutes a recovery and
transformation of a subjective interiority which is deeply Cartesian in spirit. Such a
reflective and critical subjectivity is no unfortunate early modern remnant in Kant but is
central to one side of the reciprocity of the community of subjects in What is
Enlightenment, namely, the side of the critical individual subject who uses his or her own
understanding. 4 I will argue that ethical and political subjectivity for Kant involves
achieving both some distance from actual empirical community and an effectively
Cartesian turn to the self, though Kants transcendental model more explicitly defines that
distance5 as being in reflection rather than empirical reality.6
This should still be good news for the supporters of the minimalist enlightenment as
Kants goal is the maintenance of the same autonomy and critical stance which the
minimalist enlightenment also supports; what may be more difficult to accept is that Kants
emphasis on a kind of isolation for the subject (though balanced by the public nature of
reason) is not a moral or ethical narcissism but in fact an attempt to define humanity
through its ability to be a site of resistance to the social. Descartes quasi-aesthetic and
enlightened community, whether minimalist or not. The cosmopolitan community requires and makes
explicit a space of enquiry: what we see in the Meditations is that such a space is Cartesian, requiring some
trench work in metaphysics, the kind of work Descartes does in both creating this space artificially and then
moving from it to things external to the enquirer (in Descartes case, God and the material external world).
My thanks to Jol Madore for drawing my attention to the question of the cosmopolitan community and why
it needs the Cartesian synthesis.
4
The other side, the delicate relation to others, is reflected in the three-fold version of enlightentment in the
Critique of Judgment, in section 40s discussion of the sensus communis. This larger aspect of enlightenment,
a community of subjects, ideally self-critical and autonomous but actually and empirically probably not,
needs to be addressed in the light of the complexity of Kants account of the living moral subject of the WIE
and its possible conceptual relationship to Descartes own account of how to deal with a concrete community
as a rational subject. Since the Meditator has so much more freedom from institutional constraint than Kants
enlightened subject, the relationship between Descartes and Kant on this point is bound to be more vexed.
5
Descartes implicitly defines that distance as reflection in the artificiality of the solus secedo. This fits in
with Jean-Luc Marions claims that the Meditations, both in its conception as a work and in its structure, is
responsorial. (Marion 2007, pp.38-41) My discussion is focused more on the solitude aspect of
enlightenment but I agree with Marions important point that such a responsorial nature means that the
Meditations as a project is not soliloquy or solipsism.(Marion 2007, p.41) See Henry Allisons 2012
discussion of the need for all three maxims of true enlightenment, which combine publicity and thinking for
oneself.
6
Katerina Deligiorgi cogently argues that Kants enlightenment is grounded in a publicity which seems to
leave a more Cartesian emphasis on correct method in using reason aside, while sharing Descartes
egalitarian commitment to the capacity of each person to engage in enlightened reasoning. (Deligiorgi 2005,
p.62) In fact, according to her the Kantian culture of enlightenment undermines the Cartesian certainty of
foundationalism in favour of a more dynamic approach. (Deligiorgi 2006, p.6) This seems entirely in line
with a minimalist enlightenment and also, in my view, a legitimate difference to draw between Descartes and
Kant. However, the legitimacy of this distinction seems not to rule out a connection between Cartesian
method, particularly the issue of isolation, and Kantian publicity. This is especially true because, as
Deligiorgi points out, what does the heavy lifting in Kants emphasis on free communication, is the
freedom to communicate things which are different from the empirical community or culture around one, the
freedom to challenge. (Deligiorgi 2006, p.8) This is where the legacy of Cartesian method shows itself, even
where Kant differs in actual claims about community or, more importantly, in his transcendental approach to
the question of the self and its relation to others. See also Marions point, mentioned in the note above, about
the responsorial function of the Meditations.
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definitely imaginative empirical separation of self and social sketches a seventeenth
century analogue for the transcendental reconceptualization of moral agency and of the self
which is the eighteenth century basis for Kantian enlightenment. Solus secedo, the
Cartesian assertion of an isolated space of epistemological investigation, describes the
space of resistance to the social, the space of Kants sapere aude.
I will begin by looking at the general context of Kants court of reason and how this
general notion of enlightenment is developed in four of the criteria for enlightenment
spelled out in What is Enlightenment (WIE).7 I will then turn to a discussion of Meditations
One and Two in order to show that these criteria are also articulated by Descartes in an
epistemological context. I will argue that the project of the Meditations, as developed in
Meditations One and Two, show the actual workings of epistemic enlightenment8 and thus
point forward implicitly 9 to how a rational subject might achieve critical distance from
tradition in its various forms, epistemic, ethical, moral, and political.
2. The Metaphysics of Kants Morals: The court of reason in the Critique of Pure
Reason
What Kant takes to be the issue of metaphysics is set out in the A edition of the Preface to
the Critique of Pure Reason, in 1781, three years earlier than WIE. Human reason
inevitably asks questions which we are incapable of answering, such as Does God exist?
Am I free? Kant eventually sketches out what must be done to solve the problem of the
claims of metaphysics. First he shifts from what looks like a bemoaning of scepticism and
indifferentism to saying that, in fact, the questioning of the claims of metaphysics is the
result:
not of the thoughtlessness of our age, but of its ripened power of judgment, which will
no longer be put off with illusory knowledge, and which demands that reason should take
7
These are only four of the more metaphysical criteria. There are others which I will not address in detail
here, though further discussion of these will eventually be necessary in a fuller account of the relationship
between Kant and Descartes.
8
For the sake of simplicity I refer to epistemic enlightenment in Descartes as contrasted with the more
clearly ethical, moral, and political enlightenment in Kant. However, the point of this essay is that the latter
builds on the former. I also use epistemic since it is not clear, especially in Descartes and even in Kant,
how much enlightenment requires a metaphysical or ontological rejection of tradition. In Descartes, for
example, there is no rejection of God or the soul or immortality or even of religion; there is merely the
thinking through of why I should accept these rationally. They pass the test, for Descartes, in the court of
reason, where for Kant, given transcendental idealism, the results are not clear cut, for, say, God.
9
The same epistemic enlightenment and its ethical trajectory is displayed much more explicitly in Descartes
earlier work, the Discourse on the Method, especially Parts I and II, with Part III the equivalent, in effect, of
Kants distinction between the public and the private use of reason. Descartes autobiographical Part I shows
him leaving his minority; Part IV shows the results of this in the Je pense. This I think can be fruitfully
glossed, in Kantian terms, as I think for myself, therefore I am, as Scott Johnston has suggested to me in
conversation. However, discussing the details and implications of such a gloss in the text of the Discourse is
beyond the scope of the current essay, though a crucial stage in recovering the extent of Descartes being an
enlightener. In this discussion I intend only to show that the enlightenment point is definitely there in the
text of Meditations One and Two, including the sum, existo of the Meditation Two cogito.
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on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a
court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its
groundless pretensions, and this not by mere decrees but according to its own eternal and
unchangeable laws; and this court is none other than the critique of pure reason itself.
(A xi-xii, GW 100-101)
In a well-known footnote he explains further what such a court would be and what it would
accomplish:
Our age is the genuine age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion
through its holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly seek to exempt
themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and
cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been
able to withstand its free and public examination. (A xii, GW 100-101)
Note that this respect is unverstellte, genuine, unfeigned, hence, one can assume, uncoerced or free.
I say the private rather than the secretive because there is nothing necessarily secret about the private
interests governing an individual who is subject to them in society, in fact. Kant makes it clear in WIE that
his notion of public involves the public of educated readers who ought to be free to engage in debate. In
Perpetual Peace and elsewhere this notion of public expands to one involving politics as well, something
already implicit in the WIE, especially in the latter parts discussion of educating the people to be good
citizens.
12
Of course Kant and Descartes have, prima facie, striking differences about first person subjectivity and
many of these differences are relevant to a full discussion of Descartes and Kant on enlightenment. Kants
discussion in the Refutation of Idealism and the Paralogisms indicate many of these differences. A full
discussion would need to address such differences in detail; all I seek to do here is sketch some of the
possible connections between these two thinkers of enlightenment, particularly in the kind of space
indicated by Descartes as necessary for independent thinking. Kants transcendental turn of course radically
redefines this space just as he redefines the place of theoretical and practical reason, but the space of solitary
11
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3. Marks of Enlightenment
In What is Enlightenment? Kant expounds a principle fundamental to his practical
philosophy, the principle of thinking for oneself. He opens with:
Enlightenment is the human beings emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority
is inability to make use of ones own understanding without direction from another. This
minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of
resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have the
courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment.14
(AA 8:35, Gregor 17)
The two stresses on ones own understanding are instructive here because in the first
instance one is indeed using ones own understanding but in the leading-strings of someone
elses direction, a book, a spiritual or medical advisor, or others. Once one embarks on the
process of enlightenment, one begins to make use of ones own understanding again, but
this time independently of anothers direction.
Kant spells this out in the rest of the essay, including his famous and perhaps
notorious distinction between the enlightened public use of reason and the less autonomous
(and necessarily so) private use of reason, when one has a job or a function. In the latter
cases one is bound, as a part, to the direction of the whole; but merely as someone who
thinks, one has freedom in the public use of ones reason, a freedom a monarch or
governing power should not restrict. As Kant eventually explicates it, the binding nature of
private reason makes one a cog in a machine, in a sense, while the freedom of the public
use of reason, properly used, allows one to avoid complete reduction to such mechanism,
while allowing a limited amount of such mechanical existence.
There are four explicit criteria for enlightenment, which Kant articulates all of
which link autonomy and being non-mechanical15, not a machine, as he explicitly states in
several differences places in the essay. The first is where Kant is referring to those who
would like to make human beings essentially non-autonomous:
thinking needed to be laid out first by Descartes (and Rousseau, according to Deligiorgiand possibly
Augustine, in a sense) before itself being critically transformed.
13
In sections 4 and 5 of this essay.
14
All references to What is Enlightenment and the Critique of Practical Reason are from Gregors
translations in Kant, Practical Philosophy, and are cited in the text with the Akademie pagination and the
pages in Gregor. References to the German text of the Critique of Practical Reason are to the Akademie
Textausgabe in Kants Werke, Vol.V; references to the German text of WIE are to the Akademie Textausgabe
in Kants Werke,Vol. VIII.
15
In the Critique of Practical Reason and in the Critique of Judgment, works later than WIE, Kant gives us a
detailed account of mechanism that links both his theoretical and practical uses of the term and thus helps to
shed some light on the use of machine language in WIE. The second Critique highlights the independence of
thinking that makes a moral subject non-machine like while the third Critique emphasizes the reciprocity and
interaction which characterize non-machines, specifically, biological organisms. I have addressed both these
discussions of mechanism elsewhere in some detail.
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those guardians who have kindly taken it upon themselves to supervise them; after they
have made their domesticated animals dumb and carefully prevented these placid creatures
from daring to take a single step without the walking cart [Gngelwagen] in which they
have confined them, they then show them the danger that threatens them if they try to walk
alone. (AA 8:35, Gregor 17)
The walking cart Kant has in mind is revealed in the next paragraph where he refers to
Precepts and formulas, those mechanical instruments of a rational use, or rather misuse,
of his [anyones] natural endowments, are the ball and chain of an everlasting minority.
(AA 8:36, Gregor 17, emphasis added) Extrapolating from these two references, we can
say that these are akin to the rules or concepts Kant refers to in the first Critique, when he
discusses the difficulty of judgment as subsuming correctly under a rule: such
subsumption, not at all identical with knowing the rules or concepts, is difficult to learn
and almost impossible to teach, since it is essentially the art of having judgment. One can
have all the rules in the world without being able to apply them.
Generally Kant has nothing against rules at all; in fact, the hallmark of well-formed
judgment is to use rules, either theoretically or practically. The point, as we will see, is not
to use them mechanically which in the WIE discussion means using them unreflectively,
on the say-so of someone else, or on the say-so of some putative authority; in other words,
the problem is not necessarily the rules as such, but the issue of whether they are selfimposed or imposed by another16 If it is right then the gods will say so, but it is not right
because the gods say so.
A third reference to the activity of the citizen comes once Kant has made a
transition from the possible enlightenment of individuals to the more probable
enlightenment of the public at large, provided they are allowed freedom in the public use
of reason:
Now, for many affairs conducted in the interest of a commonwealth a certain mechanism
is necessary, by means of which some members of the commonwealth must behave merely
passively, so as to be directed by the government, though an artful unanimity (knstliche
Einhelligkeit), to public ends Here it is, certainly, impermissible to argue; instead, one
must obey. But insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of a
whole commonwealth, even of the society of citizens of the world, and so in his capacity of
a scholar who by his writings addresses a public in the proper sense of the word, he can
certainly argue without thereby harming the affairs assigned to him in part as a passive
member. ( AA 8:37, Gregor 18, emphasis added)
For example, says Kant, one cannot refuse to pay taxes as a citizen but the same citizen
does not act against the duty of a citizen when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his
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thoughts about the inappropriateness or even injustice of such decrees17. ( AA 8:37-38,
Gregor 19) In giving us an account of the balance between public and private uses of
reason, Kant also lays out what it means to be mechanical. Precepts and formulas certainly
play a role but now mechanism is also revealed as necessary for many aspects even of a
commonwealth18 and it consists in accepting that one is a passive part of a machine, a part
whose unity with the whole is simply artful (knstliche) or constructed.19
There are several other references which can be connected to passivity and
mechanism but the one we will conclude with is at the end of WIE. After teleologically
analyzing the development of human beings to the point where, as people they are capable
of being free, Kant says that the tendency and vocation of thinking freely gradually works
back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of
freedom in acting20) and eventually even upon the principles of government, which finds it
profitable to itself to treat the human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping
with his dignity. (AA 8:41-42, Gregor 22). Kant is clearly connecting the capacity to be
free in ones actions with being more than a machine and connecting this moreness with
human dignity, which he will later make the hallmark of being a human being in the
Groundwork, even if he over-optimistically sees this as profitable to government.
Thus, WIE indicates that being mechanically unenlightened involves over-reliance
on precepts and formulas and other kinds of rote learning, fundamental and perpetual
direction from others, being a passive part rather than an active member,21 and thus lacking
dignity and being treated as a virtual child if not an actual one. As we will see, all four
points are addressed by Descartes Meditator22, both in the content of Meditations One and
Two and in the very formulation of the project.
17
There is, of course, the question of whether such obeying in action and being critical in speech is a
sufficient or acceptable political move. Kant famously is more supportive after the fact of things, like
revolution, that he beforehand would not endorse, and in the case of revolution, actually condemns. See
Ripstein (2009) for a lengthy discussion of the relationship between Kants political theory and his theory of
freedom, especially chapter 11 which deals with the thorny issue of revolution.
18
I say even because the image of the commonwealth most favourably expressed by Kant is that of an
organic body, where, of course, the parts and the whole enjoy a reciprocal relationship rather than a topdown relationship. See the Critique of the Power of Judgment, sect.59, (AA5: 352). Given Kants comments
in this section, the mechanism of state is the body to its soul, which would be its life, The reciprocal
unity of citizens and rulers/governments.
19
This point about the artful is significant when Kant denies in teleological judgment that organic life can
be regarded as an artwork in which parts are subordinated to the whole. See the second half of the Critique of
the Power of Judgment, especially the discussion of the Analytic (AA 5: 359-383).
20
Earlier in the discussion Kant says that people move in this direction normally if not actively prevented
from so doing. See AA 8:41, Gregor 21.
21
The issue of passivity probably comes out of Kants reading of Rousseau. Certainly elements of his linking
life with freedom and organisms analogously with proper commonwealths comes out of Rousseaus
distinction between an aggregate and an association and the resulting notion of the general will. However, see
Deligiorgi for a discussion of important differences from Rousseau in this context.
22
Aryeh Kosman (1986) has a well known discussion in which Descartes and the Meditator are importantly
distinct. For one thing, Descartes knows how the project finishes, while the Meditator, speaking in the
present tense, does not. A similar point has been developed more recently by Charles Larmore (2006), who
points out that the Meditators attitudes reflect a more traditional semi-Aristotelian view which Descartes
himself would not have held. Larmore thus reads the Meditations as almost a dialogue (which in form it
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a hypercritical reason is also criticized as an individual reason, the isolated and abstractly
rational subjectivity that Hans Jonas connects to Kant (Jonas 1973, pp. 43-35) but which
could easily be attributed (and often is) to Descartes. This is an abstract and empty
rationality, the pale anemic subjectivity of Ryles ghost in the machine. Taken together
with the anti-authoritarianism, such features make Cartesian subjectivity look thoroughly
isolated, abandoning the robust social sense of the self, such as that found in Hegel,
perhaps.26
However, Descartes does much more than just radically deconstruct authority and
tradition; he uses hyperbolic doubt as a particular kind of tool, to articulate a synthesis of
rationality and authority not unlike that found in Kants What is Enlightenment? He has to
achieve the abstraction and isolation of the Meditations with a good deal of effort and
while he content of his world presents itself to him under the aspect of authority and
tradition, his goal is to provide a sound foundation for any content which is true.
Moreover, reading the cogito as abstract and empty ignores the relationship in
Meditation Two between the cogito and the cogitationes, which constitute a rich though
unsatisfying world of sorts for Descartes. We thus definitely find a social sense of the
self in Descartes alongside his rejection of an uncritical sociality of which Descartes was
only too keenly aware and which he sought to limit.
5. Meditation One: Artificial secession as power over my own epistemic attitude,
power over my judgment, power to think for myself
Descartes opens the Meditations with his famous backward glance at what he once knew,
what he eventually realized as false, and what his project is for overcoming such falsity:
Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true
in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had
subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life,
to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to
establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last. (AT 17; CSM
12).27
the Meditations as a whole and the project of the Discourse, especially the publicity which Descartes
eventually endorses.
26
In his recent book on Kants What Is Enlightenment? Samuel Fleischacker ably defends Kant against
charges of isolation and anti-social thinking. (as does, of course, Deligiorgi) It is not clear who does quite the
same for Descartes, but Jean-Luc Marions recent volumes on Descartes seem to go some way toward at least
showing that he is not quite the thinker of isolation as usually portrayed. Many Descartes scholars interested
in his relation to mediaeval thinkers (e.g., Anthony Kenny) also emphasize this.
27
Quotations from Descartes are from the Meditations and are from the translation in The Philosophical
Writings by Cottingham. The Latin is from Oeuvres de Descartes, Volume IX, edited by Adam and Tannery.
Citations are given with from the Adam and Tannery first, with the Cottingham page abbreviated to the
standard CSM; I have also consulted Cottinghams 2013 stand alone translation of the Meditations, which is
based in large part on the previous CSM version.
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After retailing his reservations about the enormity of the task and his procrastination on it,
he switches from the historical past into the perfect tense and thence into present tense as
he states that today I have expressly rid my mind of all worries and arranged for myself
a clear stretch of free time. I am here quite alone, and at last I will devote myself sincerely
and without reservation to the general demolition28 of my opinions. (AT17-18; CSM 12)
It is worth noting that the verb, secedo, used in I am here quite alone (solus
secedo), means to go apart, separate, withdraw with other overtones of retiring from
public life and political overtones of rebellion.29 I want to suggest that Descartes is turning
himself quite artificially and temporarily into a whole, rather than accepting his social
aspect as a part, the aspect linked to mechanism by Kant. The artifice is reinforced by the
pretence within pretence motif of Meditation One, where the project of hyperbolic doubt,
rejected by Descartes elsewhere as a real issue (including the Synopsis of the Meditations),
is presented to us as pretending for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and
imaginary. (AT 22; CSM II, 15) This pretence is implicit in the dream hypothesis but is
quite explicit in the adoption of the demon hypothesis, which is a supposing done by
Descartes himself.
In this framework of conscious pretence, Descartes does not question (rightly or
wrongly) whether the actual phenomena he is experiencing could be different qua actual
phenomena. He says: Suppose then that I am dreaming, and that these particularsthat
my eyes are open, that I am moving my head and stretching out my handsare not true.
Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such hands or such a body at all. (AT19; CSM II, 13)
He does not, however, say that he is doing something else, at least, from the point of view
of his own observation. He could be a brain in a vat, of course, not a man in a dressing
gown, as described in the earlier paragraph. But his experience right now is not describable
as brain in vat but as man wearing dressing gown near fire, my eyes open, etc. He may
be worried that he is actually something utterly different (the brain in the vat) but he is not
worried about what he will later call the objective reality of the ideas he is experiencing.
He is worried about their formal reality, about their ontological not their
phenomenological status.
28
In the light of Gadamers worries, it is important to note that for Descartes such a demolition is strictly in
the space of theoretical reason.
29
s-cdo , cessi, cessum, 3, v. n., I. to go apart, go away, separate, withdraw (class.; not in Cs.; but cf.
secessio). B. In partic. 1. To go aside, withdraw, retire b. In post-Aug. authors (esp. in Suet.), to retire from
public into private life; absol.: c. To seek the exclusive society of any one, to retire from the world: ad
optimos viros, Sen. Ot. Sap. 1, 1. 2. Polit., to separate one's self by rebellion, to revolt, secede II. Trop.
(very rare; perh. only poet. and in post-Aug. prose): antequam ego incipio secedere et ali parte considere,
to dissent from the opinion, Sen. Ep. 117, 4: a fesso corpore sensus, Cat. 64, 189: qui solitarius
separatusque a communi malo civitatis secesserit, has withdrawn himself, Gell. 2, 12, 1: cum ad stilum
secedet, shall give himself up to writing, Quint. 1, 12, 12: in te ipse secede, retire within yourself, Sen. Ep.
25, 7. All this material selected from the entry in: A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrews' edition of
Freund's Latin dictionary. revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten by. Charlton T. Lewis, Ph.D. and.
Charles Short, LL.D. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1879. The National Endowment for the Humanities provided
support for entering this text.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Dsecedo
Accessed Friday, September 05, 2014
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This is at the core of his artificial hypotheses. Descartes worries about the causes of
his ideas, identifying false information about these causes as something he had accepted
as true (admiserim: had admitted, had allowed in). He states, right after the explicit
supposition of the all powerful demon, that I shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this
meditation; and even if it is not in my power to know any truth, I shall at least do what is in
my power, [to suspend my judgment (French version)] that is, resolutely guard against
assenting to any falsehoods, so that the deceiver, however powerful and cunning he may
be, will be unable to impose on me in the slightest degree. (AT23; CSM II, 15).
This is not a passive subjectivity, even in its worries. Moreover, the activity, much
like Kantian subjectivity, is a formal activity, a consciousness of the idea of freedom. For
Descartes deception can take away my freedom at the deepest level in some ways but not
when I can ask the question about deception in Meditation One and then continue
unfolding its implications in Meditation Two.
We can now ask whether the project, as set up in Meditation One, shows the marks
of enlightenment. With the four points of non-enlightenment in mind, we can see that
Meditation Ones project itself addresses all four problems. The Meditator is anxious not to
rely on rote learning, on traditional knowledge, without at least testing for its truth in the
court of reason. In this context he will take hyperbolic pains to rely on no one, at least at
the outset and the very point of solus secedo is to guard against the unreflectively accepted
intellectual influence of others. Additionally, the Meditator is no mechanical part,
subordinated to others but, rather, is making the whole answerable to him by proving its
epistemic worth. This interaction or feedback by one whom Descartes himself understands
to be a part (himself normally), is essentially enlightenment, even if one thinks the later
Meditations move away from this.30 And, finally, the Meditator is no child, either actually
or metaphorically: he has left his minority in virtue of his isolation and also in virtue of his
demand that everything answer to his reason. In other words, the Meditator is trying to
think for himself and has, through the solus secedo, created the artificial space, physical,
social, epistemic, within which such thinking can safely take place. 31 In this artificial
space, tradition becomes answerable to the court of reason.
6. Meditation Two, Part I: Actively asserting the subject
What then is this self which is trying to emerge from its minority, from the heavy hand of
tradition, or, at least, unreflective tradition? Is it, fundamentally, a statement about my
30
I would argue that they do not. But this is too large a topic to address here, especially in its relationship to
the nature and power of God. . Tom Vincis discussion of Descartes epistemology, especially of his truth
rule of clarity and distinctness, meticulously constructsan argument involving the nature of the rule and its
use, which allows a convincing solution to the Cartesian Circle problem. See Vinci 1998, especially
chapters 1-3 and the epilogue, in which Cartesian epistemologys relation to scepticism is explored in more
general terms.
31
The precepts of the Discourse, Part III, make clear how important such safety is for Descartes, reflecting
his clear understanding that theoretical and practical reason are quite distinct. In Part III, as in much of the
Discourse and the Meditations, the spatial motifs are abundant.
