


The **Journal**
of Global Development and Peace



Spring 2010



EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Thomas J. Ward

MANAGING EDITOR

Dave Benjamin

EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD

Stephen Healey
Meg Zayan
Mark Setton
Tarek Sobh
Chunjuan Nancy Wei

LAYOUT & COPY EDITOR

Katarina Deshotel

PUBLICATIONS COORDINATOR

Guljana Torikai

FINAL PROOF EDITOR

Justin Hume

SUBMISSIONS**COMMENTARY, ARTICLES, MISCELLANY, BOOK REVIEWS**

The Journal welcomes manuscripts for consideration. Guidelines for submissions are as follows:

1. Footnotes: end of manuscript, as notes.
2. Avoid abbreviations.
3. Be consistent in ALL respects.
4. Polish entire MS very carefully.
5. Abstract for article
6. Biography: stress training, positions, publications. Third person.
7. Include color jpeg file photo of self.

Send Articles, Commentary, and Book Reviews via:

Email (preferred): intlcoll@bridgeport.edu

By post to: International College
126 Park Avenue, Bridgeport, CT 06604

© 2010 by the International College of the University of Bridgeport; 225 Myrtle Avenue; Bridgeport, CT 06604. All rights reserved. No part of this online or print publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The views expressed are solely those of individual authors.


Library of Congress: ISSN 2152-3908

Table of Contents

Foreword	i
China's New Diplomacy Towards Southeast Asia: Motivations, Strategies, and Implications	1
<i>Dr. Zhiqun Zhu</i>	
From Mao Back to Confucius: China's Approaches to Development and Peace	23
<i>Dr. Chunjuan Nancy Wei</i>	
The New International Role of China and its Relations with Argentina in Times of Crisis	41
<i>Eduardo Daniel Oviedo</i>	
Maybe We Should Look at Other Countries	69
<i>Alexander Kuzminov</i>	
Israel and Palestine—Looking ahead Twenty Five Years A Symposium Report	77
<i>Dr. Thomas J. Ward</i>	
Appendices on Israel-Palestine	
Changing Demographics and the Middle East.....	99
<i>Dr. Richard L. Rubenstein</i>	
China's Global Hunt for Oil.....	109
<i>Dr. Zhiqun Zhu</i>	
“Will the President be able to resolve the Middle East crisis?”	116
<i>Dr. Richard L. Rubenstein</i>	

Foreword

Thomas J. Ward



This Spring 2010 Vol II of the *Journal of Global Development & Peace* focuses on two key areas of geopolitical interest: Northeast Asia and the Middle East. Certainly the Middle East and Northeast Asia can each be expected to remain a fulcrum of interest as we enter the second decade of the new Millennium. In his article studying the changing dynamic in relations between Argentina and China, Professor Eduardo Daniel Oviedo, Professor of Contemporary History and International Relations at the Argentina's Universidad Nacional de Rosario, describes how, at a time when Western Europe and the United States have turned inward, China is forging powerful state-to-state economic and political relations throughout Latin America. With a newfound spirit of political and economic independence, Latin American republics increasingly seek to strengthen their ties with China. In the case of Argentina, trade with East Asia now exceeds trade with Western Europe, which had been Argentina's major partner for decades. In Brazil, China has replaced the United States as its principal trading partner. Dr. Oviedo's article punctuates the extent to which China has emerged as a major player in Latin America and elsewhere in the world. He points to the November 5, 2008 publication and distribution of *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean* as an indicator that China intends to become a major player in a region long thought to be a part of the United States' sphere of influence.

In his article on Southeast Asia, Dr. Zhiqun Zhu, John T. and Catherine MacArthur Chair of East Asian Studies at Bucknell University, describes China's growing role in Southeast Asia. He notes that China has replaced its past practice of confrontation with "soft diplomacy." Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have long had a territorial dispute with China over the Spratly Islands. In the past, the substance of China's response has consisted of military threats and deployments; however, Zhu points out that today economic cooperation and partnership have become the thrust of China's new initiatives with countries in this region.

China has de-emphasized the Marxist rhetoric that defined it for three decades and has begun to explore its philosophical roots. In her article on China, Dr. Chunjuan Nancy Wei provides us with insights into today's China and its search for a new philosophical

identity. In her article, Dr. Wei observes how China's leaders attempt a marriage of Confucianism, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and a market-oriented economy. In foundational texts such as *Analects*, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, and *The Great Learning*, Confucianism studies relationships and integrity. It comments on the ideal relationship between the Emperor and his ministers. In the Chinese understanding of this relationship, the minister was expected to be submissive to the Lord. However, at the same time, he did speak his mind for the well-being of the emperor and the kingdom. Indeed, such frankness was one of the characteristics of Confucius himself and marks much of the trajectory of Confucianism in China.

Confucianism made its way to Japan during the Taika Reforms (646 A.D.) and it was adapted over the years to Japan's political and cultural realities, as was the case elsewhere. During the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), the Shogun played both the central military and political role in Japan's governance. The military gave orders and subordinates acted on such orders. The Japanese ministers were subordinate to the orders of the Emperor and, more importantly to the Shogun, his military and political chargé. Mao arguably represented a Chinese Shogun rather than an emperor in spite of the Marxist accouterments. Mao renewed China's role as a major world power; however, there was not much room for dissent among Mao's ministers, as evidenced by the fate suffered by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and Minister of Education Liu Shaoqi during the Cultural Revolution.

As today's leaders redefine China in a Post communist, nationalistic setting, Confucianism, particularly its Neo-Confucian application, appears on the verge of a renaissance in China. Here Dr. Wei introduces this topic with a helpful introduction to key aspects of both Marxism-Leninism and Confucianism. Dr. Wei's expertise in Chinese politics along with her lifelong experience of the Confucian tradition establish a context for understanding a new trend in China's political development that deserves the attention of China observers and scholars alike.

In his article "Maybe We Should Look at Other Countries," Professor Alexander Kuzminov of the University of Bridgeport's College of Naturopathic Medicine comments on the ways in which acupuncture and other forms of ancient Chinese preventative medicine and healing could reduce health care costs and keep individuals healthy in the developing and the developed world alike. We applaud Professor Kuzminov for his article on complementary medicine which is the first of its type to appear in *The Journal of Global Development and Peace*. Preventative healthcare is sorely needed in the developing world and should be represented more prominently in literature on development and in the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals as well.

* * *

Between 2005 and 2007 the International College sponsored a series of symposia that specifically dealt with the Middle East. Interestingly we chose to approach this topic, not from the perspective of the present, where current controversies might cause us to lose the long-term perspective. The focus instead was “Looking Ahead Twenty-Five Years.” Over the next two decades an ongoing evolution of political and commercial alliances in addition to shifting demographics could lead to dramatic changes in the policies that Western Europe and the United States have vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine.

This article on the Middle East is meant to provide insight into the discussions and research that we have conducted on this topic here in the University of Bridgeport’s International College. The current balance of power in the Middle East may very well shift over the next two decades. That shift may result in a decline in support for Israel both from the European Union and from the United States. The present time, when those commitments remain strong and viable, would thus appear to be a most opportune time for the United States, the European Union, Israel and Palestine to seek a long-term solution to the challenges that exist.

We are grateful that we may include two speeches in the appendix that were delivered during our discussions by Dr. Richard Rubenstein, Distinguished Professor of Religion, that address the challenges that Israel and the West face in the future. Interestingly, these two speeches point to two very different ways in which Israel might respond to future challenges.

Dr. Zhiqun Zhu’s lecture on China’s Global Hunt for Oil was delivered in October 2005 and it was the opening lecture in this series. Dr. Zhu’s presentation describes the extent to which China is increasingly a key player in the Middle East and Africa. One can infer from this article that, as China becomes more dependent on the Middle East to address its energy needs, it may also be asked to clarify its views on ongoing developments between Israel and Palestine. As China becomes more of an economic player in the region and the United States potentially becomes less of a player, how will this impact on the privileged US-Israel relationship that has been so central to Israel’s survival and development over the past seven decades?

In Spring 2010 the International College initiated a second series of symposia on the Middle East. Again, the major focus of those discussions will be long-range. An emphasis in these symposia will be “learning to listen to the other.” The opening two symposia specifically deal with understanding the current mindsets of Palestinians and Israelis. Rather than challenging those mindsets, the symposia will encourage participants to internalize and be prepared to articulate the positions of the key players in the process.

In Fall 2010 we intend to move to more challenging issues but again from a long-range philosophical viewpoint rather than a short-term political perspective:

What steps would be needed to effect genuine reconciliation between Arabs and Israelis? Is it at all possible? Can one find within the Qu'ran and the Hadith an apologetic for the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East or is this an inherent violation of Islam? The discussions that we intend to pursue are meant to foster a better understanding of the parameters and the possibilities that exist for the future of Israel in the Middle East.

Hopefully readers of this issue of the *Journal of Global Development & Peace* will find its contents deserving of reflection.

Thomas J. Ward
Executive Editor
Journal of Global Development & Peace

China's New Diplomacy Towards Southeast Asia: Motivations, Strategies, and Implications

Zhiqun Zhu



Abstract

This article addresses three questions: why is China interested in Southeast Asia? What strategies has China employed to achieve its foreign policy objectives? And what's the impact on international political economy? China's skillful diplomacy, geographic proximity, economic complementarity, and a large presence of overseas Chinese willing to promote relations between their countries of residence and their ancestral homeland all contributed to China's rising popularity in Southeast Asia. The mutually beneficial China-Southeast Asia relationship is a successful South-South cooperation in international political economy. The article also suggests that despite China's growing influence in the region, the United States remains a dominant power in Southeast Asia. For China to become a truly responsible global power, it needs to pay more attention to other development issues such as environment and human rights.



Biography

Zhiqun Zhu is currently John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Chair in East Asian Politics and Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania. His recent publications include *US-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace* (Routledge, 2006), *Understanding East Asia's Economic "Miracles"* (AAS Publisher, 2009), *Global Studies: China* (ed. McGraw-Hill, 2010), and *China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance* (Ashgate, 2010). His teaching and research interests include Chinese politics, East Asian political economy, and US-East Asian relations. He has received several research grants and fellowships and was named a POSCO Fellow by the East-West Center in Hawaii in 2006 and a Senior Visiting Fellow by the National University of Singapore in 2010.

Since the early 1990s, China's diplomacy has experienced some significant transformations. While the fundamental principles of China's independent and peaceful foreign policy remain unchanged, this new diplomacy is characterized by China's efforts to seek oil and other energies, to expand trade and investment, and to project soft power. This paper addresses three questions: what are the motivations behind China's new diplomacy towards Southeast Asia? What strategies has China employed to achieve its foreign policy objectives? And what is the impact on international political economy?

Chinese-Southeast Asian relations have experienced ups and downs since 1949. During most of the Cold War, China was seen by many Southeast Asian nations as an exporter of communism. Diplomatic relations were strained as Southeast Asian governments suppressed communist insurgents, many of whom were ethnic Chinese. In fact, ASEAN was first established in 1967 as an anti-communist political group. Normal political and economic relations between China and most Southeast Asian nations were almost non-existent.

China and ASEAN established official links in 1991. In the early 1990s, the relationship was still tentative at best. To a large extent, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which offered an opportunity for China to upgrade its relations with the region, was a turning point and fundamentally changed Chinese-Southeast Asian relations. While the United States was critical of Southeast Asia's development model and slow in its response

when the crisis hit the region, China quickly responded, with an immediate promise not to devalue its currency. After the crisis, ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino announced, "China is really emerging from this smelling good."¹ By November 1997, the relationship had evolved to the level of annual ASEAN plus China summits.

Since the late 1990s China has advanced its relations with ASEAN states in numerous fields including foreign aid, trade, finance, infrastructure, labor, environment, tourism and education. For China, strong ties with ASEAN are particularly significant in its relation to the rest of the world. They are a crucial part of China's good neighbor diplomacy (*mulin waijiao*). If relations with ASEAN nations are smooth, China can claim that it is a peaceful power and is trusted in its own neighborhood.

Motivations of China's New Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

1) Strategic importance

China needs a peaceful environment for its continued economic growth. Southeast Asian nations are considered China's "periphery countries" (*zhehoubian guojia*) to which China pays particular attention. Southeast Asia contains all the shipping routes for China's energy imports and transportation from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Roughly 80 percent of China's energy imports transit through the Malacca Strait. China is expected to import more energy and other resources through these sea routes, espe-

cially the Malacca Strait, yet it is extremely vulnerable to any disruptions at these choke points. China wishes to reduce its dependence on energy supplies through the Malacca Strait but has few alternatives now. This predicament has been dubbed China's "Malacca Dilemma" by Chinese scholars and media.

China needs a peaceful environment for its continued economic growth.

Partly to address this dilemma, in June 2009 CNPC announced a plan to construct an oil pipeline connecting Myanmar with China. The 1,100 km crude oil line starts from the port of Kyaukryu in Myanmar and ends in Kunming. The oil pipeline, when completed, will be used to transport oil to China from the Middle East and Africa as well as Myanmar itself.

As a close neighbor, Southeast Asia also serves other strategic purposes for China. After the Cold War and during much of the 1990s, there was a heated debate in the United States regarding its policy toward China: Engagement or containment? Since the mid-1990s, China has supported ASEAN as a collective body in order to balance the strategic pressure of the United States. Many Chinese efforts to promote relations with ASEAN were intended to forestall a possible US con-

tainment strategy.

2) Reaping benefits from trade and investment

Economic cooperation remains the focus of China's relations with Southeast Asian nations. Sino-ASEAN trade grew from \$8 billion in 1991 to over \$200 billion in 2007 and \$230 billion in 2008. When the ASEAN-China FTA is implemented by 2010, the world's largest free trade zone will be created with 1.7 billion people, a total GDP of \$2 trillion, and total trade volume exceeding \$1.2 trillion.² Southeast Asia, home of the majority of the Chinese overseas population, is also a major investor in China's economic and social projects. By the end of 2005, Southeast Asian nations and businesses had invested in nearly 30,000 projects in China, totaling about \$40 billion.³

Southeast Asia is fast emerging as an important supplier of China's industrial commodities and energy, and the region as a whole runs a trade surplus with China. China displaced the United States as ASEAN's top trading partner in 2008. As planned, trade in goods will be liberalized by 2010 for China and the six older ASEAN members, and by 2015 with four newer members: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Poorer countries in Southeast Asia benefit most from China's investment with added infrastructure—roads, ports, bridges, hospitals, schools, etc. The infrastructure projects funded by China seem clearly aimed at helping to assure China's access to natural resources and to enhance its soft power.

China and Singapore enjoy strong economic ties. The two countries signed a FTA in October 2008. During Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Singapore in November 2007, he and his Singaporean counterpart Lee Hsien Loong signed several cooperation agreements including the deal for the eco-city in Tianjin near Beijing. Singapore was a leading investor in a multi-billion dollar industrial park in Suzhou near Shanghai during the 1990s.

Two-way trade between China and Malaysia is expanding by 20-25 percent per year. Having exceeded \$33 billion in 2007, it is projected to reach \$50 billion by 2010.⁴ In November 2006, Malaysia's state-owned energy company, Petronas, won a 25-year contract to supply Shanghai with three million tons of LNG per year in a deal worth \$25 billion—by far the largest single trade deal between the two countries.

Until a few years ago, China was considered an almost hostile power in Indonesia. Now China is forging close diplomatic and political links with Indonesia, which has deep reserves of oil as well as LNG. Sino-Vietnamese trade has also jumped from the modest \$30 million in 1991 to \$4.9 billion in 2004 to a record \$15.9 billion in 2007. This makes China Vietnam's biggest trading partner.⁵ Cambodia is believed to have granted China the rights to one of its five offshore oil fields that could yield as much as \$700 million to \$1 billion a year.⁶

Northern Myanmar has a large ethnic Chinese population, creating cultural ties that facilitate trade between the countries.

With proven natural gas reserves of about 2.48 trillion cubic meters, representing 1.4 percent of the world supply, Myanmar is increasingly at the center of a growing competition between China and India to



ASEAN seal and flags of member nations

develop and transport offshore natural gas to their respective home markets.⁷ China has built dams and roads connecting the interior of Myanmar to China's southern flank, and is reported to be working on a deep-water port on Myanmar's west coast. China's influence is clearly growing in Myanmar. In June 2007, China brokered an unusual direct meeting in Beijing between a senior US State Department official and Myanmar's minister of foreign affairs.⁸

In Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen boasted of China's offer of \$600 million in "no strings attached" loans, which was made during a visit from Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Spring 2006. According to Hun Sen, the traditional lenders, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United States and Japan,

together pledged just \$1 million more than China, and the money came laden with conditions.

In 2006 in the Philippines, China was offering an extraordinary package of \$2 billion in loans each year for three years from its Export-Import Bank. That made the \$200 million offered separately by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank “look puny”, and easily outstripped a \$1 billion loan under negotiation with Japan.⁹ To compete with America's influence in the region, China has pledged an initial \$6.6 million grant to the Philippine Army in September 2007. China had offered provisionally to provide as much as \$1.2 billion in financial facilities for the Philippine military. It has also supplied weapons to the Philippine military such as Harbin Z-9 utility helicopters.¹⁰

3) *Seeking ASEAN's support against Taiwanese independence*

With China's growing power and influence in the region, most Southeast Asian nations have demonstrated deference to China over the Taiwan issue. They seem to appreciate China's policy of maintaining the *status quo* across the Taiwan Strait and opposed Taiwan's destabilizing policies during the Chen Shui-bian administration (2000-2008). Rodolfo C. Severino, former ASEAN secretary general, remarked that being an inter-governmental organization, ASEAN does not find it proper to deal officially with Taiwan in the same way that it conducts relations with sovereign states. He said for the sake of regional prosperity and stability, ASEAN would love to see Tai-

wan avoiding any moves toward *de jure* independence.¹¹

The Singapore government has repeatedly expressed its concern about Taiwan's movement toward formal independence and explicitly voiced its opposition to Taiwanese independence. For example, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made clear Singapore's position on the Taiwan issue while holding talks with visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on November 18, 2007. “Singapore supports the one-China policy and opposes “Taiwan Independence,”” Lee reiterated.¹² Singapore has occasionally played the role as an intermediary between the PRC and Taiwan. Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew helped both sides communicate in the 1970s and 1980s, and in 1993 Singapore hosted the historic talks between envoys from the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Deferring to China's wishes, most governments in Southeast Asia have banned minister-level officials from visiting Taiwan. As an indication of the PRC's victory over Taiwan in the diplomatic competition, Taiwan does not have formal diplomatic relations with any of the ASEAN members. However, Taiwan maintains a notably substantial presence in Southeast Asia through the official “economic and cultural representative offices” across the region. Likewise, most Southeast Asian nations also maintain semi-official trade and cultural offices in Taipei.

China's Strategies in Southeast Asia

China has pursued a combination of both bilateral and multilateral strategies in its relations with ASEAN. Its approach has been pragmatic, without attaching political, environmental, human rights and other conditions to its trade with and aid to Southeast Asian countries.

1) Promoting trade and investment

Flush with over \$2 trillion in foreign currency reserves, China is making big loans and making huge investments abroad, including Southeast Asia. China has provided generous aid packages to Southeast Asian nations. In April 2005 President Hu Jintao signed a Strategic Partnership agreement with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, extending credit and loans for \$300 million worth of infrastructural projects and more than \$10 billion of private sector investment to Indonesia. In September 2006 China announced a large aid package comprising \$2 billion of loans a year for the next three years for the Philippines, outshining offers of \$200 million from the World Bank and ADB, and negotiations for \$1 billion from Japan.¹³

Throughout the 1990s, Sino-Philippine relations had centered on the contentious issue of ownership of the Spratly Islands, resulting in tense physical and diplomatic stand-offs between the two countries. After President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed power in 2001, Sino-Philippine relations grew so fast that President Arroyo has reportedly appointed at least four special envoys to manage the two

countries' growing economic, political, and strategic ties.¹⁴ During one of Arroyo's visits to Beijing, she signed a confidential protocol with China related to the exploration of South China Sea oil resources. The agreement would allow China to explore for oil resources within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including areas that the two sides have historically disputed. Pleased with the status of Sino-Philippine relations, in 2007 President Arroyo declared China to be "a very good big brother."¹⁵

China has provided billions of US dollars worth of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Southeast Asian nations. In a short time span, the PRC has become a major player in ODA to the Philippines: according to one report, in 2006 it ranked fifth, behind Japan, the ADB, World Bank and United Kingdom, providing 5 percent, or \$460 million, of \$9.5 billion in total ODA.

A fast-growing Chinese presence is one of the most striking features in Laos these days. Since 2000 China has been pouring billions of dollars in development aid and investment into the land-locked country. The new stadium, built for the Southeast Asia Games in 2009, was financed by the China Development Bank. According to official statistics, at least 30,000 Chinese live in Laos, but in reality the figure could be 10 times greater.¹⁶

In 2006, China's Guangxi Autonomous Region government made a proposal to build a Pan-Beibu Gulf (Tonkin Gulf) Economic Zone. The envisioned N-S Economic Corridor attempts to encom-

pass South China and Indochina. In all, it will cover China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore while Myanmar and some ASEAN archipelagic countries such as Indonesia can be drawn in by extension. If properly constructed and managed, the N-S corridor could become the backbone of China-ASEAN economic cooperation. It could become a corridor for the flow of human resources, commodities, information, and capital.

China was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with East Timor when the latter gained independence on May 20, 2002. Though China's aid and investment in East Timor is dwarfed by that from major donors such as the EU, Australia, Japan, and Portugal, China has focused its investment on key public projects. In early 2008, China handed over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, a large office complex built at a cost of \$7 million. Several miles away, the construction of the new presidential palace, paid for with \$6 million in Chinese aid, was nearing completion in 2009. China's next major aid project will be a \$6 million office complex to house the Ministry of Defense and Security and headquarters for the East Timor Defense Force.¹⁷ Two-way trade quickly expanded from \$1.7 million in 2005 to \$9.4 million in 2008, making China East Timor's fourth largest trading partner after Indonesia, Singapore, and Australia. China also provided aid to help improve East Timor's human resources. The Chinese government has made available a number of university scholarships for East Timorese. Since 2004, China has dispatched two batches

of resident medical teams of more than 20 doctors to the country.

China-ASEAN cooperation now covers agriculture, the information industry, human resources development, transportation, energy, culture, tourism, development of the Mekong River, and public health.



Floating market Mekong River, Vietnam

2) Exercising soft power

China has employed strategies to emphasize the softer side of its power and intentions. China's approach to Southeast Asia since the mid-1990s has been characterized by a conscious dampening of outstanding regional disputes, a willingness to engage in multilateral dialogue and in-

stitutions, and rhetoric of good neighborliness and mutual benefits.¹⁸ China has made efforts to accommodate its smaller Asian neighbors, many of which have long had tense relations with Beijing. It has tried to present an image of a friendly, peaceful, caring, and responsible neighbor. It has also participated assiduously in the ASEAN-led regional institutions such as the ARF and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) dialogues, promoting regional security.

Providing financial assistance to its neighbors is a major form of projecting soft power for China. Between 2002 and 2007, China pledged \$12.6 billion in economic assistance to Southeast Asian nations.¹⁹ Most significantly, the assistance came without any political conditions. In 2006, China announced it would donate \$1 million to the ASEAN Development Fund and provide another \$1 million to support programs of the ASEAN community. In addition, China would train 8,000 people for ASEAN in the next five years, and invite 1,000 to visit China.²⁰ It also announced it would sign a treaty establishing a “nuclear weapons free” zone in Southeast Asia, a largely symbolic move that signals its increasing willingness to forge closer ties with regional nations.

China negotiated a Declaration on the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea and formally acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of ASEAN in 2003 as the first external signatory. Its willingness to negotiate multilaterally with rival Southeast Asian claimants in the territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands in

South China Sea reassures them that China is serious about its peaceful rise.

China's assistance often comes when most needed. In the wake of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, China offered \$1 billion in financial assistance to regional countries. In 2004 China was quick to send \$60 million worth of aid and supplies to regional countries affected by the tsunami.²¹ The sum of Chinese foreign aid in Southeast Asia has surpassed the amount provided by the United States. For example, in 2002, China's aid to Indonesia was double that of the United States. In 2006, China's aid to the Philippines was four times that of the United States, while the amount to Laos was three times US aid.²²

In December 2006, China announced it would provide \$200,000 in aid to the typhoon-ravaged Philippines. Typhoon Durian caused widespread damage, including 1,000 people dead or missing in the north-central province of Albay. China also agreed to provide an interest-free loan of \$12.5 million to Cambodia in the next five years to implement the projects agreed upon by both sides.²³

China has been attempting to project an image of a peacefully rising power in the world. It has used public diplomacy to reinforce the concept of peaceful development, such as through museum exhibits in Malaysia to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the voyage of Zheng He, a Ming Dynasty admiral who sailed across the world. These efforts have paid off. In Thailand, polls show that more than 70 percent of Thais now consider China

Thailand's most important external influence, though Thailand had long been a US ally.²⁴ The difficulty of gaining US visas immediately after 9/11 propelled many Thais and other Southeast Asians to travel to China as students and tourists. Studying in China has become an easy sell to young Asians eager to reap economic benefits from today's interdependent world.

To promote Chinese language and culture, the Chinese government has opened Confucius Institutes throughout Southeast Asia. As of mid 2009, at least 24 Confucius Institutes had been established in the region to promote teaching and learning of Chinese language and culture.

Status-conscious Asian families used to send their children to study in the United States or Europe. Now a berth in a top Chinese university is seen as increasingly attractive. In Malaysia, students of non-Chinese background are flocking to primary schools where Chinese is taught. In Singapore, the government still sends a handful of students on scholarships to the top universities in the United States and Great Britain, but it has introduced a parallel program to send equal numbers of its best students to China and India. In the past, experience in the United States was important; now experience in China is just as good.²⁵ Cultural exchange is a two-way street. Chinese students number in the thousands in colleges and vocational schools in several Southeast Asian nations. In 2003 11,000 PRC nationals were enrolled in Malaysian schools, representing a quarter of all foreign students and the largest single group

of students in Malaysia.²⁶

Observers of China-South Asia relations have to be amazed at the speed China is gaining popularity in this part of the world. Not too long ago, most Southeast Asian nations had a rocky and tense relationship with the communist government in Beijing. The militaries in Southeast Asia had been concerned about the "yellow fever"—the threat from the north. Public displays of Chinese culture and heritage were banned. Ethnic Chinese lived as second-class citizens in their own country. Ten years after the fall of Suharto in 1998, dragon dances were no longer forbidden and the Chinese New Year has become an official holiday. Indonesia's ethnic Chinese have their own newspapers, and Chinese firms are now competing with US and European companies for Indonesia's oil, minerals and gas. In addition, Confucianism is recognized as one of the country's official religions.

China has actively promoted tourism in Southeast Asia. Over the last decade, Chinese tourists have experienced an annual growth of 30 percent. The number of Chinese visitors to Vietnam alone reached 778,000 in 2004.²⁷ In 2007, 3.4 million Chinese tourists visited the ASEAN region, a number that, for the first time, surpassed the amount of Japanese tourists.²⁸

The Singapore-Malaysia-Thailand route is very popular among the newly rich Chinese middle class. These nations have relaxed visa restrictions for Chinese nationals, resulting in increasing numbers of

tourist arrivals. Chinese tourists, less fearful than Americans of the threat of being targets of terrorism after 9/11, are becoming the dominant tourist group in the region, outnumbering Americans and the ubiquitous Japanese. "Among some countries, China fever seems to be replacing China fear," said Wang Gungwu, Chairman of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore.²⁹ All 10 ASEAN countries are approved tourist destinations for Chinese now. Massive tourist developments in Singapore, including integrated resort-casinos, are not so subtly aimed at cashing in on Chinese tourists. The casino was a hard sell in Singapore due to the government's moralistic, anti-gambling tone in the past.

As another way of enhancing its soft power, in the early 21st century China dropped its militant stand on the dispute over the Spratly Islands. Instead, it is opting for a cooperative solution. China is engaging in the region within the ASEAN-led process, especially through the mechanism of "ASEAN Plus Three." There are also military exchanges between China and Southeast Asian nations. A number of Malaysian military officers have attended military academies in China, and vice versa. In August 2009, China launched the communications satellite Palapa D for Indonesia from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest China, using a Chinese-made Long March 3B rocket.

3) Highest-level involvement

In international relations, high-level meetings are not only symbolic of warming

relations between states but can often overcome difficulties and get things done. Chinese leaders have become frequent travelers to Southeast Asia and vice versa. High-level delegations from China to Southeast Asia today surpass those of the United States or any other outside power. These visits promote relations between China and Southeast Asia. In November 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin made his first visit to Cambodia and Laos as the head of state. Chinese and Vietnamese leaders have exchanged many visits. In November 2006, President Hu Jintao visited Vietnam and attended the 14th APEC summit in Hanoi. He went on to visit Laos.

Premier Wen Jiabao visited Singapore in November 2007 and attended the 11th APT Summit and the Third East Asia Summit held in Singapore. Premier Wen officiated at the launch of the Singapore-China Foundation which provides scholarship and exchange programs for government officials.³⁰ Chinese vice-Premier Li Keqiang paid an official visit to Indonesia in December 2008. Li said upon arrival that China highly values the strategic partnership with Indonesia and hoped that his visit would boost bilateral relations to a higher level.³¹ During Li's visit, the two countries signed energy and trade deals worth more than \$4 billion. Among the agreements were deals for the Export-Import Bank of China to provide a \$482 million loan to develop a plant in West Java and another \$293 million loan for a plant in East Java. The two countries had also signed a memorandum of understanding for a \$1 billion loan from the China Export Bank to allow Indonesia to

buy Chinese goods including machinery and steel.³²

Leaders from Southeast Asia have traveled to China often. Vietnamese Communist Party leader Nong Duc Manh visited China twice in 2007 and 2008. To further this growing tradition, Manh and President Hu announced the establishment of a high-level hotline for consultations on major issues—the first of its kind between a Vietnamese leader and a foreign counterpart.³³ Apart from annual leadership visits, the two neighbors have numerous exchanges between governmental and non-governmental officials on an almost daily basis. In October 2008, Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung journeyed to China and attended the Asia-Europe summit in Beijing.

Since Singapore and China established diplomatic relations in 1990, bilateral relations have been developing steadily. Singapore is China's seventh largest trading partner, and China's largest in ASEAN. Lee Kuan Yew maintains close personal relations with several generations of the PRC leaders and is a frequent traveler to Beijing and other places in China. Singapore sometimes serves as "a spokesman for China in the Asian region," said Guan Anping, a Beijing-based trade lawyer and former Chinese trade official. "Sometimes when it's not convenient for China to say certain things, it passes the message through Singapore."

High-level exchanges between the Philippines and China have been frequent, especially since President Gloria Arroyo took office in 2001. President Arroyo has

visited China several times while President Hu Jintao paid a state visit to the Philippines in April 2005. In addition, the annual PRC-Philippines defense talks were inaugurated in 2005. In October 2006, Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan met in Beijing with visiting Philippine Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense Antonio Santos and agreed to foster closer strategic relations between the two countries, including closer exchanges between the two militaries.

Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej visited China in July 2008, his first since taking office in January 2008. In October 2006, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited China and met with Chinese Vice Premier Huang Ju for the second Sino-Indonesian Energy Forum in Shanghai. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation and agreed that beginning in 2009, Indonesia's Tangguh gas field will provide 2.6 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually to China's Fujian Province for 25 years.³⁴ Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao hosted a gathering of ASEAN leaders in the southern city of Nanning on October 30, 2006 to celebrate 15 years of Chinese dialogue with ASEAN.

On December 30, 2008, the Chinese government announced the appointment of a senior woman diplomat as the first ambassador/special envoy to ASEAN, signaling China's growing attention to the region. The ambassador, Xue Hanqin, is a senior diplomat and an expert on international law. The appointment came af-

ter the world's two top economies—the United States and Japan—had sent envoys to the bloc earlier and showed China's willingness to strengthen ties with ASEAN. China has previously appointed special ambassadors to the Middle East and Africa, a gesture seen by observers as signaling that it attaches great importance to those areas.

4) Wooing Overseas Chinese

Southeast Asian nations have the largest concentration of Overseas Chinese. Approximately 30 to 40 million people of Chinese ancestry, or over 6 percent of the region's population, live in Southeast Asia. Since the beginning of Beijing's open door and reform policies in the late 1970s, Overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia as well as those in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao have been a major source of FDI into the Chinese mainland. The Chinese government often wines and dines these Overseas Chinese, hoping that they will continue to invest in China and that they can help promote relations between their countries of residency and their ancestral homeland.

There are roughly 6 million ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Although their numbers are small, Chinese Indonesians control a huge amount of wealth—one-half to three-quarters of private wealth in Indonesia by most estimates, and more than three-quarters of Indonesia's 20 wealthiest people are ethnically Chinese.³⁵ According to one study, at least 90 percent of Sino-Indonesian trade involves Chinese Indonesians. Buttressed by reduced

cultural barriers to doing business and a ready-made, national distribution network due to Chinese Indonesian ownerships of small businesses, they are simply the natural trading partners for Chinese manufacturers. With almost all of Indonesia's largest corporations and financial houses controlled by Chinese Indonesians, they are natural players in the Chinese market.³⁶

In Cambodia, China Radio International (CRI) and Cambodia's national radio station jointly launched an international radio service in December 2008, with 18 hours of broadcasting in Cambodian, Chinese, English, and Chaozhou (Southern Min) dialect. The programs cover current news, economy, culture, sports, and entertainment. Popular Chinese music is also introduced in the program. This new radio service is reportedly developed to counter the influence of VOA and Radio Free Asia in Southeast Asia and to cater to the needs of the Overseas Chinese in the region.³⁷ In addition, three Chinese language newspapers are published daily in Cambodia. The local Chinese communities in Southeast Asia serve as a strong linkage between these countries and China.

Assessment

1) China enjoys close relations with ASEAN nations and its influence is growing, but there are limitations.

Southeast Asian leaders and the public generally view China's development favorably. It is very rare for them to openly question China's rise. The changing per-

ception of China has been fed by a number of developments since the financial crisis in 1997. These include China's pledge not to devalue the yuan during the economic crisis, its offer of a FTA to ASEAN, a joint declaration on a code of conduct in the South China Sea, cooperation with ASEAN to combat the SARS outbreak in 2003, and China's decision to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

Singapore often sides with China in international affairs. While some Western politicians and activists were considering boycotting the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics in protest of China's crackdown on Tibetan protesters and its human rights record, Lee Kuan Yew said he and other Asian leaders would attend the ceremony since "there is no reason for us to offend the Chinese."³⁸

In May 2008, China garnered the support of ASEAN on the Tibet issue during an APT meeting in Singapore among senior foreign ministry officials from ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea. Peter Ho, permanent secretary in the Singapore foreign ministry, who chaired the meeting, said that ASEAN "welcomed the restoration of normalcy and the latest move of the Chinese government to have contact

and consultation with the private representative of the Dalai Lama. This will help restore stability."³⁹

China has "learned how to speak the language of the region, of Southeast Asian diplomacy— multilateralism, (and) confidence-building— much more than the United States has."

The "China heat" is unmistakably perceptible. Chinese language programs attract many young students across Southeast Asia. Aileen Baviera, dean of the Asian Center at the University of the Philip-

pines, remarked that China has "learned how to speak the language of the region, of Southeast Asian diplomacy— multilateralism, (and) confidence-building— much more than the United States has."⁴⁰ In November 2000 when President Jiang Zemin visited Cambodia, his Cambodian host had thousands of children line the streets of Phnom Penh, waving tiny Chinese flags or small photographs of Jiang. The scene resembled that of a papal visit to a devoutly Catholic nation, commented Josh Kurlantzick, author of *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*.⁴¹ When Premier Wen Jiabao visited Indonesia in 2003, he was toasted with frequent ovations. In contrast, when President Bush visited the same year, many Indonesian cultural and political leaders would not even meet with him.

However, there are lingering suspicions about China in some parts of Southeast Asia. Demonstrators in Hanoi protested

in early 2008 what they saw as Chinese aggression in the Spratly Islands. Such protests were rare in Vietnam but were tolerated by the government, in part because they tapped into a deep well of nationalism with roots in Vietnam's long and often bitter experience with its giant neighbor to the north. More than a thousand years of domination by China have left many Vietnamese deeply suspicious of China, although China has become Vietnam's second-largest trading partner now. China's territorial disputes and historical conflicts with Vietnam, including a bloody border war in 1979, have placed some limits on deepening relations between the two communist neighbors.

Chinese companies' efforts to expand trade and investment in the region are not always welcomed especially when they fail to generate local jobs. For instance, the Vietnamese government approved a project in late 2007 to exploit reserves of bauxite—the key mineral in making aluminum—with an investment of \$15 billion by 2025. The state-owned Chinese mining group, Chinalco, has already put workers and equipment to work in the remote Central Highlands as of early 2009. More than 2,000 Chinese workers were expected to be imported to work in the project, which led to an outcry from many unemployed Vietnamese suffering from the global economic downturn. The project was also opposed by leading figures such as Vietnam's great war hero General Vo Nguyen Giap, the last living comrade of the country's founding father, Ho Chi Minh. General Giap and others said the Chinese-run project would be ruinous to the environment, displace eth-

nic minority populations and threaten national security with an influx of Chinese workers and economic leverage.⁴² Similar complaints about Chinese investment have been heard in other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos and Singapore, where Chinese workers have been brought in to work on China-funded projects. These cases underscore the limits of Beijing's charm offensive in Southeast Asia.

In East Timor, China has established itself as an important player in the country's economic affairs after its independence in 2002. However, China's role is very limited when compared to Australia, Portugal, Indonesia, and the UN. Its efforts to access East Timor's oil and gas reserves have made little headway. China's growing ties with ASEAN notwithstanding, other powers especially the United States, Japan, Australia, and India maintain considerable influence and have a strong presence in the region.

2) Contentious issues

Contentious issues exist between China and Southeast Asia, one of the most salient of which concerns human rights, particularly the case of Myanmar. On August 8, 1988, Myanmar's military opened fire on demonstrators in what is known as the 8888 Uprising and imposed martial law. The 1988 protests paved the way for the 1990 People's Assembly elections. However, the election results were subsequently annulled by Senior General Saw Maung's government.

Aung San Suu Kyi has earned interna-

tional recognition as an activist for the return of democratic rule, and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. The ruling regime has repeatedly placed her under house arrest. Despite a direct appeal by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to Senior General Than Shwe and pressure by ASEAN, the military junta extended Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest for another year in May 2006 and again in August 2009. The junta faces increasing pressure from Western countries. Myanmar's situation was referred to the UN Security Council for the first time in December 2005 for an informal consultation. In September 2006, ten of the UN Security Council's fifteen members voted to place Myanmar on the council's formal agenda. On January 8, 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged the national government to free all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi. In late 2007 Myanmar's military government violently put down another pro-democracy protest movement led by Buddhist monks, drawing international condemnation, and tighter US sanctions. Without much pressure from China, the military regime continues with its repressive policies.

China is one of Myanmar's major trading partners and investors, including \$1.4 billion to \$2 billion in weaponry to the ruling junta since 1988 and pledges of nearly \$5 billion in loans, plants and equipment, investment in mineral exploration, hydro power, oil and gas production, and agricultural projects.⁴³ A Myanmar opposition group, the 88 Generation Students organization, urged the boycott of Beijing Olympics in protest against what it called

China's "bankrolling" of the Myanmar military government that crushed pro-democracy protests in 2007.

Like on the issue of Sudan, China is not the cause of the problem in Burma. How-



Buddhist monks

ever, as a responsible global power, China needs to do more to prevent massive human rights violations in repressive, faltering countries. Beijing's siding with the oppressive military regime tarnishes China's hard-earned image in Southeast Asia. In July 2009 ASEAN established the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), formally translating its rhetoric of moving from being state-centric to more people-oriented into action. The new focus on human rights by ASEAN members may add complexity to Sino-ASEAN relations in the future if China fails to put more pressure on Myanmar.

Perhaps the most controversial issue between China and Southeast Asian nations is the overlapping claims of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is considered to have great gas and oil potential.

In addition, a significant proportion of the more than six million barrels of oil per day produced by China and Southeast Asian countries comes from the South China Sea region.⁴⁴ The situation in the Spratlys has improved since 1995 when China built controversial structures on Mischief Reef. Largely due to the diplomatic efforts of the Southeast Asian states in the early 2000s, China has obeyed the code of conduct in the disputed territory since then.

Any unilateral action may trigger negative repercussions in the region. For example, in April 2009, Vietnam appointed an official to be the chairman of Hoang Sa District (Paracel Islands), which compelled China to denounce it as illegal and to reaffirm its sovereignty over the Paracels. Demonstrations by Vietnamese youths broke out outside Chinese diplomatic missions in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Paris, and London in late 2007 following rumors about China's intention to establish Sansha city to govern the Paracels and Spratlys over which Hanoi claims sovereignty.

3) US-China competition or cooperation in Southeast Asia?

A 2007 Pew Research poll found that only 29 percent of Indonesians and 27 percent of Malaysians had a favorable view of the United States as opposed to 83 percent of Malaysians and 65 percent of Indonesians who had favorable views of China.⁴⁵ Other polls suggest that the United States is still viewed as the predominant soft power influence in Asia. According to a Chicago Council on

Global Affairs survey in 2008, despite China's growing influence, the United States remains the undisputed leader in soft power in Asia.⁴⁶ While many in Asia consider China to be the future leader of Asia, China fared much worse than expected in soft power—its political system, legal system, respect for human rights and normative appeal all scored very low in the eyes of Beijing's neighbors. The American culture, from Hollywood movies to MTV, remains vastly more popular and accessible, and the United States is still holding the dominant military power in the region. However, the trend is clear: the Chinese are quickly catching up.

China has made deep inroads into Southeast Asia since the mid-1990s. When leaders of China and the United States visited countries in Southeast Asia, they seemed to have brought with them two different sets of agendas. According to an article in Singapore's *Straits Times*, Chinese President Hu Jintao spent his time "touring a market place" while US President George W. Bush was "surveying the battlefield."⁴⁷ The United States, especially under President George W. Bush, did not seem to understand that the economic imperative, not the war against terror, is an issue of top concern in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian nations want to be respected and treated as economic partners by major powers.

China has been actively expanding public diplomacy in Southeast Asia while the United States was cutting it back. CRI, with upbeat news and features, broadcasts in English 24 hours a day, while VOA broadcasts 19 hours and will soon be cut

back to 14 hours. CCTV-9, China's premier state-owned English television channel, which features suave news anchors and cultural and entertainment shows, is broadcast worldwide. America may have CNN International, but in the realm of public policy, the United States has "nothing comparable," remarked Mr. Blackburn.⁴⁸ Across Southeast Asia, American centers run by the former U.S. Information Agency, which once offered

what ASEAN needs most are stability and development, the twin goals which both the United States and China can help to achieve.

English-language training and library services, were closed and staff was slashed as part of the worldwide cutbacks in the 1990s.

The Barack Obama administration that came to office in January 2009 has paid more attention to Southeast Asia. Six months into her new role as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton already visited Southeast Asia twice. While attending the ASEAN forum in July 2009, Clinton declared that "the United States is back in Southeast Asia." She signed ASEAN's Treaty on Amity and Cooperation and said the United States would name a per-

manent ambassador to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta and seek a "comprehensive partnership" with host country Indonesia. President Obama attended the APEC summit in Singapore in November 2009.

The United States remains the second largest investor in Southeast Asia after Japan. China's recent gains are not necessarily at America's expense. There is little chance of Southeast Asia being subjected to a Chinese Monroe Doctrine, even if China had such an intention of denying the region to outside powers like the United States. Because the United States has more power, more instruments, and provides more common security goods for the region than China does, Southeast Asians generally wish to maintain US involvement in the region. Specifically, countries like Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia are buying a strategic insurance policy from the United States by facilitating US forward military deployment in the region to deter potential Chinese aggressiveness.

While engaging China, these countries are also developing robust and close ties with the United States and other powers such as Japan, India and Australia to balance China. As a scholar in Southeast Asia commented, Asian countries do not have much trust for one another, and the United States is perceived as the least distrusted of all major powers.⁴⁹ Most countries in Southeast Asia welcome a continued US presence. US naval ships regularly visit Singaporean and Malaysian ports, and the US navy holds annual joint exercises with their counterparts in the

region. The Philippines and Thailand now enjoy major ally status with the United States. In addition, ASEAN has also deepened its relations with other powers such as India and Japan.

It would be a mistake to view China's new diplomacy in Southeast Asia as necessarily malignant or adversarial to US interests. In fact, what ASEAN needs most are stability and development, the twin goals which both the United States and China can help to achieve. China's continuous advance into the region through both bilateral and multilateral cooperation does not necessarily mean that the United States' substantial role will be replaced. There will be competition for resources and influence in Southeast Asia between China and the United States, but the two countries can also cooperate on many issues in the region, such as securing energy supply, cracking down on drug and human trafficking, combating terrorism and piracy, and promoting stability.

Concluding Remarks

The speed of the transformation of China-Southeast Asia relations since the early 1990s has been stunning given that not long ago many countries in Southeast Asia were firmly anti-communist, and countries like Indonesia were mortal enemies of the PRC. Today, China has a powerful presence in the region and is considered a good neighbor by all Southeast Asian nations. The considerable success of Chinese diplomacy in Southeast Asia is due to a combination of bilateral and multilateral economic, political, and

cultural strategies.

China's skillful diplomacy, geographic proximity, economic complementarity, and a large presence of overseas Chinese willing to promote relations between their countries of residence and their ancestral homeland all contributed to China's rising popularity in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian nations generally view China's development as an opportunity for their economic growth and interest in China has greatly increased. China's responsible behavior during the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis and the 2008-9 global economic downturn has been highly praised by many governments and the public in the region. The relatively peaceful environment in the South China Sea is not only testimony of China's moderate and friendly approach to the disputes but has also been conducive to China's growth at home.

The United States remains the dominant force in Southeast Asia, but Chinese influence is growing. For Southeast Asian nations, while the United States can be a distant ally with other priorities, China is right next door and is going to stay. Realizing the sensitivities of the region, China has been careful not to appear threatening as its power continues to grow. It is seen by some to be taking advantage of America's waning influence in Southeast Asia, but China is not engaged in a zero-sum diplomatic competition with the United States. In fact, the two great powers can and should turn Southeast Asia into a new venue for global and regional cooperation.

Note: This paper was based on the author's presentation at the "India, China and Asia: Geo-Civilizational Perspectives" conference in New Delhi on December 6, 2009. For a more thorough examination of China's diplomacy, please refer to the author's book, *China's New Diplomacy: Rational, Strategies and Significance* (Ashgate, 2010).

References:

1. Quoted in Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power," *Policy Brief No. 47* (June 2006), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
2. Evelyn Goh, "China and Southeast Asia," *Foreign Policy In Focus*, December 12, 2006.
3. Wen Jiabao, "Creating a Beautiful Future of China-ASEAN Relations," A speech made at the conference commemorating the 15th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue, Nanning, China, October 30, 2006.
4. "Malaysia: The Strategic Gateway to Asia," *Financial Times*, November 13, 2008: p. 19. And Ian Storey, "Malaysia's Hedging Strategy with China," *China Brief*, Vol. VII, Issue 14 (July 11, 2007), p. 10.
5. Do Thi Thuy, "China and Vietnam: From 'Friendly Neighbors' to 'Comprehensive Partners'," RSIS Commentary, July 9, 2008, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
6. Jane Perlez, "China Competes With West in Aid to Its Neighbors," *The New York Times*, September 18, 2006.
7. Drew Thompson, "US Turns to China to Influence Myanmar," *Asia Times Online*, September 21, 2007.
8. Thompson, "US Turns to China to Influence Myanmar," September 21, 2007.
9. Perlez, "China Competes With West in Aid to Its Neighbors," September 18, 2006.
10. Noel Tarrazona, "US, China Vie for Philippine Military Influence," *Asia Times Online*, September 20, 2007.
11. Rodolfo C. Severino, "Taiwan: the View from Southeast Asia," *PacNet Newsletter #36*, CSIS, September 20, 2007.
12. "Prime Minister: Singapore Supports One-China Policy," *Xinhua*, November 18, 2007.
13. Goh, "China and Southeast Asia," December 12, 2006.
14. Noel Tarrazona, "US, China Vie for Philippine Military Influence," *Asia Times Online*, September 20, 2007.
15. Ian Storey, "Trouble and Strife in the South China Sea Part II: The Philippines and China," *China Brief* Vol. 8, Issue 9, The Jamestown Foundation, April 28, 2008.
16. Nga Phan, "China Moves Into Laid-back Laos," *BBC News*, April 8, 2008.