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isolated subjectivity and not a statement about the world? This last point will affect just
how enlightened the Cartesian res cogitans can be, since Kantian enlightenment cannot be,
in the nature of things, about an isolated non-social subjectivity.32
John Cottingham points out that the cogito, as what Descartes calls cognitio,
knowledge of a sort by immediate acquaintance, is different from scientia, systematic
knowledge, such as science or a system of natural philosophy and that this difference has
implications for certain Cartesian problems, such as the Cartesian circle. For example, in
the second set of Objections Descartes is asked about his claim in the Meditations,
especially Meditation Five, that God is necessary to guarantee the veracity of all genuine
knowledge, especially knowledge dependent on memory. Specifically the objectors
(AT124-125; CSM II, 89) want to know whether the veracity of the cogito depends on
God. If it does, Descartes cannot escape the Cartesian circle: if we need the cogito for the
idea of God in order then to prove Gods existence through the nature of this idea, then we
need the cogito to be independently true. We cannot say that we know its truth only if a
veracious God exists, since we need the cogito to know that a veracious God exists.33
In the second set of replies, Descartes sidesteps the objectors question by stating
that the cogito is a first principle and that knowledge of first principles is not knowledge in
the normal sense (AT 140; CSM II, 100). It is, as Cottingham points out, cognitio 34 ,
whereas God is necessary for scientia, systematic knowledge.
There is good reason not to see the cogito, even as cognitio, as hyper-isolated and
abstract way. For one thing, it does not make sense of the discussion of the cogitationes,
the penses which are part and parcel of the Je pense. As Anthony Kenny points out there
is probably no limit the subject can raise to the number of examples of the cogitationes35,
each of which is a worldly reinforcement of the thinking subject.( Kenny 2009, p. 47).36
32
Deligiorgi strongly emphasizes and develops this point in her discussion of Kants culture of
enlightenment.
33
The entire problem of the Cartesian Circle is, in many ways, vitally important for any assessment of
Descartes complete project and system as reflecting enlightenment.
34
Cottingham: Descartes seems to distinguish here between an isolated cognition or act of awareness
(cognitio) and systematic, properly grounded knowledge (scientia). (CSM II, 100, note 2) While I disagree
with the characterization of an isolated cognition (as the next sections discussion of the cogitationes
makes clear), Cottingham elsewhere has put his finger on the central problem for seeing Descartes as an
enlightener, though this important problem will not be addressed in this article. This is the tension between
the autonomy and independence of reason on the one hand and what Cottingham calls Descartes conception
of creatureliness, a conception that brings us back, as Meditations Three, Four, and Five do, to a necessary
dependence on a creative power, i.e, God. This tension between independence and creatureliness pervades
the entire structure of the Meditations. (Cottingham 2013, Philosophical introduction, xxiii). Much of this
is discussed, at greater length, in Cottinghams 2008 book, Cartesian Reflections.
35
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the importance of the cogitationes as well and seems generally to stress the role
of attention and judgment in Descartes, something which will be discussed further below. See the, preface
xiv, Introduction section: Chapter 3 on attention and judgment, especially pp. 47-50, and Part 3, Chapter 1,
on The Cogito.
36
This more cognitive dimension to the I think is illuminated by reading Descartes through an
Augustinian lens, as Cottingham and others have commented, even if, as Marion has noted, there are
important and radical differences between the two thinkers. (Marion 2007, pp.23-26) I have discussed some
of these Augustinian/Cartesian similarities and differences elsewhere.
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7. Meditation Two, Part II: The world of the cogitationes
If the cogito, the I think, is rooted in the struggles of the Augustinian fallor, then the
world of the Cartesian cogitationes, the thoughts, gives the cogito some purchase on its
otherness as they unfold the richness of the thinking self and its activity.37 In so doing, they
draw attention to how content of thinking can be questioned by the Meditator in the
process of enlightenment. Appearing initially to present the world, the cogitationes, at this
stage, show no such warrant; when the Meditator dares to know them they turn out, for the
time being, to be only his thoughts, to lead him back to himself, rather than forward toward
the world. 38 This is itself an advance, since the Meditator now knows that he needs a
foundational epistemic warrant for his knowledge (scientia), namely, the secure and
grounding existence of an absolute idea, the idea of God. While Kant and Descartes are
bound to disagree on the need for this particular type of foundational epistemic warrant,
they should agree that coming to understand the status of ones ideas as ones ideas
initially is already an advance over nave or unenlightened notions of experience. This is
the first step in the enlightenment project as laid out in section 40 of the Critique of
Aesthetic Judgment, to think for oneself and also the main step of WIE; the second step, to
think from the point of view of everyone else, is not available to the Meditator at this stage
in the Meditations.
Descartes makes a well-known and much challenged transition from the cogito
(strictly, sum, existo) to the res cogitans, the thinking thing. He then gives a very inclusive
definition of thinking, one which will be changed considerably first in Meditation Four and
then in Meditation Six. Here the definition comprises everything that one could see as
falling under consciousness generally: But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is
that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also
imagines and has sensory perceptions. (AT 28; CSM II, 19)39 He then asks if everything
on this considerable list belongs to him and in so doing finds that he is a much more
complicated centre of activity than the opening of Meditation Two might suggest. He is
diversified into a series of activities, all of which presage the cogitationes:
Is it not one and the same I who is now doubting almost everything, who nonetheless
understands some things, who affirms that this one things is true, denies everything else,
desires to know more, is unwilling to be deceived, imagines many things even
involuntarily, and is aware of many things which apparently come from the senses? Are
not all these things just as true as the fact that I exist, even if I am asleep all the time, and
37
This richness of the self comes to fruition in Spinoza and Leibniz, particularly in Leibnizs interplay of
possible world and monad.
38
In the end, of course, the cogitationes do lead to the world, first through the idea of God in Meditations
Three and Five and secondly, through the idea of body in Meditation Six.
39
The last line consists of present active participles such as dubitans, intelligens, negans, volens, sentiens and
could be translated: a thing doubting, understanding, perceiving etc. Descartes is conscious of himself
doing all of these things in the present moment, thus lending some credence to his own claim that he is not
making an inference in the initial presentation of the cogito.
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even if he who created me is doing all he can to deceive me? Which of these activities is
distinct from my thinking? Which of them can be said to be separate from myself?. (AT
28-29; CSM II, 19)
Descartes then goes on to say that those objects which appear to him in sensation may not
exist but he certainly seems to experience them and that it is in this limited way he can be
said to image and sense even though what he is imagining and sensing may be false. In
this limited sense, even an activity like perception, so different initially from the abstract
rational claim of the cogito, is actually the enriched version of the cogito.
At this stage, then, the differentiation in the activity of the thinking self becomes a
differentiation in the objects of the cogitated world. Descartes, finding himself slipping
back into the old, socialized, traditional, common sense way of thinking and thus finding
his solus secedo threatened by his mental embeddedness, decides to allow his mind free
rein in considering one of the objects of the traditionally viewed world, the notorious piece
of wax.
In its strange transformations, the wax could, somewhat imaginatively, be read as a
material record of all the Cartesian transformations to date and, indeed, many of those to
come. Less imaginatively, it becomes the representative of all the res extensa, all the
material things of the world which become transformed under the modern mathematical
eye. The wax goes through two significant transformations, firstly, from its one sensory
thing to another, sensibly different thing, and secondly, from a sensory object to a
mathematical, geometrical object. In the sensory transformation we are informed that the
fragrant smell of the flowers, the sweet taste of the honey, are all transformed in the wax
into melted, hot, liquid, no longer possessing these qualities. The wax remains, even in this
strange pool. Why? Descartes concludes that the wax was none of these things, not the
sweet taste, the fragrant scent, the cold hardness or the hot liquid. Just as Descartes himself
was Nempe dubitans, intelligens etc., the active thinking thing, the wax is nempe nihil
aliud quam extensum quid, flexibile, mutabile, something extended, flexible, changeable.
How does Descartes know this? As with Plato and Augustine, the answer is through my
judging intellect, something applicable to the next example, when Descartes asks whether
the humans he sees crossing the square could, under their hats and coats, be automata.
Sed judico hominess esse, but I judge that they are human beings, solely through the
scrutiny of the mind alone. And, should anyone think the wax and the people are
unrelated, Descartes refers to regarding the wax as taking off its clothing and considering it
naked, and solely through the mind.
However, as Anthony Kenny has emphasized, the cogitationes, including the wax
and the humans, prove also that Descartes is a thinking thing. Meditation Two concludes
that this peculiar world is tied into the proof of the cogito:
For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, clearly this same fact entails
much more evidently that I myself also exist. It is possible that what I see is not really the
wax; it is possible that I do not even have eyes with which to see anything. But when I see,
or think I see (I am not here distinguishing the two), it is simply not possible that I who am
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now thinking am not something. By the same token if I judge that the wax exists from the
fact that I touch it, the same result follows, namely that I exist. If I judge that it exists from
the fact that I imagine it, or for any other reason, exactly the same thing follows. And the
result that I have grasped in the case of the wax may be applied to everything else located
outside me40.This is because every consideration whatsoever which contributes to my
perception of the wax, or of any other body, cannot but establish even more effectively the
nature of my own mind.41 (AT 33; CSM II, p.22; emphases added)
The world of the cogitationes, though still a world of thought, thus continues the project
of enlightenment by presenting the thinking subject, the Meditator, with the worldly
material whose status he or she must interrogate. Real or not, I must be satisfied that the
status of my ideas has been satisfactorily proven to me, even if, as Meditation Three will
go on to discuss, such satisfaction may involve ideas which could never have only been
part of my mind. 42 That, however, is a new and troubling stage in the journey of
enlightenment, a rocky journey which for Kant, unlike Descartes, constitutes the battlefield
of metaphysics. Nonetheless, Descartes enters this contest as someone ready for an answer,
however different from Kants, which at least locates itself in the court of reason, if not
quite in a critique of pure reason.
8. Conclusion: Building the court of reason?
Thus, the Cartesian solus secedo licenses and indeed is the explicit space of the Kantian
sapere aude. Kants semi-Cartesian43 recovery of the troubled insights of a subjectivity
not fully dominated by social or empirical determinations, is, of course, a recovery which
then tries to balance the social and the subjective not through transcendence as such, unlike
Descartes, but through the highly involved and weighty means of the critical philosophy
and its substitution of transcendental method for transcendent insight. The calm, cold,
waters of Kants transcendental idealism may or may not be an advance of some sort over
the metaphysics, hot, spicy, and eternal44 of Descartes. Nonetheless, reflecting on ones
rational subjectivity and its status and limitations sets the stage for an enlightenment
project by building part of the foundation of a court of reason: Such reflection forms the
precondition for a minimalist enlightenment. Kantian or not, this artificially induced and
temporary epistemic solitude is a crucial step in emerging from ones minority,
40
Descartes worries about the relation of his subjectivity to what is outside him, God and the external world
are revealed, especially in Meditations III, V, VI, through the expressions in me, a/ad me, extra/ex me, ex
meis ideis, sine me.
41
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes this point in his chapter, The Cogito. (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.435)
42
Chief among these, of course, is the idea of an infinite substance: God.
43
This is not a self-professed Cartesianism, in spite of Kants relatively mild position toward Descartes in the
Refutation of Idealism and in spite of sympathies with aspects of the Cartesian I think
44
Thus Gil Shalev, in his comments on Peter Harris presentation in the Philosophy Winter Colloquium 2015,
Memorial University. I am myself inclined toward the colder ice palace of a bounded Kantian reason but this
itself does not exclude Descartes, at least in principle, from being a full enlightener. Generally, I want to
thank Gil for discussions with me about Descartes over the years which have been a source of much insight,
especially on the proofs of Gods existence, and the general import of the Cartesian Circle
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45
I owe much to the patience and critical engagement of many of my classes, in this case, especially to the
students, undergraduate and graduate, from various iterations of the Descartes course, several seminars on
Spinoza and Leibniz, and, in the last couple of years also classes in Rationalism and in the History of
Modern philosophy. They have tolerated, encouraged, and written about tortured reflection on rational
subjectivity in its own right and in relation to eternity, helping me in my own reflections on these topics.
46
This paper came, in part, out of a commentary on Samuel Fleischackers keynote talk for an inaugural
conference at Memorial organized by Scott Johnston and Jol Madore in 2013, on Kants What is
Enlightenment? My thanks to the organizers for their encouragement, comments, especially Jol Madores
detailed editorial feedback, and patience as organizers and editors. I have also benefited from comments on
the Descartes material at the 2015 Atlantic Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy and from
discussions with Tom Vinci, whose work has always made Descartes convincing to me.
47
I do stress normative. Why social transformation actually happens when it does may have little or
nothing to do with critical individuals, critical communities, or any such rational actors; the likelihood is that
transformation may happen for a host of other, non-rational reasons. But transformation still presumes that
things can be otherwise, both socially and for an individual.
48
Tawneys actual comment (in Religion and the Rise of Capitalism) was that Karl Marx was the last of the
Schoolmen, probably an even more remarkable (or unlikely) comparison. My own comment is primarily to
emphasize that Descartes, who says change yourself, not the world in the Discourse, has a link of sorts to a
social revolutionary like Marx, for whom such transformation should be of the world as well. And, as Tom
Sorell points out, the two have this in common, that there is a Cartesianism quite distinct from though
related to Descartes himself just as there is a Marxism quite distinct from though also related to Marx. (Sorell
2005, p.xxi)
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----------. (1991), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume III, Translated by John
Cottingham, Robert Stootfhoff, Dugald Murdoch, Anthony Kenny, CUP, Cambridge.
----------. (1964), Oeuvres de Descartes, Volume IX, Edited Charles Adam & Paul
Tannery, J.Vrin, Paris.
Kant, Immanuel. (1997), Critique of Pure Reason. Translated Paul Guyer and Allen Wood.
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: CUP,.
-----------. (2000), Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated Paul Guyer and Eric
Matthews. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: CUP,.
----------. (1996), Practical Philosophy. Translated Mary Gregor. The Cambridge Edition
of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: CUP,.
----------. (1902-83), Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Kniglichen Preuischen (later
Deutschen)
Akadmie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. Berlin, De Gruyter.
----------. (1968), Kants Werke, vols. i-ix, 2nd edn, Berlin, De Gruyter.
Secondary Sources
Allison, Henry E. (2012), Kants Conception of Aufklrung. In Henry E. Allison,
Essays on Kant, OUP, Oxford, pp.229-235.
----------. (1990), Kants Theory of Freedom, CUP, Cambridge.
Broughton, Janet. (2002), Descartess Method of Doubt,
Princeton and Oxford.
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Kenny, Anthony. (2009), Descartes. A Study of His Philosophy, St. Augustines Press,
Indiana (from 1997 and 1958).
Kosman, L. Aryeh. (1986), The Naive Narrator: Story and Discourse in Descartes
Meditations. In Essays on Descartes Meditations, ed. Amelie Rorty, University of
California Press, Berkeley, pp.21-43.
Larmore, Charles. (2006), Descartes and Skepticism. In The Blackwell Guide to
Descartes Meditations, ed. Stephen Gaukroger, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, pp.17-29.
Loeb, Louis E. (2010), Reflection and the Stability of Belief, Essays on Descartes, Hume,
and Reid, OUP, Oxford.
Lewis, Charlton T. and Charles Short. (1879) A Latin Dictionary, founded on Andrews'
edition of Freund's Latin dictionary, revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten.,
Clarendon
Press,
Oxford,
electronic
version:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentr
y%3Dsecedo Accessed Friday, September 05, 2014
Marion, Jean-Luc.(2007), On the Ego and on God. Further Cartesian Questions, translated
Christina Gschwandtner, Fordham University Press, New York.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. (2002), Phenomenology of Perception, translated Colin Smith,
Routledge, (from 1962 translation).
Peacocke, Christopher.(2012), First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes or Kants?,
Philosophical Perspectives, no., 26, pp.247-275
Ripstein, Arthur. (2009), Force and Freedom. Kants Legal and Political Philosophy,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Sorell, Tom. (2005), Descartes Reinvented, CUP, Cambridge.
Statile, Glenn. (2005), Descartes Translation Problem. In International Philosophical
Quarterly, no. 45.2, pp.187-202. (2) (2005): 187-202
Vinci, Thomas C. (1998), Cartesian Truth, OUP, Oxford.
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Afterword.
On Enlightenment and the Most Difficult Problem of the
Human Species
Eplogo.
Sobre la Ilustracin y el mayor problema de la especie humana
Abstract
In this Afterword, I discuss the papers contained in the dossier in regards to a central issue
for Kant: leadership. The issue for Kant is the paradox of the human species need for a
master that is human yet morally perfect. This of course is an as-yet unobtainable
requirement that Kant thinks can only be properly met through a civil constitution. The
issues of elitism and the tension between a maximal and minimal Enlightenment in
light of Kants requirement will be discussed.
Key words
Kant; Enlightenment; Civil Constitution; Leadership; Master; Elitism
Resumen
En este eplogo comento los artculos recogidos en el dossier en relacin con una cuestin
central para Kant: el liderazgo. Kant plantea la cuestin de la paradoja consistente en la
James Scott Johnston, Dept. of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Memorial University of Newfoundland,
sjohnston12@mun.ca .
[Recibido: 19 de octubre de 2015
Aceptado: 30 de octubre de 2015]
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necesidad que la especie humana tiene de un jefe que sea humano, pero moralmente
perfecto. Esta es sin duda una exigencia no alcanzable an, que Kant considera plausible
solo a travs de una constitucin civil. Se discutir el elitismo y la tensin entre una
Ilustracin maximalista y minimalista, a la luz de la exigencia de Kant.
Palabras clave
Kant; Ilustracin; constitucin civil; liderazgo; jefe; elitismo
In providing an afterword for this set of papers on Kant and the Enlightenment
drawn for our first Kant Conference at Memorial University , I am conscious of the
likelihood of merely adding my claims to the claims already put forth. Now all papers raise
the question of elitism to some degree. And this seems a fitting point of departure. But I
dont want to raise an issue that is already raised (and dealt with) by the papers. As such, I
intend to take a different tack: I want to see what theme(s), beyond the Enlightenment
itself, these papers raise. I see one immediately spring forward--leadership. The problem of
leadership as I construe it concerns Kants admonition that humankind needs a master, yet
every (human) master requires a master, for the human species and every human being
therein is morally imperfect. Because this condition cannot hold (we cannot have an
infinite regress of leadership), humankind must rely on masters that are morally imperfect.
In what follows I will briefly outline Kants views on the matter and then discuss
the problem in light of the various claims of the papers. I dont intend on solving the
problem here: I merely suggest that any discussion of the Enlightenment must face this
question, and it is one that has no immediate solutionat least not in the short-term. As
such, I think I can fairly say that for Kant, we belong to an Enlightenment that is as yet
unfinished.
I follow for the most part the English translation of Kants works in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant. These are: An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? Translated by M. Gregor,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by M.
Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; On the Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, But
It is of no Use in Practice, translated by M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; The
Metaphysics of Morals, translated by M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Idea for a
Universal History with Cosmopolitical Intent, translated by A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University
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The solution to this latest problem of humankind, Kant suggests, lies in correct concepts
of the nature of a possible constitution, together with great experience practiced through
many courses of life, as well as a good will that is prepared to accept it (IAG, AA 8: 2223).
Idea for a Universal History appeared in 1784--the same year as What is
Enlightenment? Idea, both being published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift. The one
and the other deal with similar themes, including the political conditions required for any
enlightened age to prosper. But Idea strikes a less sanguine note than What is
Enlightenment? for it presents the problem of leadership of the species as obdurate. And
herein lies the cautionary message regarding the prospects of an enlightened age I think
Kant means for us to grasp: no matter how civil the Enlightenment is, it requires
leadership. The paradox of the human species in need of a master yet supposedly free and
capable of practicing autonomy is perhaps the most intractable controversy to arise from
Kants Ideas essay. Kant doesnt offer a solution to this paradoxat least not here.
Indeed, Kant is quite clear about the nature of the problemafter all, it is the most difficult
of all for the human species. But it is also clear Kant does not think the need for a master
contradicts the autonomy or freedom of subjects; rather(to put it with more precision) he
thinks a resolution to the paradox is forthcoming.
Leadership puts the problems of an enlightened agethose of fractiousness and
disagreement (Foster), the problem of an aristocracy of the Gelehrten (Foster, Pich), the
problem of autonomy and subjectivity on the part of the enlightened (Rajiva), the problem
of the scope or reach of the Enlightenment (Fleischacker), and that of courage (Madore) in
context. For an answer to each of these is partly dependent on the response to the problem
of leadership. And the problem of leadership has no facile solution, for until the conditions
for a civil society and constitution are fully met, the fact remains that humankind will need
Press, 1999; Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, translated by A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
2
I have somewhat adjusted Woods translation.
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a (imperfect) master. I will take up each of these problems in the context of the problem of
leadership, in turn.
Thus I am saying that without a civil constitution, it is less likely that subjects can practice their (moral)
autonomy effectively. As such, the civil constitution enshrines what is a sort of political kingdom of ends. I
realize that this is a controversial issue in Kant scholarship and I dont want to make light of it by such a
facile assertion. However, given the stress Kant places on both enacting a civil constitution and incorporating
that constitution into the (good) wills of humans in communities, I think that, at least in 1784, Kant did think
the two ran together.
4
See for example, Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment, edited by A.
Honneth, T. McCarthy, C. Offe, and A. Wellmer (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1992). I am here thinking of
Habermas and the attempts of German social theorists to construct a legal-political discourse from conditions
of universality and reciprocity. While this view is controversialit seems to deny the sense of Bildung Kant
maintains regarding the Enlightenment in favour of a more procedural accounting of rightsit does seem to
me to fairly represent at least part of what Kant is trying to get at.
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Fleischacker brings this out with particular clarity in the final chapter of his book, What is Enlightenment?
See Samuel Fleischacker, What is Enlightenment? New York: Routledge, 2013.
6
At least in the short-to-intermediate term. Regardless of Kants gesture towards a less rhetorically
hierarchical ordering of the human species in the Doctrine of Right, it is the case that here he is unequivocal.
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peoples and not simply a distinguished social or learned class (TP AA 08: 304). But it
does, I think, require us to extend beyond the reach of the Enlightenment that Fleischacker
wants to say stops at the borders of censorship. A master has the right to dictate what
speech is permitted and what denied through a civil constitution. Does this restrict the
freedom of the pen? No. It doesnt restrict this freedom, as it nowhere inhibits or implies
the inhibition of scholarship; rather it provides penalties to those that contravene the
sovereign. In a maximal Enlightenment of the sort Kant lays out in Idea for a Universal
History, the sovereign through the civil constitution has the wherewithal to lead.
The example I want us to think about is that of hate speech codes. Fleischacker
discusses these most fully in What is Enlightenment? There, the argument turns on the
assumption that obstruction to access of speech or works results in a net restriction of free
speech. So, if restriction of free speech (say, restriction of sexist posters in the workplace)
takes place, there will be a burden on whoever imposes that restriction to create other
spaces where the restriction is lifted.7 In other words, a corresponding obligation is owed
to those whose free speech is restricted--an obligation that must be carried out by the
sovereign under the civil constitution. But this is not the minimal Enlightenment towards
which Fleischacker gestures; it is maximal. And it is maximal because the civil
constitution works through a sovereign--a civil constitution works through a master.8
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Bibliography
Fleischacker, S. (2013). What is Enlightenment? New York: Routledge.
Honneth, A., McCarthy, T., Offe, C., and Wellmer, A. (Eds.) (1992) Cultural-Political
Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment, Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.
Kant, I. Gesammelte Schriften Hrsg: Bd. 1-22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der
Wissenschaften zu Gttingen. Berlin 1900ff.
Kant, I. (2011) An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? Translated by M.
Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1996a) Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by M. Gregor,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1996b) On the Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, But It is of no Use in
Practice, translated by M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1996c) The Metaphysics of Morals, translated by M. Gregor, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
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Resumen
Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) es uno de esos autores que puede ser abordado tanto desde la
perspectiva literaria como desde la filosfica. Dada la diversidad de sus obras, que comprenden
poemas, novelas, as como dilogos y ensayos filosficos, siempre ha constituido un desafo para
las distinciones entre disciplinas, haciendo surgir inevitables dificultades metodolgicas. Incluso su
presencia en el canon an suscita controversias entre los estudiosos: mientras que su papel como
poeta destacado en la Ilustracin tarda y el clasicismo weimariano est con justicia fuera de toda
duda, Schiller ha sido en cambio considerado o bien como un mero filsofo aficionado,
completamente deudor de Kant, o bien como un pensador independiente enfrentado a Kant; estas
dos consideraciones han conducido obviamente a diferentes visiones sobre su posicin en el
interior del canon. En ambos casos, de todos modos, las nicas obras que se han tomado en
consideracin son las que se refieren al pensamiento kantiano, compuestas y publicadas por
Schiller en la dcada de 1790. Por esta razn, ha ganado peso la creencia de que Schiller como
filsofo slo existe gracias a Kant. El propsito de este artculo es poner en duda esta tesis
mostrando la profundidad de la filosofa schilleriana de juventud, as como apuntando a la
continuidad de sus intereses antes, despus y ms all de Kant.
Marie Curie Fellow en la Faculty of Medieval and Modern Languages de la University of Oxford. E-mail
de contacto: laura.macor@mod-langs.ox.ac.uk .
[Recibido: 20 de octubre de 2015
Aceptado: 30 de octubre de 2015]
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1. Introduccin
La pertenencia de Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) al canon filosfico es una cuestin
controvertida y, precisamente por ello, siempre actual. Poeta y mdico, dramaturgo e
historiador, Schiller no se ajusta a los normales lmites entre las disciplinas en muchos
sentidos, y representa justamente por ello un desafo y al mismo tiempo un estmulo para
los estudiosos de su obra. Su talla intelectual no est en discusin y tampoco lo est su
contribucin a la cultura posterior, y no slo la alemana: desde la Novena Sinfona de
Beethoven hasta las peras de Verdi, el impacto de Schiller sobrepasa con mucho la
literatura hasta influir en la msica sinfnica, la lrica y, ms recientemente, la misma
identidad europea. A pesar de ello, paradjicamente, la posicin de Schiller en el panorama
ms especficamente filosfico, desde su poca hasta nuestros das, no ha sido definida an
de manera unvoca, hasta el punto de que todo anlisis estrictamente filosfico de su obra
necesita todava hoy una justificacin preliminar; en efecto, a menudo esos anlisis son
introducidos por captulos metodolgicos y/o historiogrficos en los que se exponen las
razones tericas y/o histricas que legitiman dicho enfoque filosfico.1
Sirva como ejemplo por encima de todos: Beiser 2005, pp. 7-10 (Schillers Status as Philosopher).
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La utilizacin en este punto, e incluso en el ttulo, del concepto de destino del hombre
(Bestimmung des Menschen) es una prueba decisiva de la deuda de Schiller hacia la tica
de su tiempo: introducido hacia la mitad de siglo por el telogo Johann Joachim Spalding,
esta nocin se haba vuelto ms adelante la palabra clave del cruce entre dimensin
metafsica y tica en la lnea de la tradicin del moral sense de procedencia angloescocesa.24
Otro pasaje, extrado de la novela inacabada Philosophische Briefe, publicada en 1786
pero probablemente redactada inmediatamente tras la educacin recibida en la Karlsschule,
confirma el entrelazamiento entre moral y metafsica en el pensamiento del joven Schiller.
Desear la felicidad ajena es lo que llamamos benevolencia [Wohlwollen], amor [Liebe].
[] El amor el fenmeno ms bello de la creacin animada, el imn omnipotente
del mundo espiritual, la fuente de la devocin y de la virtud ms sublime [] El amor,
por tanto, querido Raphael, es la escalera por la que nos encaminamos hacia la semejanza
a Dios (NA XX, pp. 119, 124).
Hasta aqu la pars construens de la filosofa del joven Schiller. Como suele ser
habitual, hay sin embargo tambin una pars destruens que toma su blanco polmico del
contexto de la Ilustracin tarda, y que se lanza consiguientemente contra el materialismo
de cuo francs. En el discurso escrito con ocasin del cumpleaos de Franziska von
Hohenheim, Die Tugend in ihren Folgen betrachtet (1780), el espritu imperfecto de un
La Mettrie se define como una potencial semilla de corrupcin para sus semejantes, cuyas
almas indefensas podran contagiarse del dulce veneno difundido por su pecado y
encaminarse as lejos de su alto destino [hohe Bestimmung] hacia la antigua oscuridad
brbara del animal estado salvaje (NA XX, p. 33).
Una vez ms en los Philosophische Briefe, Schiller formula claramente la
contraposicin frontal entre amor y egosmo, que no acepta compromisos, y la inserta en el
contexto de su propio tiempo:
La filosofa de nuestra poca contradice me temo esta teora [sc. del amor]. Muchas
de nuestras cabezas pensantes han credo poder ahuyentar gozosamente este impulso
24
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divino [sc. el amor] del alma humana, borrar la huella de la divinidad y disolver este
noble entusiasmo en el fro aliento mortfero de una mezquina indiferencia. En el
sentimiento servil de la degradacin de uno mismo se han aliado con el ms peligroso de
los enemigos de la benevolencia [Wohlwollen], el egosmo [Eigennuz], con el fin de
explicar un fenmeno que era demasiado divino para sus corazones limitados. De un
msero egosmo [Egoismus] han extrado su doctrina descorazonadora, y han hecho de su
limitacin la nica unidad de medida del creador esclavos degenerados, que en el fragor
de sus cadenas gritan contra la libertad [] estos peligrosos pensadores [] con gran
derroche de inteligencia y genialidad embellecen el egosmo y lo ennoblecen,
convirtindolo en sistema.
[]
Yo declaro abiertamente que creo en la existencia de un amor no egosta. Estoy
perdido si no existe, renuncio a la divinidad, a la inmortalidad y a la virtud. No me queda
prueba alguna de que pueda confiar en ellas si dejo de creer en el amor (NA XX, pp.
121-122).
Estas son las posiciones con las que Schiller, como alumno de la Karlsschule, entra en
contacto y de las que se apropia: amor, Dios e inmortalidad, es decir, tica y religin estn
ntimamente conectadas y cualquier infiltracin del materialismo debe ser duramente
combatida, dado que puede ser una potencial semilla de destruccin para todos estos
supuestos. A primera vista, la antigua historieta de un joven Schiller adhiriendo
completamente a las posiciones de la Ilustracin tarda y en absoluto preocupado por
problematizarlas no parecera tan errnea. A primera vista, justamente. Pero qu es lo que
cambia en el Schiller lector de Kant? Qu pasa cuando el ex alumno de la Academia,
empapado en moral sense y tesis metafsico-religiosas, entra en contacto con la drstica
reduccin de las facultades cognoscitivas del ser humano y con la fundamentacin
trascendental de la moral que instaura el criticismo?
3. Schiller despus de Kant
Schiller empieza a leer a Kant durante el verano de 1787, cuando se acerca a los
escritos menores aparecidos en la Berlinische Monatsschrift entre 1784 y, precisamente,
1787, como la Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbrgerlicher Absicht y el
clebre ensayo Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklrung?.25 La aproximacin a las tres
Kritiken se pospone hasta comienzos de 1791, cuando Schiller anuncia no sin cierto
orgullo a su amigo, el ferviente kantiano Christian Gottfried Krner, que se ha hecho con
una Kritik der Urteilskraft y que le ha apasionado tanto que siente una urgencia terica de
profundizar en el estudio de todo el sistema (NA XXVI, pp. 77-78). No es casual que, a
finales del mismo ao, Schiller encargue un ejemplar de la Kritik der praktischen Vernunft
(NA XXVI, p. 112), de la Kritik der reinen Vernunft (NA XXVI, 119), y, en muy poco
tiempo, su propsito se haya vuelto el de no abandonar la filosofa kantiana antes de
haberla desmenuzado del todo, aunque ello tenga que llevar[me] tres aos (NA XXVI, p.
25
Para un anlisis del primer acercamiento de Schiller a Kant cfr. Macor 2010, pp. 129-150.
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Por lo que respecta a la pars destruens, evidentemente, existe una identidad de perspectiva
entre el Schiller alumno de la Karlsschule y Kant. Si nos desplazamos a la pars construens,
sin embargo, parece haber una fuerte divergencia: segn Kant, de hecho, la perspectiva
religiosa, ms o menos ligada al sentimentalismo de raigambre anglo-escocesa (Kant
asigna a la tradicin wollfiana un papel central que no tiene en Schiller),26 no se distingue
en el fondo de la materialista, en el sentido de que ambas son generadas por el egosmo.
Hacer el bien porque se espera cualquier tipo de recompensa no en la tierra, sino en el ms
all, no vuelve la buena accin menos egosta (cfr. KpV, AA 05, p. 36), y tambin el
sentimiento moral, este pretendido sentido especial, concede, es verdad, a la virtud el
honor de atribuirle inmediatamente la complacencia y la alta estima hacia ella, pero se
limita slo a no echarle en cara, por as decirlo, que lo que nos ata a ella no es su belleza,
sino nuestro beneficio (GMS, AA 04, pp. 442-443). A pesar de su conviccin de tener
que rechazar el desafo materialista, los filsofos de la Ilustracin tarda no habran sabido,
en realidad, estar a la altura de ese desafo, porque habran terminado por dejarse
contaminar por el enemigo, alojndolo de incgnito en sus sistemas.
Slo hay que examinar los ensayos sobre la moralidad [], y enseguida se encontrar
una mezcla portentosa, sea el destino especfico de la naturaleza humana [die besondere
Bestimmung der menschlichen Natur] (y junto con ella la idea de una naturaleza racional
general), sea la perfeccin, sea la felicidad, aqu el sentimiento moral, all el temor de
26
Sobre la filosofa moral de Kant y sus fuentes, tanto respecto a la vertiente anglo-escocesa como a la
wolffiana, existen hoy en da numerossimos estudios, entre los que cabe remitir a algunos de entre los ms
relevantes: Schneewind 1992; Schwaiger 1999; Wood 2008; Snchez Madrid 2013; Sensen 2013. Schwaiger
2013 (pp. 136-139) ha reivindicado justamente el papel jugado por Baumgarten en la reflexin sobre el
egosmo moral.
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Es preciso notar, obviamente, la vuelta del concepto de Bestimmung des Menschen, que
Kant aqu critica exactamente en la versin de la que Schiller se haba apropiado en la
poca de la Karlsschule, pero que hay que recordarlo el mismo Kant retoma de manera
positiva y transforma tanto en el mbito de la filosofa moral como en el de la filosofa de
la historia.27
Una nica fuente subyace a todos [estos] principios espurios de la moralidad, esto
es, la heteronoma de la voluntad, que tiene lugar cuando el hombre sigue imperativos
hipotticos: debo hacer algo, porque quiero otra cosa, y no el imperativo categrico:
yo debo actuar de esta o de la otra manera, aunque no quiera nada ulterior (GMS, AA
04, p. 441).
De esta crtica no se libra, como ya ha sido mencionado, la tica del sentimiento moral,
hasta el punto de que incluso el filntropo no puede evitar la sospecha de egosmo en su
accin:
Ser benficos, cuando se puede, es un deber, y adems hay algunas almas tan propensas a
la participacin que, aun sin un motivo ulterior que derive de la vanidad o del inters,
sienten una ntima satisfaccin en la difusin de la alegra a su alrededor, y saben gozar
del contento ajeno, si ste es obra suya. Sin embargo afirmo que una accin semejante,
por muy conforme al deber, por muy amable que sea, no tiene valor moral alguno, y que
ms bien se une con otras inclinaciones, como por ejemplo la inclinacin al honor, que
cuando afortunadamente se dirige hacia lo que constituye la utilidad general y es
conforme al deber, y por lo tanto es digno de honor, merece elogios y nimos, pero no
admiracin; en efecto, esa accin carece de contenido moral, esto es, del cumplimiento de
la accin no por inclinacin, sino por deber. Imaginemos de hecho que el nimo de este
filntropo [Menschenfreund] estuviera ennegrecido por un dolor propio que apagase toda
participacin en el destino ajeno, y que siguiera teniendo la posibilidad de ayudar a otros
menesterosos, pero que la pena ajena no lo conmoviera ya porque est demasiado
ocupado con la propia, y ahora que ninguna inclinacin le lleva a hacerlo, se despojase de
esa mortal insensibilidad y llevase a cabo la accin sin inclinacin alguna, slo por deber:
entonces esa accin tendra verdaderamente un autntico valor moral por s misma (GMS,
AA 04, p. 398).
La conclusin es clebre:
Ahora bien, si es preciso que una accin llevada a cabo por deber prescinda enteramente
del influjo de la inclinacin y por ende de todo objeto de la voluntad, no queda nada que
pueda determinar la voluntad sino, objetivamente, la ley [das Gesetz] y, subjetivamente,
el puro respeto [die reine Achtung] hacia esta ley prctica, y por lo tanto la mxima de
seguir esta ley incluso en detrimento de mis propias inclinaciones (GMS, AA 04, pp. 400401).
27
Sobre estas dos vertientes vase: Hinske 1994; Brandt 2007, pp. 57-60, 108-125, 180-221; Macor 2013, pp.
208-212, 248-267.
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Las seis cartas al Prncipe de Augustenburg, escritas entre febrero y diciembre de 1793, nos han llegado
nicamente a travs de transcripciones y no enteramente (de la ltima slo se conserva el comienzo); se trata
de documentos decisivos y olvidados por los estudiosos, que afortunadamente recientemente se han vuelto a
ocupar de ellas. Vase al respecto el amplio y revolucionario aporte de Riedel 2013.
298
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En este texto confluye, con algunas modificaciones y omisiones, la penltima de las cartas al Prncipe de
Augustenburg, esto es, la que lleva fecha de 3 de diciembre 1793, ya citada anteriormente (cfr. NA XXI, pp.
322-333). La tesis segn la cual la eliminacin en el texto publicado de la profesin de fe kantiana (que se ha
recogido en esta contribucin en la nota 28) constituira la muestra de un alejamiento de la fundacin
kantiana de la moral, progresivamente sustituida por una mayor atencin al papel de la perfeccin sensible
(NA XXVI, p. 325), no parece slida, en primer lugar si se repara en las muchas otras afirmaciones
kantianas, equivalentes a aqullas, sobre la pureza de la intencin moral, de las que est plagado el ensayo;
en segundo lugar, por la presencia de una especial consideracin hacia lo sensible ya en 1793. Sobre el
carcter no contradictorio de esta posicin remito a Beiser 2005, pp. 169-182.
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Hinske 1985, p. 1002. Sobre los conceptos clave de la Ilustracin alemana, tanto en filosofa como en
literatura, vase tambin: Hinske 1999; Godel 2007. Acerca de la importancia de estos conceptos para
Schiller, cfr. Macor 2010.
31
Buchwald 1936/1937, p. 64 (1774).
32
Ibidem, p. 50 (1773).
33
Ibidem, p. 52 (1774).
34
Riedel 1995, pp. 17, 23 (1773).
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35
Ibidem, p. 18 (1773).
Buchwald 1936/1937, pp. 64-65 (1774). Sobre la predileccin de Abel por los conceptos de Eklektik,
Selbstdenken y Mndigkeit remito a Riedel 1995, pp. 411-415.
37
Hoven 1984, p. 46.
38
Esta costumbre, habitual en las universidades, estaba cayendo en desuso a finales del Siglo XVIII, as que
su introduccin en la Karlsschule adquiere un valor an ms significativo precisamente si se enmarca en este
contexto histrico. Cfr. Paulsen 1921, pp. 132-135; Riedel 1995, pp. 393-394.
36
302
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Para referirse a este modo de proceder a travs de, pero contra los extremos, se ha hablado de un
procedimiento dialctico-sinttico desarrollado por Schiller desde los ltimos aos como estudiante y que
mantiene hasta la fase kantiana (Hinderer 2013, pp. 161-162). Riedel (1998, pp. 569-570) identifica en la
predileccin de Schiller por el gnero literario del dilogo una clara herencia de la praxis disputatoria
conocida en la Karlsschule.
40
Para un anlisis ms preciso de los Ruber desde este punto de vista permtaseme remitir a Macor 2011.
Una atencin programtica a toda la produccin dramatrgica de Schiller permitira probablemente seguir el
desarrollo del desenmascaramiento del amor tambin en Kabale und Liebe (1784) y en el Don Karlos (1787).
Algunos apuntes en este sentido pueden encontrarse en Riedel 2009; Foi 2013, pp. 81-94.
41
Algunas consideraciones interesantes sobre la naturaleza narcisista del amor y de la creacin artstica como
forma de amor a partir de esta carta has sido formuladas por: Pugh 1996, 179-180, 187, 189, 191-192;
Driscoll Colosimo 2007, 25-27; Robert 2011b.
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Estas referencias a la posible naturaleza ilusoria de la religin deben ser reconducidas a los estudios
realizados en la Karlsschule, y en particular al mtodo psicolgico propuesto por Abel en la lnea de la
Natural History of Religion de Hume (1757). Sobre este punto vase Burtscher 2013 y 2014.
304
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Bibliografa
NA=Schillers Werke. Nationalausgabe. Im Auftrag des Goethe- und Schiller-Archivs,
des Schiller-Nationalmuseums und der Deutschen Akademie, coord. J. Petersen, L.
Blumenthal, B. v. Wiese, N. Oellers, Bhlaus Nachfolger, Weimar 1943ss.
Beiser, F. (2005), Schiller as Philosopher. A Re-Examination, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Brandt, R. (2007), Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant, Meiner, Hamburg.
Buchwald, R. (1936/37), Aus Schillers Kindheit und Jugend. Neue Dokumente, 41.
Rechenschaftsbericht des Schwbischen Schillervereins, pp. 14-83.
Burtscher, C. (2013), Schiller, Hume und die Religionspsychologie. Zu dem Gedicht
Resignation und dem Bcherbestand der Karlsschule zu Schillers Schulzeit,
Philosophical Readings, no. 5, pp. 50-62.
(2014), Glaube und Furcht. Religion und Religionskritik bei Schiller,
Knigshausen & Neumann, Wrzburg.
Dehrmann, M.-G. (2008), Das Orakel der Deisten. Shaftesbury und die deutsche
Aufklrung, Wallstein, Gttingen.
Dewhurst, K., Reeves, N. (1978), Friedrich Schiller. Medicine, Psychology and
Literature. With the First English Edition of his Complete Medical and
Psychological Writings, Sandford, Oxford.
Driscoll Colosimo, J. (2007), The Artist in Contemplation. Love and Creation in
Schillers Philosophische Briefe, German Life and Letters, no. 60/1, pp. 17-39.
Foi, M. C. (2013), La giurisdizione delle scene. I drammi politici di Schiller, Quodlibet,
Macerata.
43
Probablemente no sea casual que una posicin anloga pueda encontrarse en Goethe, que en sus dilogos
con Eckermann sostiene haber seguido un camino semejante al de Kant, pero independiente del suyo; cfr.
Reed 2001.
306
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Resumen
Dentro de la hermenutica filosfica, no es fcil encontrar un trabajo que se acerque con tanto
respeto al pensamiento del poeta, dramaturgo y filsofo Friedrich Schiller como el de Laura Anna
Macor. Si su trabajo destaca dentro de lo que Valerio Rocco ha denominado una autntica
revolucin historiogrfica, es porque es uno de los pocos acercamientos a la obra schilleriana que
hace un deliberado esfuerzo por tomarse su relevancia filosfica en serio, con independencia de la
adherencia de Schiller a la filosofa transcendental kantiana. Frente a obras como la de Frederick
Beiser que, por otra parte, merece un gran reconocimiento por su riguroso estudio y defensa de la
filosofa schilleriana, Macor bucea en la produccin mdica, potica y dramtica del joven Schiller
para dar all con contenidos de carcter legtimamente filosfico, con la intencin de demostrar no
slo la ntima coherencia de su pensamiento, sino tambin su calidad filosfica antes, despus y
ms all de Kant. Lo interesante de este planteamiento es que, al contrario que la mayora de los
intrpretes, Macor no se acerca condescendientemente al carcter hbrido del pensamiento de
Luca Bodas Fernndez, Doctora en Filosofa por la Universidad Autnoma de Madrid desde 2013. E-mail
de contacto: luciabodas@gmail.com .
310
Schiller, sino asumiendo que el mismo es, de hecho, una fuente de riqueza multidisciplinar que no
jerarquiza los saberes. Una riqueza que, adems, es una clara seal de la relevancia actual del
planteamiento schilleriano.
Palabras clave
Friedrich Schiller; Immanuel Kant; Sptaufklrung; educacin; diletantismo
Abstract
Within philosophical hermeneutics, it is not easy to find a work that addresses the thought of the
poet, playwright and philosopher Friedrich Schiller with the respect of Laura Anna Macors. If her
work stands out within what Valerio Rocco has called an authentic historiographic revolution, it is
because is one of the few approaches to the Schillerian work that makes a deliberate effort to take
its philosophical relevance seriously, independently of Schillers adhesion to Kants transcendental
philosophy. Opposite to analysis as the one of Frederick Beiser, one that on the other hand deserves
a great recognition for its meticulous study and defense of Schillerian philosophy, Macor dives in
the young Schillers medical, poetical and dramatic production, finding there genuinely
philosophical content, with the intent not only of stating the intimate coherence of his thought, but
also his philosophical quality before, after and beyond Kant. The most interesting part of her
approach is that, opposite to most of Schillers readers, Macor does not address the hybrid
character of Schillers thought in a condescending way, but assuming it as a source of
multidisciplinary richness that does not hierarchically organize the knowledges. A richness that, on
top of that, is a clear sign of the actual relevance of Schillers thought.
Key words
Friedrich Schiller; Immanuel Kant; Sptaufklrung; Education; Dilettantismus
311
ste, Die Bestimmung des Menschen, era de hecho el ttulo del primer pargrafo de su primera disertacin
mdica de 1779, Philosophie der Physiologie, NA XX, pp. 10-29.
2
Macor, L. A., 2008, pp. 16-20 y pp. 124-147.
3
Storz, G, 1969, p. 19.
312
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ste es el caso tambin de muchos de los intrpretes marxistas de Schiller. Vase especialmente, Lukcs
G., 1947, 1954a y b; y Abusch, A., 1980.
12
Brodsky, C., 1988, p. 132.
13
Schaper, E., 1964, p. 361.
14
Schutjer, K., 1996, pp. 81-115.
15
Cit. en Schulz, H., 1905, p. 153 y Wilkinson, E. M. y Willoughby L. A., 1967, p. cxxxviii.
16
Cfr. Beiser, F. (2005), Schiller as Philosopher, cit., p. 3: Schillers account on aesthetic judgment is
superior to Kants because it recognizes that it is necessary to give reasons for such judgments, reasons that
314
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Schiller, F. (1789) Was heit und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte?
(Antrittsvorlesung am 26, Mai 1789, Jena). NA XVII, T. 1., pp. 359-376). Existe una traduccin de Faustino
Oncina (1991), pp. 1-18.
20
Macor haba hecho notar cmo la extendida conviccin entre los intrpretes de que Schiller haba sido
llamado a Jena para ocupar la ctedra de historia en lugar de la de filosofa se debe a una confusin del
mismo Schiller que, en la portada de la leccin inaugural se haba definido a s mismo como Profeor der
Geschichte. Cfr. Macor, L. A., 2008, pp. 135-136.
21
Villacaas Berlanga, J. L., 1996, p. 226.
22
Safranski, R., 2004, p. 308.
316
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Para un recorrido por los diferentes estudios de Schiller en la Karlsschule, cfr. Safranski, R., Schiller o la
invencin del Idealismo Alemn, cit., pp. 35-146.
24
Dewhurst K. y Reeves, N. 1978, p. 73.
25
Beiser, F., 2005, pp. 14-15.
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Al respecto, es muy interesante el modo en que Mara del Rosario Acosta plantea esta cuestin. Lejos de
poner en duda el valor filosfico del planteamiento de Schiller, Acosta sugiere lo siguiente en La tragedia
como conjuro, cit., p. 143: Frente al inters kantiano en las condiciones transcendentales del juicio esttico,
el anlisis de lo sublime en Schiller muestra que su inters primordial es la pregunta por qu papel juega lo
sublime en la realizacin de la idea de humanidad en aquellos individuos que lo experimentan. Acosta
sugiere que es precisamente en el anlisis final de Schiller de lo sublime donde comienza a percibirse un
claro alejamiento del planteamiento kantiano (p. 121). En definitiva, el inters schilleriano por lo sublime,
ms all del acercamiento kantiano, tendra que ver con la posibilidad de la realizacin de la libertad en lo
real. De hecho, pensar en la posibilidad de una libertad que aparezca, que se manifieste en lo sensible, es para
Acosta una de las grandes diferencias que Schiller establece respecto a Kant (p. 191).
32
Macor, L. A., 2008, pp. 146-7.
33
Beiser F., 2005, p. 203.
34
Heinz, J., 2007, p. 203.
35
Rocco, V., 2009, p. 212.
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A saber: Vom Witz und Scharfinnigkeit (Collins, AA, 25.1: 132-139); Vom Witz und von der
Urtheilskraft. oder vom Vermgen Aehnlichkeit und Unterschied zu bemerken (Parow, AA, 25.1: 310-328);
Vom Witz und von der Urtheilskraft (Parow, AA, 25.1: 341-358); Vom Witz und der Urtheils Kraft
(Friedlnder, AA, 25.1: 515-520); ad 572 (Pillau, AA, 25.2: 754-756); Von dem Vermgen unserer
Seele, Vergleichungen anzustellen (Menschenkunde, AA, 25.2: 959-974); Vom Witz und UrtheilsKraft
(Mrongovius, 1262-1272); Von dem Witz und der Urtheilskrafft (Busolt, AA, 25.2: 1459-1462).