17. Ian Storey, "China's Inroads into East Timor," *China Brief*, Vol. IX, Issue 6, March 19, 2009, pp. 7-10.
18. Goh, "China and Southeast Asia," December 12, 2006.
19. Lum, et al. "Comparing Global Influence," p. 84.
20. Wen, "Creating a Beautiful Future of China-ASEAN Relations," October 30, 2006.
21. David Fullbrook, "China's Strategic Southeast Asian Embrace," *Asia Times Online*, February 21, 2007.
22. Kurlantzick, "China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power," p. 3.
23. Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, "China-Southeast Asia Relations: Summitry at Home and Abroad," *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*, CSIS, December 2006.
24. Kurlantzick, "China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power," p. 4.
25. Ibid.
26. Ian Storey, "Malaysia's Hedging Strategy with China," *China Brief*, Vol. VII, Issue 14 (July 11, 2007), p. 10.
27. Do Thi Thuy, "China and Vietnam: From 'Friendly Neighbors' to 'Comprehensive Partners'," RSIS Commentary, July 9, 2008, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
28. H.H. Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang, "Transformations in China's Soft Power toward ASEAN," *China Brief* Vol. VIII, Issue 22 (November 24, 2008), p. 12.
29. Perlez, "Chinese Move to Eclipse U.S. Appeal in South Asia," November 18, 2004.
30. Le Tian, "Eco-City Pact Inked with Singapore," *China Daily*, November 19, 2007.
31. "Li Keqiang Begins Indonesia Visit," *Xinhua*, December 20, 2008.
32. "Indonesia, China Sign US\$4b in Energy and Trade Deals," Channel NewsAsia, December 22, 2008. http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/view/398003/1/.html
33. Do Thi Thuy, "China and Vietnam: From 'Friendly Neighbors' to 'Comprehensive Partners'," RSIS Commentary, July 9, 2008, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
34. Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, "China-Southeast Asia Relations: Summitry at Home and

- Abroad,” *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*, CSIS, December 2006.
35. Brian Harding, “The Role of the Chinese Diaspora in Sino-Indonesian Relations,” *China Brief*, Vol. 8, Issue 16 (August 1, 2008), Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C.
36. Ibid.
37. “War between CRI and VOA,” Duowei News (dwnews.com), March 9, 2009.
38. Grant Clark and Haslinda Amin, “Beijing Olympics Air Quality to Meet World Standards, Lee Says,” *Bloomberg News*, May 5, 2008.
39. “ASEAN Backs China on Tibet Issue,” *Kyodo News International*, May 7, 2008.
40. Sullivan, “Neighbors Feel China's Expanding Power,” April 3, 2008.
41. Josh Kurlantzick, “Chinese Soft Power in Southeast Asia,” *The Globalist online* (www.theglobalist.com), July 2, 2007.
42. Seth Mydans, “War Hero in Vietnam Forces Government to Listen,” *The New York Times*, June 28, 2009.
43. Ibid, p. 85.
44. Michael Richardson, “A Southward Thrust for China’s Energy Diplomacy in the South China Sea,” *China Brief* (Jamestown Foundation), Vol. 8, Issue 21 (November 7, 2008), p. 7.
45. Lum, et al. “Comparing Global Influence,” pp. 89-90.
46. The findings and summary of the survey were reported in June 2008 and the final report, which was released in April 2009, can be found on the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ website at www.thechicagocouncil.org/softpowerindex.
47. Evelyn Goh, “A Chinese Lesson for the US: How to Charm Southeast Asia,” *The Straits Times*, October 31, 2003
48. Perlez, “Chinese Move to Eclipse U.S. Appeal in South Asia,” November 18, 2004.
49. Sheng, “Is Southeast Asia Becoming China’s Playpen?”

From Mao Back to Confucius: China's Approaches to Development and Peace

Chunjuan Nancy Wei



Abstract

Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong each had different visions for China. As a neo-Confucianist, Chiang embraced traditional culture, while his archrival Mao aimed to create an egalitarian socialist China with elements of Marxism. As a result of these two competing visions, Mainland China initially rejected Confucius; however, Mao's successors have invited him back during the last two decades. While China is moving full steam ahead towards modernization, it is also looking back at its own Confucian and Daoist traditions. Will the Sinicized Marxism and Confucianism work hand in hand to promote world development and peace? Or will they pose a conundrum for Chinese leaders?

If Confucius were alive, he might be shamed, even fearful, to live in 20th century China.¹ The New Culture Movement of the 1910s blamed him for the weakness and poverty the Chinese people then experienced. Calling for reassessment of all traditional values—with Beijing University as its center—the movement featured heated debates between two opposing positions: those who preferred incremental changes in Confucian traditions, and those who wanted to replace those teachings with Western values and beliefs, emulating a Bolshevik-like revolution. Chen Duxiu, the iconoclastic editor of the *New Youth Journal* and soon-to-be founder of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),

shouted the slogan “Down with the Confucius Family Shop.” Other intellectuals proposed inviting two foreign concepts to China: “Mr. Democracy” and “Mr. Science.”

The land of Confucius faced a critical moment. Should China continue its old ways, an approach many denounced for the then existing state of the nation—politically weak, economically stagnant, and culturally conservative—or should it instead break with tradition and remake a new republic with progressive Western ideas such as human rights, freedom and equality?

Biography

Dr. Chunjuan Nancy Wei received her Ph.D. in political science and M.A. in public policy from Claremont Graduate University in Southern California. Her recent articles have been published in Yale Journal of International Affairs (in press) and the Southeast Review of Asian Studies, as well as a book chapter “The U.S. and China: The power of illusion” in the Alliance Curse. She is the coauthor of the book Zui Xin Meiguo Yao Lan (Survey of America) and co-translator of the book Wanquan Shagua: Qiu Zhi (The Complete Idiot's Guide to Getting the Job You Want). She is currently writing a book on Ancient China's Thirty-Six Stratagems and the U.S. War on Terror.


China's intelligentsia no doubt found itself divided in its Confucian legacies. The Kuomintang Party under Chiang Kai-shek made repeated efforts to revive Confucian values in the late 1920s and mid 1930s. When the party relocated to Taiwan, they brought Confucius with them, where he continues to be venerated as the Great Educator. Each year on Confucius' birthday (September 28), Taiwan holds ceremonies commemorating its Teacher's Day.

On the Mainland, Confucius experienced a turbulent period. The CCP banished Confucius and made itself a new god of Mao Zedong Thought, a mixture of localized Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. A military genius and a fine poet, Mao unified the Mainland while retaining most of the territory the Qing Dynasty had ruled, including Tibet and Xinjiang. Yet Mao's economic policies, notably the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, brought disaster to the country. Tired of repeated political movements, the people never quite forgot the teachings and influence of Confucius. Authorities realized this nostalgia presented an opportunity to solidify its rule. Accordingly, Confucius has returned to Mainland China, albeit with a modern twist.

A Sketch of the Confucian Legacy

Confucius lived at about the same time as Socrates and Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha), a time that German philosopher Karl Jaspers referred to as the axial age.² The China that Confucius experienced was one divided into a myriad of minor states warring with each other, the

closest modern equivalent being the Warlord Period *sans* the presence of foreigners. The great educator perceived a society wrapped in a vicious cycle of poverty,



Ancient statue of Confucius, Qufu Shandong Province, China

violence and chaos. With a sense of mission to restore social order, he traveled across borders lobbying rulers to live virtuously while caring for their people. These leaders generally greeted Confucius and his message with deaf ears. In his lifetime, the philosopher recruited some 3,000 students and inculcated in them the importance of personality, rituals, ethics, government and self-cultivation. Recognizing his profound teachings, the Chinese revered him posthumously as Kong Fuzi, meaning Master Kong and Latinized as Confucius.

It is important to note that Confucianism is not a religion, *per se*; rather, it is a system of thought and conduct concerned with self-cultivation, moral order, statecraft, and proper relationships among human beings. Rich and complex, Confucianism adopts as its core and spirit humanity (仁 *ren*), righteousness (义 *yi*), and peace (和 *he*), with rituals (礼 *li*) and music (乐 *yuè*) as its external manifestations. These ideals and practices permeate all aspects of Chinese life. The Confucian focus on learning and the concepts of filial piety and harmony are central to its practice.

Emphasis on Education and Learning

Many sayings and aphorisms contained in Confucius' *Analects* still guide many Chinese in their daily lives. For instance, Confucius viewed education as a right for all: "In education there are no class distinctions."³ When asked what to do with China's huge population, Confucius instructed that the people should be "enriched" and "educated."⁴ He saw learning as a great enjoyment: "To learn and at due times to repeat what one has learnt, is that not after all a pleasure?"⁵ He also stressed the importance of learning from one another: "When walking in a party of three, I always have teachers. I can select the good qualities of the one for imitation, and the bad ones of the other and correct them in myself."⁶ He accentuated the significance of thinking in the process of acquiring knowledge: "Learning without thinking is labor lost; thinking without learning is perilous."⁷ He believed the fruits of learning would

leave a person at peace: "Having heard the Way [Dao] in the morning, one may die content in the evening."⁸

The central importance given to education and learning positively influenced the ancient Chinese state and proved instrumental in fostering China's prominent status in the world at that time. For example, the Tang Dynasty (618-906) established a competitive civil service examination, the world's first meritocratic promotion system, which selected moral scholar-officials to run the state. However, this system was not without its problems. One notable drawback was the Confucian classics, the core underpinning of the Tang Dynasty's education, had little practical relevance to daily life, a feature limiting upward mobility. This regimen provided limited material or spiritual inducements for trade, scientific exploration or technological advancement.⁹ Reformers finally abolished the examination prior to the collapse of Qing Dynasty.

The Concept of Filial Piety (孝)

Before the 1911 Revolution, the values of the typical Chinese family centered around filial piety found in Confucian teachings. "A young man's duty," said Confucius, "is to be filial to his parents at home and respectful to his elders abroad."¹⁰ While his parents were alive, the man was supposed to serve and provide, even wine and dine them, if he could afford it. Upon a parent's death, the child was required to observe mourning for three years at home. Furthermore, it was simple to determine whether or not a

son was filial, even after the father's passing. "If, for three years, he makes no changes to his father's ways," said Confucius, "he can be said to be a good son."¹¹ While instrumental in preserving ancestral wisdom, this dogma served to prevent social change and growth.

Confucian teachings laid the foundations for Chinese tradition of taking care of parents in their old age, removing a major social problem for Chinese society. However, it has created many drawbacks in practice. Distinctive responsibilities delineated between men and women¹² resulted in the subjugation of females to males. A strict pecking order was enforced among siblings.¹³ Marriages were often dictated by parents and matchmakers. The killing of a father by a son or a husband by a wife drew longer and harsher punishments than that done to a son by the father or to a wife by the husband. The idea of equality was foreign to Confucian families, scholars and officials, resulting in unfair burdens being placed on women, subordinates and inferiors. Lu Xun, an influential writer in the Republican era (1911-1949), called this self-sustaining practice a "man-eating" system.

Because the Chinese concept of the state is built upon families, evidenced by the term 國家 (nation families), even kings—those "beneath one (the heaven) but above millions"—could not escape filial duty. Usually the emperor succeeded to the throne upon his father's death. According to the Confucian requirement, he had not only to mourn and perpetuate his father's policies, but had to obey the

whims of his surviving mother; accordingly, this gave the empress dowager (and often her family as well) enormous political influence.¹⁴ This doctrine in effect crippled the ability of the emperor to govern independently.

In essence, while Confucian instructions on learning encouraged scholarship, filial piety suppressed the nation's creativity and made the Chinese family structure ultimately more rigid than necessary.

Peace, Harmony and Governance

Confucius instructed rulers that "To govern is to set things right. If you begin by setting yourself right, who will dare to deviate from the right?"¹⁵ The Master set a high standard for leaders: "If the ruler himself is upright, all will go well without orders. But if he himself is not upright, even though he gives orders they will not be obeyed."¹⁶ Confucius taught that governors should lead by example, being benevolent and virtuous. "Virtue never stands alone," he said. "It is bound to have neighbors."¹⁷

Dismayed by the chaos of his time, Confucius attached great importance to social stability, peace and harmony. "In carrying out rituals, it is harmony that is prized."¹⁸ The great philosopher called for tolerance and plurality: "A gentleman seeks harmony but not uniformity."¹⁹ Confucian harmony focused mainly on peace in human relations and between man and nature. To restore order, Confucius called for rectification of names, rather than making a Constitution to regulate each member's social behavior. In his view, the

root cause of the social ills of his time was the confusion of names: “When names are incorrect, the words will not ring true.”²⁰ Accordingly, he advised statesmen to “Let the ruler be ruler, the minister minister, the father father and the son son.”²¹ After the name of relationships is rectified and every member of society knows his position and duties, all the emperor should do is “to have done nothing (*wu wei*) and yet have the state well-governed.”²²

What is an ideal government according to Confucian teachings? Rather than providing tedious statistics and getting bogged down in technicalities, the Master said that “[Good government is obtained] when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far off are attracted.” The beauty of his answer lies in Waley’s translated version, that “when the near approve and the distant approach,”²³ a good government can be quantified, as evidenced by a leader’s approval ratings and the numbers of legal and illegal immigrants.

Clearly, Confucian teachings are multi-dimensional and exist on many levels. Like many of his contemporary philosophers in the West, he was a great reformer, a brilliant educator, and a noble person. Sadly to himself and his adherents, the Master died disappointed that his teachings were ignored by the rulers of his day.

In the last 2,500 years, Confucianism has waxed and waned in influence, contending with dozens of other native and foreign schools and religions. During the

Han Dynasty, Confucianism became state doctrine. Drawing on Daoism and Buddhism—two other main streams of traditional Chinese culture—it evolved during the Song Dynasty into a rigid set of ideologies emphasizing hierarchy and absolute obedience. Institutionalized and internalized through civil service examinations, the neo-Confucianist interpretations proved instrumental in making the Middle Kingdom agrarian, arrogant, inward-looking, and resistant to change. Such a Confucian China would be doomed in its first encounters with the West.

An Uneasy Engagement: Confucius Collides with Marx

Following the Opium War of 1839, China entered a period of decay, foreign invasion and domination, an era characterized by unequal treaties, extra-territoriality and national division. The Century of Humiliation (1839-1949) cast doubts among the intelligentsia regarding the usefulness of Confucian thought and teachings. Some radicals, including the Communist founders Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, fiercely denounced Confucius, demanding the Master meet and contend with a foreign rival: Karl Marx.

Like Confucius, Marx travelled across borders, preaching his political economy and theory. When his works were first introduced to China in 1899, it was 16 years after his death. Moreover, having lived in England for some time, the Chinese mistook the German philosopher for a Briton.²⁴ Regardless, the Chinese pondered his revolutionary document *The*

Communist Manifesto, coauthored with Friedrich Engels and published in 1848. In the *Manifesto*, he declared that existing human history was not the Confucian ideal of harmony, but “the history of class struggles.” To paraphrase the English poet John Donne, Marxism would be the new ideology that called into doubt all Chinese traditions and values.²⁵

What was Marx proclaiming? He shared with Confucius the common concern about the prosperity and well-being of the people. In fact, historian Guo Moruo in his allegorical meeting of the two great political thinkers entitled *Marx Enters the Confucian Temple*, declares the two philosophers as mutually complementary.²⁶ However, while Confucius concerned himself primarily with self-cultivation and social order, Marx cared more about the oppressed working class. From these separate vantage points, each struggled with central, universal questions. Why are the workers getting poorer? Confucius would have faulted the leader as incapable of being in power. Marx suggested a different path: the overthrow of the existing system through revolution, declaring, “Proletariats of the world, unite!”

Where are human societies heading toward? The two shared similar ends. Confucius pointed to an orderly “harmonious world” (*da tong* 大同) with no states or racial distinctions,²⁷ while Marx posited a stateless, classless society where wealth distribution would follow the principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.” However, they differed on means and preconditions. The Confucian Age of Great


Peace (another translation of *da tong*) was inward-looking, through self-cultivation in virtues and rituals, while the Marxist ideal was to be achieved through class struggles and the dictatorship of the pro-

while Confucius concerned himself primarily with self-cultivation and social order, Marx cared more about the oppressed working class.

letariat. Further, while every member in the Confucian society had to be virtuous, Marxist utopia would require all members to give up self-interest.

Was Marxism an appealing philosophy for the Chinese? Not particularly. Like the trendy movements of anarchism, liberalism, socialism, social Darwinism, and democracy, communism contended as only one of the many ideologies battling for the Chinese mind and heart. Intellectuals in the Middle Kingdom quickly discovered that Marxism proved more directly relevant to the urban industrial workers of Europe, not the poor peasants in their own country. In addition, they felt that Marx and Engels’ prediction—that the socialist revolution would occur in developed capitalist countries including Great Britain and France—was irrelevant to China’s circumstance. However, the

revolutionaries found Lenin's interpretation of Marxism a powerful tool to mobilize the masses. Instead of preaching a communist utopia, Lenin focused on nationalism and anti-imperialism, a prescrip-



*Statue of Marx and Engels, Marx-Engels-Forum
Alexanderplatz, Berlin*

tion that immediately inspired those who sought to redress the effects of Western and Japanese colonialism. By not viewing the Chinese peasant society as a burden, Lenin suggested to the communists that the peasants constituted "the weakest link of imperialism."²⁸

Was Marxism-Leninism immediately embraced by the Chinese? Not really. The task was neither simple nor straightforward. It would need foreign-trained intellectuals such as Lu Xun who fiercely attacked the old to make room for the new.

It took the Russian October Revolution (1917) and the Soviet-sponsored Communist International (ComIntern) to prepare the Chinese for the practicality of Communism. The Japanese invasion also proved essential in distracting the attention of the Kuomintang Party, an entity keen to worship Confucius. Even so, the moment demanded a charismatic leader as a necessity, for as the Chinese saying goes, "Turbulent times make heroes."²⁹ Mao emerged as the one Chinese leader who eventually betrayed Confucius by embracing Marx. Or so it seemed.

Enter Mao: Confucian Rebel

Born in Hunan in 1893, Mao Zedong practiced Buddhism at a young age due to his mother's influence. Like many children of his time, Mao began his education by memorizing the *Analects* and the Four Classics. His arranged marriage, the strict schooling of the Confucian teachings, and the books he read on peasant uprisings and western ideologies, undoubtedly contributed to his rebellious nature. An ancient civilization "carved up like a melon" by foreigners was a heart-rending wound to his psyche. Like many intellectuals of his time, Mao stood convinced that Leninism could save his country. Yet, unlike his Moscow-trained colleagues, the so-called 28 Bolsheviks who dogmatized Marxism and Leninism, Mao was more practical and less fervent. He always stressed the importance of linking Marxist theory with Chinese practice.

What was Mao's attitude towards Confucius? Professor Xu Quanxing of the Beijing-based Communist Party School, the

author of *Mao Zedong and Confucius*, reveals a Mao who treated Confucius differently at different stages of his life. It was well-known that Mao confessed to Edgar Snow in 1936 that he visited and paid homage to the home and grave of “the sage” in Qufu during the year of the May Fourth Movement.³⁰ Xu insists that Mao’s familiarity with the classics and traditional Chinese culture paved the way for the Sinicization of Marxism.³¹ His conclusion seems reasonable considering Mao’s talk in October 1938, in which he emphasized the importance for Communist Party members to study Chinese heritage:

We, the Chinese race, have thousands of years of unique history and many treasures, to which we are still pupils. Contemporary China has grown out of the China of the past; we are Marxist in our historical approach and must not lop off our history. We should sum up the history from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen and take with us the valuable legacy. This is important for guiding the great movement of today.³²

With the ascendancy of the CCP in 1949, Mao had the state power to implement a series of nationalist initiatives, and to create a Marxist China that was to surpass the power of the British and rival that of the Americans. He grew to be more critical of Confucius for not paying attention to production and economic activities, while acknowledging there was “some truth” in his teachings. It was during the Cultural Revolution that Mao initiated the largest-scale anti-Confucian movement in

Chinese history. Red guards destroyed temples honoring Confucius, labeling them symbols of feudalism and revisionism. Many historic Confucian sites and relics were also damaged or destroyed. They denounced Confucian thought with the convenient excuse that the sage had supported the slavery system, culminating in the so-called “Pi-Lin pi-Kong” [批林批孔, Criticize Lin Bao and Confucius] campaign of 1973. The founder of the PRC, Mao allegedly directed the campaign by saying that “Confucius has to be criticized.”³³ Other evidence of Mao’s complete rejection of Confucius can be found in a poem he wrote professing that “Confucianism is chaff in essence, albeit it enjoys high reputation.”³⁴ In spite of these denunciations, Xu insists that Mao’s latter-stage radical attitude, as harsh as it was, did not represent Mao’s life-time attitudes toward Confucius. In fact, Xu concludes Mao was a Marxist who never completely rejected Chinese tradition and Confucianism.

Professor Huiyun Feng of Utah State University appears to support Xu’s view. Her research indicates that Mao’s decision-making style in wars, along with those of his comrades-in-arms and successors, followed more of the Confucian beliefs and norms than Marxism. Using content study and sequential game analysis, Feng examined six Communist leaders in three major wars—the Korean War (1951-3), the Sino-Indian War (1963), and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979)—and concluded that the goal of China’s leaders was not spreading communism through the world but protecting China’s sur-

vival.³⁵



Statue of Mao Zedong, Zhongshan Square, Shenyang, Liaoning Province, China

Was Mao a Marxist then? He certainly embraced Engels' dialectical materialism and Marxist historical materialism. Thanks to the falsification of Marxist prediction that socialism would succeed in advanced industrialized countries, Mao, just as Lenin and Stalin, added his own distinctive development to Marxist revolutionary strategy. His conception of the "new-democratic revolution," along with his signature tactic "encircling the cities from the countryside," was not to be found in Marxist-Leninist books. According to an informed colleague of mine, Mao's most important contribution was that "he put China back on the world map," yet, the untold political, social and economic disasters are also his legacy to

the Chinese state. In spite of this, Mao's Cultural Revolution did not kill China; instead, it ironically made her stronger. To undo these wounds, Mao's successors found themselves forced to blaze a path that is uniquely Chinese but with "Marxist" characteristics.

Post-Mao Confucius Redux: From the "Harmonious Society" to the "Harmonious World"

Post-Mao Chinese regimes have made efforts to distance themselves from Marx by embracing Confucius. In 1987, the first International Conference on Confucian Studies was permitted to be held in Qufu. Weeks after the crackdown on the Tiananmen Student Movement in 1989, the government quietly endorsed a celebration of the sage's birthday. The then-President Jiang Zemin appeared at the party, quite unannounced.³⁶

Born in the 1920s, Jiang was influenced by traditional Chinese values. In a Confucian society that overly-stressed the importance of a name, Jiang's given name was indirectly taken from the Confucius teaching that a gentleman should "benefit the people."³⁷ Jiang confessed that he was influenced by three types of education: the teachings of Confucius and Mencius; the "bourgeois" scientific accomplishments, and Marxism.³⁸ As a trained engineer, Jiang did make an effort to incorporate traditional thinking into Communist political theory. In 2000, he proposed his theory of Marxism in China with the "Three Represents." In it, the CCP would represent advanced productive forces, progressive cultures and the fundamental

interests of the Chinese people. Unlike the Maoist conviction that Communists represent only the interests of the urban workers and peasants, Jiang expanded his constituency to the entire Chinese people. His biographer Robert Kuhn notes that the “Three Represents” signaled a return to traditional Chinese culture, a conscious effort to blend Confucianism with Chinese Marxism.³⁹

Jiang Zemin was probably the first top Chinese leader since the Cultural Revolution to publicly acknowledge Confucius as a positive influence in the PRC. While visiting Hungary in 1995, Jiang remarked at the Chinese embassy that Confucius was “a great educator in ancient China,” quoting him saying that “real knowledge is to know the extent of one’s ignorance.”⁴⁰ President Hu Jintao continued Jiang’s fondness for quoting Confucius. On April 29, 2005, in welcoming Lien Chan, Chairman of Taiwan’s Kuomintang Party, Hu said, “When a friend comes from afar visiting us, is that not delightful?” “Your trip to the mainland is a milestone,” the President said, “not only in the CCP-KMT relationship, but also in the cross-Taiwan Strait relations.”⁴¹ Later, the two leaders proposed social and international programs reflecting the harmonious society aspects of Confucian ideals.