2
O tema do engenho em Kant foi, at hoje, alvo de escasso interesse; ou ento, mais frequentemente, de um
interesse meramente pontual, complementar, servindo a anlise de outros temas. Entre os contributos que a
isto constituem excepes, por se focarem propriamente sobre o tema da abordagem kantiana ao tpico
filosfico do engenho, destaco, entre outros: Best, Otto F., Der Witz als Erkenntniskraft und Formprinzip,
especialmente o sub-captulo Hlle fr die Vernunft: I Kant, pp. 64-66, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1989; Ritzel, Wolfgang, Kant ber den Witz und Kants Witz, in Kant-Studien 82
(1):102-109 (1991); Witz und reflektierende Urteilskraft in Kants Philosophie, en Bacin et alii (ed.): Kant
und die Philosophie in weltbrgerlicher Absicht, Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, vol. IV, 487-96;
Silva, Fernando M. F., Zum Erfinden wird Witz erfordert. On the evolution of the Concept of Witz in
Kants Anthropology Lectures, in Kants Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen, pp. 121-132, ed. Bernd Drflinger,
Claudio la Rocca, Robert Louden, Ubirajara R. De A. Marques, Berlin/Boston, W. de Gruyter, 2015.
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Doravante, todas as citaes de Kant em lngua portuguesa sero da minha autoria, e portanto da minha
responsabilidade, excepo daquelas respeitantes ao Opponenten-Rede, que extraio da traduo que da
pea fez Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos: Sobre a iluso potica e a potica da iluso, Apresentao, Traduo e
Notas de Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos, in Estudos Kantianos, Marlia, v. 2, n.2, pp. 291-314, Jul/Dez.2014.As
nicas citaes que opto por deixar no original so aquelas extradas de dicionrios, por razes bvias. J
com respeito s citaes da palavra de Kant, elasreportam-se sem excepo Akademie-Ausgabe:
Gesammelte Schriften. Hrsg. Kniglich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Berlin: Georg
Reimer/de Gruyter, 1900ff.
4
Der Witz bringt die Krffte in Bewegung. Die Urtheilskrafft hingegen hemmt sie und hlt die
zugellsigkeit des Witzes im Zaum.
5
Der Witz belebt das Gemth durch Annehmlichkeit die Urtheilskraft vergngt es durch Grndlichkeit.
6
Der Witz ffnet ein Feld zu Aussichten, er paart die Dinge, er giebt einem Einfall die Krafft eine Menge
von andern in Bewegung zu setzen und schafft nee Ideen; die Urtheilskraft soll die unbedachtsamen
Ausschweifungen des Witzes hemmen und in Ordnung bringen.
7
Der Witz ist vernderlich um Neuigkeiten begierig und wird ungeduldig wenn ihn etwas lange aufhlt.
8
Der Witzige ist frei im Urtheilen (...). Der UrtheilsKraft besitzt ist behutsam im Urtheilen.
326
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Das Spiel des Witzes gefllt uns wol sehr aber wenn es am Ende ist, sind wir doch nicht damit zufrieden.
Der Verstand sucht sich vom ganzen und Manigfaltigen eine Idee zu machen. Kann er das nicht, so ist er
unzufrieden., e ns, aduz por fim Kant, somos deixados com um blindes Getn.
328
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Schade, Oscar, Altdeutsches Lesebuch Gothisch Altschsisch Alt- und Mittelhochdeutsch, mit Literarischen
Nachweisen und einem Wrterbuche (2 Bde.), Halle, Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1866.
15
Graff, Eberhard G., Althochdeutsce Sprachschatz, oder Wrterbuch der althochdeutschen Sprache, Berlin,
beim Verfasser und in Commission der Nikolaischen Buchhandlung, 1835-1843.
16
Heyse, Johann C. A., Handwrterbuch der deutschen Sprache mit. Hinsicht auf Rechtschreibung,
Abstammung und Bildung, Biegung und Fgung der Wrter, so wie auf deren Sinnverwandtschaft,
Magdeburg, bey Wilhelm Heinrichshofen, 1849.
17
Benecke, Georg F., Mittelhochdeutsches Wrterbuch, mit Benutzung des Nachlasses, Ausg. von Wilhelm
Mller und Friedrich Zarncke,Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1854-1866.
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Consultado em www.http://woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB/
Immer wahrt witz den rein rationalen charakter, auch dort, wo einflusz von esprit vorliegt (Grimm).
330
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Diderot, D., DAlembert, J. le R., Encyclopdie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des Sciences, des Arts et des
Mtiers, Berne, Lausanne, Chez les Socits Typographiques, 1751-1772.
21
Johnson, Samuel; Walker, John, Dictionary of the English Language, London, William Pickering, George
Cowey and Co. Poultry, 1755 (Rev. 1827).
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(...) ein Mischmasch von Vorstellungen der den Verstandes Begriffen sehr schdlich ist.
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Wenn man durch eine Aehnlichkeit eine Sache reproduciren will, so mu es eine wahre Aehnlichkeit in
den Sachen, nicht aber in willkhrlichen Zeichen seyn.
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Sunt autem qvaedam rerum species, qvibus mens ludit, non ab ipsis ludificatur.
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Breve nota
sobre critrios de
traduo
25
Witz und UrtheilsKraft dienen zur Verbindung der EinbildungsKraft mit dem Verstand. Der Witz bringt
die EinbildungsKraft dem Verstand nahe
26
Es gehrt also zur Philosophie viel Witz. Der Witz dient dem Verstande zur Erfindung (AA, 25.1: 518);
e ainda: Zu Erfindung und zu Wissenschaften gehrt Witz, aber es muss noch Wahrheit dazu kommen
(AA, 25.2: 1266)
336
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Traduo
Do engenho e da faculdade de julgar
Immanuel Kant
1784/85
[AA, 25.2: 1262-1272]
Collins, 1772/73: Ao engenho, ope-se a faculdade de julgar. Para inventar exigido engenho, para
aplicar a faculdade de julgar. Para trazer as coisas confluncia e conexo, necessria faculdade de
diferenciao. O engenho a faculdade de comparar, a faculdade de julgar a faculdade de associar e separar
as coisas. s pessoas engenhosas, assoma-se-lhes sempre algo semelhante. Coisas semelhantes no esto por
isso associadas, pois entre as coisas no deve haver a mnima semelhana. Embora os conceitos sejam um e o
mesmo. Semelhana no uma associao de coisas, mas sim da representao de coisas. A faculdade de
compreender a diferena pertence no propriamente ao engenho, mas sim faculdade de julgar. A
perspiccia o gnero de ambas, ela uma capacidade para encontrar detalhes extremamente ocultos. (AA,
25.1: 132)
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Collins, 1772/73: O engenho mutvel, e ama tambm a mutao. Ele ama a novidade, e impaciente
quando tem de esperar muito, a delonga num stio -lhe adversa e intolervel, ele procura sempre forjar
comparaes e novas semelhanas, a mostra ele tambm a sua utilidade. (AA, 25.1: 137)
29
Collins, 1772/73: Engenho e faculdade de apreciao agradam no s a ns, mas tambm aos outros. O
engenho diverte e apraz, a faculdade de julgar tranquiliza a satisfaz. Amamos o engenhoso, mas respeitamos
e reverenciamos aquele que possui faculdade de julgar. O engenho traz as foras [do nimo]ao movimento. A
faculdade de julgar, ao invs, tolhe-as e confina o irrefreamento do engenho. O engenho abre um campo para
perspectivas, ele emparelha as coisas, ele d a uma inspirao a fora de pr em movimento um conjunto de
outras, e cria novas ideias; a faculdade de julgar deve tolher os incautos excessos do engenho, e traz-los
ordem. (AA, 25.1: 135)
30
Parow, 1772/73: A memria a faculdade de reprodues aleatrias de representaes outrora tidas. - Por
conseguinte, ela diferencia-se da fantasia principalmente na medida em que h que poder reproduzir as suas
representaes a contento, uma vez que a fantasia, de modo arbitrrio, volta a trazer as anteriores imagens ao
nosso nimo. A fantasia igual a uma actividade infatigvel, ela , por assim dizer, uma torrente de imagens
que para a flui incessantemente. Por vezes, estas imagens so-nos sabidas, por vezes no, aqui uma imagem
estimula a outra, e assim por diante, sem fim. (AA, 25.1: 314)
Parow, 1772/73: Estas capacidades consistem propriamente apenas no actibus da comparao, e
so totalmente diferentes da sensibilidade, mediante o que as representaes so geradas em ns. Assim,
nestas capacidades, algo depende realmente da constituio fsica do nosso crebro, e no incorrecto,
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Friedlnder, 1775/76: O engenho fugaz, tal como a faculdade de julgar pesada. Assim, os
conhecimentos do engenhoso so efmeros, eles fazem por certo uma impresso, mas no se mantm e no
so interiorizados. (AA, 25.1: 520)
33
Parow, 1772/73: O engenho muito sedutor; se ocorrer a um poeta uma inspirao devidamente
engenhosa, ele antes preferiria ser enforcado, do que asfixiar a inspirao nascena. Ele v nisto uma
espcie de infanticdio, que se oblitere uma to bela criatura do entendimento. Quem tem uma propenso para
o engenho, no a pode sonegar. (AA, 25.1: 133)
Parow, 1772/73: Para alm disso, temos uma faculdade para produzir representaes que nunca
foram conservadas na nossa fantasia, sim, que nunca foram postas nos nossos sentidos, e esta a faculdade
de poetar [Dichtungs Vermgen]. Esta faculdade no apenas um promus condus que exige a representao,
e as representaes to-pouco so renovadas mediante ela, antes representaes novas so produzidas ou
fingidas. (AA, 25.1: 321)
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1. Introduccin de la traductora
El concepto kantiano de propiedad, de Howard Williams, se publica por primera vez en
la revista The Philosophical Quarterly, en enero de 1977 2 . La frase que da inicio al
artculo: Kant no se considera como una de entre las grandes figuras de la filosofa
poltica, justifica doblemente la razn y, en gran parte, el contenido del artculo de
Williams. Es cierto que hasta bien entrada la segunda mitad del siglo veinte la filosofa
poltica kantiana no acapara el inters que ha suscitado en los ltimos decenios. Con
anterioridad a este periodo, la reflexin sobre la obra de Kant se centra mayoritariamente
en su epistemologa, doctrina tica y en la filosofa de la religin. Esto no quiere decir que
los trabajos sobre la filosofa poltica de Kant sean inexistentes, as como pienso que el
lector concordar en que la afirmacin de Williams con respecto al lugar de Kant en la
historia de la filosofa poltica es desafortunada, en ningn modo justificada3. Lo que s es
1
Ricercatrice post-doc della Universit degli Studi di Trento. Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia. Email:
lorena.cebolla@unitn.it .
2
Williams, H.; Kants Concept of Property, The Philosophical Quarterly, 27 (106), 1977, 32-40.
3
Para una lista de las publicaciones sobre Kant en el periodo anterior a la publicacin del artculo de
Williams vase: Kant-Bibliographie 19451990, Ruffing, M. (ed.), V. Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main,
1999. Como hemos sealado, se puede comprobar que el nmero de publicaciones relativas a la poltica y al
derecho en Kant es ciertamente escaso si lo comparamos con aquellas referidas a los tres mbitos de
investigacin por excelencia sobre Kant. Sin embargo, las referencias existen y son relevantes. Curiosamente,
[Recibido: 3 de octubre de 2015
Aceptado: 21 de octubre de 2015]
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hablando por lo tanto de una nocin que no tiene sentido en la relacin directa entre el
sujeto y el objeto, sino que se explicita solo como derecho (es decir, como la contrapartida
de un deber) al que, en este caso, le sigue tambin el hecho de poder ser considerado de
naturaleza jurdica. Hasta aqu no se da ninguna contradiccin entre la explicacin del
autor y el texto kantiano. De hecho, Williams hace hincapi precisamente en la necesidad
da pensar el contrato social o la voluntad general como idea de la Razn que sirve a
fundamentar el concepto de propiedad privada perentoria, dado que esta nocin surge del
reconocimiento por parte de los sujetos de los deberes y derechos que se siguen de una
relacin que hasta el momento el pacto ha permanecido oculta. Esta relacin entre
sujetos se convierte en una consciente y libre, justa, solo bajo la forma de una aceptacin
universal o pacto social. Es en este punto donde la argumentacin se vuelve problemtica,
en el momento en que Williams continua el discurso debatiendo no ya entre la possessio
phaenomenon vs la noumenon, sino entre el estado de naturaleza y el estado civil como dos
opuestos que reflejaran, respectivamente, libertad y coaccin. Williams presenta la
problematicidad que l atribuye al concepto de propiedad kantiana en los siguientes
trminos: Tenemos que imaginar que la tierra una vez perteneci a todos en comn y que
posteriormente decidimos distribuir esta herencia en comn. Pero claramente estas dos
perspectivas se contradicen entre s. O suponemos que los individuos acordaron la
existente distribucin de la propiedad en base a la previa propiedad comn, o podemos
suponer que discutieron tal distribucin de la propiedad y tuvieron que ser forzados a
aceptar dicha posicin. Es imposible suponer que los mismos individuos estuvieron al
mismo tiempo en acuerdo y en desacuerdo con tal distribucin existente de la propiedad7.
Es decir, desde el punto de vista de Williams, el hecho de que la propiedad no se
convierta en perentoria si no hay una coaccin jurdica que la acompae (se cree un estado
de derecho), que surge a su vez de un derecho (natural) de todo sujeto a coaccionar a los
restantes a entrar en dicho estado jurdico, hace de la propiedad un concepto incoherente si
se considera que al mismo tiempo, y a la base de la fundamentacin de este concepto,
subyacen las precondiciones morales de la propiedad comn de la tierra y la de voluntad
comn. De este modo pretende el autor establecer una contradiccin entre el concepto
preliminar de propiedad (o como esta se presenta en el estado de naturaleza bajo las
ideas morales antes mencionadas, que sera dependiente completamente de la voluntad del
hombre), y el concepto definitivo o real de la misma (que dependera en su existencia de
la sancin del derecho). Contrapone pues Williams, como muchos otros, la moralidad del
estado de naturaleza a la legalidad del estado civil, presentando esta contradiccin en
trminos de liberalidad vs coaccionabilidad, y analizando por tanto y en definitiva a la
propiedad inteligible en Kant en base a las consecuencias que esta nocin supondra para el
sujeto por lo que respecta a la autonoma de su decisin en una situacin de derecho
concreta. Esta es una oposicin comn pero del todo desacertada que por lo general
justifica la falta de libertad del sujeto en el estado civil simplemente desde la perspectiva
p. 13.
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Vanse como ejemplos de esta posicin: Willaschek, M.; Right and Coercion: Can Kant's Conception of
Right Be Derived from his Moral Theory?, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17,2009, pp.49
70. Wood, A.; The Final Form of Kants Practical Philosophy, en Timmons, M. (ed.), KantsMetaphysics
of Morals. Interpretative Essays, Oxford University Press: New York, 2002, pp. 1-21.
9
Kant, I.; 5: 33; 6: 222, 394.
10
Vanse por ejemplo: Shell, S.M.; Kants Theory of Property, Political Theory, 6(1), 1978, pp.75-90.;
Tierney, B.; Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant, Journal of the History of Ideas, 62,
2001, pp.381-99; Hodgson, L.P.; Kant on Property Rights and the State, Kantian Review, 15, 2010, pp. 5787.
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Kant no se considera como una de entre las grandes figuras de la filosofa poltica. En
comparacin con las obras de su colega idealista alemn Hegel, sus escritos polticos han
recibido escasa atencin. Esta suerte no es del todo merecida. Kant, es cierto, se ocupa de
la poltica en un modo ms sucinto que Hegel, pero esto no significa que lo que escribe sea
en ningn modo menos profundo.
De hecho, como intentar demostrar, Kant ofrece una importante contribucin a la
comprensin del Estado Moderno. Esta contribucin se hace especialmente patente, a mi
parecer, en su anlisis de la propiedad en los Principios Metafsicos de la Doctrina del
Derecho. Lo que ms le interesa a Kant de la propiedad es su posibilidad en general, o,
como l dice: el modo de tener algo exterior como suyo (6:245). Para l, esta es un
concepto extremadamente problemtico, cuya pertinencia a los asuntos del hombre tiene
que ser explicada por completo. Kant comienza distinguiendo los modos en los que puede
decirse que se posee (besitzen) un objeto. El primer modo de la posesin es el que l llama
la posesin sensible, o fsica, de un objeto; el segundo es el de la posesin inteligible del
objeto. Es este segundo modo de la posesin el que, segn Kant, es con diferencia el ms
importante. Mientras que la posesin sensible de un objeto significa su mera apropiacin
corporal, la posesin inteligible indica una posesin que no es dependiente de la
apropiacin fsica. Posesin inteligible significa, por lo tanto, que una cosa es ma aun
cuando se da el hecho de no tenerla conmigo (ibd.). Este tipo de posesin es la que Kant
define como posesin de jure, o posesin legal de un objeto. En este punto somos quizs
ms afortunados que Kant por el hecho de que el idioma ingls, al contrario del alemn,
posee una palabra que se refiere especficamente a este tipo de posesin: propiedad11. La
11
En el texto original se est refiriendo a la palabra ownership, que traduce el concepto de propiedad por
clara oposicin a la de posesin, entendida esta ltima como tenencia fsica no acompaada necesariamente
de un ttulo legal. No existe ni en alemn ni en espaol una palabra equivalente en este campo que sustantive
el concepto de ser el propietario o dueo de algo, que sea diferente del sustantivo propiedad y que, al
mismo tiempo, se contraponga en un modo claro al tener en posesin algo en un mero sentido de tenencia.
En el texto hemos decidido mantener la traduccin de ownership como propiedad por oposicin a la
posesin, con la asuncin de que a la primera le acompaa en el texto la caracterstica de la legalidad
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propiedad, por tanto, la posesin inteligible (possessio noumenon) debe ser una realidad.
Por el contrario, la posesin emprica es solo posesin en apariencia (possessio
phaenomenon) (ibd.).
Por lo tanto, el problema de cmo la existencia de la propiedad acontece se reduce
ahora a la pregunta: cmo es posible una posesin meramente jurdica (inteligible)?
(ibd.). Otro modo de formular esta pregunta puede ser, sugiere Kant: cmo son posibles
las proposiciones jurdicas sintticas a priori?, ya que de este tipo sera, en efecto, una
proposicin que gobernara la propiedad de los objetos ms all de su posesin fenomnica.
Segn Kant, la proposicin prescindira necesariamente de todas las condiciones empricas
de la posesin en el espacio y en el tiempo. Esto nos conduce a una distincin que reside
en el ncleo de la filosofa kantiana. Desde el punto de vista de Kant, es el Entendimiento
quien se ocupa de los objetos situados en el tiempo y el espacio. En otras palabras, el
Entendimiento se ocupa de los objetos empricos. Pero es la Razn quien emplea
proposiciones que tiene que ver con objetos no limitados en este sentido. La Razn, en
otras palabras, se ocupa de objetos noumnicos. Por lo tanto, el acto de mostrar cmo son
posibles las proposiciones sintticas del derecho es una tarea de la Razn. Entendimiento y
experiencia no son instancias en las que confiar para establecer la realidad de estas
proposiciones. Esto se sigue del hecho de que la propiedad es un nomeno y no un
fenmeno.
Kant presenta de este modo un punto sensato. Al decir que la propiedad es
noumnica lo que est afirmando es que no es un hecho accesible al descubrimiento
emprico. Esto es sensato porque la proposicin que dice esto es mo no puede
establecerse del mismo modo en que se establece la proposicin esto es verde. La
observacin emprica, por muy sistemtica que sea, poco puede hacer para aclarar el
problema. Puede ser que Kant perciba aqu que la propiedad no es un objeto, sino una
institucin que depende para su funcionamiento de la observancia de un sistema de reglas
determinado. Un individuo no puede por s mismo establecer el derecho a una cosa, porque
el derecho consiste en la aceptacin pblica de un estado de cosas existente o deseado en el
futuro. Los derechos, y en concreto los derechos de propiedad, deben ser tan vlidos para
los dems como lo son para uno mismo, de otro modo no existiran los derechos. Kant es
extremadamente claro en este punto. Desafortunadamente, sin embargo, es un punto que en
el que no profundiza, ya que est ms preocupado en mostrar cmo es posible la posesin
noumnica que en descubrir en qu consiste.
Si tal proposicin que permite la posesin noumnica fuera posible, defiende Kant,
tomar posesin de una cierta parte de la superficie de la tierra sera un acto del arbitrio
(Willkr) sin ser una usurpacin. El posesor basara tal acto, discute Kant, en nuestra innata
comn posesin de la superficie de la tierra, as como en la Voluntad General a priori que
corresponde a tal comn posesin (6:359/7), y que permite la existencia de la propiedad
privada. Pero aunque esto implicara que el uso de la tierra estara disponible para todos
(sin distincin), no significa sin embargo que haya sido as natural u originalmente. La
opinin de Kant es, por lo tanto, que la propiedad privada no puede ser independiente de,
ni previa a, todo acto legal.
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Aunque un terreno se considerara o se declarara libre, es decir, abierto al uso de cualquiera, no se puede
decir, sin embargo, que sea libre por naturaleza y originalmente antes de todo acto jurdico., porque tambin
aqu habra una relacin con las cosas[] esta libertad del terreno sera para cualquiera una prohibicin de
servirse de l; para lo cualse precisa una posesin comn del terreno que no puede darse sin contrato. Pero un
suelo que solo puede ser libre mediante contrato tiene que estar realmente en posesin de todos aquellos
(asociados entre s), que se prohben recprocamente el uso del mismo o lo suspenden.
14
John Locke, Segundo Tratado sobre el Gobierno Civil, seccin 25.
15
C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Oxford University Press: Oxford,
1962, pp.200-1.
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de jure. La apropiacin fsica de un objeto es de hecho necesaria para que este sea mi
propiedad, pero no es una condicin suficiente. La posesin emprica no puede ser
equivalente a la propiedad, porque si as fuera, como hemos visto, una cosa no sera
nuestra una vez que estuviera fuera de nuestro alcance. Pero Locke confunde esta forma de
posesin con la propiedad y por esta razn, sugiere Kant, no consigue percatarse de la
necesidad de un contrato social inicial que haga posible la propiedad privada. Desde la
perspectiva kantiana, es la posesin inteligible la que constituye la propiedad privada.
Esto no significa que Kant prescinda enteramente de la nocin de un estado de
naturaleza al tratar el concepto de propiedad. A primera vista podra parecer que debe
inevitablemente prescindir de esta nocin. Aquellos tericos de la poltica que atraen
nuestra atencin al estado de naturaleza lo hacen con la finalidad de que imaginemos
cules seran las circunstancias si no existieran ni leyes ni gobierno. La intencin de
Hobbes, por ejemplo, es la de despertar un malestar y miedo genuinos con respecto al
estado de naturaleza que representa. La vida sin el Leviatn es, cree Hobbes, menos que
humana. Por lo tanto, para l, como para otros muchos tericos del derecho natural, el
estado de naturaleza ha de ser algo que podramos experimentar. Y experiencia es un
trmino clave aqu. Kant usa experiencia en el sentido limitado de experiencia sensorial o
Anschauung. Esta es la experiencia que presenta la filosofa empirista: las cosas en cuanto
inmediatamente aprehendidas a travs de la mirada de ellas (una traduccin literal de
Anschauung). Y es en este sentido en el que el estado de naturaleza no es, segn Kant, algo
que podamos haber experimentado; no ha existido nunca como un estado de cosas
emprico. Los atractivos de Hobbes y Locke con respecto al estado de naturaleza
desaparecen en Kant. Pero, como he sugerido, esto no significa que Kant no haga uso de la
nocin de estado de naturaleza en su deduccin de los derechos de propiedad. De hecho, la
nocin es crucial para l. Sin embargo, esta nocin es una idea de la razn pura prctica, la
cual tiene una realidad moral en lugar de emprica. Como l mismo dice, esta comunidad
originaria del suelo y, por tanto, tambin de las cosas que hay en l, es una idea que tiene
realidad objetiva (jurdico-prctica), y se diferencia de la nocin de una real comunidad
primitiva que es una ficcin (Erdichtung) (6: 251). Del mismo modo que Dios existe en
su filosofa moral para explicar y respaldar nuestras predisposiciones morales, Kant invoca
la idea de un estado de naturaleza como un postulado a priori que procura los fundamentos
racionales para la existencia de la propiedad. Como postulado de la razn pura prctica se
da al parecer un estado natural en el que la tierra estaba en nuestra comn posesin, y,
como postulado similar, se da un contrato social subsiguiente que permite la propiedad
privada de la tierra y sus productos.
Pero no debera sorprender a nadie, aade Kant, el hecho de que los principios
teorticos subyacentes a la propiedad de las cosas exteriores se pierdan en lo inteligible y
no supongan ninguna ampliacin del conocimiento(6:252). Esto es as porque el concepto
de libertad en el que se basan los principios no permite una deduccin teortica. Los
principios, en otras palabras, no tienen realidad emprica alguna. El concepto de libertad
puede derivarse solamente a partir de las leyes prcticas de la razn (el imperativo
categrico) como un hecho de la misma (ibd.).
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acuerdos tcitos por la mayora de los hombres la cohesin social estara en peligro. Como
seala Kant, las condiciones para que yo sea capaz de tener propiedad son las mismas
condiciones que hacen posible para todos el tener propiedad. Sin embargo, como dichos
acuerdos no son existentes realmente ni son reconocibles en las acciones de todos los
hombres, Kant los denomina ideas de la razn pura prctica.