A Harmonious Society and the “*Bu Zheteng*” Doctrine

The idea of building a harmonious society was outlined in the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th CCP Party Congress held in September 2004. Aimed to correct pollution, regional disparities and unequal distribu-

tion of wealth, it was viewed as a revolutionary change in Deng Xiaoping’s approach of “allowing some to get rich.” In addition to embracing the Confucian concept of harmony, President Hu included elements of democracy and a market economy. In 2007, at the 17th Party Congress, Hu reiterated that his party would work hard to “develop the socialist market economy, socialist democracy, an advanced socialist culture and a harmonious socialist society, and make China a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country.”⁴²

The “*bu zheteng*” doctrine, which Hu articulated in off-the-cuff remarks during late 2008 while commemorating the 30th anniversary of China’s reform, immediately caught the world’s attention because journalists had a difficult time defining or translating the concept. “*Zheteng*” is a colloquial term with negative connotations used in Northern China. In essence, it refers to a person who keeps frittering around by doing things over and over again, ending up with no good result. Some of Mao’s policies fit perfectly with such a description. In an attempt to find solutions to China’s poverty and backwardness, he tried new programs from “Three Anti, Five Anti” to the extreme “Great Leap Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution,” bringing China to near bankruptcy. With the promise of “*bu zheteng*” (不折腾), Hu implied that his government has learned from Mao’s mistakes and would not engage in any self-consuming political movements or any self-inflicted social and economic setbacks.⁴³ The “*bu zheteng*” principle is

somewhat similar to the Confucius' "doing nothing" philosophy in that it wisely advocates positive avoidance of potentially destructive actions for the sake of activity alone, when inaction might yield a better result.

A Harmonious World

President Jiang was the first high level official to blend the harmony concept with China's foreign policy. During his speech at the Bush Library in Texas on October 24, 2002, he expounded the concept of "harmony without uniformity" in the context of U.S.-China relationship:

Harmony promotes co-existence and co-prosperity whereas differences foster mutual complementation and mutual support. Harmony without sameness is an important principle in the development of all social affairs and relationships and in guiding people's conduct and behavior. Indeed, it is the essential factor of the harmonious development of all civilizations.⁴⁴

To take the Confucian concept of harmony to a new dimension, China declared in the Preface of its *National Defense White Paper* for 2006 that it "pursues a road of peaceful development, and endeavors to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity."⁴⁵ In his visits to rival India in late 2006, Hu Jintao conveyed a similar message that his China would return to the Confucian ideal of a constructive role in promoting peace and development in South Asia. Hu expressed

his wishes that the two neighbors jointly pursue peace and prosperity, quoting Confucius as saying that "One who wishes to be established seeks to establish others; One who wishes success helps others to achieve success."⁴⁶

Hu Jintao conveyed... his China would re- turn to the Confucian ideal of a constructive role in promoting peace and develop- ment in South Asia.

Two major policy initiatives of Hu's development and peace strategies are worth mentioning; namely, the Confucius Institutes and the Overseas Youth Volunteers (OYV). Emulating the American "Peace Corps," China created its own OYV program in 2002, sending the first team of volunteers to Laos. With a very competitive screening process, the OYV recruits college graduates 20 to 35 of age to be dispatched to Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia to teach Mandarin, Confucianism, Chinese calligraphy, medicine, martial arts (*wushu*), shadow boxing, computer skills, and agricultural technologies. The volunteers' services are not limited to these areas; surgeons and nurses, music teachers, and agricultural graduates are among the other volunteers.⁴⁷ The seven-year-old program has placed hundreds of Chinese youth in more than 50 countries. Hu's other initiative, the Confucius Insti-

tutes (CIs), are not-for-profit organizations under the Beijing-headquartered Office of Chinese Language Council International, or its Chinese abbreviation Hanban. As the British Council, the French Alliance Française, and the German Goethe-Institut were established to promote respective national cultures and languages, the CIs are devoted to teaching Mandarin and promoting Chinese culture abroad. Due to China's growing economic power, an estimated 100 million non-Chinese will have learned the language by 2010, requiring 5 million Mandarin teachers. To tap into the surging demand (and to counter the "China threat" thesis promulgated in the West), Beijing plans to set up 1,000 CIs worldwide by 2020, projecting an image of China that is Confucian and peace-loving. The first Confucius Institute debuted in late 2004 in Seoul, Korea. Since then, 396 CIs or Classrooms have been established in 87 countries and regions as of October 2009, 124 of which are in Europe and 65 in the United States alone.⁴⁸

In the U.S., Confucius used to be a cultural phenomenon in the China-towns or Chinese enclaves. Today, he has increasingly served as a bridge among Eastern and Western cultures. Since its debut at the University of Maryland in 2004, Confucius Institutes are embraced in dozens of colleges and communities; currently there are 65 such institutes or classrooms in the United States. In September 2009, the state of California established its Confucius Day, while the PRC hailed a great statute of Confucius it gave to the City of Houston as a symbol of China-US friendship. A month later, U.S. Congress

adopted a resolution commemorating the 2560th anniversary of the birth of Confucius. These events are harbingers that Confucian China and the United States may, over time, actually find more common interests in the realm of political and cultural values.

China's Future: Reconciling Marx and Confucius

How does Confucius—the great philosopher and educator who suffered unpopularity in China for nearly a century—suddenly become one of the most prominent cultural icons for the Party-State? The prevailing explanation is that Confucianism provides a “magic recipe for marrying authoritarian politics with capitalistic prosperity.”⁴⁹ In today's money-driven society when mass incidents (the Chinese government euphemism for large-scale protests) are occurring every day, a Confucianism that promotes hierarchy, obedience and respect for authority is conducive to Hu Jintao's goal of creating a “harmonious society.”

While this interpretation is largely true, it has overlooked one important variable: Marxism has failed in Russia and Eastern Europe, but in China it has been absorbed into the traditional culture. What has caused the discrepancy? According to Shaorong Huang, professor of English and Communication with University of Cincinnati, Sinicized Marxism and Confucian traditions share at least three important similarities. They both emphasize human centrality and self-cultivation; both attach importance to the unification of

theory and practice; and finally, though authoritarian, both promote humane governance.⁵⁰ Given the three important connections, it is not difficult to understand how Hu Jintao might be able to deliver a speech praising his predecessor's "Three Represents" as Marxism developed to suit China's new reality. Hu said, "Public opinion determines whether a political party or a government will rise or fall. For a Marxist party to win the people's support and thus to be invincible, its theories, policies, and actions must be in accordance with the people's fundamental interests."⁵¹

Commenting on Gorbachev's failure to understand the risks of reform, British historian Robert Service lamented that "the edifice of communism was a tautly interconnected piece of architecture," and that "the removal of any wall, ceiling or doorway in the edifice carried with it the danger of structural collapse."⁵² Fully aware of the risk, the China of recent decades had no intention of following and copying the Soviet system. Rather than rejecting Mao, the PRC founder, Deng Xiaoping instead issued a verdict of "70% right and 30% wrong." He avoided making major changes to the communist edifice. Indeed, his successors simply brought in Confucian bricks and tiles to strengthen the building, and repainted the exterior with sickles and hammers. Though messy, political expediency called for extraordinary measures.

President Jiang was the first to clean up the "tangle" of that expediency. A resourceful leader, his approach suggested a wedding or, in the words of his biogra-

pher, the building of "a new hybrid system of Confucian moral philosophy and Marxist political theory."⁵³ This is a daunting task because Confucius has a clear advantage. As Australian diplomat Reg Little observed, "the length, diversity, continuity and extensive records of Confucian culture give it [China] a character more formidable, pervasive and unifying as a political, social, economic and spiritual influence than any of the Abrahamic religions, whether Judaism, Christianity or Islam."⁵⁴ For China, it is much easier to go back than to move forward. Indeed, to do so only honors the Master's counsel: "Study the past if you would define the future."

References:

1. The author wishes to express her gratitude to her colleagues, Drs. Thomas Ward and Kim Setton, for valuable advice and discussion.
2. Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, translated from the German by Michael Bullock, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953).
3. William Theodore De Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, & Burton Watson, *Sources of Chinese tradition*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 25 (XV: 38). The original: *You jiao wei lei* 有教无类.
4. Ibid, p. 35 (XIII: 9).
5. Arthur Waley (Tr.), *The Analects* (Alfred A. Knopf: Everyman's Library, 2000), p.75 (I: 1). *Xue er shi xi zhi, bu yi yue hu*, 学而时习之, 不亦乐乎?
6. De Bary, et al., p. 25 (VII: 21). *San ren xing bi you wo shi yan. Ze qi shan zhe er cong zhi, qi bu shan zhe er gai zhi* 三人行, 必有我师焉。择其善者而从之, 其不善者而改之.
7. De Bary, et al., p. 26 (II: 15). *Xue er bu si ze wang, si er bu xue ze dai* 学而不思则罔, 思而不学则殆.
8. De Bary, et al., p. 25 (IV: 8). *Zhao wen dao xi si ke ye* 朝闻道, 夕死可矣.
9. June Tefuel Dreyer, *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition* (6th ed., New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008), pp.38-42.
10. De Bary, et al., p.26 (I: 6).
11. D.C. Lau (Tr.), *Confucius: the analects* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1992), pp. 60-61 (I: 11).
12. This is called “*Nan nu you bie*” 男女有别.
13. “*Zhang you you xu*” 长幼有序.
14. Empress dowagers and regents Lu of Han Dynasty, Wu Zetian of Tang Dynasty and Ci Xi of Qing Dynasty were prominent examples. They assumed power behind the throne after their husbands' deaths.
15. De Bary, et al., p.34 (XII: 17). *Zheng zhe, zheng ye. Zi shuai yi zheng, shu gan bu zheng?* 政者, 正也。子帅以正, 孰敢不正?
16. Ibid, p.34 (XIII: 6).
17. Lau, p.75 (IV: 25). *De bu gu, bi you lin* 德不孤, 必有邻.
18. *Li zhi yong, he wei gui* 礼之用, 和为贵 (I:12), re-translated by Au-

- thor after referring to Lau, p.61; Waley, p.78.
19. *He er bu tong* 和而不同 (XIII: 23), re-translated by Author. Here the concept “*tong*” can also be translated into “conformity,” “sameness,” “partisanship,” and “identity.”
20. *Ming bu zheng ze yan bu shun* 名不正，则言不顺 (XIII: 3), re-translated by Author.
21. *Jun jun, chen chen, fu fu zi zi*, 君君，臣臣，父父，子子 (XII: 11), re-translated by Author.
22. De Bary, et al., p.35 (XV: 4).
23. Waley, p.165 (XIII: 16). *Jin zhe yue, yuan zhe lai*, 近者悦，远者来.
24. Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1990), p.260.
25. It comes from John Donne’s poem “And new philosophy calls all in doubt, the element of fire is quite put out; the Sun is lost, and the earth, and no mans wit can well direct him where to look for it.” (*An Anatomy Of The World*, <http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/an-anatomy-of-the-world/>)
26. Guo Moruo, 郭沫若, “Ma Kesi jin wen miao” 马克思进文庙 [Marx Enters the Confucian Temple], *Hongshui* 洪水, Vol 1, No.7, January 1, 1926. <http://www.zhongguosixiang.com/redirect.php?tid=18478&goto=lastpost>
27. Kang Youwei, a great believer in Confucius, explained the “*da tong*” (大同) ideals: “There will be a day when everything throughout the earth, large or small, far or near, will be like one. There will be no longer any nations, no more racial distinctions, customs will be everywhere the same. With this uniformity will come the Age of Great Peace.” See De Bary, et al., p.733. For more information on “*da tong*,” see *Book of Rites*.
28. Mark Borthwick, *Pacific century: the emergence of modern Pacific Asia* (2nd ed.), (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p.179-185.
29. *Shi shi zao yingxiong* 时势造英雄。
30. Edgar Snow, *Red star over China* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p.152.
31. Xu Quanxing 许全兴, *Mao Zedong yu Kong Fuzi: Makesi zhu yi Zhongguo hua ge an yan jiu* 毛泽东与孔夫子: 马克思主义中国化个案研究 [Mao Zedong and Confucius: Case studies of Sinicization of Marxism], (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 2003).

32. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* 毛泽东选集, Vol. 2 第二卷, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社), p.534, re-translated by Author.
33. Roderick MacFarquhar & Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's last revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), p.367.
34. This is a line in Mao's poem to Guo Moruo written in August 1973, entitled "Du 'fengjian lun:' cheng guo lao 读〈封建论〉呈郭老 [To Guo Moruo: On Feudalism]. *Kong xue ming gao shi bi kang* 孔学名高实秕糠。
35. Huiyun Feng, *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: Confucianism, Leadership and War*, (New York: Routledge, 2007).
36. William Theodore De Bary, *The trouble with Confucianism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
37. (*Hui ze cang sheng* 惠泽苍生, "cang sheng" meaning "min", the masses).
38. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, *The man who changed China: The life and legacy of Jiang Zemin* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004), p.26.
39. Ibid, p.562.
40. Ibid, p. 269.
41. "Hu Jintao zai renmin dahuitang huijian lian zhan" 胡锦涛在人民大会堂会见连战 [Hu Jintao Meeting with Lien Chan in the Great Hall of the People], *Sina News*, April 29, 2005, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-04-29/15006530655.shtml>
42. Hu Jintao, "Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China" (Part VII), October 15, 2007, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>
43. Originated from a northern dialect of "bie xia zheteng," the phrase does not have a good English equivalent. Western media have used the following versions "not getting sidetracked", "not flip-flopping", and even "not swaying back and forth", and "not dithering," but none of these has captured the gist of Hu's talk.
44. "Speech by President Jiang Zemin at George Bush Presidential Library," *Chinese Embassy Website*, October 24, 2002, <http://www.chinese-embassy.no/eng/dtxw/t110222.htm>.
45. *National Defense White Paper for 2006*, the Preface, (Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, December 29, 2006),

- <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194487.htm>
46. “Hu Jintao xindeli yan jiang,” 胡锦涛新德里演讲 [Hu Jintao’s Speech at New Delhi], East-Day.com, November 22, 2006, <http://news.eastday.com/eastday/node81741/node81762/node173120/u1a2462007.html>. *Ji yu li er li ren, ji yu da er da ren* 己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人 (VI: 26), re-translated by Author.
47. “Zhongguo tese de hepingdui” 中国特色的和平队 [Peace Corp with Chinese characteristics], Volunteers BBS, October 29, 2007, http://rss.xinhuanet.com/newsc/politics/2007-10/29/content_6956348.htm; “China to Send More Volunteers to Africa,” *China Daily*, February 15, 2007, <http://chinagate.cn/english/news/50115.htm>; For the law regulating the Overseas Youth Volunteers, see <http://www.lawinfochina.com/Law/displayModeTwo.asp?id=3821&keyword=>
48. “‘China threat’ fear countered by culture,” *People’s Daily online*, May 29, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200605/29/eng20060529_269387.html; Wangluo Kongzi Xueyuan 网络孔子学院 [Confucius online] http://college.chinese.cn/en/node_1979.htm; “Confucius Institute: promoting language, culture and friendliness,” *Xinhua Net*, October 2, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/02/content_5521722.htm
49. Richard McGregor, “Why fast-changing China is turning back to Confucius,” *Financial Times*, April 11 2007.
50. Shaorong Huang, “Communicate Heritage: Political and Cultural Similarities between Chinese Marxism and Confucian Tradition,” *China Media Research*, 2(2), (2006), pp.94-102.
51. “Hu Jintao zai sange daibiao yan-tao hui shang de zhongyao ji-anhua” 胡锦涛在“三个代表”研讨会上的重要讲话 [Hu Jintao’s speech at the “Three Represents” Campaign], July 1, 2003 <http://www.hnass.com.cn/html/Dir/2006/03/30/00/01/89.htm>. Translated by the author.
52. Robert Service, *Lenin: A biography* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p.492.
53. Kuhn, p.439.
54. Reg Little, “The Beijing games, Confucius and the very great US depression,” *New Dawn*, No. 108, (May-June 2008), <http://www.newdawnmagazine.com/Article/>

The_Beijing_Games_Confucius_and_the_Very_Great_US_Depression.html

The New International Role of China and its Relations with Argentina in Time of Crisis

Eduardo Daniel Oviedo



Abstract

This article studies the ways in which China's rise in the pecking order of the world's economies impacted Argentine-Chinese bilateral relations at the beginning of the current international economic crisis. First of all, China's rise widened the asymmetry of powers, changing the scheme of bilateral relations between China and Argentina from a traditional South-South model of cooperation to a North-South relation. Secondly, the trade between these two countries, indicated by Argentina's export of soybeans and soy by-products to China, is the staple for maintenance of productive political relations. These economic ties have influenced Argentine foreign policy toward China, especially on the "China question." China's evolving economic role is pertinent to understanding the recent historic transformation of foreign trade in Argentina. In 2007, for the first time in Argentina's economic history, exports to Asia exceeded exports to Europe. Thirdly, at a time when the United States and the European Union are preoccupied with resolving the challenges of the international economic crisis, the Chinese government has published its first "white paper" on Latin America and the Caribbean region. This document outlines the intentions that China's government has for China-Latin American relations medium to long-term and also what impact this will have upon Argentina. Lastly, the extent of interdependency and the role that domestic markets can play in alleviating this are the most important factors in grasping different countries' reactions to the current economic crisis. Argentina and China are not exceptions in this matter and lessons can be learned from the ways in which different countries addressed the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Biography

Dr. Eduardo Daniel Oviedo earned his PhD in political science from the Cordoba Catholic University of Argentina. He had previously obtained his Masters in Law from the Peking University, China. Doctor Oviedo is Professor of Contemporary History and International Relations at Rosario National University, Argentina. At the Argentina National Scientific and Technical Research Council Professor Oviedo has researched the history of China-Argentine diplomatic relations. He authored Argentina and the East Asia: Foreign Policy from 1945 to 1999 (UNR Editora, Rosario, 2001); China in Expansion: Foreign Policy from Tiananmen until Entry into WTO (EDUCC, Cordoba, 2005) and Korea—A Look from Argentina (UNR Editora, Rosario, 2005). Doctor Oviedo serves as Chinese public translator and as adviser to the Rosario Board of Trade.

Introduction

The current economic crisis is a time of power redistribution that will affect the pecking order of relations among the nations of the world. If China continues to grow at a high rate in the coming two or three years, it probably will narrow the gap with the United States prior to when academics had projected this to happen. The new role of China in the international system has led to an asymmetrical relationship with the developing world. China has changed the South-South cooperative dynamic of the past to a North-South paradigm, which will have important consequences for countries such as Argentina.

China's role as a great power was demonstrated in November 2008, when the Chinese government released "China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean."¹ The paper evinced China's potential of becoming a global power and taking advantage of the United States and the European countries' focus on their internal economic recession while Latin American countries increase their degree of autonomy from both regions. These developments provide favorable conditions for the new Chinese advances in the region.

China's national interest has changed from the pursuit of political recognition to economic diplomacy (a consequence of the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan), mainly in its pursuit of minerals, energy and food supplies. Nevertheless, until the "Taiwan question" is resolved, political recognition will remain a priority for

China in Latin America and particularly in Argentina. Until this is resolved, China will not be fully able to demonstrate its political independence and its economical potential for the region. On the other hand, Argentina's policy towards the Taiwan issue, based on discretionary policies characteristic of all members of the international community, has been to support the position of the People's Republic of China in observance of international law and with respect to the role of China in the United Nations. It has done so without abandoning commercial pragmatism, another key factor in the process of political change. In the case of the role of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations, academics failed to recognize the focus was not on economic questions, although it was conditioned by the international situation and the economic capacity of the nation-state.

China's accumulated national power and experience during the past thirty years of economic opening and reform, as well as the huge potential of the domestic market, serves as a strong support for China's policy to expand domestic demand in order to respond to the international crisis. For its part, Argentina hasn't made the "second transition"² in the socio-economic sphere yet which would allow it to strengthen the democratic process. Limited interdependence with international financial markets and a focus on local production that will meet the domestic market demands can reduce the worst effects of the subprime mortgage crisis. In addition, the level of interdependence is advantageous to Argentina and put China at risk. However, both

countries have significant domestic markets in which to develop their economic potential in the current world crisis although agricultural reforms in China present a new challenge to Argentina in the long-term.

This study confirms that the increase in power asymmetry and the complementation in bilateral trade prevail and that they do impact the political-diplomatic arena, especially considering the dichotomy that exists between autonomy and subordination in facing hegemonic powers. In bilateral trade, soybeans and soybean oil are the most important products. At the same time, they are an example of how to expand the supply of exports. In this case, Argentine government policies should accept the challenge of expanding horizontal production and increasing the value in vertical form while also expanding the diversification of markets, where China will remain an important client along with other countries.

The Dynamics of Asymmetries

After most of six decades of the political process, Argentine-Chinese relations reflect the dynamics of power asymmetry. From the time of establishing diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-Shek government in 1945, spiritual and material potential was in Argentina's favor vis-à-vis a prestigious and triumphant China, which held a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, although it had been devastated by the Second World War, the emergence of the People's Republic of China and the ongoing "Chinese question"; a controversy that divided China's territory and resulted again in two governments, intensifying the asymmetric distance in Argentina's favor. (See Table 1)

During the twenty-seven years of diplomatic ties between Argentina and the Republic of China (from 1945 to 1972), the governments only signed two agreements: the Treaty of Amity (1947) and the Cultural Agreement (1966). In the same

Table 1: Phase of Argentine foreign policy towards China

Year	Type of Relations
1945	Establishment of diplomatic relations between Argentina and the Chinese State
1945-1972	Diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of China, without political linkage with the People's Republic of China, with trade interactions and without accrediting an Economic and Cultural Office in Beijing.
1972	Normalization of diplomatic relations with the government of the People's Republic of China
1972 to present	Diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, without political linkage with the Republic of China, with trade interaction and a Commercial and Cultural Office in Taiwan since 1992.

Table 2: GDP comparative percentage between Argentina and China

Countries	1985	1989	1998	2002	2005	2007
In GDP						
People's Republic of China	67,000	417,000	928,000	1,209,000	2,263,000	3,120,000
Argentina	16,000	53,000	324,000	154,000	173,000	238,000
Percentage between both	4.1	7.8	2.8	7.8	13.1	13.1
In PPP						
People's Republic of China			3,983,000	5,625,000	8,610,000	7,083,000
Argentina			368,000	377,000	539,000	513,000
Percentage between both			10.8	14.9	15.8	13.8

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1990, 2000, 2004, 2007 and 2009.

number of years of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, that is, between 1972 and 1999, both parties signed more than forty treaties and agreements in several areas but primarily in the economic and cultural spheres. From the perspective of this vast difference it is easy to note a greater convergence between the interests of Argentina and the People's Republic of China. Nevertheless, comparing two different historic moments is always imprecise, especially when the two periods are marked by different political orders, by the acceleration of the globalization process and a greater frequency of international exchanges.

The quality of the relationship between China and Argentina changed with the economic and political rise of the People's Republic of China in international stratification until the asymmetric dimension of the relationship was reversed. China is now positioned as the third largest economy of the world since 2007, in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and it is ranked second, in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). In 2007, Argentina held the thirtieth position, in terms of GDP, and the twenty-

second rank in terms of PPP. The Chinese economy (not including Hong Kong) is 14.5 times larger than Argentina's, in terms of GDP, and 13.1 times larger in terms of PPP. The Argentine economy is similar to that of Finland or Hong Kong's, in terms of GDP, and is placed between Saudi Arabia and Thailand in terms of PPP. That is to say, from that the asymmetric relation in Argentina's favor in the forties (as much with respect to the Republic of China as to the People's Republic of China) turned into a relationship of equals in the following decade but has emerged as a North-South relation from the end of last century. This economic comparison does not conform to South-South cooperation as affirmed by Chinese government officials. While this may have been adequate to describe the levels of interaction in the seventies and eighties, it is completely obsolete in any effort to describe the position of China and Argentina in the world economic hierarchy at the beginning of the 21st century. (See Table 2)

China's rise has re-oriented the trade interaction and, fundamentally, the nature of Argentine exports. From the time of

the establishment of diplomatic relations, with the exceptions of 1946, 1962 and between 1964 and 1966, sales to China were nonexistent. In 1970, according to information provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses of Argentina, Europe represented 58.1 percent of external sales; while Asia only 8.7 percent with 70.3 percent of this coming from Japan versus 3.5 percent from Taiwan and only 1.6 percent to the PRC; while Taiwan participated with 0.3 percent and the PRC with 0.14 percent of the total exports. In 2007, for the first time in history, Argentine exports to Asia exceeded sales to Europe, promoted by exports to the People's Republic of China, which represented 43.9 percent of exports to the Asian continent and 9.2 percent of total sales, while Taiwan only reached 0.16 percent. This transformation of Argentine foreign sales resulted from China's economic rise as well as European structural decline and its distortive policy of providing subsidies to agriculture. (See Table 3)

The trade situation described in the foregoing paragraph demonstrates the importance of the Chinese economy in the community of nations. It required Argen-

tina to open new consular offices in Asian countries, as well as maintaining a diplomatic staff in Europe, with an increase in the size of the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. China, as a diplomatic destination, is a clear reflection of this change. At the beginning of the nineties, Argentina only had one Consular Section in the Argentine Embassy in Beijing. In 1997, after the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, the Argentine Government established a Consulate General in the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. In 2000, President De la Rúa established the Consulate General and Promotion Center in Shanghai. In 2004, President Kirchner inaugurated the Agricultural Section in Beijing. Recently, in 2009, the Argentine government opened the General Consulate in Guangzhou. In total, Argentina has three General Consulates and a Consular Section in the Argentine Embassy in Beijing. For its part, China only maintains the Consular Section of the Embassy in Buenos Aires, even though since 1988 it has the right to establish two General Consulates in the Argentine territory. These consular structures demonstrate greater efficacy in Chinese consular activity with less personnel. In this sense, the greater Argentine con-

Table 3: Argentine exports comparative percentage by continent

Continent	1970	1990	2007	2008
America	30.8%	42.0%	48.8%	48.1%
Asia	8.7%	16.7%	21.1%	19.8%
People's Republic of China	0.14%	1.9%	9.27%	9.06%
Europe	58.1%	38.3%	20.8%	22.3%
Africa	1.0%	3.3%	7.1%	7.2%
Oceania	0.1%	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%

Source: Argentina National Institute of Statistics and Censuses

sular presence in China does more to increase bureaucratization than to develop exports. In addition, other factors may help to explain the asymmetric relation, such as China's role as a permanent member in the United Nations' Security Council (constant since 1945), its nuclear and military capacities, the nature of Chinese diplomacy and other factors that contribute to the power gap with Argentina.

In the diplomatic sphere, the change from symmetrical to asymmetrical relations is also evident in the large number of issues needing resolution in China's foreign relations agenda. However, the resolution of the question of Hong Kong's, Macau's and China's access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has made it so that the foreign policy of this Asian power has gained greater autonomy and increased the asymmetrical gap in its diplomatic relations with Argentina and other developing countries. This factor is important to take into consideration in attempting to determine the decisional asymmetry in the international arena.

After China recovered sovereignty in Hong Kong and Macau, and was admitted to the WTO, its foreign policy obtained more freedom of action to negotiate with the other members of the international community. For Argentina, these issues were agenda themes in the nineties that required diplomatic negotiations or, simply a *quid pro quo*, for China's support on the Malvinas islands³ in addition to other questions. The increase of capacity to address such questions and their policies oriented toward reunification with Taiwan restrained the diplomatic ac-

tion of the Duhalde, Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner administrations because the only remaining *quid pro quo* for the "Chinese question" and the problem of human rights in China was to negotiate for China's support of national interests in the political area.

We would assert that, as a result of the increasing asymmetry in China's favor, the diplomatic resources to negotiate national questions were gradually lessened in recent years, unless new problems or questions that affect China in the international arena require Argentine support, as is normal in an interdependent community. Something similar happened in the Antarctic cooperation, since Argentine logistic support was left aside while China achieved more experience and scientific development on the White Continent, though the bilateral cooperation in this area advanced in specific projects.

Even if signed agreements prevail in the economic-cultural field, a few political documents prescribe the general guidelines of the foreign policy and structure these ties. For example, the brief joint communiqué of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Argentina signed in February 1972 changed the political orientation of the Argentine state toward China's government. Other documents, often somewhat unnoticed, are the background for other bilateral documents, some of which are especially important, as is the case with the agreement for China's entry into the WTO subscribed in March 2000, or the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade and Investment Cooperation, which was

signed in November 2004. Compared to bilateral trade, which can be measured from import and export data, political relations only can be estimated, according to realist doctrine in terms of the power capacities of the states in question and the asymmetries generated between two countries and their impact on other spheres of power that are expressed in the interactions, for example, of the economic, cultural or scientific–technological fields.

Characterized as an asymmetrical power relation, the variation in the attributes of each state during most of six decades of interaction has changed the Argentine-Chinese relationship from an asymmetrical preponderance in favor of Argentina, to a scheme of South-South cooperation in the seventies and eighties. Beginning in the nineties and continuing into the new century, China’s rise in the international order turns the relationship into one that is characteristic of a North-South model with China clearly being the dominant power. However, it is important to emphasize that this dynamics of asymmetries did not alter the peaceful and friendly relations between both countries, although a few frictions do exist, especially in fi-

nancial and commercial matters.



The role of the soybean in the bilateral trade

Argentina, Brazil, China and the United States are the main producers of soybeans. China directs its entire production to internal consumption, having to import grains and by-products from the international market. However, while Brazil

Table 4: Percentage of the soybean and its by-products in Argentina’s total exports (2003-2005)

Year	Percentage
2003	84%
2004	76%
2005	77%
2006	59%
2007	80%

Source: Argentina National Institute of Statistics and Censuses

Table 5: Composition of the Argentine exports toward China (2001-2006)

Chapter	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits	79.3%	46.8%	50.1%	43.6%	54.4%	40.6%
Animal and vegetable fats and oils	0.6%	20.9%	33.8%	32.8%	22.1%	19.1%
Mineral fuels and oils	2.1%	0.7%	0.5%	7.8%	5.9%	25.8%
Raw hides and skins	9.5%	10.6%	4.9%	5.7%	2.5%	4.7%
Metalliferous minerals	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	4.3%	2.3%
Wool fine or coarse animal hair	3.2%	2.7%	1.2%	1.0%	0.6%	0.5%

Source: Argentina, Ministry of Economic and Production, Center for Production Studies.

and the United States also address part of their production to the internal market, Argentina (the third producer and exporter of soybeans) exports almost its entire production, considering that soy-based products are not part of the Argentine's daily diet. In quantity and price, the soybean and its by-products are not only the most important component of Argentine exports to China, but also of Argentine-Chinese trade. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, the export share of soybean grains and soybean oil in Argentina's total exports to China varied among 59 and 84 percent in the five-year period 2003-2007. (See Table 4)

As a result of the bilateral agreement signed in March 2000 and China's entry into the WTO in December 2001, soybean grains sales declined since 2002 at the same time that soybean oil sales increased based on the expansion of grinding capacity in port of Rosario, on the Paraná River. This is now the largest vegetable oil-extracting platform in the world. The change from soybean grains to soybean oil was accomplished as a na-

tional priority to add value to the soybean industry. It did so by increasing taxes on grain exports rather than on industrialized soy products. This measure became increasingly unpopular, mainly in the Argentine rural zones, resulting in a political confrontation between the government and the farmers who opposed this policy. Along with the volatility of world market prices and unfavorable climatic conditions, this had an adverse effect on the 2008-2009 crops, estimated by the Rosario Board of Trade at around 37 million metric tons or 12 million less than the 49 million tons reached in the 2007-2008 harvest. That would without a doubt affect the amount of grains and soy by-products exported to China. (See Table 5)

As we have already noted, soybeans and soy by-products are the driving force of Argentine-Chinese trade. In 2001, during President Jiang Zemin's visit to Argentina, the Chinese and Argentine Heads of State celebrated surpassing the level of 2 billion dollars of bilateral trade. While in 2008 this amount rose to 14.5 billion dollars, Chinese and Argentine experts both consider it necessary to diversify the Ar-

gentine supply of exportable products. However, as a result of dollar values and the preponderant share of soy in Argentine exports, it is unlikely that this will change without a substantive drop in the international price of the soybean, a soybean price reduction could lead to a great diversification of exports because of the drop in prices. Nevertheless, internal and external factors alike threaten the role of the soybean in bilateral trade. This, therefore, requires that public and private actors alike stay alert in a world of potential financial crises.

The key idea is to maintain or ideally surpass the current levels of trade with China in an exchange where the soybean continues to be the driving force of trade. By the end of the sixties, Chinese experts arrived in Argentina in order to provide technical assistance on these easily cultivated oilseeds at a time when wheat was the main product sold to China. Ten years later, in 1977, Argentina exported the first delivery of 15,000 tons of soybean oil. This experience can be a model to design new products that, from now to the next decade, could be included in the supply of Argentine exports to China. Following the successful model of soybeans, it would be possible to implement the diversification of new exports on a horizontal level. At the same time, this requires Argentina to add value to present and new productions that, in vertical form, mainly belong to the

process of industrialization of agricultural products. However, the production of commodities or the development of new crops would still be a necessary condition for increasing value. These two aspects need to be linked to the geographical “de-

concentration” of external markets as the central point of market diversification theories and risk mitigation. In this respect, since the founding of MERCOSUR, Argentina has made Brazil its main partner, representing 18.9 percent of its total exports in 2008, followed by China with 9.0 percent, the United

States with 7.4 percent, Chile with 6.7 percent, the Netherlands with 4.2 percent and Spain with 3.9 percent. Collectively these countries constitute 50.1 percent of Argentina’s total exports. In summary, government policy should accept the challenge of increasing horizontal production, enhancing value through vertical production and expanding the diversification of markets, where China will be an important client among other prominent markets.

This general strategy should emphasize endogenous development by avoiding the export of strategic non-renewable products that contribute to the development of other nations, in order to channel them into local productive industry. At the same time, in an interconnected community, Argentina has the capacity to form its own interaction network and avoid the

The key idea is to maintain or ideally surpass the current levels of trade with China in an exchange where the soybean continues to be the driving force of trade.

Table 6: Argentine-Chinese bilateral trade (2003-2008)

Year	Argentine exports	% of total exports	Argentine imports	% of total imports		Balance
2000	885,000,000	3.35	1,222,000,000	4.83	-	337,000,000
2001	1,224,000,000	4.61	1,113,000,000	5.47	+	111,000,000
2002	1,177,000,000	4.58	342,000,000	3.80	+	835,000,000
2003	2,581,000,000	8.72	742,000,000	5.36	+	1,838,000,000
2004	3,055,000,000	8.84	1,737,000,000	7.73	+	1,318,000,000
2005	3,336,000,000	8.26	2,270,000,000	7.91	+	1,066,000,000
2006	3,646,000,000	7.84	3,153,000,000	9.23	+	493,000,000
2007	5,166,000,000	9.26	5,092,000,000	11.38	+	74,000,000
2008	6,397,000,000	9.06	7,104,000,000	12.37	-	707,000,000

Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, Yearbook of Argentine Foreign Trade 2000-2008. Unit: US dollar

third-party countries mediating its relations with Asia-Pacific nations and with China in particular. This implies that the current response is to surpass specially required immediate budget needs and plan long-term. (See Table 6)

In 2008, Argentine exports reached 6.397 billion dollars with a share of 9.1 percent of the total sales, approximating the commitment assumed by China in the memorandum of understanding signed in 2004 relating to plans to increase the Argentine exports to 4 trillion dollars in a period of five years. At the same time, imports grew at a greater rate than sales, reaching 7.104 billion dollars and constituting 12.4 percent of total purchases, generating a deficit of 707 million dollars in the balance of trade, a situation that has not occurred in Argentine-Chinese bilateral trade since 2000.

The growth in the importation of manufactured goods such as machines, electric

apparatuses, chemicals and also textiles threatened Argentine production and employment.⁴ This shows that local Argentine industries wasted the opportunity of the “high dollar” impulse of the Duhalde and Kirchner administrations to develop greater international competitiveness in order for Argentine industries to find themselves better positioned at the moment of the removal the protections or the diminishing of the benefits of the overvalued dollar, as has occurred before the gradual disappearance of the effective protection of exchange rates eroded by inflation. The lack of investment and development of competitiveness appears reflected in the decline of third-party markets. In 2007, China replaced Argentina as Brazil’s second largest supplier, understanding that the geographical proximity and the favorable conditions created by the MERCOSUR free trade area have not been sufficient to relegate this Asian power to a lesser trade role in the region. Precisely, the lack of coordination in the

macroeconomic policies of the MERCOSUR member states led each country to adopt unilateral trade measures that tended to “perforate” the Common External Tariff⁵ and allow China and other countries to benefit from this and resulting in the MERCOSUR rule proving to be quite meaningless. Nevertheless, in the textile sector, the Brazilian San Paulo State Industrial Federation (FIESP) and the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) agreed to monitor Chinese shipments in order to avoid an “invasion” of Chinese products.⁶ While in the case of shoe imports, since 2007 MERCOSUR and Mexico’s industrialists have agreed to strengthen the measures of regional protection and urged governments to adopt measures aimed at strengthening integration in order to allow this industry to develop.⁷

The threat of Chinese products has been mitigated with the application of anti-dumping measures.⁸ The challenge of the subprime mortgage crisis has led to protectionist policies. New frictions in commercial matters have emerged that led to the decision adopted by the General Direction of Customs to increase control measures on imports⁹, establishing values criteria for 21,600 sensitive products in order to avoid a situation where, as a consequence of the reduction of consumption in the United States and Europe, these products would enter Argentina and distort the domestic market. This measure that was immediately publicized by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.¹⁰ The agreement between Argentina and Brazil to elevate the Common External Tariff on various products (wine, peaches, dairy

products, textile, shoes, wooden furniture and so on) generated concern in the Chinese government, especially after the G-20 decided not to carry out protectionist measures for one year.¹¹

At the same time that the afore mentioned frictions arose, relations improved with the agreement between the National Transportation Secretary and the CITIC group, allowing for the purchase of 279 freight cars, in order to modernize the rolling stock of the metro of Buenos Aires.¹² In November 5, 2008, President Fernández de Kirchner presided in the signing of a contract between Argentine businesses and the delegation of CITIC¹³, which provided an opportunity for the President to receive China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. In April 2009, the governors of the Central Bank of Argentina and the People’s Bank of China both signed an agreement of bilateral currencies swap (in Argentine pesos and Chinese renminbi) worth 10.2 billion dollars, for three years, that is meant to guarantee access to international currency in the eventual case of a lack of liquidity. The swap can be used to acquire Chinese or Argentine goods, demonstrating China’s decision to loosen financing requirements for developing countries, allowing them to acquire goods and help their exports sector as well as aiding the renminbi’s profit on the global economic stage vis-à-vis a contraction of financial markets.

The impact on diplomatic relations: Argentina and the “China question”

The “Chinese question” has continued

across the entire history of Sino-Argentine diplomatic relations. It is a central issue in the bilateral agenda since 1949 and, even exceeds the beginning point of this study. The revolutionary process in China led several Argentine governments to define their political behavior and, consequently, to opt for one of the two political blocks of the Cold War, or to maintain a neutral attitude in the question. Since 1950, successive Argentine governments responded to the “Chinese question” in tandem with the hemispherical commitment to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, even while not accrediting ambassadors between 1950 and 1957.

The *Détente* of the seventies facilitated a change of political orientation to recognize the People’s Republic of China, adapting foreign policy to the existing reality of a revolutionary process that occurred within the continental part of China. It considered the “Chinese question” as inherent to the Chinese state internal sphere, according to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, recognized in the joint communiqué signed in Bucharest in 1972.

Until 1991, to recognize the “one-China policy” implied to adopt an equidistant position among the parties in conflict, without interfering in internal affairs, allowing Argentina to retain the option of deciding which government represents the Chinese state and with which to maintain diplomatic relations, in a context where the People’s Republic of China as well as the Republic of China both defended the “one-China policy” and dis-

puted over which government actually represented the Chinese state. Taipei implemented the “theory of special state-to-state relations”¹⁴ of “dual recognition.” This was intensified when the Democratic Progressive Party rose to power in Taiwan. Argentina lost its “equidistance” and moved in favor of the People’s Republic of China’s position, because the PRC was the only part of the two side controversy that persisted in the “one-China policy.” In a strict sense, Eduardo Duhalde’s government recognized the principle of “one-China policy” explicitly in a public and bilateral document for the first time¹⁵, strengthening the political orientation with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, also stipulated in the communiqué of Bucharest, without abandoning the principle of non-interference. President Kirchner continued with this policy of supporting the People’s Republic of China when a controversy emerged in 2007 about Taiwanese authorities trying to enter the United Nations as a new member state.¹⁶

Argentina thus evolved from non-intervention in this question (considered an internal matter in February of 1972) to the position of supporting to the People’s Republic of China based on the principle of territorial integrity adopted by the Duhalde administration and passed on to President Kirchner. Moreover, this position coincided with that of the United Nations, for instance in rejecting the many initiatives of Taiwanese authorities to access the Organization. This new position was adopted when Taiwanese authorities (term frequently use by PRC officials and academics) ended dialogue on

the Taiwan Straits and attempted to access the United Nations as a new member state.

In a succinctly worded statement, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations, International Trade and Worship states in several bilateral documents that:

- The “Chinese question” is regulated by the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and we continue to view it as an internal matter as we have since 1972;
- Reaffirms the character of normalization (and not establishment) of diplomatic relations in 1972;
- Taiwan does not have sovereign state status;
- Taiwan is part of the Chinese territory (unlike other countries that do not recognize the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan) and;
- Argentina supports the “one-China policy” supported by the United Nations since 1971 (although, in reality, the organization has maintained such policies since first addressing this in 1950).

China and the first “white paper” to the Latin American and Caribbean region

In the foreword, the Chinese government states its general policies and specifies that the document “aims to further clarify the goals of China’s policy in the region, outline the guiding principles for future cooperation between the two sides in various fields and sustain the sound, steady and all-round growth of China’s

relations with Latin America and the Caribbean.”¹⁷ The first part of the document refers to the status and role of Latin America and the Caribbean in international affairs. The second addresses China’s relations with the region, where the government makes a retrospective assessment of ties. The third part, under the rubric of “China’s Policy on Latin American and the Caribbean,” focuses on relations since the strategic plan, which aims to develop a “comprehensive and cooperative partnership,” where the general objectives are to expand common ground, to deepen cooperation and achieve mutually beneficial and common development, to draw on each other’s strengths, to boost common progress and intensify exchanges, and finally, the One China principle is sustained as the political basis for the establishment and development of relations.

The specific policy by area appears in the fourth part, entitled “Strengthen China’s Comprehensive Cooperation with the Latin American and Caribbean region.” This is the most extensive section and represents more than eighty percent of the document.

The fifth part of the document turns its attention to the support of regional and sub-regional organizations “in exerting their positive influence in regional and international affairs” and pointing to China’s intent to strengthen communication, consultation and cooperation with relevant organizations in various fields (political, economical, socio-cultural, peace, security and judicial affairs). This position coincides with traditional Euro-

pean policies to support “Latin Americanism,” an antagonistic and opposite vision to the hemispheric conception, attributed to the United States’ intent for continental domination from the end of the Nineteenth Century. Here it also expresses support for regional and sub-regional organizations but also recognizes the hegemonic struggle with the United States.

The paper does not add anything new to policy ties towards the region but it has the virtue of systematizing the different policies and positions that China has implemented toward each country and it now presents them in the wider context of the region. Its content insists on considering the region as homogeneous, stipulating a general policy, without understanding the peculiarities of each state. It would be similar to Latin-American states per se establishing their policies towards the Asian continent without distinguishing among their different parts. That is to say, to treat China the same as Japan and Korea, as well India, Israel, Iraq or Russia.

The document reiterates China’s position on foreign policy and international relations that represent the subjective thought of the Chinese government. Its text begins by saying that “The world today is undergoing major transformation and adjustment...”¹⁸, a phrase that seems very pertinent at the moment of the current crisis, but is diluted when we observe that year by year, in more than twenty years of Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government documents, it is a recurring phrase. As Professor Wang Ji Si

expressed in Peking University classes: “There is nothing emptier than this phraseology.”

This is also true in the case of referring to China as the largest of the developing countries. This generates reservations and a lack of respect in the academic world. These are concepts that, of course, are not taken seriously. The document in question precisely shows that China is deploying its potential to transform the Chinese state into a global power, as today is defined by the old big powers, or to democratize a world when even China has never known democracy internally.

So, what then is the contribution of the paper? As a country that executes planning, China also searches to plan its relations with Latin America. As it has been expressed, these refer to a systematization of the policies towards the region, in order to generate foreseeable and confident relations with the Latin-American governments. According to the Chinese foreign minister Yang Jie Chi, the document plans the objectives of China towards the region and provides guideline principles in different areas.¹⁹ The region, which is not homogeneous in its policies towards China and where Taiwan even concentrates its most extensive support, continues to be a place of diplomatic struggle with Taiwanese authorities and of hegemonic struggle with the great powers. The “white paper” confirms the camouflaged mechanisms of domination, where the semblance of ideology hides the search for transforming influence into hegemony, in spite of the fact that China still lacks the necessary elements needed

to become a hegemonic power.²⁰ In the current scenery, it finds itself presented with an opportunity, in a world aggravated by an economic crisis and with a high level of conflict, where the redistribution of power affects the correlation of forces and, very probably, China soon will reduce the gap with the superpower sooner than is expected by most academics.

The false dichotomy between autonomy and subordination

The Chinese authors affirm that the 1970's were the moment of transition from the dependence on the United States policy to autonomy in the countries of the region.²¹ This point of view was associated with developing the basic argument to explain "realistic change" in the behavior of the Latin-American states towards China, justifying the massive normalization of diplomatic relations with the government of the People's Republic of China. Nevertheless, those primary decisions were closely tied to international distension, the change of Chinese representation at the United Nations and improvement in China-US relations. In addition to the economic expectations that awoke this Asian power in Latin-America and the autonomy of the governments in the context of American hegemony. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis María de Pablo Pardo declared the freedom of action in Argentine foreign policy.²²

In fact, this autonomy appears in the "Tiananmen crisis" of 1989, when several countries of the region continued their

normal cultural, economic, and diplomatic relations with China in spite of the deterioration of political ties between China and United States. The sanctions applied by the administration of George H. Bush and those of the European Economic Community did not have an influence on the foreign policy of the principal nations of Latin America. At the same time the governments of these countries observed while American and European companies continued doing business in China. In Argentina, the policy of non-interference in internal affairs, begun by president Alfonsín, continued during the two Menem administrations, distancing Argentina from measures such as sanctions. This course of action towards China was significant because it refuted the "automatic, non-critical and unconditional alignment"²³ of the Menem foreign policy toward the United States, as argued in the local academic world.