Por lo tanto, en el estado de naturaleza puede haber propiedad externa, pero es
solo provisional (6:256). Es provisional hasta la fundacin de una sociedad civil;
consecuentemente, Kant considera que toda forma de sociedad que no posea una
constitucin se encuentra en un estado de naturaleza. El derecho a tener propiedad le
pertenece a todo sujeto en dicho estado natural, pero esto sucede solo de acuerdo a un
derecho natural que sirve como anticipacin a la sociedad civil. Este derecho no se asegura
gracias al estado de naturaleza, sino mediante la subsiguiente fundacin de una sociedad
civil. En cualquier caso, en el estado de naturaleza poseemos un derecho natural a obligar a
los dems a entrar con nosotros en una sociedad donde la tenencia de propiedad sea
sancionada mediante poderes legales positivos (6:257). Este derecho se considera una
demanda moral absoluta sobre el hombre en el estado de naturaleza. Tan irresistible es esta
demanda que aunque la mayora de hombres en el estado de naturaleza desearan que no
hubiera un estado legal, la suya puede considerarse como una opinin unilateral. Es
nuestro derecho, defiende Kant, forzar a la mayora a ser libre en una brgerliche
Gesellschaft.
Este argumento es caracterstico, ya que contradice en apariencia el argumento
general de los derechos naturales. Kant est diciendo, en efecto, que no existen derechos
naturales tal y como estos se entienden normalmente. Esto se sigue claramente del sugerir
que no existen derechos antes del establecimiento de la sociedad civil. A la base de todos
nuestros derechos reside una constitucin civil (brgerliche). El estado de naturaleza, por
tanto, no confiere de por sningn derecho. Los derechos no son nuestros en un modo
innato. Sin embargo, Kant retiene un uso para la nocin de derechos innatos, y sugiere que
estos estn basados en una presuposicin legal. Esta presuposicin legal consiste en que los
hombres se unirn en un contrato social para establecer un estado civil. As pues, con Kant,
los derechos naturales, paradjicamente, son solo derechos naturales desde el punto de
vista de una ya establecida la brgerliche Gesellschaft. Esto es lo que quiere decir Kant
cuando afirma que el derecho de propiedad dentro del estado de naturaleza es solo
provisional. El derecho depende enteramente de la suposicin que el demandante entrar
con otros en una sociedad civil; y como ltima medida, de que puede ser obligado a entrar
en dicha sociedad16.
La deduccin de los derechos de propiedad no es por tanto tan frgil como podra
parecer en un primer momento. No es una deduccin que dependa enteramente de la
voluntad moral del hombre. Lo que ha de tenerse en cuenta es que Kant establece como
precondiciones morales para la propiedad la de una propiedad comn originaria de la tierra
y sus productos, y un subsiguiente contrato social que permita a cada uno establecerse en
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nicamente al que corresponde a alguien frente a una persona, que est en posesin comn
junto a todos los dems (en el estado civil) (6:261). Aqu Kant expresa su punto de vista
con firmeza. Lo que est diciendo es que la propiedad privada depende siempre de nuestra
original posesin comn de la superficie de la tierra. Tenemos una situacin, por tanto, en
la que se considera a todo el cuerpo de ciudadanos como la salvaguardia de una institucin
que debe ser aceptada en un primer momento a travs de la coaccin.
El fracaso de Kant para resolver esta dificultad en su argumentacin representa una
falla seria de su filosofa poltica que podra llevarnos a rebajar su vala como filsofo.
Pero supongamos por un momento, como hace Goldmann17, que esta falta de coherencia
en el argumento kantiano refleje una falta de coherencia en las relaciones sociales
existentes. El panorama que nos encontramos es el de una poblacin insatisfecha que
soporta una institucin que no refleja del todo sus deseos. Si aadimos a esto la suposicin
de Kant de que los modelos de propiedad en una sociedad deben ser decididos por la
comunidad como un todo, nos encontramos con la imagen de la sociedad civil como una
sociedad continuamente atormentada por la posibilidad del conflicto. El hincapi que Kant
hace en el uso de la fuerza para mantener a la sociedad unida, y el nfasis equivalente que
pone en el acuerdo comn para el establecimiento de las principales instituciones de la
sociedad, son, cuando se los considera a un mismo tiempo, incompatibles. Es esta tensin
en la filosofa poltica de Kant la que explotan los intrpretes marxistas, que dan una
preeminencia particular al postulado a priori de la propiedad comn que provee las bases
para la justificacin kantiana de la propiedad privada. Podemos ver sobre estas bases la
razn por la cual Marcuse afirma que la justificacin kantiana de la moderna brgerliche
Gesellschaft nos lleva ms all de dicha sociedad 18 . Porque, como el mismo Marcuse
seala, los fundamentos que Kant aduce para la organizacin existente de la sociedad no
residen dentro de tal sociedad sino en su opuesto. Segn esta perspectiva, Kant no yerra al
ofrecer una explicacin contradictoria de las relaciones de propiedad; est ms bien
sealando las dificultades que residen en el corazn de la sociedad occidental19.
17
Goldmann, L.; Immanuel Kant, NLB: London, 1971. Su tesis principal es que la filosofa kantiana refleja
fielmente los dilemas del individuo burgus. Vase especialmente caps. 1 y 3, part.2.
18
Marcuse, H.; Studies in Critical Philosophy, Beacon Press: London, 1972, p. 94. La ley civil con Kant,
dice: permanece como una autoridad que no puede ser justificada racionalmente en sus orgenes sin ir ms
all de los lmites de aquella sociedad para cuya existencia esta es necesaria.
19
Durante la escritura de este artculo hice gran uso de los comentarios de W.H. Walsh y Henry Tudor a una
versin anterior del mismo.
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ILEANA P. BEADE
Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina
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del perodo crtico se desarrolla una teleologa trascendental, cada vez ms ligada a la
propia naturaleza y modo de funcionamiento de nuestra facultad racional.
La investigacin se estructura en tres partes. En la primera parte se aborda el
problema de cmo interpretar la teleologa de manera tal que sta no resulte reducida a un
mero patrn de comportamiento, y pueda advertirse su conexin esencial con el concepto
de intencionalidad o estructura propositiva (purposiveness) de la razn. En esta parte
inicial se examinan asimismo las caractersticas propias de toda explicacin en general, a
fin de sealar que el componente teleolgico se halla presente tanto en las explicaciones
cientficas entendidas como procedimientos a partir de los cuales un evento singular es
interpretado como un tem integrado en una serie de relaciones legalmente regladas como
en nuestra explicacin o interpretacin de los eventos en el marco de la experiencia
cotidiana. Ambos modos de explicacin exhiben argumenta Fugate un carcter
intrnsecamente teleolgico, en la medida en que consideran un fenmeno particular como
expresin de ciertas leyes universales: toda forma humana de explicacin y comprensin
es irreductiblemente teleolgica en su nivel estructural ms bsico (p. 99). Bajo la
premisa de una presencia ineludible de aspectos teleolgicos en todo modelo explicativo
ya se trate, reiteramos, de investigaciones cientficas o de la experiencia cotidiana, Fugate
intenta mostrar que en el marco de la doctrina crtica del conocimiento, el objeto
fenomnico exhibe una estructura intrnsecamente teleolgica, por cuanto se lo concibe
como una entidad cuyas caractersticas son resultado del propio modo de funcionamiento
de la razn. El modelo teleolgico de explicacin no debe ser pensado, as pues, como un
modelo contrapuesto a los principios mecanicistas de la ciencia moderna, sino que resulta
compatible con tales principios y, por tanto, con la justificacin trascendental de la
experiencia cientfica, fundada en los principios de la fsica mecanicista.
La segunda parte de la investigacin profundiza en el anlisis de los componentes
teleolgicos presentes en la teora kantiana del conocimiento, para lo cual se examinan, en
primer lugar, algunos antecedentes histricos fundamentales para la comprensin del
concepto kantiano de experiencia. Fugate sostiene que, pese a sus discrepancias, autores
como Hoffmann, Crusius y Wolff conciben ciertos principios ontolgicos como resultado
de leyes que regulan el funcionamiento del entendimiento humano, y parecen coincidir en
el reconocimiento de una estructura teleolgica interna que sera inherente a nuestras
propias facultades cognitivas. Sin embargo, desde la perspectiva crtica, el error principal
en el que incurre el racionalismo dogmtico es que confunde subrepticiamente los
principios de la experiencia con principios determinantes de las cosas en s mismas, y no
reconoce, por consiguiente, los lmites insuperables del conocimiento humano (cf. p. 143).
Si bien Kant recupera nociones de la tradicin racionalista en el desarrollo de su propio
concepto de experiencia, la doctrina crtica trasciende los desarrollos previos, no slo al
establecer el lmite insuperable de todo conocimiento humano, sino al acuar un nuevo
concepto de teleologa. Kant transformara radicalmente los rasgos teleolgicos presentes
en los sistemas dogmticos previos al introducir la nocin de una estructura
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ocupa de sealar los fines esenciales a los que se dirige la razn en virtud de su
constitucin intrnseca; tanto nuestra actividad cognitiva como prctica encuentran sentido
en relacin con la sabidura como meta final. Los objetos de la razn terica, as como los
objetos de la prctica (i.e. los fines representados por la voluntad), reflejan una estructura
interna esencialmente teleolgica, que es, a su vez, resultado de la propia constitucin
teleolgica de la razn.
En sntesis, esta incursin pormenorizada en tpicos fundamentales de la filosofa
kantiana propone considerar la teleologa como hilo conductor a partir del cual interpretar
el carcter unitario y sistemtico de la filosofa crtica en su totalidad, invitando a una
reflexin acerca de las tareas que Kant asume como esenciales en el desarrollo de su
extensa obra filosfica. Fugate desarrolla una lectura que procura traer a la luz la funcin
especfica y sistemtica que desempea la teleologa en los escritos kantianos, realizando
una contribucin significativa a las importantes discusiones que han tenido lugar, en las
ltimas dcadas, acerca de la cuestin.
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DAVID PEA-GUZMN
Laurentian University, Ontario, Canada
Resea : Jennifer Mensch, Kants Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical
Theory, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2013, 258 pp., ISBN: 978022602198
In Kants Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of the Critical Philosophy
(University of Chicago Press, 2013), Jennifer Mensch provides a reading of Kants theory of
cognition that brings its biological and naturalist influences to the fore. In the interest of defending
an interpretation of Kants philosophy as an epigenetic theory of reason, the author tracks Kants
own intellectual development from his pre-critical to his critical stage, with an elucidating reading
of the infamous silent decade that separates them. Along the way, she explores how the concept
of epigenesis that served as the guiding-star for so many debates in natural history from the
seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries became the dominant model through which Kant
approached the theory of knowledge. On the whole, the work paints a portrait of Kant in which the
father of transcendental idealism figures not as the great taxonomer of the understanding (as he is
often portrayed) but as a theorist of reasons organic emergence from out of itself. This ambition is
elegantly contained in the opening sentence of the Introduction, where Mensch writes: This
book is oriented by the conviction that Kant should be fitted into a framework that has begun to
take shape in a number of fields when it comes to thinking about the mid- to late eighteenth
century, a framework that can be called something like organic thinking, or, better yet,
organicism.1
Interestingly, this organicist reading of the Kantian philosophy is not achieved through
some in-depth analysis of the passages in the third Critique where Kant talks about organisms and
Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Center for Evolutionary Ecology and Ethical Conservation (CEEEC),
at Laurentian University, Ontario (Canada). Email contact: dpenagu@emory.edu .
1
Mensch, Jennifer, Kant's Organicism. Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy (Chicago:
Chicago University), 1.
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teleology or even through a focused study of Kants select writings on the life sciences. Rather, it is
established more through a comprehensive re-framing of the Kantian project as a whole. For
Menschs work here is, in a strong sense of the term, a narrative that tells a story about of all the
parts of the architectonic relate as one. This is, I take it, one of the books most impressive
accomplishmentsnamely, that it does not tie its fate either to a passage from one of Kants
various magnum opuses or to a reading of some of his less-known publications, but instead
wagers the weight of its thesis solely on the authors ability to change the readers perspective
concerning the conceptual thread by which these works hang individually and as a collective.
The book is composed of seven chapters (spanning less 160 pages in total) organized in
chronological order. Yet, because of the organic nature of the book itself, the reader may find it
helpful to begin and end her reading of it with the authors brief but commanding Introduction,
which proffers a condensed account of the books global thesis as well as a helpful sketch of the
historical trajectory of Kants development as a thinker from the 1840s to the 1870s. The details of
this sketch get filled out over the course of the book, as the author guides the reader through
Kants many and varied attempts to come to term with what was, quite literally, the problem of the
century: the problem of genesis. How do we understand the emergence of the new? Surely,
mapping the general arc of this trajectory seems to be the books overriding scholarly interest. But
it is also clear that the author has another, more local, goal in mind. She wants to convince her
audience that this trajectory genuinely matters for how we think and talk about Kants single most
groundbreaking advancement: his theory of cognition in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781).
The first two chapters provide the historical background for this organicist reading of Kant.
The first one, Generation and the Task of Classification, discusses seventeenth century debates in
natural history about the possibility of a systematic classification of nature that function as the
backdrop to Kants own organic interests and concerns. Is a taxonomic system of nature possible?
Does such a system presuppose the ontological existence of natural kinds or natural essences? If
not, what grounds taxonomic kind terms? And, if so, how are these metaphysical essences to be
assimilated into the conceptual armature of a largely empirical science? How are these fixed kindterms, moreover, to be reconciled with the evident flexibility and variability of species? Mensch
notes that these debates received their first impetus from Robert Boyles re-introduction of the
Aristotelian concept of natural entelechies into naturalist discourse and that this re-introduction
culminated in the theoretical confrontation between the species nominalism of John Locke and the
preformationist theory of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz that Kant would eventually make it his
job to overcome.
Chapter two, Buffons Natural History and the Founding of Organicism, follows the
consequences this polemic through the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century, naturalists
such as Georges Buffon made remarkable headway in the study of living matter by shifting the
terms upon which the seventeenth century debates rested. First, they replaced the taxonomic
framework of their predecessors with a genealogical one, effectively replacing concerns about the
position of species within a classificatory grid (tables of differences) with new ones about the
phyletic histories of species as a whole (lines of descent). Second, they began employing a new
concept in their study of organisms that wasnt available the preceding century: the concept of
force. Although this concept was originally forged in the context of Newtonian physics, various
naturalists appropriated it for the study of the living. Why? Because this concept gave naturalists a
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model for describing and explaining natural phenomena (organization and reproduction for
example) without having to appeal to outright metaphysical principles, such as Boyles Aristotelian
entelechies. Buffons concept of embryonic expansion and Maupertuiss theory of organic
forces are examples of this cross-disciplinary appropriation. And, as Mensch points out, these
conceptual innovations in natural science were by no means unique or isolated events that stood out
as anomalies in their cultural milieu. Both were part and parcel of a revolution that came to place
organicism at the heart of both science and the arts in the mid- to late eighteenth century.2 This is
the same revolution that Kant would eventually stage in the domain of epistemology.
Chapter three, Kant and the Problem of Origin, is (along with seven) the most important
chapter of the entire book for it lays out the position that will serve as both the foundation for the
rest of the work as well as the authors lead criticism of current Kant scholarshipthe position that
Kants long pre-critical period makes sense only when viewed as a sustained philosophical
engagement with the problem of origin. Mensch makes two arguments that cut against the grain of
received Kant scholarship. The first is that all of Kants publications before the 1780s, from On the
True Estimation of Living Forces (1747) to Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens
(1755) to The Only Possible Argument In Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God
(1763), share one the same objective: articulating a notion of generation [erzeugen] in which the
development of a thing is more than the unfolding [auszuwickeln] of a pre-existent form. Kant
thought there must be a kind of generation (epi-genesis) in which a things development is not
merely the execution of a fixed blueprint but a creative process that allows for the emergence of
something new. Mensch shows that during the pre-critical period Kant systematically invokes
this idea so as to separate himself from the preformationist philosophy of Leibniz and the coarse
empiricism of Locke, from the mechanistic writings of Newton and the mordant dogmatism of
Wolff. Menschs second argument is her continuity thesis (my term). This is her assertion that
there is no real break between Kants pre-critical and critical periods. There is only continuity.
The theory of epigenesis he starts developing in the 1740s and 50s in his writings on natural
science and cosmology is the same theory that, in refined and modified form, grounds his system of
transcendental idealism in the 1780s and 90s.
The details of this continuity thesis then get spelled out in chapters four and five, where
Mensch argues that Kants epistemological writings (on the genesis of ideas) follow quite
organically from his early writings on cosmology and natural science (on the genesis of planets and
animals). In chapter four, The Rebirth of Metaphysics, she argues that well before the silent
decadein works such as Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766) but also the 1769 DissertationKant
was already wrestling two epistemological problems that would frame his critical account in 1781:
(1) the problem of the origin of ideas (which Kant tackles by splitting sense and intellect) and (2)
the problem of their rightful employment and possible abuse (which Kant described as a problem
of subreption, i.e., of using concepts outside their legitimate field of applicability). These
epistemological ventured convinced Kant that the way to get metaphysics unstuck from the
morass of empiricism and rationalism was to move metaphysics in the direction of a science of
limits, which could only be achieved via an epigenetic theory of knowledge. But, as chapter five
makes clear, it would be a mistake to think that these early interests in the problem of genesis
appear before 1770 only then to be submerged during the silent decade. During this period, to
start, Kant was fully immersed in questions concerning the logic of genesis, formation and
2
Ibid., 50
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inheritance. Indeed, it is in the years leading up to the full-fledged articulation of the critical
standpoint that he manages to crystalize (Menschs word) the all-important concept of teleology
that sneaks into the first Critique vis--vis the transcendental imagination and later acts as the
organizing principle in the third Critiques investigation of judgment. Furthermore, Mensch claims,
it is also through the writings of this period (especially his anthropological discourses on race) that
Kant first conceives of humanity as possessing a germ of reason, the same germ that spawns the
laws of the understanding in the first Critique and secures the prospects of moral action in the
second. With this move Mensch draws a continuous arch of epigenetic thinking that cuts through
entire Kantian corpus and brings together under a single parabola the murmurs of the pre-critical
stage, the presumed silence of the 1770s and the decisive roar of 1781.
Having establishing this continuity, Mensch directly takes up the question that would have
been at the center of Kants thinking while writing the Critique of Pure Reason: What does it mean
to talk about the genesis of reason or the emergence of concepts and concepts within a
transcendental framework that stands in sharp opposition to empirical psychology? In Empirical
Psychology in Tetens and Kant, Mensch claims that Kant develops a notion of metaphysical
epigenesis that reconciles the anti-empirical demands of the newly born transcendental framework
and the temporal logic of the concept of epigenesist itself. Framed through Kants often neglected
relationship to philosophical writings of J.N. Tetens, this chapter sheds light on the two strategies
by which Kant broke away from the allure of empirical psychology: 1) his appeal to the
transcendental imagination and 2) his discussion of epistemic right.
Kants Organicism closes with an imposing final chapter that takes a birds-eye point of
view on Kants architectonic of reason. Drawing on content from the previous chapters, Mensch
clarifies that Kants view of reason and the philosophical system that articulates it (the Bauplan)
are both modeled after an organic theory of animal development. Kant leans on the notion of
epigenesis to explain how reason grows. He uses it to explain, on the one hand, the metaphysical
genesis of the laws of reason and, on the other, the historical development of reason as a whole.
More importantly, however, Mensch makes the strong claim that only as an effect of Kants
appropriation of a biologically-informed theory of genesis does the the centerpiece of [Kants]
theory make any sense: the infamous transcendental deduction of the first Critique. Readers
interested in how this crucial component (the deduction) functions within the entire Kantian system
or how the entire system turns on it are likely to find this final chapter particularly rewarding.
It is exciting to see a work of scholarship that combines textual exegesis with historical
analysis in a clear yet sophisticated fashion. And it is even more exciting to come across a work
that paints a picture of the man from Knigsberg that is as relevant for philosophy as it is for
history, biology and the history of biology.
Even so, the book suffers from two distinct shortcomings. The first one is the provinciality
of its audience. Although its content is germane to debates in philosophy, history and biology, the
work is written only with a philosophical audience in mind. In fact, it seems to be written almost
exclusively for Kant scholars that already have a solid grasp of the three Critiques and their place
in the history of Western philosophy. Philosophers who do not specialize either in Kantian
philosophy or in the early modern period more generally might struggle with some sections (e.g.,
the discussion of Leibniz in chapter two, the description of the logical versus the real use of the
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intellect in chapter four, and the analysis of the transcendental deduction in chapter seven), while
non-philosophers might be entirely overpowered by them. My advice for these readers is to consult
the footnotes whenever possible since the majority of them are elaborations of ideas contained in
the body of the work and not simply references to primary or secondary sources.
The second shortcoming of the work is that, in a way, it lacks a conclusion. If Mensch is to
be commended for her ambitiousness in taking Kants whole intellectual trajectory as her object of
study, she may be criticized for the chariness of her overall approach. She limits herself to
describing the implications of her interpretation only in relation to Kants own philosophy. But
there is virtually nothing in the book about what this might mean beyond that; nothing about what
this reading might teach us about Kantianism after Kant. What might Menschs thesis tell us, for
instance, about Hegels meta-critique of Kant in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) or about
Nietzsches attacks in Genealogy of Morals (1887) and Twilight of the Idols (1888) in the
nineteenth century? Or about how the tenets of Kantianism were mobilized by neo-Kantians,
phenomenologists, moral theorists and epistemologists in the twentieth? What might her argument,
moreover, have to say about the state of Kantian scholarship today in Europe, North America, Latin
America or elsewhere? And what might it teach us about the current uptake of Kants teleological
discourse in the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of evolution? Could it be that this
epigenetic perspective brings to light new links between Kants theory of cognition and
contemporary neuroscience or that it helps us make new interventions in ongoing debates about the
origin of consciousness, rational choice theory and social epistemology? Why and how, in short,
should Kants organicism matter?
To be sure, Kant was a complicated thinker with a multi-faceted legacy, and no single
work can begin to contain all these facets at once. Plus, a book without self-imposed limits is
hardly a book worth reading. Still, the book would have benefited from an additional chapter or
two investigating some of the thesiss implications (maybe just one or two!) beyond Kants own
corpus. As it stands, it is almost as if Mensch finishes the book a few bricks short of a load; almost
as if she refuses, perhaps in line with the spirit of the very Kantian philosophy she studies, to go
beyond the bounds of her island of early modern research and leap into more speculative territory.
Yes, she has rearranged this island from within in a creative manner and put Kantianism in a new
frame. But readers interested in what this rearrangement and this reframing might mean to those
who live in different islands have no choice but to turn their backs to the Pillars of Hercules and, as
Francis Bacon would have it, embark on the voyage themselves.
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Caimi, Mario, Kants B Deduction, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
2014, pp. 140. ISBN: 978-2-85944-569-0
El libro Kants B Deduction de Mario Caimi es una traduccin al ingls del francs Leons
sur Kant. La dduction transcendantale dans la deuxime dition de la Critique de la
raison pure, basado en un curso dado por el autor en la Universidad de la Sorbonne en el
ao 2004. El libro cuenta con un prlogo, una introduccin, tres captulos y una
conclusin.
En el prlogo, el autor expresa que la intencin del libro es exponer el argumento
de la deduccin trascendental de la segunda edicin de la Crtica de la razn pura como un
todo. Los lineamientos fundamentales de esta exposicin consisten en presentar el
argumento de la deduccin como un enriquecimiento sinttico y progresivo del principio
aperceptivo. As, este anlisis propone leer el texto como una exposicin ejecutada
siguiendo el mtodo sinttico, lo que le dara una unidad argumental clara, atendiendo a su
vez a la tarea negativa de la deduccin de demostrar que las categoras no son conceptos
vacos.
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El captulo 1 Unidad y el objeto comienza (15) por el mtodo sinttico que ha
de aplicarse al pensar puro en tanto pretende referirse al ser. Los conceptos por enriquecer
y esclarecer son enlace (combination) y sntesis. Aqu se descubre que el mltiple es
condicin de posibilidad de la sntesis, as como la unidad lo es de ambos. Mientras la
sntesis de la imaginacin se limita a reunir el mltiple, la sntesis pensada en el concepto
da la regla de dicha reunin. La regla gua a la sntesis y le da unidad. Partiendo del
concepto difuso de enlace, se aslan las nociones de mltiple, actividad sinttica y regla
dada en el concepto. En tanto la regla brinda unidad a la sntesis y al mltiple, se revela
que la unidad es condicin de ellos. El enlace no es dado, sino que es la forma del
pensamiento, la representacin de la unidad sinttica del mltiple, unidad que no es
producto de la sntesis, sino su condicin. Esta unidad dada por la regla no es dada en un
hecho concreto, ni es la categora de unidad; es la unidad de la experiencia como un nico
todo, cuyo sujeto debe ser un s mismo nico.