After this crisis, a new autonomous experience took place in the five-year period which elapsed between the signing of the bilateral agreement with the United States that gave China access to the WTO, in November 1999, and the visit of president Hu Jintao to the region, in November 2004, when Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba recognized China's market economy status. In between these two events, Latin-American governments have transitioned away from orienting their policies towards China as influenced by the hegemonic power of the United States to autonomous decision-making. The starting point, that is to say, the adherence of China to the WTO in December 2001, clearly shows United States

leadership in the organization and on the American continent. This was again affirmed when, after the Chinese-American bilateral agreement of November 1999, the countries of the region one-by-one signed their bilateral agreement with China, except in the case of Mexico where commercial interests were reluctant, thus delaying its decision until the last moment. Five years later, some countries of the region bilaterally recognized China's market economy status, while the United States and the European Union, according to the text of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China to the WTO, referred to the status of China's economy as transitional. The causes for this decision were already analyzed²⁴ and they consist in the creation of important economic interests in relation to China, and the United States, after its intervention in Asia, relegated its interest in the Latin American region to secondary status, facilitating China's entry into the region in order to associate the Latin American countries with its process of economic modernization.

These decisions do not represent autonomous structural tendencies, since they appear in intermittent forms, if we analyze them while taking into account the United States' international position. Perhaps, the old concept of "international permissibility," expressed by Professor Helio Jaguaribe²⁵ would constitute one of the clearest means for explaining the position taken by Latin-American governments in opposing the United States policy for handling China. When the governments of the region observe margins of permissibility, they escape from the halo

of hegemonic influence and they act in contradictory direction with the world's superpower. However, this circumstance

Latin-American governments have transitioned away from orienting their policies towards China as influenced by the hegemonic power of the United States to autonomous decision-making.

of opposing the United States, by merely seeking autonomy in decisions will not necessarily lead to benefits. Contradictory and autonomous actions vis-à-vis the United States can, at the same time, go against national interests. On the other hand, policies can be autonomous and yet consistent with those of the United States.

The experience of the Great Depression and the importance of continuing interdependence

The subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and its impact on the world economy brought new challenges to the national policies of other states. Argentina and China are not unaffected by this debacle that began in early 2008 and still has not expressed its real magnitude in the world economy, but it is clear that, similar to the reaction taken by states following the Great Depression of the 1930s, governments are beginning to

adopt traditional protectionist policies and other Keynesian measures in order to stimulate internal demand, even though the Director-General of the World Trade Organization, Pascal Lamy, has stated on several occasions that protectionism and isolationism are not adequate responses to solve the problem²⁶, besides the commitment assumed in Washington by the G-20 members for an open global economy.²⁷

The concept of interdependence among the nations, introduced in international relations theory in the 1970s faces the challenge of the current economic crisis. During the Great Depression of the thirties, the governments of the great powers and other nations suffered its effects in greater or smaller proportion, and adopted protectionist measures in order to address it. Countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan also developed and implemented policies that would result in territorial expansion. The Soviet Union represented the one exception in these developments. Between 1929 and 1934, the five-year plan increased production at the same time it was declining in capitalist countries. During this period the Soviet Union witnessed its transformation from an agrarian structure to forced industrialization.²⁸ Nevertheless, the real cause for the Soviet Union's lack of "contamination" during the crisis primarily stemmed from the scarce levels of interdependence that the USSR had with the world economy, due to it being ostracized first by the Russian revolution and secondly, following its formal constitution in 1922, when the USSR was recognized by Germany and other European

powers and when it later began to establish commercial links with those nations in 1924. The example from the Soviet Union may help us to analyze the current crisis and it can provide insight into the role of interdependency, in spite of the fact that historians recognize that each event is unique and unrepeatable. Nevertheless, previous events can enable us to understand and interpret new scenery, although it is highly unlikely that it will produce the same reaction, even though New Keynesianism is a doctrine that guides the government's actions in this new emergency.

At present, the opening level of nations involved in substantial trade widely surpasses the parameters set by Kenneth Waltz. This American professor maintained that states that import and export 15 percent or more of their Gross Domestic Product yearly, depend heavily on having reliable access to markets outside their borders.²⁹ Two or more parties who are involved in such relations are interdependent in the sense that they are mutually vulnerable to the disruption of their exchanges.³⁰ In practice, considering its levels of opening, Germany and China are the most interdependent economies among the six first great powers and, paradoxically, the United States is less interdependent, although with figures that surpass the 15 percent level presented by Waltz. (See Table 7)

The degree of openness is more extensive in the small and medium-sized powers due to the high incidence of foreign trade in their reduced GDP. Undoubtedly, North Korea and other closed economies

do not follow this logic; however, in general, it is quite common among developing countries. Consider the following table where the degree of openness of the MERCOSUR members, South Korea and Chile is shown. (See Table 8)

This analysis is an effective way to explain interactions on the level of economies; however, it cannot apply to international politics, where the states would be interdependent if the costs of the breakdown in their relations or a decrease in their interaction would be equal for each one of them.³¹ But the inequality among states is a part of the nature of the international system, where interdependency will depend on whether or not the parts are dependent to an equal degree with each other for the provision of goods and services and on the ability to replace those goods and services from within the domestic economy.

The inequality among states makes it impossible to determine who will be the winners and the losers of any new Depression, but it does clarify that the mere opening of the economies does not imply that they are more vulnerable, since vul-

nerability emerges when domestic market replacements of imports cannot be produced, or if it can only be done at a very high cost.³² In such a case, exchange takes on great value for a country, and is of fundamental importance for those that conduct a nation's foreign policy.³³ China, as opposed to other countries vulnerable to world economic interdependence, has a greater capacity to replace global markets with domestic markets, even if at a high cost. Furthermore, it continues to maintain a totalitarian political system, with authoritarian capacity to distribute the effects of the crisis. Admittedly, it would always be preferable for China to maintain its current status, a situation which has led to remarkable achievements in that country. This can help us to understand why in its policies, China is prone to defend the multilateral system of free trade, responding to those countries that generate obstacles to their exports, through policies such as anti-dumping measures.

Precisely, replacement of the market is the key. Besides being one of the most open economies, China has the advantage of having created a domestic market of

Table 7: Levels of trade interdependence in the six major powers

Country	X+M	GDP	Percentage
United States	3,180,161	13,811,200	23.0%
Japan	1,333,806	4,376,705	30.4%
Germany	2,385,960	3,297,233	72.4%
China	2,173,784	3,280,053	66.3%
United Kingdom	1,052,793	2,727,806	38.6%
France	1,165,417	2,562,288	45.5%

Source: World Development Report 2009. Unit: million dollars
X + M = Exports plus imports.

Table 8 : Levels of trade interdependence in the MERCOSUR members, Chile and South Korea

Country	X+M	GDP	Percentage
Paraguay	10.654	12.004	88.7%
South Korea	728.202	969.795	75.0%
Chile	114.404	163.915	69.7%
Uruguay	10.320	23.087	44.7%
Argentina	100.713	262.331	38.4%
Brazil	287.230	1.314.170	21.9%

Source: World Development Report 2009. Unit: million dollars

X + M = Exports plus imports.

great scale. Perhaps, the most important construction in thirty years of reform is the formation of a market that did not exist originally or existed precariously. In several articles we have clarified that population and consumer markets are not interchangeable concepts. In other words, the unreal idea of 1,320 million consumers is installed universally. Nevertheless, the internal market has grown according to China's economic growth rates and today it is an attraction for all exporters in the world. Therefore, the answer of the Chinese government is the application of New Keynesian policies, which means the expansion of internal demand as a driving force of reactivation, in a country with one of the highest domestic savings rates in the world.

The orthodoxy of the reforms remains under the magnifying glass, because an excessive opening to the world economy is one of the main causes of the present Chinese economic situation. Without a doubt, the way China chooses to face the current economic crisis and the impact that capital markets and international

trade has on China can possibly destroy the monolithic direction of the Chinese Communist Party and lead to two possible macroeconomic orientations, one of which could reflect China's economic experience of the past, though there is nothing certain in this matter. The leadership of Hu Jintao will be tested and it will depend on the way in which his government manages any transfer of the international crisis to the Chinese economy.

In principle, the answer appears to have two levels. Short-term, China must adopt the measures that the United States and the European countries have applied with the purpose of stabilizing markets and reviving internal demand. In the long-term, China will continue structural reforms and advances in the transformation of its agriculture, its retirement system and other areas. The success in the application of these measures depends on continuity in the current ideological views of the Politburo of the Central Committee.

Agricultural reform presents a direct challenge to the agro-industrial exports of Ar-



Puerto Madero, Buenos Aires, Argentina

gentina because China's policy of "land transaction" will lead to a greater concentration of land that will allow for greater investment and the use of modern technology which would increase land productivity. In the current situation, characterized by small farms and an impossible expansion of the agricultural territory, China's farmers lack sufficient capital to modernize agrarian techniques. This was a policy that the government maintained in the past in order to preserve full employment and to avoid migrations of Chinese youth to the cities in pursuit of employment. Nevertheless, this did not stop the process of urbanization.

China's agricultural reform reflects the inexorable world and local trends of land concentration, with the intent of increasing production through greater investment in technology. It also supports transference of management to capable producers who can administer larger tracts of land than those that are currently overseen. These measures will accelerate urbanization. One negative effect is that it will lead to increased unemployment, causing people to migrate to large cities in search of jobs. That surely, will reflect in the Gini index and contribute to greater social problems. Nevertheless, these can be mitigated by other policies, such as the

results that can be obtained through more efficient family planning, raising the retirement age and other measures that this government has studied and probably will adopt.

In Argentina, the economic policy implemented after the crisis of 2001-2002 abruptly decreased the levels of economic openness, a policy enacted to reduce the impact of the world crisis on the domestic economy. Argentina now has less interdependence with other countries in the areas of trade and investments, although the emerging economic and political instability following policy conflicts with the rural sector adds unpredictability that will lead to complications with the international and domestic crisis in the national economy. Simultaneously, traditional factors that could mitigate the impact include crop rotations in the event that the international soybean demand is lessened. This is more easily done in Argentina versus other exporting countries, which have commodities that are less interchangeable in the domestic economy (for example, copper in Chile). The domestic demand consumes almost 50 percent of the national industrial production and the possibility of substituting current imports from China with other markets or national production exists.

Conclusion

The particular case of China challenges the thesis held by some Argentine scholars that their Ministry of Foreign Relations has minimized its attention to economic questions. This thesis originated from observing Argentina's bilateral trade results compared to those of other Latin-American economies during the period that began with China's entry into the WTO. Nevertheless, such comparisons are not exclusively the domain of diplomacy and the need exists for a modernization plan that can propel a "second transition"³⁴, that will not only be political but also socio-economic that can support democracy in Argentina. Those steps are naturally particular to Argentina's domestic policies. In the same way, a re-articulation of China's domestic policies thirty years ago, led to reform and economic openings that resulted in high levels of internal growth and a significant expansion of foreign trade. Argentina's Ministry executes foreign policy and uses the economic resources that it represents. The economy has been a driving factor in the formulation of Argentina's foreign policy towards China. In the case of the constitutional governments of Frondizi and Illia, even while maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan, they propelled exports to the People's Republic of China in the sixties, although the interests in the matter were not sufficient to facilitate earlier diplomatic relations. For several reasons, trade relations did not advance in the magnitude of the Argentine government's desires until the end of seventies. In the view of diplomatic personnel, that has been central to this process

since the beginning of the 21st century; relations between China and Argentina could become contentious if there is not an advance in commercial matters.

Since China's entry into the World Trade Organization, the sales of soybeans and its by-products fluctuated between sixty and eighty-four percent of total Argentine exports to China, being the main component of its sales. However, currently these products are facing the challenges of the world economic crisis as well as agricultural reform in China. The economic crisis directly influences the policies of states that are beginning to adopt traditional protectionist policies and other New Keynesian measures as instruments of economic policy. As noted, such measures are seen as useful in contracting international trade and in interfering in the soybean business. Besides, the Chinese agricultural reform, oriented towards assuring food security, generates a new challenge to the Argentine agricultural exports. Some researchers understand that the future of Argentine grain trade and, consequently, the development of the hinterland of the port of Rosario, in the core of the Pampas region of Argentina, will be impacted and constrained by the international situation and Chinese domestic policies. On the contrary, the present paper considers the existence of domestic and international factors, with regard to the history of Argentine grain sales to China as confirming that the soybean industry will maintain, in the coming years, the major role that it has played until the present time in Argentine-Chinese trade.

No market, besides those of major qualities, is exempt from the effects of a crisis of global magnitude. China is one of the most open economies in the world and this further increases the impact, but also Beijing has the capacity to replace the international market with the internal market, even at high costs, since it has not only expanded internal demand with savings capacity, but, historically, it has been a country that has faced adverse situations with a capacity for recovery. Expectations remain focused on the international community's behavior towards the crisis. That is to say, that it remains to be seen whether states will adopt protectionist politics themselves or they will accept the proposal of the G-20 to suspend measures of this kind for one year in order to return to the previous levels of international trade. In the case of China, the answer appears in two levels. In the present situation, the Chinese government has adopted the same measures that the United States and European countries have applied to stabilize markets and revive domestic demand. Long term, China will continue structural reforms as well as make progress in the transformation of its agriculture and its pension system.

In the past two decades, soybean production in the United States, Brazil and Argentina has continuously expanded based on the growth of Chinese demand. South American production has had a better performance than the United States.³⁵ Until the present, the growth in exports of Argentine soybeans to China lacks a threat of disruption due to the world economic crisis or the contraction of Chinese demand. Any possible reduction would

probably be caused by the effects of an Argentine decrease in supply due to climatic conditions or governmental measures that would discourage agricultural investments and thus affect the performance of this oilseed. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the development of the soybean in Argentina. In the 1960s and 1970s, soy was recognized as an exotic crop. It was felt that it would help to pioneer the research and development of this and other crops sought by the Asian market. It would also contribute to the diversification of Argentina's exports and, thus, achieve a so called "diversification of production," admittedly, a term normally applied to the industrialization of this or other crops rather than to the export of commodities. Both China and Argentina should keep in mind the importance of the soybean if they want to maintain stabilized bilateral trade. At the same time, the Argentine government should adopt measures in order to diversify exports.

Endnotes:

1. 中华人民共和国外交部、中国对拉丁美洲和加勒比政策全文、北京 2008 年 11 月 5 日。Ministry of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025.htm>
2. Guillermo O'Donnell, *La transición en Brasil: continuidades y paradojas*, en Instituto de América Latina de la Academia de Ciencias Sociales de China, *Colección de Ponencias del Simposio Internacional "América Latina en el Umbral de los Años 90"*, Beijing, 1988, pp. 3-11.
3. In the English-speaking world, the Malvinas islands are known as the Falklands.
4. Ecolatina, *El boom de las importaciones chinas una amenaza para la industria nacional*, Informe Económico Semanal, N° 654, Buenos Aires, 29 de Febrero de 2009, pp. 1-4.
5. Ibid, p. 1.
6. *Pacto Brasil-Argentina contra invasión china*, en diario *Ámbito Financiero*, Buenos Aires, 7 de Mayo de 2009.
7. *Empresarios del calzado considera a China una amenaza*, en diario *La Nación*, Buenos Aires, 31 de Agosto de 2007; *Industriales latino-americanos proponen adoptar medidas de defensa regional contra China*, en Federación Argentina de la Industria del Calzado y Afines, Buenos Aires, 30 de Agosto de 2007, en <http://onudi.org.uy>
8. Argentina applies antidumping measures to air conditioners, tire, sunglasses, rolling bearing, insecticides, thermoses, steel pipes, tape measures, play cards and microwave. In Ecolatina, *El boom de las importaciones chinas...*, p. 4.
9. República Argentina, Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos, Dirección General de Aduanas, *Nota Externa N° 87/2008*, publicada en el Boletín Oficial el 10 de Octubre de 2008.
10. República Popular China, Ministerio de Comercio, *La aduana argentina requiere que algunos productos importados necesitan solicitar previa autorización*, 3 de Noviembre de 2008, <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/i/jyjl/200811/20081105868754.html>
11. República Popular China, Ministerio de Comercio, *El MERCOSUR prepara elevar el Arancel Externo Común a algunos productos importados*, Beijing, 19 de Noviembre de 2008. <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/i/jyjl/200811/20081105900280.html> China is the economy to which applies most quantity of antidumping measures. In the first semester

- of 2008, the WTO registers 85 new cases of investigation by dumping, surpassing the 61 cases of the previous year. Turkey, United States, India, Argentina and the European Union apply 54 new measures. From 85 cases, Chinese was object of 37, followed by Thailand, the European Union and Indonesian. In República Popular China, Ministerio de Comercio, *Crecimiento vertiginoso de las investigaciones antidumping global en el primer semestre del corriente año*, Beijing, 10 de Noviembre de 2008, 中华人民共和国商务部、今年上半年全球反倾销调查数量猛增 en <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/difang/jangsu/200811/20081105881320.html>.
12. República Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación, *Anuncian la compra de 279 coches nuevos para el sistema de subterráneos de Buenos Aires*, 5 de Noviembre de 2008, www.casarosada.gov.ar
 13. In Chinese 中国中信集团公司。
 14. *Responses to Questions Submitted by Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany) Lee Teng-hui President Republic of Taiwan*, 9 de Julio de 1999, en <http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/0799.htm>
 15. República Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Comunicado de prensa conjunto con motivo de la visita del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Popular China, Sr. Tang Jiaxuan, a la República Argentina*, Buenos Aires, 18 de Octubre de 2002, en www.mrecic.gov.ar/ministerio/prensa/13802.htm
 16. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, *La Argentina reafirma su política de "una sola China"*, Comunicado de prensa N° 324/07, Buenos Aires, 17 de Agosto de 2007.
 17. 中华人民共和国外交部、中国对拉丁美洲和加勒比政策全文、北京 2008 年 11 月 5 日。Ministry of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025.htm>
 18. Ibid., p. 1.
 19. *Yang Jie Chi: El documento político de China para América Latina y el Caribe es el importante diplomático de China para América Latina*, en Xinhuanet, Beijing, 5 de Noviembre de 2008, 杨洁篪、中国对拉美和加勒比政策文件是中国对拉美外交重要举措、新华网、北京、2008 年 11 月 5 日。 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-11/05/content_10311836.htm
 20. Eduardo Daniel Oviedo, *China en América Latina ¿Influencia o he-*

- gemonía?*, en revista Diálogo Político, Fundación Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung A.C., Año XXIII, N° 2, junio 2006, ps. 199-221.
21. Zhu Man Ting, *Punto de inflexión diplomático de América latina desde los años setenta*, en Colección de América latina, N° 3, Beijing 1985, pp. 1 y ss. Another author considers that the politics of the Latin-American States in the seventies passed, of the “alignment” to “not alignment”; of the “unilateral dependence” to the “multilateral cooperation”; of the “westernization” to the reality of the “south”; of the “Pan-Americanism” to the “Latin-Americanism” and; of the debate of the problems of “security” to that of “economic development”. In Xiao Feng, *Sobre el desarrollo de la política y teoría diplomática de los estados de América latina (primera parte)*, en Estudios Latinoamericanos, Instituto de América Latina de la Academia de Ciencias Sociales, N° 2, Beijing 1989, pp. 9 y ss.
22. Luis María de Pablo Pardo, *La política exterior argentina y el sistema internacional*, en Silvia Ruth Jalabe (comp.), *La política exterior argentina y sus protagonistas 1880-1995*, Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, Buenos Aires, 1996.
23. Artemio Luis Melo, *Introducción al análisis de la política exterior hacia los Estados Unidos (1983-1993)*, en Alfredo Rizzo Romano y Artemio L. Melo (comp.), *Las relaciones Argentina Estados Unidos(1983-1993): variables para un análisis interpretativo*, Homo Sapiens, Rosario, 1993, p. 33. Artemio Luis Melo, *El gobierno Menem*, UNR Editora, Rosario, 2001, p. 93.
24. Eduardo Daniel Oviedo, *China en América Latina ¿Influencia o hegemonía?*, pp. 210-211.
25. Helio Jaguaribe, *Autonomía periférica y hegemonía céntrica*, Estudios Internacionales, N° 46, Santiago, Abril-Junio, 1979, pp. 96-97.
26. OMC advierte contra proteccionismo como remedio a crisis financiera, en Centro de Noticias ONU, 8 de Octubre de 2008, en <http://www.un.org/spanish/News/fullstorynews.asp?newsID=13548&criteria1=comercio>.
27. Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, November 15, 2008.
28. Pasquale Villani, *La edad contemporánea, 1914-1945*, Ariel Historia, Barcelona, 1997, p. 94.
29. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Random House, New York, 1979, p. 142.
30. Ibid.

31. Kenneth N. Waltz, op. cit., pp. 142-143.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Guillermo O'Donnell, op. cit., pp. 3-11.
35. Darill E. Ray, *China's dramatic growth in soybean imports and its commodity price impact*, University of Tennessee, Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, 2008.

References:

- Luis María de Pablo Pardo, *La política exterior argentina y el sistema internacional*, en Silvia Ruth Jalabe (comp.), *La política exterior argentina y sus protagonistas 1880-1995*, Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, Buenos Aires, 1996.
- Alfredo Rizzo Romano y Artemio L. Melo, *Las relaciones Argentina Estados Unidos (1983-1993): variables para un análisis interpretativo*, Homo Sapiens, Rosario, 1993.
- Artemio Luis Melo, *El gobierno de Menem*, UNR Editora, Rosario, 2001.
- Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, November 15, 2008.
- Ecolatina, *El boom de las importaciones chinas una amenaza para la industria nacional*, Informe Económico Semanal, N° 654, Buenos Aires, 29 de Febrero de 2009.
- *Empresarios del calzado considera a China una amenaza*, en diario La Nación, Buenos Aires, 31 de Agosto de 2007.
- Federación Argentina de la Industria del Calzado y Afines, *Industriales latinoamericanos proponen adoptar medidas de defensa regional contra China*, Buenos Aires, 30 de Agosto de 2007.
- Jaguaribe Helio, *Autonomía periférica y hegemonía céntrica*, Estudios Interna-

- cionales, N° 46, Santiago, Abril-Junio, 1979.
- Ministry of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025.htm>
 - O'Donnell Guillermo, *La transición en Brasil: continuidades y paradojas*, en Instituto de América Latina de la Academia de Ciencias Sociales de China, *Colección de Ponencias del Simposio Internacional "América Latina en el Umbral de los Años 90"*, Beijing, 1988.
 - OMC advierte contra proteccionismo como remedio a crisis financiera, en Centro de Noticias ONU, 8 de Octubre de 2008, en <http://www.un.org/spanish/News/fullstorynews.asp?newsID=13548&criteria1=comercio>
 - Oviedo Eduardo Daniel, *China en América Latina ¿Influencia o hegemonía?*, en revista Diálogo Político, Fundación Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung A.C., Año XXIII, N° 2, Junio 2006.
 - *Pacto Brasil-Argentina contra invasión china*, en diario Ámbito Financiero, Buenos Aires, 7 de Mayo de 2009.
 - Ray Darill E., *China's dramatic growth in soybean imports and its commodity price impact*, University of Tennessee, Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, 2008.
 - *Responses to Questions Submitted by Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany) Lee Teng-hui President Republic of Taiwan*, 9 de Julio de 1999, en <http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/0799.htm>
 - Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, *La Argentina reafirma su política de "una sola China"*, Comunicado de prensa N° 324/07, Buenos Aires, 17 de Agosto de 2007.
 - República Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Comunicado de prensa conjunto con motivo de la visita del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Popular China, Sr. Tang Jiaxuan, a la República Argentina*, Buenos Aires, 18 de Octubre de 2002.
 - República Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación, *Anuncian la compra de 279 coches nuevos para el sistema de subterráneos de Buenos Aires*, 5 de Noviembre de 2008, www.casarosada.gov.ar
 - República Popular China, Ministerio de Comercio, *El MERCOSUR prepara elevar el Arancel Externo Común a algunos productos importados*, Beijing, 19 de Noviembre de 2008.
 - República Popular China, Ministerio de Comercio, *La aduana argentina requiere que algunos productos importados necesitan solicitador previa autorización*, 3 de Noviembre de 2008.
 - República Popular China, Ministerio de Comercio, *Crecimiento vertiginoso*

- de las investigaciones antidumping global en el primer semestre del corriente año*, Beijing, 10 de Noviembre de 2008, 中华人民共和国商务部、今年上半年全球反倾销调查数量猛增
www.mofcom.gov.cn
- 中华人民共和国外交部、中国对拉丁美洲和加勒比政策全文、北京2008年11月5日。Ministry of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025.htm>
 - República Argentina, Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos, Dirección General de Aduanas, Nota Externa N°87/2008, publicada en el Boletín Oficial el 10 de Octubre de 2008.
 - Villani Pasquale, *La edad contemporánea, 1914-1945*, Barcelona: Ariel Historia, 1997.
 - Waltz Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979.
 - World Bank, *World Development Report 2009, Reshaping Economic Geographic*, Washington, November 2008.
 - Argentina Republic, National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, *Yearbook of Argentine Foreign Trade*, Buenos Aires, 2000-2008.
 - *Yang Jie Chi: El documento político de China para América Latina y el Caribe es el importante diplomático de China para América Latina*, en Xinhua wang, Beijing, 5 de Noviembre de 2008, 杨洁篪、中国对拉美和加勒比政策文件是中国对拉美外交重要举措、新华网、北京、2008年11月5日。
 - Xiao Feng, *Sobre el desarrollo de la política y teoría diplomática de los estados de América latina (primera parte)*, en Estudios Latinoamericanos, Instituto de América Latina de la Academia de Ciencias Sociales, N° 2, Beijing 1989.
 - Zhu Man Ting, *Punto de inflexión diplomático de América latina desde los años setenta*, en Colección de América latina, N°

Maybe We Should Look at Other Countries

Alexander Kuzminov



Abstract

Affordable health care is becoming more and more of a problem in the United States. The quality of health care is also under scrutiny. Different countries reached their health care strategies through application of their experiences and their abilities. The main agenda was to provide inexpensive and highly effective health care to their citizens. Many countries chose acupuncture as either the main modality of treatment or as a treatment equal in value with an allopathic treatment. In the US, the public and medical community still need to be educated about the benefits of Oriental Medicine and acupuncture. Acupuncture, in particular, is often still looked at as something mystical and enigmatic, sometimes even the art of a charlatan. This article summarizes how three less developed countries have used acupuncture to improve their citizens' health without significant capital outlay or great cost to consumers. Many questions remain about how to address health care issues, both in America and around the world; but looking at the state of health care in China, Cuba, and Tajikistan can provide insight into the potential from acupuncture and Oriental Medicine worldwide.