Al abordar el 16 el autor indica que aqu Kant intenta determinar el principio que
se enriquecer progresivamente por medio del mtodo sinttico a lo largo de la deduccin:
El Yo pienso debe poder acompaar a todas mis representaciones (B131). Este principio
se presenta como aquello que posibilita la unidad de todas las representaciones, en tanto
abarcadas en la nica serie de las representaciones de un nico s mismo, de modo que
todo mltiple de la intuicin tiene una referencia necesaria al Yo pienso en el mismo
sujeto en el que ese mltiple se encuentra (B132).
La intencin de Kant no es probar la existencia de una sustancia pensante, ni
abordar las caractersticas de la persona, sino tratar cierta caracterstica de las
representaciones mismas: deben poder ser pensadas por un mismo sujeto. Este principio
sera adecuadamente cumplido an si las representaciones fueran atribuidas a diversos
yoes, sin mediar unidad ni sntesis de ellas.
Para garantizar la unidad de todas las representaciones en una nica experiencia, el
sujeto que las piensa debe concebirse como idntico a s mismo. Conciencia de s y
conciencia de su identidad son las notas distintivas del yo. La nocin de yo se introduce
para explicar la unidad que se impone a las representaciones por medio de la sntesis. Es la
identidad del s mismo lo que evita la dispersin de los actos del pensar y, en consecuencia,
de las representaciones. El acto de la espontaneidad del entendimiento se llama
apercepcin, y la representacin yo pienso es generada por la autoconciencia.
La apercepcin se refiere a la unidad e identidad del s mismo como a la de todas
las representaciones en tanto referidas a un nico yo. Estas representaciones pertenecen al
sujeto por una actividad sinttica. Esta sntesis es la condicin de la identidad del s mismo.
No es el yo pienso asociado a cada representacin lo que les brinda unidad, sino la
conciencia de la sntesis del mltiple. Slo la conciencia de la unidad de la sntesis permite
la identidad de la conciencia y la unidad del mltiple. La conciencia de esta unidad de la
sntesis requiere la unidad de mltiples actos sintticos por medio de los cuales las
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representaciones se renen. As, hay una relacin de dependencia recproca entre identidad
de la conciencia y mltiple intuitivo. Sin mltiple intuitivo, no hay sntesis; sin sntesis no
hay conciencia de la identidad de s a travs de los mltiples actos de sntesis. Sin
conciencia de la identidad no hay reunin del mltiple en la unidad. De esta manera, se
descubren las notas distintivas de identidad y apercepcin que hacen del yo y de la sntesis
los conceptos a ser integrados en el principio aperceptivo. El trmino vago yo pienso es
reemplazado por el concepto ms preciso de apercepcin que supone lo autoconsciente,
idntico y nico de un s mismo activo que lleva a cabo las sntesis estudiadas. La sntesis
que ha de reunir al mltiple debe ser a priori en tanto su unidad (dada por la regla de un
concepto) no puede ser tomada de la sensibilidad. As, la unidad sinttica no es un
contenido de la conciencia, sino la forma de toda representacin para poder ser contenida
en una nica conciencia, poder acompaar el yo pienso. Esta es una primera condicin de
la objetividad.
El 17 incorpora las nociones de uso del entendimiento, conocimiento y objeto. La
cuestin ser cmo la representacin tiene validez objetiva, i.e. referencia a un objeto. La
clave de la validez objetiva de las representaciones recae en la sntesis. Tendrn validez
objetiva las representaciones cuya sntesis sea llevada a cabo segn una regla que haga
necesarios a los mltiples elementos de un concepto para conformarlo a ste.
Slo a travs de un concepto que imponga una regla a la sntesis de forma tal que
sea necesario el enlace del mltiple intuitivo ser posible para estas representaciones tener
una referencia a un objeto (validez objetiva). El concepto de objeto en general es el que
brinda la regla de sntesis del mltiple intuitivo que permite la representacin de un objeto
como tal. Pero la sntesis ejecutada en concordancia con este concepto no produce slo la
unidad analtica que puede encontrarse en todo concepto emprico, sino la unidad sinttica,
basada en la necesidad de la unidad de la apercepcin. La unidad sinttica que hace posible
toda unidad analtica es la sntesis fundamental que brinda la regla universalmente
necesaria de toda sntesis de las representaciones: el principio aperceptivo. As, el principio
aperceptivo es la condicin suprema de toda validez objetiva de las representaciones. La
unidad de la conciencia que hace posible al entendimiento como facultad del
conocimiento, posibilita el conocimiento de objetos. La referencia de las representaciones
a un objeto se basa en la unidad de la conciencia; y el objeto mismo es dependiente de la
unidad de la apercepcin.
El 18 precisa el sentido de la objetividad atribuida al principio aperceptivo. Para
ello, se distingue una unidad objetiva de una subjetiva (sntesis asociativa). Mientras la
sntesis asociativa se sostiene en la asociacin contingente del contenido de la experiencia,
la unidad objetiva supone una sntesis aplicada sobre el mltiple intuitivo puro y
homogneo del tiempo, unidad que no sera posible por una sntesis asociativa. El enlace
necesario del mltiple intuitivo puro (cuya regla es el principio de la unidad necesaria de la
apercepcin) constituye la objetividad y la unidad objetiva sobre la cual se vuelve posible
el enlace contingente de la conciencia emprica referida a datos de la experiencia.
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El 19 se propone explicar la estructura interna de la sntesis antes considerada.
Aqu se agrega un nuevo elemento: el juicio. Este juicio no es, advierte el autor, propio de
la lgica formal que se ocupa de la relacin entre representaciones, sino un elemento de la
lgica trascendental en el que se trata de la relacin de conocimiento bajo la unidad
aperceptiva. Es aquello correspondiente a la actividad del entendimiento.
Mientras la sntesis asociativa se enuncia bajo la forma de juicios de percepcin que
expresan representaciones enlazadas contingentemente en la conciencia emprica, la
sntesis objetiva se expresa en juicios que omiten toda referencia a m y a mis
representaciones y establecen nicamente un enlace de representaciones en el objeto
mismo. Al enlace necesario establecido por el concepto de objeto en general se
corresponde la forma impuesta por el juicio.
Demostrado que la subsuncin del mltiple bajo la forma del juicio se corresponde
con la unificacin objetiva del mltiple bajo la unidad de la apercepcin, resta evaluar si la
forma del juicio supone un concepto a priori, lo que demostrara que esos conceptos a
priori se refieren a objetos. La respuesta se encuentra al considerar las categoras como
conceptos por los que el mltiple intuitivo es determinado con respecto a las funciones
lgicas del juicio.
El 20 incorpora el concepto de categora al principio aperceptivo. Hasta aqu, se
concluy que el mltiple intuitivo debe ser determinado por las funciones lgicas del juicio
a fin de ser integrado en una nica conciencia. Definiendo a las categoras como conceptos
que refieren el mltiple intuitivo a un objeto, puede reemplazarse las funciones lgicas
por las categoras como conceptos que expresan tal enlace. As, se afirma que el mltiple
intuitivo debe encontrarse sujeto a las categoras. Vemos cmo el texto avanza hacia la
meta indicada por el autor (demostrar que las categoras no son conceptos vacos) y por
medio del mtodo indicado (enriqueciendo progresivamente el principio aperceptivo).
El captulo 2 La aplicacin de las categoras ( 21-25) comienza indicando que,
llamativamente, en el 20 no se hizo referencia al objeto, sino a la objetividad de los
enlaces sintticos. Luego de presentar la enorme variedad de interpretaciones que intentan
explicar por qu la deduccin trascendental tiene dos partes, el autor ofrece su punto de
vista: esta segunda parte no se ocupa de la objetividad de la sntesis de las
representaciones, sino que debe enfrentarse a un elemento absolutamente heterogneo al
pensamiento e independiente de las categoras: la presencia efectiva del objeto en la
sensibilidad, dependiente de la afeccin. Debe explicarse la aplicacin de las categoras al
objeto dado.
Para esto, Kant reformula en B144 el principio aperceptivo, enriquecindolo al
incorporar la referencia a la intuicin emprica. En tanto la intuicin emprica es dada por
medio de la afeccin, debe incorporarse el particular modo en que sta es dada a fin de
acreditar la validez de las categoras respecto del objeto de los sentidos (B145). El anlisis
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modo que el objeto emprico no slo est sujeto a la forma del tiempo, sino contenido en
un nico tiempo.
La sntesis figurativa es aquella encargada de ejecutar esta actividad sinttica sobre
el mltiple puro de la intuicin humana, diferencindose de la sntesis intelectual, en la que
se considera el enlace de un mltiple intuitivo en general. Se la llama tambin sntesis
trascendental de la imaginacin.
Esta facultad se presenta como una faceta de la espontaneidad. La actividad del
entendimiento capaz de hacer que el mltiple sea acompaado por el yo pienso se
dividira en dos momentos. Por un lado, la sntesis; por el otro, el concepto o regla que le
da unidad. La regla es seguida por la imaginacin en su actividad de sntesis. Terminada
esta tarea de sntesis, el entendimiento reconoce la unidad del concepto en el producto
terminado de la imaginacin. Con ello, recibe el mltiple su unidad y es reconocido como
unificado. Con estos elementos, se ve enriquecido el principio aperceptivo, habindose
descubierto que la unificacin del mltiple intuitivo de la sensibilidad humana exige una
actividad sinttica ejecutada por la imaginacin unificada por la regla brindada por el
concepto del entendimiento (bajo la forma de un juicio).
En tanto la cuestin que debe resolver la incorporacin de la imaginacin consiste
en explicar cmo el entendimiento aborda un mltiple absolutamente heterogneo al
pensar, la facultad de la imaginacin debe corresponder tanto a la sensibilidad como a la
espontaneidad. Mientras en la edicin de 1781 la imaginacin es considerada una facultad
autnoma, en la segunda edicin consiste en una funcin del entendimiento, en tanto ste
se dirige a la sensibilidad. La imaginacin no sera otra cosa que el entendimiento en tanto
ste obedece no slo a sus principios lgicos, sino tambin a aquellas determinaciones que
le impone la forma de la intuicin (la determinacin del objeto no solamente por medio de
la forma del antecedente y el consecuente, sino por medio del antes, el despus y la
simultaneidad).
El final del 24 presenta la paradoja del sentido interno. Autores como Paton, Carl,
De Vleeschauwer y Allison han entendido que esta seccin rompe la lgica argumental del
texto de la deduccin. El autor entiende que esto se concluye al no advertir que aqu no se
trata de una exposicin del concepto de yo, sino de una discusin sobre la aplicacin del
entendimiento a la sensibilidad pura, lo que no debe ser tenido por conocimiento de s.
La paradoja del sentido interno constara de tres paradojas. La primera tratara
sobre el hecho de que la intuicin pura del sentido interno no d conocimiento sobre el s
mismo. La segunda tratara sobre el hecho de haber, aparentemente, dos s mismos que
concuerdan y no concuerdan a la vez (uno, pensante, el otro, de la intuicin). La tercera
paradoja tratara sobre el hecho de que la apercepcin misma no sea auto-conocimiento.
Las dos primeras paradojas se refieren a la intuicin y se basan sobre la restriccin del
conocimiento al terreno de las apariencias. La tercera paradoja se apoya en un examen de
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la apercepcin: el yo, aun siendo autoconsciente, no puede conocerse sino es por medio de
la auto-afeccin del sentido interno. El autor analiza este punto.
La cuestin se presenta bajo la forma de un anlisis de la sntesis de la imaginacin.
La sntesis de la imaginacin es llevada a cabo al interior del sujeto en tanto es efectuada
sobre el mltiple de la intuicin pura. Esto supondra una afeccin del sentido interno por
medio de la actividad sinttica del entendimiento. Atendiendo nicamente al acto sinttico,
debe explicarse por qu la pura espontaneidad no da conocimiento del s mismo.
En el 25 se presenta el problema en su forma definitiva: La conciencia de s
mismo dista todava mucho de ser un conocimiento de s mismo (B158). El sentido
comn dira lo contrario: la autoconciencia intelectual debera bastar para conocer la
existencia del s mismo. Llamativamente, Kant tambin hace esta afirmacin (cfr. B157),
pero esto no sera una apropiacin del cogito cartesiano. Lo existente no sera un yo en s
mismo, sino el sujeto como condicin necesaria aunque insuficiente del conocimiento,
una existencia en el pensamiento (la mera posibilidad de la existencia). La existencia
efectiva del objeto exige intuicin. Con ello Kant nos dice, entiende el autor, que el
pensamiento no es una determinacin suficiente de la existencia.
Ahora bien, cabe preguntarse qu es aquello que se nos presenta en la autoafeccin. El material dado en el sentido interno no debe ser tenido necesariamente como la
aparicin del s mismo. Cul s sera el fenmeno del s mismo? El s mismo slo podra
ser conocido por medio de la sensibilidad, en la medida en que ste la afectara. Tal
afeccin sera la elaboracin formal del mltiple dado. Kant no explica cmo podramos
conocer la existencia del s mismo a partir de esta actividad. Slo indica que tal existencia
no es la propia de los fenmenos, ni de las cosas en s. No es la categora de existencia
aplicable a los objetos de la sensibilidad. En todo caso, quedara claro que el conocimiento
del s mismo no puede estar sustentado en la apercepcin.
El captulo 3 la aplicacin de las categoras a los objetos reales (26-27 y
Breve concepto de esta deduccin) comienza por abordar el 26. En l se llevara a cabo
el paso decisivo de la deduccin. En l se introduce el mltiple intuitivo emprico que nos
da objetos efectivamente reales. En tanto la deduccin deba demostrar que las categoras
no son conceptos vacos, lo que debe demostrarse aqu es que este contenido emprico
tambin puede ser sintetizado por el enlace categorial.
En su primera seccin (B160-B163) se demostrara que toda representacin
emprica se encuentra sujeta a la sntesis de apercepcin. Para ello, se introduce la sntesis
de aprehensin, por medio de la cual se enlaza el mltiple produciendo una intuicin
emprica. En tanto el mltiple intuitivo slo puede ser dado bajo las formas de espacio y
tiempo, y stos como intuiciones puras que ofrecen un mltiple intuitivo puro son
unificados por la sntesis figurativa, la sntesis de la aprehensin debe adecuarse a la
unidad de stos dada por los conceptos puros del entendimiento. De esta manera, el
mltiple intuitivo emprico, sintetizado por la sntesis de la aprehensin, es ubicado en su
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respectiva parte de un tiempo y espacio unificados. La unidad de la sntesis del mltiple es
condicin de posibilidad de la sntesis de toda aprehensin (B160), de modo que sta se
encuentra sujeta a las categoras. As se probara la aplicacin de las categoras a los
objetos efectivamente existentes y, siguiendo el hilo conductor de la deduccin, se
completara el enriquecimiento progresivo del principio aperceptivo, integrando el mltiple
emprico a la apercepcin.
En su segunda seccin (B163-B165) se probara que todo fenmeno debe estar
sujeto a las leyes del entendimiento. Aqu, la cuestin ser explicar la aplicacin de las
categoras a la naturaleza misma. En tanto la naturaleza es la suma de todas las apariencias,
y stas se encuentran sujetas al enlace categorial, puede decirse que el entendimiento
prescribe leyes de uniformidad de los objetos y de la naturaleza. As, el principio
aperceptivo se ve enriquecido con la introduccin del concepto de naturaleza.
En el 27 contamos con una conclusin y la introduccin del concepto de
epignesis. La epignesis sera una metfora biolgica para explicar el origen de las
categoras y la relacin del pensamiento con la existencia de objetos empricos. Frente a un
posible origen emprico de las categoras o una explicacin innatista, la figura de la
epignesis explicara metafricamente a las categoras como conceptos adquiridos
originados en la actividad del entendimiento humano. En segundo lugar, la nocin de
epignesis se aplicara al surgimiento del conocimiento emprico, originado por la
intervencin del entendimiento y la sensibilidad. As, ni pensamiento ni ser preexisten el
uno al otro. Entendimiento y sensibilidad son los padres del conocimiento en esta metfora
biolgica. Por el contrario, la preformacin habra supuesto que los conceptos puros, la
naturaleza y sus leyes existieran independientemente y sin relacin recproca.
En el tratamiento del breve concepto el autor muestra la integracin de todos los
elementos considerados en una frase compleja que admite mltiples interpretaciones y
traducciones.
Finalmente, en el captulo Conclusiones, el autor recapitula sobre los puntos
principales de su investigacin: haber mostrado el mtodo seguido por Kant en la
deduccin B, exhibiendo as su unidad estructural y argumentativa; esclarecer la meta de
esta deduccin en la demostracin de que las categoras no son conceptos vacos; presentar
al principio aperceptivo como nico principio admitido por la deduccin y
progresivamente enriquecido por la incorporacin de los conceptos de identidad del s
mismo, apercepcin, sntesis y unidad sinttica, objeto, intuicin y, finalmente, naturaleza.
En esta detallada resea hemos intentado hacer apreciable la unidad y coherencia de
la interpretacin propuesta por Mario Caimi. El libro se propone objetivos precisos que
cumple de manera clara y profunda. Sin desviarse innecesariamente en la discusin de
problemas secundarios que haran al lector perder el hilo conductor de la propuesta
interpretativa, el autor demuestra paso a paso la concatenacin lgica del argumento
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expuesto en la deduccin, teniendo siempre a la vista la meta que l entiende este texto
perseguira y el mtodo empleado por Kant para su consecucin. A tal explicacin, por un
lado, detallada y, por el otro, integradora, se agrega como notas a pie un cuerpo textual que
incluye la referencia a las obras de otros especialistas y la discusin de sus posiciones. Tal
tratamiento ha sido acertadamente ubicado como notas a pie.
El texto reseado ser una referencia obligatoria en los aos venideros para los
especialistas kantianos que se propongan estudiar la deduccin trascendental. En esta obra
breve pero contundente, clara y lgicamente estructurada tenemos el ejemplo de una
investigacin filosficamente profunda, acadmicamente rigurosa y unitaria que jams
pierde de vista la integracin del objeto investigado en una totalidad. Por otra parte, la
claridad expositiva del texto emula la voz del maestro ejerciendo su oficio ante sus
discpulos.
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Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos, Regresso a Kant tica, Esttica, Filosofia Poltica, Lisboa,
Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2012, 549 pp., ISBN: 978-972-27-1923-0
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LUCIANA MARTNEZ
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Resea : Lara Denis y Oliver Sensen (eds.), Kant's Lectures on Ethics: a Critical
Guide. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015. 289 pp. ISBN: 1107036313
Este libro es un comentario introductorio de los apuntes de clase tomados por los alumnos
en los cursos de I. Kant sobre tica, impartidos entre 1763 y 1794. Es decir, que la fuente
que se estudia a lo largo de sus captulos son los apuntes de los estudiantes que asistan a
las clases que Kant dictaba en la Universidad de Knigsberg a lo largo de su extensa, y
multifactica, carrera docente. Como se hace evidente a travs de las cifras enunciadas, los
apuntes considerados recorren una gran parte de la biografa de nuestro filsofo. El
primero de ellos es casi veinte aos previo a la publicacin de la Primera Crtica y
contemporneo de un texto que proporcion a Kant un gran reconocimiento, el Ensayo
premiado por la Academia de Ciencias de Berln en 1763. El ltimo es posterior a la
Tercera Crtica, de 1790, y contemporneo a la Metafsica de las costumbres. En sus
clases, Kant utilizaba dos libros de texto, escritos por A. G. Baumgarten. En primer lugar,
utilizaba su Introduccin a la filosofa primera prctica, de 1760. En segundo trmino, en
el desarrollo de los temas especficos segua la tica filosfica, primero en la edicin de
1751 y despus en la de 1763.
En virtud de estas consideraciones, podemos adivinar la cantidad de interrogantes
que suscitan los apuntes de clase. En primer lugar se encuentra la cuestin de la autora,
que incluye a figuras reconocidas ms all de su intervencin en las clases, como Herder y
Collins. En segundo trmino, la datacin de los textos es tema de estudio. Disponemos de
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copias de copias, y en algunos casos se discute la fecha de las clases a las que
corresponden. Adems, suponiendo la fidelidad de las notas con respecto a lecciones del
filsofo, hay que tener presentes la referencia permanente al pensamiento de Baumgarten.
Finalmente, luego de analizar las tesis desarrolladas en las clases, hay que considerar su
relacin con la obra publicada por el filsofo.
Algunos de esos apuntes fueron traducidos al ingls y publicados por la Cambridge
University Press en un volumen que el libro de Denis y Sensen pretende glosar 1 . El
comentario contiene un prlogo, una introduccin y tres secciones de cinco captulos cada
una. Los paratextos del libro son herramientas tiles, aunque breves, para introducirse en el
estudio de los apuntes de clase. En el prlogo, escrito por J. B. Schneewind, podemos
reconocer tres temas. El primero est dado por las condiciones en las que Kant imparta sus
clases. Luego, el autor discute un artculo del editor Werner Stark, que trata sobre las
semejanzas y diferencias entre dos manuscritos sobre tica. Finalmente, Schneewind se
refiere a la relevancia de las lecciones para comprender la filosofa prctica de Kant. La
introduccin, por su parte, est a cargo de los editores del libro, Denis y Sensen. En ella, en
primer lugar se evalan los pro y los contra del uso de las lecciones como fuente para el
estudio de la filosofa de Kant. En segundo trmino, se especifican las pretensiones y la
naturaleza del libro. ste no pretende ser un comentario exhaustivo de las lecciones sobre
filosofa prctica de Kant, sino una gua crtica para la lectura de la seleccin de esas
lecciones publicada en ingls por la CUP. La tercera parte de la introduccin resea los
captulos del libro.
La primera seccin del volumen se titula "Las fuentes". Precisamente, contiene
cinco contribuciones dedicadas a desarrollar, cada una, un aspecto de los apuntes
compilados en la traduccin inglesa. Su primer captulo, a cargo de Stefano Bacin, se
titula "Las lecciones de Kant sobre tica y la filosofa moral de Baumbarten". Estudia la
relacin entre las clases de Kant y la tica de Baumgarten. La necesidad de esta
investigacin se basa en el hecho conocido de que en sus clases Kant desarrollaba un
comentario de libros de texto. En las clases de tica, en particular, segua dos libros de
Baumgarten, uno para presentar la filosofa prctica en general y uno para ocuparse de los
detalles de la tica. Kant se alejaba sin embargo de esos textos en las partes introductorias
de sus cursos, que ao a ao se volvan ms extensas. El captulo de Bacin proporciona
argumentos sobre la deliberada seleccin de los manuales por parte de Kant y comenta
cmo interpretaba nuestro filsofo algunos contenidos de la tica de Baumgarten. Con el
tratamiento del concepto de obligacin, de los fundamentos de la moral y de la estructura
de las obligaciones ticas, Bacin ilustra que la seleccin de los libros de Baumgarten
constituye un alejamiento de la tica wolffiana por parte de Kant. Para Bacin, los apuntes
de tica muestran que nuestro filsofo estableca un dilogo crtico con Baumgarten, en
estrecha continuidad con su propia produccin filosfica. El captulo siguiente, de Patrick
R. Frierson, intitulado "Herder: religin y motivacin moral", trata sobre el inicio de la
1
Kant, I. (1997). Lectures on Ethics, Cambridge University Press. Eds.: Peter Heath y J. B. Schneewind.
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Luciana Martnez
clase. El ttulo del primer artculo de esta seccin, de Stephen Engstrom, es
"Consideraciones antiguas en la concepcin de Kant del bien supremo". Es un estudio de
los apuntes de Collins que pretende exhibir que ya en el perodo precrtico del pensamiento
kantiano la felicidad cumpla una funcin importante en la filosofa prctica. Por medio del
estudio de ese concepto y del de bien supremo, Engstrom procura precisar cul es la
relacin de la filosofa kantiana con la tradicin eudemonista. El captulo 7 del libro est
escrito por Allen Wood. Se titula "La historia kantiana de la tica". Tambin este texto
contiene una reflexin acerca de la recepcin de la historia de la filosofa, particularmente
de la filosofa prctica. Wood propone rastrear la relacin del pensamiento de Kant con la
filosofa moral antigua y con la filosofa contempornea en las consideraciones kantianas
sobre la historia de la tica. El siguiente captulo es de Oliver Sensen y se titula
"Obligacin moral y voluntad libre". A diferencia de los aportes previos, orientados a
estudiar la insercin de Kant en la historia de la filosofa, el texto de Sensen desarrolla, en
cambio, una tesis sistemtica. Para el autor, la funcin central del concepto de obligacin
no se expresa en las obras publicadas de Kant, pero s en sus lecciones, gracias a la
eleccin del libro de Baumgarten como fuente para sus clases. El artculo propone una
caracterizacin de ese concepto y de los argumentos para defender su rol en la tica. El
texto "La escurridiza historia de las leyes permisivas de Kant", de B. Sharon Byrd propone
una interpretacin de las leyes permisivas en la filosofa kantiana. Byrd seala que a partir
de los textos de Kant resulta sencillo identificar las acciones prohibidas y las acciones
moralmente indiferentes. No es, empero, tan fcil la distincin de las acciones permitidas.