Biography

Alexander Kuzminov is a licensed acupuncturist in New York and Connecticut. He graduated from Pacific College of Oriental Medicine Magna Cum Laude with a degree in Master of Science in Oriental Medicine. For many years Alex has worked with different medical doctors which allowed him to have good understanding of how to combine western treatments with the acupuncture and herbal treatments. Alexander Kuzminov also has a BSEE (Bachelor of Science Electrical Engineering) Degree. He finds that having a background in engineering helps to deepen his understanding of many aspects of acupuncture. Alex is also an accomplished martial arts practitioner, having studied Karate, Aikido and Sun Do Korean Yoga. Many years ago Alexander Kuzminov met a teacher who introduced him to the rare skill of using the ancient I-Ching system when treating different illnesses. When the I-Ching principle is employed in tandem with acupuncture and herbal medicine, profound and lasting results can be achieved for a wide variety of health conditions. Alex specializes in using scalp acupuncture to treat many different illnesses. He finds that this particular therapy has excellent results particularly in the treatment of multiple sclerosis, parkinson's disease, asthma, neurological problems and pain that has not been resolved by using different treatment modalities. Alexander Kuzminov is an Associate Professor of Acupuncture at the University of Bridgeport. He teaches acupuncture related courses and supervises students at the University Acupuncture Clinic.

For decades Americans have had increasing difficulty accessing quality health care due to rising insurance costs and out-of-pocket expenses for hospital stays, doctors' visits and prescriptions. Though the United States of America is one of the world's most advanced societies, according to the World Health Organization, the country ranks only 37th out of 190 when countries are compared according to overall health system performance and 71 on the level of overall health. There is another extremely alarming fact. The United States ranks first in health expenditure per capita vis-à-vis the other 190 countries included in the study.¹ No wonder Americans are alarmed and many feel health care reform is sorely needed.

In the July 2009 issue of *Acupuncture Today*, an article referenced President Obama's positive outlook towards acupuncture and other alternative therapies that have proven track records.² The President's openness suggests great promise for acupuncture practitioners and for the health care delivery system. Acupuncture may finally be incorporated into mainstream medicine and more Americans will derive the benefits that have been available in other countries and cultures for decades, even centuries.

In the United States, the public and the medical community still need to be educated about the benefits of Oriental Medicine and acupuncture. Acupuncture, in particular, is often still looked at as something mystical and enigmatic. It is at times still viewed as the art of a quack.³ However, the World Health Organization (WHO) has compiled a list of illnesses

successfully treated by acupuncture. This list was created by medical doctors and is available online at their website.⁴ Many doctors in the United States don't know about this list and many still consider acupuncture untested and perhaps even unsafe. Nevertheless in many other countries acupuncture is utilized as an effective alternative to Western medicine. But what about other countries? What do other nations do to keep their citizens healthy? What happens if there are shortages of antibiotics or common medications in hospitals? What do they offer to their population?

This article summarizes how three culturally different countries have used acupuncture to improve their citizens' health without significant capital outlay or great cost to consumers. Many questions remain about how to address health care issues, both in the United States and around the world; but looking at the state of health care in China, Cuba, and Tajikistan can provide insight into the potential for acupuncture and Oriental Medicine worldwide.

China

We shall begin by considering China's history of health care. Why China? China has a very rich history and many Chinese medical texts written centuries ago are still considered quintessential to Chinese medicine and acupuncture. China is also considered to be the first country that used acupuncture for treating illness. Acupuncture and herbal medicine go back into the root of Chinese culture. The oldest book written about Chinese medi-

cine was *Huang Di Nei Jing*. This book outlines different treatment and healing strategies for overall health. The text tells not only how to treat diseases but also how to live in such a way as to prevent illness. No one knows who wrote the book, but it became one of the cornerstones of Chinese medicine.

The concepts of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism are also at the heart of Chinese medicine. These traditions have maintained some level of currency even during the periods of Western colonization and communist rule. The concept of the Great Wall preventing other peoples from infiltrating China and stealing its knowledge did not work. By the nineteenth century, civilizations that had surpassed China technologically, such as the British, defied the Middle Kingdom's long-standing traditions and demoralized China's citizens. The country also lost a great deal during the opium wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860) with England. Many of China's citizens sacrificed their sobriety due to the forced trade of opium for Chinese manufactured goods and tea. As a result of British domination, China almost became a British colony and it was sectored into spheres of influence by the major European powers. Hong Kong was an example of the British dominance—it became a British colony and was returned to China only in 1997.

During its occupation by Western powers, China started to lose its affinity for acupuncture and Chinese medicine. Instead China began to adopt Western ways

of treating illness. Some Chinese doctors who studied in Japan proclaimed Chinese medicine unscientific and fueled a movement to prohibit doctors to practice it.⁵ This was accomplished in 1947. Out of twenty Chinese medical schools in Guangdong province only one school of Chinese medicine remained. Yet people



An antique chest used to store Chinese medicinal herbs

still believed in its effectiveness. Its therapeutic results could not be overlooked and it still remained a treatment of choice. Thus China, a country that by 18th and 19th centuries, had more success than the West in treating many difficult diseases risked losing the unique and proven methods of Chinese medicine.

When China's internal war between communist and nationalist forces ended in 1949, China's economy found itself in shambles. Most medications needed to be imported and were extremely costly. Rural areas in particular suffered from shortages of medicine. Western-trained doctors were typically located far away from people in remote villages who required treatments and could not afford health

care.⁶

China thus started to rebuild. Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM)—acupuncture and herbal medicine became favored by the Communist government because they were simple, effective and economically feasible. Treating people with acupuncture, after all, required only some needles and a location where the patient could be treated, not the expensive equipment and facilities required for Western treatment methods.

In addition, effective and inexpensive therapies to supplement acupuncture were revived. These were Gua Sha, cupping and moxibustion. Gua Sha is a simple technique that was performed with a Chinese soup spoon. By scraping a specific part of the body with the spoon the doctor moved away the obstruction in the tissues and allowed for the blood to better circulate through the muscle. It was commonly used to treat muscle pain due to cold and damp weather, neck pain or lower back pain. This is still a very common technique used today in China and in the US.

Cupping was done with bamboo cups used for water drinking. It was used for injuries, pain and asthma, as well as coughing. Using a light wooden stick a doctor would create a vacuum in a cup by quickly inserting and withdrawing it from the cup. Then just as quickly, the cup would be placed of the back or the shoulder or any other part of the body by the doctor. Moxibustion is a technique to warm the point where acupuncture is to be administered and, by doing that, bring

energy into the body. To perform moxibustion, herbs tightly rolled into a cigar type shape were lit, then applied to the points being treated. This method was used to treat arthritis, pain, gynecological issues and many more conditions.

acupuncture and herbal medicine became favored by the Communist government because they were simple, effective and economically feasible.

There was, however, another reason why Chinese medicine was revived. The future leader Mao Zhedong, while fighting for the communists during 1934-1935, had ordered Chinese medicine be used to treat soldiers combat illness during that year of fighting.⁷ This revival on the battlefield should have come as no surprise since Chinese medicine has its origins in treating soldiers after battle. This practice dates back many centuries. The injuries sustained from spears, swords and, later, gun powder had been effectively treated for centuries through Chinese medicine. The world famous acupuncture point Zu San Li was successfully used as a location for giving soldiers increased vitality. Once he came into power, Chairman Mao insisted on the use of Chinese medicine and he rescinded the law that had been en-

acted forbidding acupuncture and Chinese medicine. By the end of 1950, Traditional Chinese Medicine was integrated into all medical schools, and physicians were required to study it even if they were to use only Western medicine in their practice.⁸

At that time, China suffered from a shortage of doctors in rural areas and acupuncture “came to the rescue.” A technique used in Northeast China was re-designed and used as a part of general practice. It was called “Barefoot Doctor Acupuncture” because it was practiced by laborers and by farmers who worked in the field barefoot and who had minimal medical training.⁹ Acupuncture was performed on a set of points that were easy to find and were simple to needle. These points were located at a specific spinal vertebra. Even today, these points on the spinal vertebrae are used to treat skin disease, headaches, acute arthritic pain, asthma, bronchitis, nephritis, diabetes, impotence, incontinence, eye diseases, liver diseases and many other common conditions. Today China’s health care system integrates acupuncture and Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) with Western treatment methods with positive results. There seems to be a great deal of synergy and respect for each modality of treatment. The People of China can be said to benefit from the “best of both worlds.”

Cuba

Another country that we should briefly survey is Cuba. Before the 1959 Communist Revolution, Cuba was an island tourist destination for people from many

countries and from the United States, in particular. Besides tourism, Cuba’s main export products were represented by cigar manufacturing and sugar cane production. There was only one medical school before 1959 but Cuba had its share of great doctors and was one of the world leaders in life expectancy. When Cuba became a communist country it adopted a political structure similar to the Soviet Union. Medical care was now free for every citizen. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, the million of dollars supplied to Cuba by Moscow came to an abrupt halt. Cuba fell into dire financial circumstances and lacked sufficient funds to support itself. It also needed a new medical health care system. The extant one had relied too heavily on medications and equipment from the Soviet Union and a few of its satellites. The system needed to be rebuilt, but how? What kind of medical treatments would be efficient and financially feasible? How would Cuba deliver necessary medication and treatments to its people?

In Cuba, health care had been free. Doctors went into medicine not to become rich but because they wanted to provide health care for people. Health care was looked at as a government provided service. Doctors were paid by the government. People would use a family doctor first, then a clinic and then a hospital. This was the progression of providers the Cuban citizen could receive, similar to the delivery systems found in Great Britain and Canada.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba found itself in a situation similar to

China's in 1949. Cuba had to rebuild its health system from scratch, with no money to purchase much needed medication from the West. China had its long history of Chinese medicine to fall back on but what about Cuba? Cuba lacked the same background and also had little food, which further complicated efforts to address the needs of the sick and malnourished. But Cuba, just like China, had some very creative and knowledgeable doctors.¹⁰ Some Cuban doctors had traveled to China in the 1960s and 1970s to study acupuncture and Chinese medicine. They brought back knowledge of the ancient techniques of acupuncture and Post Soviet era Cuba was the opportune venue to put this knowledge to the test. There was a list created by the WHO that identified specific illnesses that had been successfully treated by acupuncture and related knowledge that Cuban doctors accumulated from practicing acupuncture on their patients in the period prior to 1992.¹¹ Things had become so difficult at that time that one doctor treated patients with acupuncture and sustained himself just by drinking water sweetened by cane sugar.¹² Even Cuban emergency room procedures began to use acupuncture when appropriate. Operating room procedures were done with acupuncture for anesthesia.¹³ The doctors, trained in Chinese medicine, also began to use techniques for diagnosis as well as treatment. For example, there is one acupuncture pressure point that can be used to help to diagnose gallstones and another point can help in the diagnosis of appendicitis. These points proved useful when Cuba lacked equipment to perform other appropriate testing.¹⁴

By 1996, Cuba began to integrate acupuncture into the Cuban health care system more systematically. Shortly thereafter, statistics began showing improvements in the health of Cuba's citizens. They experienced, for example, less cardiovascular disease, diabetes, asthma, and hypertension.¹⁵



Tajikistan

Drug problems often have the greatest effects in less developed countries where poverty and lack of jobs contribute to increased narcotics use. The small country of Tajikistan, for example, has served for many years as the gateway for narcotics trafficking between Afghanistan and Russia and Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union and outbreak of a civil war in Tajikistan in 1997 the drug problem began to escalate. According to *Demoscope Weekly* magazine, the number of drug users increased from 57 in 1992 to over 6,192 in 2004. Over the last 10 years anti-drug security forces in Tajikistan confiscated over 62 tons of narcotics.

While, in recent years, the cotton and alu-

minum industries have grown and have begun to provide reasonable income, many of Tajikistan's citizens still get paid less than \$1.25 per day. However, the drug use problem continues to rise, affecting teenagers and adults alike

Since treatments for drug users are costly and not easily affordable for many, the Tajik government started to look for inexpensive, easy-to-use methods that could nevertheless provide effective treatment. They found significant promise in the United States, where, in New York City's Bronx borough in the 1970's, a medical doctor discovered a way to treat drug addiction with auricular acupuncture rather than with methadone. This protocol of the National Acupuncture Detoxification Association (NADA) had been used successfully for at least 20 years and with good results. In 2004, a seminar on NADA was presented to Tajik physicians. This is what one of them said afterwards: "Auricular acupuncture is a very simple way that does not require extra spending. All one needs is a room and a specialist. This method is a great help to us to deal with the period of drug dependency when a patient goes through a withdrawal period."¹⁶

Further study has shown this protocol effective in helping alcoholics or smokers recover from their addictions. The aforementioned are valuable examples of acupuncture use when finances are limited and extreme measures are needed.

In Summary

These examples demonstrate how three culturally distinct countries have utilized


acupuncture and Traditional Chinese Medicine to provide quality health care at affordable costs. Given their success, one might ask why the United States might not benefit from this. In the United States, we need to work to benefit patients that are desperately in need of effective treatment. The need exists to increase the level of health system performance given to the United States by the WHO from 37 to number 1 and to increase our level of overall health number at least by two. The United States health care expenditures are astronomical. Given the investment into our health care services, the United States should rank as best in the world but we lag far behind in many areas. Reducing health care expenditures dramatically in the United States by 50% without compromising on care needs may be an appropriate goal and hopefully treatments that have succeeded in places such as China, Cuba, Tajikistan and even in the Bronx can be more widely dispersed in parts of the developing world including Africa, South and Southeast Asia and in Latin America.

References:

1. WHO http://www.photius.com/rankings/world_health_performance_ranks.html
2. *Obama Positive Toward Acupuncture*
By Editorial Staff *Acupuncture Today* July, 2009, Vol. 10, Issue 07.
3. <http://www.quackwatch.org/01QuackeryRelatedTopics/acu.html> Dr. Steven Barrett
4. Cf. World Health Organization website, the <http://www.who.int/en/>.
5. From Legend to Science A History of Chinese Medicine , Ruan Jin Zhao, Phd. 145-146
6. From Legend to Science A History of Chinese Medicine , Ruan Jin Zhao, Phd. 145-146
7. Academy of Classic Oriental Sciences <http://www.acos.org/articles/history-of-acupuncture/>
8. From Legend to Science A History of Chinese Medicine , Ruan Jin Zhao, Phd. Page 147
9. From Legend to Science A History of Chinese Medicine , Ruan Jin Zhao, Phd. Page 149
10. Dreaming with two feet on the ground: Acupuncture in Cuba, Harriet Beinfield
11. The Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, 1991.
12. Dreaming with two feet on the ground: Acupuncture in Cuba, Harriet Beinfield
13. Dreaming with two feet on the ground: Acupuncture in Cuba, Harriet Beinfield
14. Dreaming with two feet on the ground: Acupuncture in Cuba, Harriet Beinfield
15. Dreaming with two feet on the ground: Acupuncture in Cuba, Harriet Beinfield
16. Tajikistan News September 2006. Наркологи Северного Таджикистана учатся лечить наркопотребителей иглоукальванием. www.medicalexpress.uz/index.php?id=september-2006-Tajikistan&lang=ru

Israel and Palestine—Looking ahead Twenty Five Years: A Symposium Report

Thomas J. Ward



Abstract

Beginning in 2005 the University of Bridgeport's International College conducted a series of symposia that considered changes in political economy, religion, and demographics that will affect Israel and the Palestinian territories by the year 2030. The tension in the relations between Israel and the Palestinian territories cannot continue indefinitely. Going forward, the United States may decide that it needs to reassess its diplomatic objectives and strategic priorities in the region. Today there is also need for an discussion about the lessened role the United States and Western Europe will play in this region of the world in the future, as China and India become the region's most important economic partners in coming decades. Track Two Diplomacy that pays attention to Islam is especially important.



Dome of the Rock, Jerusalem

Biography

*Dr. Thomas J. Ward is Dean of the International College and Vice President for International Programs at the University of Bridgeport. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Notre Dame, Dr. Ward did his doctoral studies at the Catholic Institute of Paris and at De La Salle University in the Philippines where he wrote his doctoral thesis under Andrew Gonzalez who later served as the Minister of Education of the Philippines. Dr. Ward has traveled in more than 60 countries and has lived in Latin America, East Asia, and Europe. He lectures in English, Spanish and French and has a working knowledge of several other languages. One of the University's pioneer instructors in distance learning, Dr. Ward has received five grants from the Connecticut Department of Education's Distance Learning Consortium for online programs that he has developed. Dr. Ward lectures and writes on issues relating to comparative education, religion and society, and regional political economy. Most recently he edited *Development, Social Justice and Civil Society—An Introduction to the Political Economy of NGOs* (Paragon House 2005). Prior to moving to Connecticut with his family in 2000 he also served as a Human Rights Commissioner in Dutchess County, New York.*

UB Symposia on Israel and Palestine

The UB symposia on Israel and Palestine began in Fall 2005. Elsewhere in this edition of the *Journal of Global Development of Peace*, we include three key presentations from those sessions, two by Richard L. Rubenstein, University of Bridgeport President Emeritus who is also a Distinguished Professor of Religion and Founder of the University's Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. The third is by Dr. Zhiqun Zhu, who served as Chair of the University of Bridgeport's Department of International Political Economy & Diplomacy from 2004 to 2008 and currently serves as John and Catherine T. MacArthur Chair of East Asian Studies at Bucknell University.

We chose "Israel and Palestine—Looking ahead Twenty-Five Years" as the overall focus of our initiative, which began in Fall of 2005. We chose to look ahead to circumvent the countless arguments and counterarguments surrounding contested Jewish settlements in Palestinian territories, suicide bombings, civilian victims of Israeli attacks on in Gaza or the launching of rockets by Hamas against Israel. An Israeli and a Palestinian spokesperson can each make the case for why their position on a given topic is the correct one and elaborate on why they have suffered injustice. The underlying assumption of such attempts at public diplomacy is to make a case before American media outlets, because of the United States' role as powerbroker in Israel and Palestine.

The strategy of "making the case to the American public" continues with the help

of pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian groups inside the U.S. who consistently present their positions to the media, political parties, legislators and other potential allies within American civil society. Both sides can become so enraptured with "winning the current argument" that they seemingly fail to recognize that the world is approaching a collective shift in the geopolitical fault line that will shape the future of Israel- Palestine relations. Rather than debating who is right or wrong in an action of the moment, the work that we began in 2005 turned its attention to current trends in military build-ups, in hegemony, in demographics, and related sociopolitical phenomena that will have strategic implications for the Middle East in the near future.

Key players in the Middle East do not appear prepared for the new roles that China and India will assume in the Middle East in the future. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks flawless American English and Palestinian rights activist Hanan Ashrawi also speaks impeccable English, but neither speaks Chinese or Hindi. Is Israel prepared for a future Middle East in which the key players may be China and India? Given China and India's growing need for oil, can they be expected to risk their commercial ties with the Arab world to advocate in favor of Israel? There is no large pro-Israeli voting bloc in either India or China either.

Understanding the Issues: The Genesis of the United States' Commitment to the Defense of the State of Israel's Right to Exist

Immediately following World War II, Israel's main munitions supplier was the Eastern bloc. Joseph Stalin had originally welcomed the creation of the State of Israel following World War II. For Stalin, the emergence of an independent Israel meant a reduction of British influence in the Middle East. Soon, however, the Eastern bloc distanced itself from Israel, seeing that Israel had become a strategic partner with the United States. A defining point in the US-Israeli relationship took place during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War when the Nixon Administration made the decision to provide overwhelming military support to the Israeli war effort.¹ Iraq and Afghanistan aside, today more than one third of the total US foreign aid goes to Israel and Egypt. Heightened aid to Egypt commenced from the Camp David accords of 1979, which led to Egypt's recognition and establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel.

The United States' support for Israel had strong geopolitical justifications during the Cold War. Israel was a pivotal ally against the Soviet Union which had made major ideological, military, and economic inroads in the region. Leaders of Pan-Arabism such as Gamal Nasser, Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad and Palestinian liberation movements were beholden to Soviet support and ostensibly committed to key aspects of its ideology, particularly its views on the need to address Western imperialism. American military strategists convincingly argued that the U.S. national interest lay in supporting Israel as a counterbalance to Soviet-supported states in the region. For its part, Israel provided intelligence and military training to na-

tions that the United States supported during the Cold War including the Nicaraguan resistance and South Vietnamese government. The collapse of the Soviet Union diminished the salience of the geopolitical argument.

Iraq and Afghanistan aside, today more than one third of the total US foreign aid goes to Israel and Egypt.

The US policy of nearly unconditional support for Israel has begun to be openly challenged in the United States over the past two decades. Such challenges can be expected to intensify as more and more of the World War II veterans who directly witnessed the horrors of the Holocaust reach the end of their lives. The rationale for U.S. support for Israel is increasingly disputed, as evidenced by the increasingly public American opposition to the expansion of Israeli settlements on the West Bank.² While the importance of an alliance with Israel in the "War on Terror" is evident, this close relationship is frequently cited by militant Muslims as the prime cause of the war. Since 1972 the United States has exercised its Security Council veto of resolutions against Israel on more than forty occasions.³ In more than two-thirds of those votes, the

United States was the only dissenting voice in the Security Council. I do not cite this to suggest that the United States was wrong to exercise these vetoes. These resolutions could have been used as a de jure rationale for launching further attacks on Israel. Some of the resolutions that won UN support over the years were outrageous, most notably the November 10, 1975 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 stating that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.”²⁴ That resolution carried in 1975 by a vote of 72 to 35 with 32 abstentions and it remained in effect until 1991. US General Assembly votes were also consistent with America’s pro-Israel position.

For decades, Israel has maintained overwhelming military superiority over neighboring Arab States, largely due to military aid provided by the United States. However, unlike in previous military confrontations, the 2006 Lebanon War did not result in the decisive victory that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had anticipated. It contributed to his electoral defeat at the hands of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and upgraded Hezbollah’s image throughout much of the Middle East. Since then, Hamas and Hezbollah militias have earned a reputation for being able to “hold their own” in spite of Israel’s overwhelmingly military superiority.