Estas acciones, generalmente prohibidas, son permitidas en casos excepcionales. Para la
expresin de este permiso se formulan leyes permisivas. Byrd sostiene que hay tres tipos
de leyes permisivas, que se caracterizan en la Moral Vigilantius, en Paz perpetua y en la
Metafsica de las costumbres. El ltimo captulo de esta seccin, a cargo de Joachim
Hruschka, se titula: "Sobre la lgica de la imputacin en los apuntes de clase de
Vigilantius". Nuevamente, el texto elegido aqu son los apuntes Vigilantius. En particular,
Hruschka estudia en ese texto la lgica de la imputacin, que es el enjuiciamiento de una
accin. En la argumentacin del autor se identifican tres momentos. En primer lugar, se
presenta el concepto de causa libera, el cual permite distinguir cules son las acciones
imputables. Luego, explica la diferencia entre la imputacin de hecho y la imputacin
lgica. Finalmente, propone una interpretacin del hecho de que la definicin de
"imputacin" que Kant proporciona en Metafsica de las costumbres no incluya el
concepto de la imputacin lgica.
La tercera seccin del libro se titula "tica". En ella se abordan temas relativos a la
discusin kantiana de la tica de Baumgarten. Su primer captulo, redactado por Paul
Guyer, se centra al igual que los anteriores, en la Moral Vigilantius. Se titula "Libertad,
fines y la derivacin de los deberes". En l, Guyer estudia la derivacin, a partir de la
libertad, de los deberes positivos y negativos hacia uno mismo y hacia los otros. El
problema que orienta su investigacin es que algunos pasajes de esos apuntes parecen
indicar que los deberes tambin se fundan en otros principios, adems del de la libertad. La
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MRCIO SUZUKI
Universidade de So Paulo, Brasil
Seria certamente pouco dizer que esta seleo e traduo de textos dos Cursos de
Antropologia traz um farto material para todos os leitores da filosofia de Immanuel Kant,
especialmente aqueles que se interessam pela sua antropologia e esttica: este volume
organizado e traduzido por Manuel Snchez Rodrguez constitui provavelmente um marco
importante para os estudos de Kant no mbito do mundo ibrico e latino-americano,
estabelecendo um parmetro para futuras edies dos Cursos de Lgica, de Metafsica, de
Moral e mesmo para uma edio dos Cursos de Antropologia em portugus.
De fato, todo aquele que alguma vez pensou em traduzir alguma dessas sries de
cursos, ou mesmo parte dela, deve ter certamente deparado com a questo: por que este
curso e no outro? Por que no combinar uma parte mais bem desenvolvida num curso
com outra seo de outro, embora tratando-se de dataes distintas? E, no final,
provavelmente, diante da dificuldade de selecionar e organizar tanto material, a escolha
acaba recaindo sobre um curso ou, pior, sobre nenhum.
A proposta do tradutor espanhol, pesquisador da Universidade de Granada, direta:
trata-se de trazer ao pblico em geral uma vasta seleo dos textos referentes esttica
kantiana, no momento fecundo de seu desenvolvimento nos anos 1770-80, quando
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La cuidada edicin crtica de las Lecciones de Antropologa de Kant presenta al lector una
extensa coleccin de textos inditos de entre los aos 1772 en que Kant empieza a impartir
sus lecciones de Antropologa hasta 1789. A stos se aaden algunos fragmentos
complementarios del legado pstumo, la correspondencia y las lecciones de lgica,
metafsica y moral. De los Mitschriften publicados por primera vez en 1997 en la edicin
de la Academia aparecen recogidos en este volumen los correspondientes a los siguientes
semestres: semestre de invierno de 1772/1773 (Antropologa Collins; Antropologa
Parow), semestre de 1775/1776 (Antropologa Friedlnder), semestre de 1777/1778
(Antropologa Pillau), semestre de 1781/1782 (Antropologa Menschenkunde), semestre de
invierno de 1784/1785 (Antropologa Mrongovius) y semestre de 1788/1789 (Antropologa
Busolt). El manual que emple Kant para dictar estas lecciones de antropologa fue la
Metafsica de Baumgarten.
La seleccin de los fragmentos sigue el criterio de proporcionar un anlisis
comparado de materiales que permitan reconstruir la formacin de las tesis fundamentales
de la Crtica del Juicio. La eleccin de Manuel Snchez hace posible por lo dems, tanto
explicar con xito la conexin sistemtica entre el problema del juicio reflexionante y la
teora del conocimiento sensible del Kant de 1770, como determinar las condiciones de
posibilidad de la fijacin de una teora del gusto de carcter trascendental mostrando cmo
el desarrollo de los problemas gnoseolgicos y la evolucin de su teora de las facultades le
permite elaborar su proyecto esttico maduro; si bien podra, en todo caso, haber sido
completado con algunos fragmentos por ejemplo de la Antropologa Dohna Wundlacken,
397
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Investigador Postdoctoral Juan de la Cierva (Formacin) en el IFS del CSIC (Espaa). E-mail de contacto:
gutierrezaguilar.ricardo@gmail.com .
401
Rosset, C. El objeto singular, traduccin de Santiago E. Espinosa, Editorial Sexto Piso, Madrid-Mxico
D.F., 2007, p. 43
2
Andaluz Romanillos, A.M. Las armonas de la razn en Kant. Libertad, Sentimiento de lo bello y
Teleologa de la naturaleza, Publicaciones Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2013, p.103
3
Ibid. p. 38
4
Ibid. p. 258
5
Ibid. p. 41
6
Ibid. pp. 213 y ss.
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Et in Arcadia ego
esencial de la materia 7 . No es un principio mecnico porque effectivement hay un plus de
significado en la comunin de las partes. Puede el enlace causal dar cuenta del agregado, en que
son las partes las que hacen posible el todo; pero en un sistema es el todo el que hace posibles a las
partes. El alqumico resultado es fruto de un entendimiento arquitectnico. Una forma de pensar, o
la forma del pensar, que hila el tejido desgarrado de la realidad. Y esta forma no obra sino por
ajuste del dominio de significados de cada concepto. As, la ampliacin del concepto de causalidad
se hace efectiva en el concepto de finalidad. Es la insuficiencia de uno la que demanda del otro.
Porque ser una cosa por mucho que la cosa ya haya sido determinada en su concepto no es
exactamente lo mismo que ser un fin [Zweck]8 . La autora del volumen que reseamos lo deja
meridianamente claro: Kant admite dos clases de causalidad en el mundo: el enlace de las causas
eficientes [] y el enlace de las causas finales (nexus finalis), tambin llamadas ideales, por
ser una causalidad segn conceptos9, lo cual no es aunque lo pueda parecer una redundancia.
Fin es el concepto de un objeto que lleva a gala el ser adems fundamento de la causalidad del
mismo. Aclrese esto. Lo que se distingue es que, a diferencia del resto de los Objekte, el concepto
de aqul objeto que acta de fin se encuentra al principio y al final del trayecto de ste hacia lo real.
Es el concepto mismo la base de su posibilidad material, pero retroactivamente tambin puede ser
narrado como la causa a posteriori de su realidad, que es por otro lado slo contingente. El efecto
precede a la causa, por as decirlo. Bajo la legalidad del juicio del terico no existe entonces y
desde luego ningn fundamento a priori para atribuir a las cosas de la naturaleza una referencia a
fines. El tiempo que fluye hacia delante pondra obstculos a este razonamiento. A saber, no hay
justificacin necesaria de un concepto tal como el de finalidad. Sin embargo, ocurre que hallamos
en nuestras expediciones al reino de las determinaciones ciertos fenmenos cuya posibilidad no nos
es comprensible desde la explicacin que da una mecnica de pesos y medidas. Por ejemplo, el
fenmeno de los seres naturales que estn vivos. Esto dicho y como una medida extraordinaria o
una huda hacia delante a uno podra ocurrrsele que una conveniente reduccin cientfica de estos
ltimos casos a aqullos nos librara de semejante entuerto 10 . No nos pongamos las cosas
demasiado fciles no obstante y planteemos el dilema como verdaderamente es, y es que el
autntico experimentum crucis es si hay acaso en la naturaleza cosas que no puedan pensarse ms
que como fines11
La profesora Andaluz se expresa en este sentido sealando a este punto un justo ecuador
del propsito de su trabajo: En nuestro [anterior] libro, La finalidad de la naturaleza en Kant. Un
estudio desde la Crtica del Juicio, nos centramos en [esta] articulacin de la finalidad de la
naturaleza en el problema del conocimiento y de la ciencia en Kant. Dejbamos para un momento
ulterior el estudio de la finalidad de la naturaleza, en lo que concierne a su funcin de vincular el
mundo de la razn terica con el de la razn prctica12. El libro del que tratamos aqu responde
precisamente a este segundo momento de la investigacin propuesta. Un momento necesario a la
pregunta consiguiente. Es tambin el momento de posible trnsito entre dos legislaciones en
apariencia incompatibles. La de la determinacin y la de la libertad. Y la pregunta consiguiente no
ha de llegar en buena lgica a las especulaciones sobre lo sublime. La exigencia sistemtica a la
que Kant se obliga tiene su locus en la Crtica del discernimiento, y es slo una deuda para con su
7
Ibid. p. 259
Ibid. p. 297
9
Ibid. p. 38
10
Ibid. pp. 308-311
11
Ibid. p. 297
12
Ibid. p. 26
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403
Ibid. p. 254
Ibid. pp. 303-304
15
Ibid. p. 313
16
Ibid. p. 319
17
Ibid. p. 322
18
Ibid. p. 325
19
Ibid. p. 194
14
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Et in Arcadia ego
tercera Crtica de relacin especulativa respecto de los objetos. Un concepto no es menos un
como si [als ob] de lo que una idea lo es. Slo cuenta entre sus haberes con el excedente de la
intuicin. Tambin aqullas moran en Arcadia.
Con todo, se nos advierte del paso. No se pretende decir que la idea del hombre como fin
ltimo de la naturaleza fundamente la idea del hombre como fin final; ms bien se trata de lo
contrario: como hemos visto, la condicin de que el hombre llegue a ser fin ltimo es que est
dispuesto a ser fin final20.
20
Ibid. p. 341
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Resea: Antonino Falduto, The faculties of the human mind and the case of moral
feeling in Kants philosophy, Berln/Boston, De Gruyter (KantstudienErgnzungshefte), 2014, 265 pp. ISBN: 978-3-11-0350002-9
En la obra que reseamos versin revisada de la tesis doctoral del autor Antonino
Falduto presenta una vigorosa reivindicacin del carcter central (y centralmente crtico)
de la teora kantiana de las facultades. Esta reivindicacin acta en dos frentes. Por un
lado, y frente a las interpretaciones que relegan la teora kantiana de las facultades a los
mrgenes del criticismo, por considerarla secundaria respecto a su ncleo trascendentalformal, defiende que dicha teora es una pieza esencial del proyecto crtico de Kant y que
su postergacin impide entenderlo correctamente. En consecuencia, segn esto, la filosofa
pura de Kant slo puede entenderse adecuadamente en el contexto de su teora de las
facultades. Pero, por otro lado, y frente a las interpretaciones que leen esta teora desde la
antropologa o la psicologa, Falduto defiende que tambin el anlisis de las facultades
pertenece de suyo al nivel discursivo de la filosofa crtica, y que la filosofa crtica es
competente y autnoma (esto es, no dependiente de otras disciplinas) para tratarla. Es
decir, que para comprender los conceptos relativos a las facultades de la mente 1 no es
*
406
necesario referirse a disciplinas empricas: dichos conceptos, segn Falduto, son tambin
elementos constitutivos de un estudio de filosofa pura sobre el ser humano y su naturaleza.
Por supuesto, la realizacin de este proyecto hermenutico comporta delimitar
cuidadosamente los diversos niveles discursivos del pensamiento kantiano, y una gran
parte de la investigacin como veremos se dedica precisamente a deslindar estos niveles
(antropologa y psicologa en sus diversas acepciones, filosofa pura, con sus
diversas partes, etc.) y a ubicarlos en el lugar sistemtico que les corresponde. Una vez
realizada esta labor de deslindamiento de precisin, es posible, segn Falduto, reconstruir
una kantiana teora de las facultades a partir de las obras publicadas en el perodo crtico y
comprenderla como un estudio sobre la vida mental del sujeto humano. Junto a esta
reconstruccin, y dependiendo de ella, Falduto propone tambin una aplicacin concreta de
esta propuesta interpretativa, que es al mismo tiempo una puesta a prueba de su
rendimiento terico, a saber: un anlisis del sentimiento moral que permite contextualizar
dicho sentimiento dentro de las actividades de la mente del sujeto humano.
La pregunta que vertebra toda la investigacin cmo hay que entender y qu
lugar le corresponde a la doctrina de las facultades de Kant? slo obtiene una respuesta
completa y articulada en los captulos 3 y 4, pero ya desde el principio del estudio se
empiezan a desgranar los elementos necesarios para obtenerla. En este sentido, los dos
primeros captulos del libro son preparatorios (lo cual no quiere decir necesariamente
menos importantes) por cuanto que a) contextualizan y fijan los trminos de la discusin
tanto histrica como sistemticamente y b) preparan el terreno para la defensa de la
interpretacin que se propone mediante una consideracin crtica de varias lecturas
contemporneas de Kant.
El captulo I trata de establecer orientaciones bsicas sobre significado del trmino
facultad [Vermgen] en la obra de Kant (1.1.) y en poca de Kant (1.2.). Asimismo, este
captulo ilustra hasta qu punto el lugar y el papel de las facultades de la mente eran
cuestiones vivamente debatidas en el ambiente intelectual germnico de la segunda mitad
del siglo XVIII (1.3.). Conviene sealar que ya en esta temprana fase de la investigacin
empieza a despuntar uno de los desplazamientos en la historia del pensamiento que Falduto
perseguir con mayor inters, a saber, el desplazamiento por el cual la facultad de sentir
[en este contexto, Vermgen zu empfinden, faculty of feeling] entra en escena y empieza a
desempear un papel cada vez ms importante en las investigaciones filosficas sobre la
32, nota al pie, las notas sobre las lecciones de antropologa de Kant, y Caygill, H., A Kant Dictionary,
Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. 210. Siguiendo una cierta tradicin de los traductores de Kant al castellano,
nosotros traduciramos en principio Gemt por nimo, pero dado que esta resea es una resea sobre el
libro de A. Falduto, y no sobre libro alguno de Kant, lo traduciremos en general por mente para reflejar la
decisin del propio autor (mind). La cuestin no es en absoluto balad, porque esta decisin tiene que ver el
propsito general de la investigacin de Falduto (interpretar la filosofa crtica como un estudio sobre la
mente humana o la vida mental del ser humano), con su ubicacin en la Kant-Forschung contempornea en
ingls (vid. p. 3 especialmente la nota 5 y todo el apartado 1.4.) y en particular con aquella que se orienta
hacia las ciencias cognitivas (vid. introduccin al captulo 2). Esta decisin puede producir, no obstante,
ciertas dificultades.
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Guillermo Villaverde
mente. En efecto, incluso antes de estudiar lo que sucede en el propio Kant, Falduto cree
que la facultad sensitiva llega a desempear un papel decisivo en los anlisis filosficos
de muchos autores (p. 22) de esta poca. Tras obtener un primera caracterizacin del
concepto de facultad [Vermgen] en trminos aproximadamente funcionalistas (p. 24), el
captulo se cierra con una re-construccin (y rechazo) de las interpretaciones
epigenticas de la filosofa crtica de Kant.
El rechazo de estas tentativas abre el camino del captulo 2, que est dedicado
precisamente a medir el alcance de algunas interpretaciones contemporneas de Kant
orientadas por el concepto (originario de las ciencias cognitivas) de mente dotada de
facultades (p. 35). En concreto, Falduto se propone discutir con las propuestas de A.
Brook (2.1.), G. Hatfield (2.2.) y, sobre todo y ms extensamente, P. Kitcher (2.4.), que ha
pretendido reconstruir la KrV en trminos de psicologa trascendental. La
Auseinanderseztung con estas lecturas es ocasin para entresacar sus fuerzas y debilidades,
y esbozar en negativo las condiciones de una interpretacin adecuada de la teora kantiana
de las facultades. Una cuestin interesa especialmente a Falduto en estas discusiones: una
interpretacin adecuada de la teora kantiana de las facultades tiene que ser capaz de
ubicarla con precisin y sin contradiccin dentro de la arquitectnica del pensamiento de
Kant.
El captulo 3 contiene precisamente la primera parte de una interpretacin de este
tipo, por cuanto se propone preparar el terreno para un anlisis de la doctrina kantiana de
las facultades como una investigacin crtica dedicada al ser humano que conoce, desea y
siente (p. 52). Para ello, y en primer lugar, Falduto localiza el objeto de esta doctrina (las
facultades de la mente humana) y distingue sistemticamente dos modos de investigarlo:
un enfoque emprico (que alimentar el cauce fundamental de la antropologa) y un
enfoque puro, propio de la filosofa crtica. En este sentido el estudio contina ahora una
tarea que haba comenzado ya en el captulo 2 (2.3.), que se revela como absolutamente
esencial para este estudio y, en nuestra opinin, tambin para una comprensin cabal del
pensamiento de Kant en general, a saber, la tarea de distinguir los diferentes planos
discursivos de la obra kantiana. Pues bien, la idea de Falduto en este punto es clara: la
interseccin ocasional de estas dos investigaciones la filosfica-crtica pura y la
antropolgica no implica que ambas sean la misma (p. 54). Esta tarea se despliega a su
vez en varias fases: en primer lugar, Falduto desarrolla una revisin histrica de la relacin
entre antropologa pragmtica y psicologa emprica (3.1.); en segundo lugar,
emprende una reconstruccin del significado del proyecto kantiano de una antropologa
pragmtica (3.2. y 3.3.), con especial atencin a la eventual posibilidad de considerar una
anthropologia trascendentalis dentro de la arquitectnica kantiana (3.4.); y, en tercer lugar,
un anlisis de los acuerdos y desacuerdos en el modo de proceder de la antropologa
pragmtica y la filosofa crtica (3.5. y 3.6.) respectivamente, con especial atencin a
aquellos lugares de la obra de Kant donde se localizan intersecciones (3.7.), como por
ejemplo el 7 de la Antropologa de 1798, que se estudia con notable detenimiento (3.9.) y
408
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junto con sus complementos en el manuscrito de Rostock (3.8.). Con esto, la investigacin
queda ya orientada hacia la cuestin que propiamente interesa a Falduto, a saber, la
presencia y el sentido de la doctrina de las facultades en el dominio de la filosofa pura y
en las obras crticas. Antes de ello, no obstante, Falduto dedicar an parte de la
investigacin (3.10. y 3.11.) a perfilar ciertos aspectos del tratamiento de la sensibilidad en
la Antropologa de 1798 y a la clasificacin general de las facultades en dicha obra y en el
manuscrito de Rostock.
Una vez que este captulo 3 ha separado convincentemente el estudio kantiano de
las facultades del contexto psicolgico-antropolgico en el que hoy suele leerse, Falduto
procede en el captulo 4 a reconstituir la presencia de la doctrina de las facultades en
algunas obras crticas, en concreto KrV, KpV, las dos introducciones a KU y MdS2. De
hecho, la re-organizacin enciclopdica de la filosofa crtica que tiene lugar en KU (al
menos segn la Primera Introduccin: EEKU, AA, 20, XI) ser un elemento importante
para la tesis de Falduto. Es precisamente desde esta organizacin enciclopdica como
Falduto examina, bajo una luz retrospectiva, la aparicin de las distintas facultades en KrV
y KpV, lo cual explica que, cuando estudia la KrV (4.2.) apenas preste atencin al pliegue
entendimiento-razn y se concentre en la oposicin entendimientosensibilidad e, incluso,
dentro de esta oposicin, preste menos atencin a la dimensin a priori de la sensibilidad
que hay ya en esa obra (cosa que, por otro lado, el propio autor reconoce, p. 137). En
efecto, lo que interesa a Falduto en esta investigacin no es tanto la sensibilidad entendida
como sentido [Sinn], sino cuanto entendida como sentimiento [Gefhl], y el estudio de su
correspondiente dimensin a priori no tiene lugar en KrV, sino en KpV. A KpV
precisamente estn dedicadas las secciones iniciales (4.3. a 4.6.) del captulo. Falduto
quiere mostrar, en efecto, que el sentimiento, como determinacin especial de la facultad
de la sensibilidad, pasa a ocupar un lugar central en el contexto del anlisis crtico
dedicado a la razn prctica (p. 139), y para ello perseguir la conexin entre razn pura y
facultad de desear a travs de varios textos, que incluyen el prefacio, la introduccin y
algunos pasajes importantes (como la paradoja del mtodo) de la Analtica de KpV. En
este punto, en el que despunta ya el asunto fundamental del captulo 5 del libro, Falduto
insiste solamente en que la KpV propone un anlisis diferente segn el cual el sentimiento
puede ser conocido a priori, y ello abre las puertas para una consideracin diferente del
concepto de sentimiento en el contexto de la filosofa pura (p. 153). En efecto, este
desplazamiento, junto con algunos otros desplazamientos conectados con l, arroja una
nueva clasificacin de las facultades en la segunda Crtica, que Falduto recompone (4.6.)
para despus comparar con la clasificacin de las mismas tal y como aparece en la Primera
2
La no inclusin de los Prolegomena en esta nmina puede llamar a priori la atencin, pero es coherente con
la decisin de autolimitar la investigacin en este punto al estudio de el papel que desempea la facultad de
sentir placer y displacer en el contexto de la divisin kantiana de las facultades (p. 127). Sobre las
posibilidades de ampliar el horizonte de la investigacin relacionadas con su inclusin volveremos ms
adelante. Del mismo modo, la inclusin en esta nmina de la Metaphysik der Sitten, que en la oposicin
crtica/metafsica caera del lado de sta ltima, se justifica porque en esta obra aparece una importante
sistematizacin de la clasificacin de las facultades en el perodo crtico y porque sirve de puente (vase p.
202) hacia el quinto y ltimo captulo de la investigacin.
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introduccin a KU (4.7. y 4.9.) y en el Prefacio y la Introduccin finalmente publicada
(4.8. y 4.10.) de esta obra. En varios de estos textos (especialmente en la Vorrede de KU y
EEKU) Falduto quiere destacar ante todo un hecho decisivo para su interpretacin: tanto la
presentacin del argumento de la KU, como su ubicacin dentro del conjunto de la
filosofa crtica, como la posibilidad de su cierre sistemtico3 se realizan por referencia al
sistema de las facultades. El problema que podra suponer a este respecto la Introduccin
publicada de KU (en el que el sistema de la filosofa no se organiza explcitamente de
acuerdo con el sistema de las facultades) es salvado sealando la funcin intermediaria del
Juicio, de modo que en esta obra la divisin tripartir del proyecto crtico sigue estando
basada en la clasificacin tripartita de las facultades, como en la Primera introduccin
(p. 186). La clasificacin kantiana de las facultades se estudia por ltimo en la
Introduccin general a MdS (4.11.), donde Falduto presta especial atencin al anlisis de
las constelaciones de trminos dentro de las que se encuentran y a las que dan lugar a) la
facultad de sentir (Leben, Gefhl, Lust, etc.) y b) la facultad de desear (Willkr, Wille, etc.).
El trabajo de todos los captulos anteriores (del 1 al 4) establece un marco general
de interpretacin de la teora kantiana de las facultades. Como ya hemos sealado, este
marco general es el que le sirve de referencia a Falduto, en el captulo 5, para entrar a una
discusin ms detallada y pormenorizada sobre el concepto kantiano de sentimiento
moral.
El captulo 5 de la obra contiene en efecto una propuesta de interpretacin del
sentimiento moral a partir del marco terico dibujado en el captulo 4 y constituye, en
nuestra opinin, la parte ms interesante del estudio, tanto por el calado sistemtico de la
cuestin del respeto en s misma que algunos intrpretes han considerado parte de lo ms
grave del pensamiento de Kant como por la propia propuesta, que en cierto modo pone
a prueba el marco terico de la interpretacin general de Falduto. De acuerdo con Falduto,
el sentimiento de respeto es [] un estado mental, es decir, una modificacin en la mente
del sujeto humano que se hace consciente de la ley moral (p. 231). Adems, este estado
mental es posible en virtud de la peculiar constitucin mental del sujeto humano, esto es,
en virtud de la constitucin de la mente humana tal y como Kant la cartografa en su
clasificacin de las facultades mentales (pp. 230-231). A partir de aqu se desarrolla una
interesante y sugerente interpretacin del sentimiento moral en general, y del respeto en
particular, que propone reubicar esta problemtica dentro del horizonte de la dimensin
esttica de la moral. Dicha interpretacin cuenta ciertamente con apoyo textual en la obra
de Kant. Nos gustara, no obstante, terminar de exponer la posicin de Falduto sealando
algunos escollos que, en nuestra opinin, puede tambin encontrar en su camino.
En primer lugar, una cuestin de fondo a la que contribuye la propia terminologa
elegida. En efecto, aunque el acuerdo de los traductores de Kant al ingls es casi universal
respecto a Triebfeder, y casi todos ellos lo traducen por incentive, y aunque esta
3
I. Kant, Hiemit endige ich also mein ganzes kritisches Geschft, KU, AA 05, 170.
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traduccin tenga sus virtudes, e incluso sea quizs la mejor posible, contiene tambin, no
obstante, el peligro de hace que nos deslicemos fuera del planteamiento kantiano.
Incentive tiene, segn el diccionario Webster, el sentido de something that incites o has
a tendency to incite to determination or action / something (as a fear or hope of reward)
that constitutes a motive or spur4, y de hecho, el trmino incentivo transmite la idea de
una recompensa final que tira de la voluntad hacia ella y de esta manera se constituye en
una motivacin para la accin. Una vez asumido (de manera consciente o inconsciente)
este marco general, la pregunta por la motivacin de la accin moral surge naturalmente
como pregunta decisiva y de hecho Falduto escribe: el tratamiento kantiano del
sentimiento moral del respeto tiene que considerarse dentro del problema ms general de la
motivacin moral (p. 221). A partir de ah empieza entonces a desarrollarse la cuestin de
si el sentimiento moral realmente es el incentivo de la accin moral del hombre (p. 225),
y de hecho el apartado 5.5. est precisamente dedicado a esta cuestin5.
Pues bien, independientemente del resultado de esta ltima discusin (en la que el
autor se inclina claramente por la tesis de que la ley moral misma es el mvil de la accin
moral), nos parece que resultara interesante discutir previamente la propia precomprensin del respeto en los trminos en los que lo hace Falduto. Pues desde el punto de
vista de la consideracin sistemtica del respeto y la motivacin de la accin moral, se
podra tambin defender en un sentido muy especfico que la accin moral no necesita
motivacin, dado que la motivacin (entendida especficamente como aquello para lo que
se hace la accin) proviene en Kant siempre de los fines de la facultad inferior de desear,
en definitiva, del principio universal del amor hacia uno mismo o felicidad propia (KpV,
Libro I, cap. 1, Teorema II). Podra defenderse en efecto que lo que sucede en el anlisis
kantiano es ms bien que todos los fines que pueden tirar de la voluntad son fines del
amor propio, y la moralidad consistira en todo caso en un empuje en sentido contrario
que retiene e inhabilita la accin efectiva de algunos de esos incentivos6. La accin moral
en Kant no se basara por tanto en suministrar fines muy puros, ni en introducir en el
mundo sensible los objetos del querer especficamente morales, sino en re-estructurar los
fines siempre dados ya de acuerdo con un nexo sistemtico distinto a su nexo natural.
Dicho de otra manera, sin inclinaciones dadas no puede haber en absoluto determinacin
de la voluntad (pues todo querer ha de tener tambin un objeto y por lo tanto una
materia, KpV, AA, 05, 34, y ese objeto proviene siempre de la facultad inferior de
desear), pero para que haya efectivamente determinacin de la voluntad la propia voluntad
tiene que dejarse determinar, y en ese punto particular es donde acta el respeto. En este
sentido, podra decirse que la forma especfica de existencia del respeto sera solamente la
4
Websters Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 1976, entrada: incentive, p. 1141.
En efecto, Falduto se plantea la discusin especializada sobre si el respeto por la ley moral o la ley moral
misma es el incentive de la accin moral, y su tesis se puede resumir as: la ley moral es el nico mvil o
incentivo de la accin moral; el respeto, por el contrario, es solamente la presentacin subjetiva o sensible del
incentivo de la accin moral. Vase p. 231.
6
Sobre esto puede verse por ejemplo S. Engstrom, Introduccin a I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason,
traducida por W. S. Pluhar, x1viii, nota 14 al pie.
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de eliminar ciertos fines. La accin por deber exigira la puesta entre parntesis (y por
tanto el reconocimiento) de las inclinaciones dadas, y el reconocimiento de que el agente
est siempre ya inserto en una apertura volitiva al mundo, pero el supuesto motivo moral
(el respeto) no rivaliza en pie de igualdad con las dems posibles motivaciones. En efecto,
la otra cara de esta situacin y que confirma el estado de cosas apuntado, es que el
sentimiento de respeto constituye un selbstgewirktes Gefhl (GMS, AA, 04, 401-402, en
nota) y un mero efecto negativo de la ley moral sobre el sentimiento (KpV, AA, 05, 72),
como el propio Falduto reconoce.
Y con esto estamos tocando ya otra cuestin relativa al fondo de la interpretacin
que nos ocupa. Si el sentimiento moral de respeto es algo que tambin cabe y encaja
enteramente dentro de las disposiciones espirituales o anmicas o mentales del hombre,
entonces es posible (e incluso aconsejable) entender todo el proyecto crtico como un
tratado de la naturaleza humana, al modo como lo hace Falduto, puesto que el permetro
de lo humano no se rompe por ningn lado. Pero si hacemos eso, entonces se desdibujan
un poco creemos aquellas vetas del pensamiento kantiano en las que se desborda la
esfera de lo humano (como la insistencia kantiana en KpV y GMS de que en principio no
se trata del hombre, vid., por ejemplo, GMS, AA, 04, 408) y se orilla la discusin (central,
por ejemplo, en la Davoser Disputation de 1929) acerca de si todo Kant puede o no puede
encajar en el molde del humanismo clsico.
Nos gustara sealar por ltimo otro aspecto del trabajo de Falduto, que toca
tambin el planteamiento de fondo de la investigacin. En este caso no se trata de la
discusin sobre el modo de interpretar un concepto kantiano en particular, ni tampoco de si
la interpretacin global resultante es ms o menos humanista o anti-humanista, sino del
modo mismo como se plantean los fundamentos de la investigacin. Y en este punto
creemos que puede ser interesante, para terminar, perfilar el horizonte general de la
investigacin de Falduto desde bases ligeramente diferentes, para esbozar as mnimamente
a) cmo se recorta dicha investigacin sobre ese horizonte, b) cmo podra prolongarse
hacia l, e incluso c) cmo podra establecerse una discusin frente a l.
Podemos empezar a reconstruir ese horizonte refirindonos a una serie de lneas
sistemticas del pensamiento de Kant que estn plegadas en la obra de Falduto y cuya
contrastacin con la investigacin propuesta creemos que podra iluminar y reforzar
algunos de sus puntos. En efecto, precisamente porque esta investigacin se interesa por la
actividad del nimo y por el lado subjetivo del sistema kantiano de las facultades (pp. 133134), podra prolongarse muy naturalmente en la direccin de estas lneas sistemticas.
Nos referimos a la cuestin de la unidad de la razn y la dimensin subjetiva de la razn.
Esta lnea del pensamiento kantiano atraviesa las Dialcticas de las dos primeras Crticas y
va ganando densidad a lo largo del proyecto crtico hasta terminar exigiendo un
tratamiento propio, en 1790, bajo la denominacin de una Kritik der Urteilskraft. Dicha
lnea es tambin el hilo conductor del problema de la unidad de lo terico y lo prctico, es
decir, del problema de la unidad de la razn y, aunque la Introduccin de KU establecer
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que dicho problema slo puede plantearse completamente en trminos de la pregunta por la
realizabilidad del fin final (KU, Introduccin, IX, AA, 05, 195-196), la cuestin se deja
sentir ya desde el Apndice de la Dialctica trascendental de KrV, y aparece siempre
vinculada a la cuestin del uso de la razn. Con esto llegamos al punto que queramos
sealar, pues es precisamente el anlisis y discusin de esta dimensin del uso de la razn
(aunque sea polmicamente, para expulsarla del estudio) el que podra servir como centro
para reconstruir de otro modo el horizonte de la lectura de Falduto.
Si se hiciese tal cosa (tomando ms en cuenta la parte final de los Prolegomena, los
57-60, que forman bloque con el Apndice de la Dialctica de KrV), entonces
quedara tambin desplegada una oposicin fundamental de la teora kantiana de las
facultades: no ya la oposicin entendimiento-sensibilidad (que Falduto estudia y atiende en
muchos sitios, por ejemplo, p. 139), sino la oposicin entendimiento-razn, que soporta
toda la dimensin subjetiva de la razn kantiana, y que desemboca en y alimenta a KU. En
efecto, precisamente porque Falduto persigue con ahnco (vase por ejemplo, pp. 133-134)
el desplazamiento de un anlisis de las facultades polarizado en un polo objetivo
(conocimiento objetivo) a un anlisis polarizado en un polo subjetivo, su reflexin
podra enriquecerse enormemente incluyendo (o al menos contrastndose con) la
profundizacin de la dimensin subjetiva de lo trascendental que se produce en KU.
Por ltimo, se podra decir que en esta problemtica del uso y la unidad de la razn
est implicada tambin la cuestin del propio estatuto de la Antropologa de 1798. En
efecto, desde ese otro horizonte, se podra argir que la distincin tan neta y ntida que
establece Falduto entre antropologa (emprica) y filosofa crtica (pura) ensombrece un
poco el peculiar lugar discursivo de la Antropologa de 1798, que parece estar, como
insinuaba Foucault, en medio de lo emprico y lo trascendental y no ser ni puramente
trascendental, ni meramente emprica, sino situarse en ese extrao nivel en el que se
examina el Gemt desde el punto de vista del juego en el que se constituye a s mismo.
La inclusin de la dimensin del Gebrauch (que solo parcialmente puede traducirse por
uso) podra arrojar interesante luz sobre estas cuestiones.
Ahora bien, si todas estas discusiones sistemticas pueden plantearse a raz del
trabajo de Falduto, y el trabajo de Falduto puede dar pie a ellas, es precisamente porque
dicho trabajo lo permite y permite sostenerlas, es decir, porque establece (y establece
vigorosamente) los puntos de referencia en las que pueden anclarse. Y ello es muy de
agradecer. En efecto, algn lector podra quizs pensar que el anlisis de algunas
cuestiones o de algunos de los autores con los que discute la obra (como por ejemplo, A.
Brook, en pp. 35-38) es muy breve y veloz, y que ello podra traducirse en un tratamiento
superficial, pero en el caso de la obra de Falduto responde a la clara conciencia de los
puntos que se quieren tratar y est sostenido por un amplsimo y profundo conocimiento de
los textos fuente y de la bibliografa secundaria. De hecho, el estilo directo y to-thepoint, y el riguroso trabajo sobre los textos, permiten disponer de un mapa y de unas tesis
que interesar a muchos investigadores de la obra de Kant, y no solamente a aquellos que
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se dediquen especficamente a la teora de las facultades o a los que compartan la
propuesta interpretativa del autor. En este sentido, si una buena investigacin es una
investigacin que permite la discusin, la investigacin de Falduto es un excelente trabajo,
incluso para quienes propongan interpretaciones del todo diferentes.
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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
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Professore di Filosofia na Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de Paran (Curitiba, Brasil). E-mails di contatto:
federico.ferraguto@pucpr.br ; federicoferraguto@yahoo.it .
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Federico Ferraguto
criticismo come una dottrina sostanzialmente basata su un dualismo tra intelletto e
sensibilit, in cui lintelletto, come forma vuota,verrebbe riempito da un contenuto
empirico che gli proviene dallesterno, che lintelletto stesso sarebbe in grado di elaborare
e raffinare (pp. 106-107). Per altro verso, e molto pi recentemente, in Mente e mondo
John McDowell, a cui Aportone dedica il primo capitolo del suo volume, sarebbe rimasto
fedele a questa interpretazione.
Partendo da Kant, ma leggendolo a partire dal 16 della prima Critica e non
dallEstetica trascendentale, McDowell sembra convinto di riscoprire nella filosofia critica
strategie teoriche utili per comprendere la questione generale dellintenzionalit. Kant,
infatti, definisce correttamente il problema della correlazione tra pensiero e mondo. Ma la
sua tesi dellidealismo trascendentale lo limita paradossalmente a una concezione
naturalista della sensibilit. Secondo tale concezione lo spazio e il tempo sarebbero forme
riferite alla nostra ricettivit, concernerebbero il fatto bruto che si trova al di fuori dello
spazio dellapplicazione concettuale e non permetterebbero di risolvere la controversia tra
chi sostiene che lo spazio dei nostri concetti debba essere giustificato in funzione dei fatti
che vi si trovano allesterno (Sellars) e chi, viceversa, pensa che la conoscenza sia possibile
solo tramite la purificazione del fatto nella dimensione dei concetti (Davidson). McDowell
mira, invece, a mostrare come lintuizione, in quanto esperienza sensibile, possa gi
mettere in atto le capacit concettuali del soggetto conoscente. Per Aportone, sostenere
questa tesi non significa necessariamente passare da Kant allo Hegel del capitolo
sullautocoscienza della Fenomenologia dello spirito, come fa McDowell. Per il quale, la
lotta per il riconoscimento sviluppata in questo capitolo della Fenomenologiasarebbe da
intendere come un movimento immanente alla coscienza stessa e volto al superamento
della separazione tra soggetto e oggetto, al fine di incontrare nelloggetto stesso la
spontaneit che lo caratterizza e di superare il dualismo kantiano. Cos, secondo
McDowell, la vera idea di oggettivit pu essere compresa solo come parte di questa
struttura, ma non come il suo abbandono in favore di una proiezione soggettiva. In termini
kantiani: quando Hegelscrive che con lautocoscienza abbiamo compiuto un passo nella
terra della verit, questo significa che abbiamo iniziato a vedere come comprendere la
conoscenza nei termini del potere unificato della spontaneit appercettiva, che non riguarda
solo il soggetto, ma anche loggetto (J.McDowell, Having the world in view, Harward
University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 153).
Secondo Aportone, per, il dualismo kantiano delle fonti della conoscenza non
implica un idealismo soggettivo. A differenza di quanto sostiene McDowell, infatti,
bisogna comprendere che ci che Kant chiama intuizione, cio ci che procurato
dallesperienza, non consiste nella semplice acquisizione di un dato extra-concettuale, ma
una sorta di avvenimento o di stato in cui gi vi un contenuto concettuale (p. 41). una
dinamica che va riscontrata in Kant stesso, la cui interpretazione dovrebbe liberarsi
dellantico pregiudizio metafisico, che continua ad agire anche McDowell e che
condizionato da Sellarse Strawson, secondo il quale le impressioni del mondo noumenale
diventano, attraverso le forme a priori, il materiale spazio-temporale dellintuizione (p. 52).
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Federico Ferraguto
prima di ogni sintesi dellintelletto, che conferisce allEstetica unirriducibilit radicale e,
addirittura, una priorit sistematica nel quadro complessivo della dottrina degli elementi.
Nella sua proposta teoricaAportone sembra propendere per questa seconda alternativa. A
suo parere, infatti, non ci sarebbero rappresentazioni immediate assolutamente date. Le
intuizioni empiriche, infatti, presuppongono una sintesi cognitiva anche quando anno una
relazione immediata con il loro proprio oggetto. Allo stesso modo, le intuizioni pure
presuppongono un atto sintetico di apprensione e di unificazione di una diversit
molteplice (p. 183). La filosofia trascendentale di Kant, pertanto, non lascia spazio a una
materia grezza o a sense data, ma coglie lunit di ragione e natura a partire da una
razionalit generale e, per usare unespressione di McDowell, ampia, cio non riducibile a
una specifica determinazione soggettiva ma implicita in ogni presa di posizione del
soggetto in rapporto al mondo. Si tratta di una conclusione sviluppata in tutte le sue
implicazioni pratiche nel quinto e ultimo capitolo del volume, in cui Aportone, discutendo
uno spettro di testi pi ampio, mostra come in Kant natura e ragione debbano essere
comprese come inscritte nellunico orizzonte di una forma pura. Non c natura senza una
ragione che la comprende. Ma, nella misura in cui pu essere compresa, cio essere
integrata in una relazione, la natura gi espressione di una compenetrazione intellettuale,
anche se non necessariamente concettuale.
Si potrebbe cos sostenere che la ricerca di Aportone si muove nella tensione che
sussiste tra formativo e formale. Dal punto di vista della filosofia critica non bisogna
considerare la ragione soltanto come facolt produttiva che d una forma a una materia
data extrarazionale o prerazionale. Piuttosto, ci che pu essere oggetto di conoscenza si
d gi in una previa relazione razionale, ossia in una forma, chesintetizza soggetto e
oggetto. Anche in questa prospettiva lobiettivo polemico di Aportonesembra essere
McDowell e in particolare il suo concetto di Bildung, ciodi una forza formativa che,
almeno nellaccezione tedesca, struttura tanto il reale, quanto il soggetto che vi si rapporta
e di cui parte. Nella misura in cui la ragione umana passibile di una crescita e di uno
sviluppo, essa pu assumere una seconda natura che muta, sviluppa e giustifica la sua
posizione nel mondo. Eppure, secondo Aportone, non si tratta di una formativit comune al
soggetto e al mondo, ma della forma della relazione che li integra.
Cos Aportone sembra approfondire quanto afferma Dieter Henrich in un saggio del
1996 intitolato Zwei naturalismen auf Englisch, in cui McDowellviene criticato, tra laltro,
per la banalit dei suoi riferimenti kantiani, considerati il riflesso di preconcetti che la
ricerca su Kant avrebbe superato gi da tempo. In Having the world in view McDowell
risponde a questa critica concordando con Henrich. Egli limita il suo kantismo a uno
strumento da usare contro Sellars e aggiunge che per comprendere le ragioni della sua
correzione del trascendentalismo kantiano nella fenomenologia hegeliana, bisognerebbe
rendere conto della funzione svolta da Fichte e, pi in generale, della discussione che
subito dopo Kant si sviluppa proprio attorno alla relazione tra sensibilit e intelletto
(Having the world in view, p. 153, n.). Di fatto, si pu contrapporre Kant a Hegel, e
propendere per questo o quellautore solo se si accetta linterpretazione fornita da Hegel
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Resea: Ameriks, Karl, Kants Elliptical Path, Clarendon Press, Oxford (UK), 2012, pp. 365.
ISBN: 978-0-19-969368-9.
En este libro Ameriks rene una serie de trabajos en torno a diferentes tpicos de la obra
kantiana y de su influencia posterior. No pretende una reconstruccin histrica de la compleja
Entwicklungsgeschichte del corpus de Kant sino una mirada en detalle de algunos conceptos clave
que han merecido especial atencin por parte de algunos estudiosos en los ltimos aos.
El hilo conductor, pero tambin la clave interpretativa, de los trabajos contenidos en este
volumen est en la figura de la elipse. Y esto triplemente. Primero, la elipse permite reconocer la
trayectoria del pensamiento de Kant. Para empezar, este trazado supone que el alejamiento de un
punto de partida inicial no constituye un cambio, pues todo alejamiento se hace sobre un mismo
eje. La trazada termina atrapando a cualquier distanciamiento, pues el movimiento pivota sobre dos
focos, que son las ramas terica y prctica de la filosofa de Kant (p. 4). En el caso de Kant esto
significa que los giros crticos no suponen un verdadero distanciamiento respecto de las ms
profundas creencias pre-sistemticas de Kant (p. 1). O que, como tambin supone el trazado de
este movimiento, todo cambio de trayectoria, toda Unwandlung (que es como Kant describi la
clase de trasformacin que traa consigo la crtica), no sea otra cosa que una vuelta, un giro, con lo
que la idea misma de revolucin, Revolution, con la que Kant tambin describi el movimiento
crtico, estara en el fondo animada por un aliento conservador. Segundo, Ameriks tambin se sirve
de la elipse para entender las lecturas y tendencias interpretativas de la obra kantiana. stas habran
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OBITUARIO
Massimo Barale, In Memoriam (1941-2015)
Nuria Snchez Madrid
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Espaa
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Poltica Editorial
Este proyecto editorial slo podr salir adelante propiciando una nutrida participacin presidida por
la ms absoluta pluralidad y obviando exclusiones de ningn tipo.
Se trata de una revista electrnica en torno a los estudios kantianos que tendra una periodicidad
bianual y alternar los nmeros monogrficos (al cuidado de uno o dos editores invitados) con
otros donde se publicarn los trabajos que obtengan informes favorables por el sistema de par ciego
El espaol ser el idioma principal, pero tambin se podrn publicar trabajos en ingls, alemn,
francs, italiano y portugus.
Los manuscritos debern ser originales inditos en cualquier idioma, que no estn bajo
consideracin en ningn otro lugar. Debern remitirse por correo electrnico en Word a:
contextoskantianos@gmail.com
428
En todos los casos los autores debern adjuntar unas breves lneas curriculares (250
palabras) donde, aparte de consignar su adscripcin institucional, den cuenta de sus principales
publicaciones y reflejen igualmente los mbitos temticos cultivados, sin dejar de proporcionar una
direccin de contacto electrnica. Por favor prepare el manuscrito para un referato ciego quitando
toda auto-referencia.
Estilo
Todas las contribuciones han de emplear tipo de letra Times New Roman, tamao 12 y espaciado
1,5 (texto y notas). Las notas deben estar numeradas consecutivamente (nmeros volados, no entre
parntesis) y aparecer como notas a pie, usando la fuente Times New Roman, tamao 10 y
espaciado simple. El nmero de nota que remite a la informacin contenida en la nota a pie
aparecer directamente despus del signo de puntuacin que cierra la cita en el cuerpo del texto.
Las palabras y sintagmas que el autor considere necesario recalcar, irn en cursiva, nunca en
negrita.
Citas y referencias
Las referencias a autores y publicaciones en el cuerpo del texto aparecern entre parntesis,
incluyendo el apellido del autor, el ao de publicacin de la obra y las pginas citadas. Ejemplo:
(Juregui 2008, p. 25)
Los pasajes de obras citados a lo largo de los artculos aparecern, con justificacin a la
izquierda de 1,5, en Times New Roman, tamao 11, sin dobles comillas. Las reseas no extractarn
pasajes con justificacin: en caso de que el autor desee citar extractos de la obra reseada lo har
entre dobles comillas en el cuerpo del texto y respetando su tamao, empleando la modalidad
indicada de referencia entre parntesis al autor, ao de la publicacin y pgina.
Las partes omitidas en citas se sealarn con tres puntos entre parntesis cuadrados
[], separados por un espacio simple de la palabra anterior y siguiente.
* Las referencias de las obras de Kant debern hacerse segn las pautas fijadas por la Edicin de la
Academia:
http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134_Instructions_for_Authors_en.pdf
* La bibliografa se debe organizar alfabtica y cronolgicamente al final del texto. Si se citan
varias obras del mismo autor, stas deben ordenarse de manera cronolgica, de la ms reciente a la
ms antigua.
Ejemplos:
Libro:
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Editorial Policy
We would like to acquaint you with a journal project that can only go forward with the greatest
possible participation of Kant scholars, without exclusions of any kind.
This periodical will be a biannual electronic journal in Kantian studies, which will alternate
between open-submission issues and single-topic issues coordinated by one or two editors. All
submitted manuscripts would undergo peer review.
Though Spanish is the Journals primary language, manuscripts in English, German,
French, Italian, and Portuguese are also welcome.
Submissions must not have been previously published, nor should they be under
consideration anywhere else in any language. Please send your manuscript as a Word attachment to
the following e-mail address:
contextoskantianos@gmail.com
Manuscript Preparation
Articles must not exceed 12.000 words, discussions 8.000 words, and book reviews
4.000
words (including footnotes and bibliography in all cases). Longer manuscripts could also be
considered by the editorial team, if the interest and quality of the contribution justifies its
acceptance.
Articles and discussions should include an abstract both in the language of the submitted paper and
in English that should not exceed 150 words as well as three to five keywords, with the title also in
English. The title of articles, in the language of the submitted text and in English, and the author
(in SMALL CAPS) will appear in Times New Roman 16 and in bold type. The institutional affiliation
will have font Times New Roman 14. The abstract and key words, also in the language of the
submitted and in English, will have font Times New Roman 11. If the language of the article or
discussion is English, the title, abstract and key words will be also translated into Spanish.
Book reviews should have a title both in the language of the submitted paper and in
English. They should also refer to the work under review as follows: Author, title, place, publishing
house, year, and number of pages.
Please include a brief biographical note (250 words) that includes institutional affiliation,
the titles of some publications, areas of specialization, and an e-mail address. Please prepare the
manuscript for blind review deleting all self-references.
Style
For any contribution, the author should use letter type Time New Roman 12 and lines should be
spaced 1.5 (text and notes). Notes should be numbered consecutively (superscript, no brackets) and
appear as footnotes, using Times New Roman 10. The number of the annotation which points to the
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bibliographic information contained in the footnote has to appear directly after the quotation mark
closing the citation.
Stress required in the text should be done through the use of italics, never in bold type.
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Waldron, J. The Principle of Proximity, New York University Public Law and Legal
Theory Working Papers 255 (2011), p. 19 http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu_plltwp,
accessed month, day year).
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