Establishment of the State of Israel— A Review of the Historical Narrative

The strongest opponents to Israel as a state have questioned its legitimacy as a nation-state since the moment Founding

Father David Ben-Gurion declared Israeli independence on May 14, 1948. The calls for the establishment of a Jewish State in the Middle East spanned across the centuries. They had become a focal point of



Two boys walk home from school, Gaza City, Gaza

diplomacy and had taken on momentum based on the writings and the organizing efforts of the Zionist leader Theodor Herzl (1860-1904). With Rome’s military intervention in 70 A.D. Jewish independence suffered a severe blow. This led to the destruction of Jerusalem and most Jewish inhabitants were killed or forced to abandon Palestine. In the Bar-Kokhba Revolt that was crushed in 135 A.D. thousands and thousands of Jewish lives were again lost. In 135 A.D. the remnants of the Jewish population were banned from Jerusalem and settled around Gali-

lee but the vast majority of Jews were moved into Europe.

The writings and prophecies of the Jewish faith helped to keep the dream of a return to Israel alive. This was also reinforced due to the abuse and suffering that Jews had suffered in foreign lands. Inspired by Herzl's writings, thousands of Jewish settlers from Eastern Europe immigrated to Palestine beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. There they purchased property, established farming cooperatives and laid the groundwork for what they saw as a future independent nation. Herzl incidentally was not bound to a return to the territory of Palestine per se although it may well have been his preference. Indeed, his underlying commitment was for a Jewish state more than for a specific geographical location. In *Der Judenstaat* Herzl expressed openness to either a portion of Argentina or to Palestine as a Jewish homeland. He describes Argentina as follows:

Argentina is one of the most fertile countries in the world, extends over a vast area, has a sparse population and a mild climate. The Argentine Republic would derive considerable profit from the cession of a portion of its territory to us.⁵

In the following paragraph, he then comments on Palestine, which was obviously close to his heart:

Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvelous potency.

If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return undertake to regulate the whole finances of Turkey. We should there form a portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism.⁶

Theodor Herzl died unexpectedly of a heart attack in 1904 at the age 44. For him, the establishment and the survival of a Jewish state, regardless of its location, would be contingent on the major European powers serving as its guarantor.⁷

The conditions that Jews faced in the early twentieth century in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia played an important role in awakening the Western powers to the need to create a Jewish homeland. This also resulted in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. In his November 2, 1917 letter to Lord Walter Rothschild, Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour informed the Baron of the British Cabinet's support for a "Jewish homeland" in Palestine. A concise statement, the Balfour Resolution emphasized that the Jewish homeland should not interfere with or infringe upon the political and territorial rights of the people who already resided in Palestine.⁸ Through the League of Nations' approval of the British Mandate for Palestine on July 24, 1922, a process was formalized for the realization of the Balfour Declaration and its call for a Jewish homeland.⁹ This process deteriorated due to the collapse of the League of Nations and the outbreak of the Second World War.

The United Nations Charter was adopted by the founding member states, including the United States, in October 1945. Following its creation, lobbying efforts intensified for a resolution in support of the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. Proponents were encouraged by U.S. President Harry S. Truman who took a strong position in favor of the creation of a new state of Israel. The Soviet Union also supported the effort, seeing this development as another way to reduce British influence in the Middle East. In November 1947, the U.S. led the way in garnering support for the passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 181 that called for the creation of two States in the Palestinian territories, one a Jewish state, Israel, and the other an Arab state that would be known in Transjordan. Resolution 181 also stipulated that the historic capital of Jerusalem would remain under the oversight of the United Nations for a period of at least five years at which time this matter could be revisited. While in its founding documents the Israeli nation emphasized its identity as a Jewish state, its Constitution made it possible for Arabs to remain there and to secure Israeli citizenship (with certain restrictions, for example, in the area of conscription into the military service).

While supporters of a Jewish homeland applauded the passage of Resolution 181, there was not the same enthusiasm on the part of the would-be citizens of “Transjordan,” the neighboring Arab state provided for by Resolution 181. Noah Salameh, co-author of *Islam and Peace* (2006), argues that the Palestinian identity was denied by this United Na-

tions vote and that still now the Palestinian identity is denied. General Assembly Resolution 181 was opposed by Iran, Cuba, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as well as by all of the Arab Member States of the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly vote supporting the creation of Israel was markedly divided with 33 nations favoring the two states solution, 13 nations opposing it and 10 abstentions.¹⁰

Compelling arguments served to support the call for the creation of the State of Israel¹¹:

1. The land of Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people.
2. A remnant of Jews remained in the region throughout the Post 70 CE and post 135 CE Diaspora with numbers growing considerably in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the renaissance of Zionism. At least one-third of the residents of Palestine in 1948 were Jewish.
3. The Holocaust demonstrated the necessity of re-establishing a Jewish State.
4. The Ottoman Empire had suffered defeat in World War I. Britain and France had assumed trusteeship roles in the Middle East to “fill the vacuum” of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. The League of Nations oversaw a process that led to official states being carved out of what had been Ottoman fiefdoms. It made

sense that in the “carving up” of the former Ottoman Empire, an area could be reserved for a Jewish State. France not only concurred with this but also advocated the creation of a Christian state (Lebanon) in the region as well.

5. The rationale for the creation of a Jewish and a Palestinian homeland made sense in light of the humane guidelines of the Balfour Declaration, the 1922 British Mandate for Palestine and the guidelines for mutual benefit with neighboring powers in Herzl’s *Der Judenstaat*.
6. Western skeptics were advised by supporters of the plan that the area under consideration as a Jewish homeland was largely unoccupied and was thus available. This assessment of the area has remained a sore point for Palestinians who feel that their numbers were misrepresented to the proponents of a Jewish State in Palestine.
7. Israel’s legitimacy, it was argued, was affirmed by International Law because Israel was established with the support of the United Nations in the Post World War II period and quickly won recognition by major world powers including the United States and the Soviet Union.
8. The State of Israel is a six decade long reality and history cannot be reversed at this

stage.

The two states solution, which has come to the forefront since the Oslo Agreements, has similarities to the framework outlined in the November 1947 Resolution 181. The original Resolution 181 provided for the creation of a Jewish state as well as an Arab state. The revived “two states policy” now constitutes a key position of the Palestinian Authority although the understandings of what is meant by a Two State solution differ sharply in Palestinian and Israeli circles. This ambiguity has led for current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to call not only for Hamas’ recognition of the right of the State of Israel but of its right to continue ad infinitum as a Jewish state. It is understandable why Prime Minister Netanyahu would call for this condition. Otherwise, Israel will probably not be able to continue as a Jewish homeland. Israelis are concerned that if the Right to Return¹² issue is taken literally, Israel and Palestine, could both end up with an Arab majority. Through a democratic process, the two states could be merged and the dream of a Jewish homeland would be lost. Arab opponents to the existence of Israel argue that Jews would be welcome to remain in any Arab-led Palestinian state that would replace Israel. They make assurances that their rights would be guaranteed because of the guidelines provided by the Prophet Mohammed on the humane treatment and religious freedom accorded to Christians and Jews because of their privileged position as “people of the Book.”

Israelis remain highly skeptical of such assurances. They can argue that any Is-

raeli Jews who remained in Palestine under such circumstances would be at risk. What would prevent tribunals being formed to try former Israelis because of their alleged role in human rights violations against the Palestinian people? Virtually every sector of Israeli society—could arguably be implicated—former members of government, the military, certain political parties, Jewish settlers in Palestinian territory, etc. could be included. Many Israelis have either secured a second passport or are attempting to do so because they feel that an Arab-led government would jeopardize their security and thus oblige them to leave Israel.¹³

The Rationale for Challenging the Legitimacy of the Process Leading to the Creation of the State of Israel

Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser (1918-1970), Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (1937-2006), Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (b. 1956) and militant political parties organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda number among the most emphatic opponents, past and present, to the existence of the State of Israel. A number of other elements are used to challenge Israel's ongoing existence:

1. The state of Israel came into existence without the support of the key local players of the region (i.e., Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and, most importantly, the Palestinians themselves).
2. Arabs point to a discrepancy in the treatment of Palestinians

wishing to return to their homeland vis-à-vis the guidelines for Jews wishing to return to Israel. Palestinians point out that while Israel aggressively promotes the Law of Return for individuals of Jewish descent¹⁴ it opposes the Right of Return to Israel for displaced Palestinians.¹⁵

3. The unconditional support for the State of Israel as a Jewish Homeland that existed at the time of its founding no longer exists among a number of the major powers who supported this at the moment of its creation. This is especially true for Russia, and, increasingly, for France.
4. China and India, two growing powers in the Middle East, did not number among the supporters of the 1947 General Assembly Resolution 181¹⁶ which opened the way to the creation of Israel. India only established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. Although India has become Israel's strongest Asian ally, India has the largest Muslim population of any nation in the world with the exception of Indonesia.

Opponents to the two state plan also question the legitimacy of the process whereby Israel came into being in the first place. They cite four specific issues:

1. In 1947 the “United Nations were not competent under international law to partition or otherwise dispose of the territory of Palestine against the wishes of the clear majority of its inhabitants” and yet this is precisely what happened through UN General Assembly Resolution 181.¹⁷
2. The partition of Palestine into two states had “no legal validity” because “the Partition Plan was adopted by the General Assembly” and “resolutions of the General Assembly have the force of recommendations to member states of the United Nations but do not have any mandatory force.”¹⁸
3. The UN partition “granted 55% of Palestine to the Jews, who at that time comprised only 30 percent of the population, and who owned a mere 6 or 7% of the land.”¹⁹ The UN partition also failed to take into account that less than one-third of the Jews resident in Palestine held Palestinian citizenship.
4. Arabs living in Palestine maintain that vast numbers of Palestinians were forced to abandon their homes in Palestine, as UN Resolution 181 moved toward passage, because of the terror that they were subjected to at the hands of vigilante Israeli armed organizations such as *Irgun*, an underground

“military arm of the Zionist movement.”²⁰ They should be permitted to return home with full citizen rights.

For these as well as other political²¹ and religious reasons, prominent leaders and organizations opposed the creation of Israel.

FDR and the Assurances to the king of Saudi Arabia

On February 15, 1945 US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met with Saudi King Ibn Saud. King Saud had shared his reservations regarding the establishment of a Jewish state in the Palestinian territories. Saud argued that it made no sense to punish Arabs for the atrocities committed by the Nazis. He recommended that a territory should be carved out of Germany for a Jewish homeland. Roosevelt gave King Saud reassurances during their meeting that no action would be taken on the creation of an independent State of Israel without the input of the Arab world. President Roosevelt had reiterated this in a letter that he wrote to King Saud on April 5, 1945, just a week prior to his death:

Your Majesty will recall that on previous occasions I communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Your Majesty will also doubtless

recall that during our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.²²

Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt's successor, took the oath of office as President of the United States on April 12, 1945. President Truman did not follow through on Roosevelt's promise to keep King Saud and other Arab leaders informed on crucial matters and to be vigilant in avoiding actions that "might prove hostile to the Arab people." Truman recognized the Israel just twelve minutes after the May 14, 1948 declaration of Independence of the State by Israel's founding Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. The Arab world viewed the proclamation of the State of Israel as a declaration of war. The day after its official founding on May 1948, Israel was attacked by the combined military forces of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Wars and skirmishes have been part of the landscape of this region since then and divisions continue until today.

Future Prospects

While on an almost daily basis the American media provides the public with news on Israel, it fails to provide the American public with sufficient information to recognize that the survival of Israel may be "time-sensitive" and that "heavy lifting" is needed now while the United States remains the key powerbroker of the region. We need more open discussion on

issues such as the right for Palestinians to return to Israel. The question of the Right to Return was the bargaining piece that led to the break down in the Clinton initiative to broker a peace between Ehud Barak and Yassir Arafat in December 2000. More also needs to be said publicly about the likelihood of declining support for Israel in the European Union because of changes in EU demographics. One in five EU citizens will be a Muslim by the year 2050. Look at the powerful ways in which a far smaller voting bloc in the United States, for example, the Cuban exile community, could stymie efforts to establish diplomatic ties with Cuba for decades.

US support for Israel might also decline because of America's changing demographics. As World War II veterans who witnessed the effects of Auschwitz and Buchenwald die off, as do their children, will future generations harbor the same commitment to protecting Israel? The vast majority of new immigrants to the United States and their children have no historical connection and no sense of responsibility for the horrors suffered by the victims of the Holocaust. To ignore questions of this type may lead one day not only to a precipitous collapse of the State of Israel but to an unanticipated arrival of millions of Israeli refugees, Jewish and Arab, at our shores. Was this to occur, would the United States again find itself unprepared to fulfill its moral responsibility to accommodate these individuals?

The Rise of China and India as Consumers of Middle Eastern Oil

China is now the third largest importer of oil after the United States and Japan. In a matter of time, China will become the second, and soon after, the largest importer of Middle Eastern oil. The chart²³ below confirms that India is now the eighth largest importer of oil. Because of its growing industrial base, India is postured to move up very significantly in the coming decade.

Table 1: Barrels of Oil

1	United States	13,150,000
2	Japan	5,425,000
3	China	3,190,000
4	Germany	2,953,000
5	Netherlands	2,465,000
6	Korea, South	2,410,000
7	Italy	2,182,000
8	India	2,098,000

In the 2009 U.S. Department of Energy’s *International Energy Outlook*, Dr. Michael T. Klare predicted “a stunning increase in the share of the global energy supply consumed in Asia and a corresponding decline by the United States, Japan, and other "First World" powers.”²⁴ Klare went on to comment on the anticipated rapid change in oil consumption patterns as early as 2010:

In 1990, the developing nations of Asia and the Middle East accounted for only 17% of world energy consumption; by 2030, that

number, the report suggests, should reach 41%, matching that of the major First World powers. All recent editions of the report have predicted that China would eventually overtake the United States as number one energy consumer. What’s notable is how quickly the 2009 edition expects that to happen. The 2006 report had China assuming the leadership position in a 2026-2030 time-frame; in 2007, it was 2021-2024; in 2008, it was 2016-2020. This year, the EIA is projecting that China will overtake the United States between 2010 and 2014.²⁵

Implications of Hegemonic Change

It is to be expected that major oil producers in the Middle East and Africa will see it as in their interest to deepen political and economic ties with China at the expense of the United States. Baker Institute for Public Policy researcher Mamoun Faundy observes as follows:

A common theme one finds within Arab public opinion pertains to the notion that inserting China into the global power equation will bring about a victory for the Arabs against Israel, which, as you know, is often viewed as a proxy for American interests. In other words, if China could become for the Arabs what the U.S. is for Israel, Palestine will become Arab once again. Last year, another Egyptian writer, Anouar Abdel Malek, suggested that Arabs

must follow the footsteps of China in order to resist “Zionist-American aggression.” He says, “There is great potential here and in Asia, and this potential does not have to remain unexplored. If we want to survive the Zionist-American quest we have to reformulate our own.” Abdel-Malek also spoke in admiration of China’s legacy of having risen up against “the intrusion of Europeans more than once.”

On the other hand, there is an element of discomfort in Arab attitudes toward China’s relations with Israel, but this is usually alleviated by strong, albeit symbolic, Chinese statements of support to the Palestinian cause. Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Chinese-Israeli relations over the past year was more focused on the implications on Israeli-US ties than on China’s position in the Arab world. For example, its reports emphasized the theme of Israel betraying its special friendship with Washington in favor of supplying China with weapons in light of a recently uncovered deal. In other words, the negative coverage is directed against Israel and not against China.²⁶

Dr. Faundy, who serves as Diana Tamari Sabbagh Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies at Rice University’s James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, prepared a monograph in July 18, 2005 outlining the implications of China’s growing

role in the Middle East: Dr. Faundy points out that “Arab-Chinese relations dated back to the 1950s when Arab Countries were first to recognize the Peo-

“Its is estimated that more than half of China’s energy needs by 2010 will come from oil, of which 58 percent already comes from the Middle East.”

ple’s Republic of China, and supported Chinese claims for a Security Council seat at the United Nations.” Dr. Faundy notes China’s goal of “maintaining the flow of oil and natural gas from the Middle East.” She then proceeds to observe:

Its is estimated that more than half of China’s energy needs by 2010 will come from oil, of which 58 percent already comes from the Middle East. This figure is expected to increase to 70 percent by 2010. Therefore, Chinese state oil companies have worked to secure equity stakes in oil and gas fields in the region. (p.2)²⁷

Faundy points out that China’s efforts in the region have led to “the creation of a Chinese-Syrian oil company”²⁸ and she also points to “the frequent public state-

ments it (China) makes in support of the Palestinian cause.”²⁹ One of the reasons to invite Dr. Zhiqun Zhu to speak at the first Bridgeport symposium was to enhance participants’ understanding of China’s growing role in the Middle East in the near future.³⁰ Dr Zhu began to undertake groundbreaking efforts on China’s pursuit of energy at that time and he continues to do so now at Bucknell University.³¹

The Changing Demographics of the United States and Western Europe

The growing role of the new economic hegemonies in the Middle East represents only one factor of change. Much attention has also been given to the dramatic shift in the demographics of Western powers resulting in one out of every two citizens of the United States coming from a racial minority by 2050.

Esther Pan has written the following on the growth in the Muslim population of Europe:

The Muslim birth rate in Europe is three times higher than that of non-Muslim Europeans, which is declining, writes Omer Taspinar, the co-director of The Brookings Institution's research project on Turkey. The Muslim population has doubled in the last 10 years to 4 percent of the European Union's population. About 1 million new Islamic immigrants arrive in Western Europe every year, and by 2050, one in five Europeans will likely be Muslim.³²

Pan observes the ways in which the growing Muslim population has contributed to a growing political and cultural divide in Europe. Speaking of the potential entry of Turkey into the European Union, Pan notes that some experts feel that “separation of mosque and state” can “temper Islamic radicalism” while others argue that the addition of so many more Muslims (70 million) will push Europe toward increasing religious radicalization.³³ Akbar Ahmed, Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at American University observes that some European Muslims respond to the perceived moral permissiveness of Western culture by trying “to assert Muslim culture aggressively and maintain the boundaries around Islam³⁴ even in the West

Changing Demographics of the United States

The demographics of the United States are also undergoing a dramatic change that could easily reshape American geopolitical priorities. On March 18, 2004, the *Dallas Morning News* reported on the changing demographics of the United States. The most important observations included reports that:

- a. The total U.S. population is expected to climb from 282.1 million to 419.9 million by 2050.
- b. Minorities will make up almost half of the United States population by 2050.
- c. The Hispanic and Asian share of the total population would double from about 13 percent to 25 percent and 4 to 8 percent, respec-

tively.³⁵

The growing Hispanic and Asian populations can be expected to have stronger ties to the challenges faced by their countries of origin than they do to the Middle East. As these populations' voting power grows, we can imagine that they will expect future American leaders to provide more attention and foreign aid to Latin America and Asia. Based on the "limited pie theory," that will mean less for Israel and Egypt. By 2050 Americans of African-American and African background will grow from 13% to 15% of the total population.³⁶ While African-Americans played a central role in the Allied victory in Europe in World War II, it is, nevertheless, likely that the concerns of those who originate from the Caribbean and Africa will increasingly turn to lobbying the United States to do more for Africa and the Caribbean. In general, the needs of the Middle East will again become less of a focus.

Changing Demographics and Track II Diplomacy

The rise of China and India, along with the changing demographics of Israel, Western Europe and the United States suggests the inevitability of a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East. The key players in the current process, especially the United States and Western Europe, are facing a future in which they may no longer be able to continue in the current role of key powerbroker and deal "maker" or "breaker." The United States, especially under the current leadership of President Barack Obama should do all

that it can to find an equitable solution for Israel and the Palestinian territories in as expeditious and yet equitable a manner as possible. At the same time, there is the need to explore alternate approaches to addressing the challenges of the region. This should include an enhanced role for the European Union as well as greater emphasis on Track Two Diplomacy.

Track Two Diplomacy—Engaging Jewish, Muslim and Christian Leadership

Much has been made of the difference between territories that some Muslims denote as "Dar al-Islam" (house of submission) versus those described as "Dar al-harb" (house of war). This differentiation is posited on the understanding that once a territory has become Islamic territory (Dar al Harb) it must remain so, forever. Based on this interpretation, it would appear that Arab claims to recognize the existence of Israel may have a *double entendre* and current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is justifiably sensitive to this topic. Recognition of Israel by the Arab world could represent only a tactical diplomatic step. One might argue that Arabs, within Israel, will utilize the democratic process to transform Israel from being a Jewish state to being a transitional state that could eventually choose by plebiscite to become Palestine or to merge with any eventual neighboring Palestinian state. If this is the future that awaits Israel, then what does that imply for Israelis and for the United Nations Resolution 181? What implications would that have for US foreign policy and immigration policy in the event of the collapse

of Israel?

It is lamentable that a more sincere effort was not made to involve the Arab and the Islamic world in the deliberations in the mid-1940s that led to the establishment of a Jewish state. It is unfortunate that the Truman Administration did not honor



Israeli separation wall covered with graffiti by protesters of the barrier, Bethlehem

President Roosevelt's assurances to King Saud that the Arab world would have its views represented as efforts proceeded. Can this oversight ever be reversed?

The next issue that I raise here may sound a bit naïve: More than sixty years after the establishment of Israel, would it still be useful to engage Islamic scholars to determine whether a rationale might exist for a Jewish state in the Middle East in accordance with the Quran and the Haddith? Jews did not abandon Israel 2,000 years ago. They were forced out. Might it have been possible six decades ago for the Islamic world to have found a rationale within Islam to provide refuge

in the form of a nation-state in their community of states for the oppressed Jewish community that had suffered virtual extinction at the hands of Adolf Hitler? King Saud may have been correct in observing in his exchange with President Franklin Roosevelt that Germany and not the Arabic world was responsible for the Holocaust and that responsibility for a homeland should really lie there. However, because of Israel's historical geographical location and heritage, could there have been a way to find a solution that Muslims and Christians alike could have supported? This is a matter that deserves further exploration. It is an issue that we hope to explore in our 2010-2011 Israel-Palestine dialogue series at the University of Bridgeport.

In this article we have explored some key differences between Israelis and Arabs and we have also shown why the terms and conditions for compromise and change need to be reassessed. The need exists to "seize the moment" and seek a solution or witness decades more of anguish that may very well touch the shores of the United States in a way that will include a massive immigration of refugees from the Middle East and the potential of the war and day-to-day episodes of terror being transplanted to American soil as revenge for the unbalanced role that the United States has long played in the region.

In Fall 2009, the University of Bridgeport began two more years of dialogue on the Middle East on a variety of issues, involving players from key communities of the conflict area. Some of the issues that we hope to explore further as we begin two more years of exchanges of views are:

Ripeness: Is now the time for negotiation and reconciliation between Israel and Palestine?

Right to Return versus Law of Return:

The Need for Contiguous Borders for a future Palestinian state.

Track II Diplomacy and the World's Religions: Can Islam find room within its belief system to accommodate a Jewish state in the Middle East?

In this next round of discussions, we will emphasize the importance of listening to “the other.” Sessions will focus on specific viewpoints and participants will be encouraged to hear and to internalize a presenter’s views instead of contemplating how best to refute them. We will emphasize that this is a time for active listening and learning. We will argue that now is a time to understand and be prepared to articulate the position and views of each of the most central players of the Israel-Palestine dialogue.

Let us conclude by observing that if a solution is not forthcoming, Israel must deal in a reflective fashion with the eventuality of a future where there may be less sup-

port for its position. The Arab world must deal with a deterioration in relations with the “losers” in an Arab “victory” in the Middle East. Our work as an academic community is to engage in inquiry. Our hope is that this inquiry can play a supporting role in the realization of a lasting and just peace for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

Endnotes:

1. Tarnoff, Curt and Nowells, Larry, *Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs and Policy*, (Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service—Library of Congress), April 15, 2004, p. 13., Available on the web at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf>, referenced on October 27, 2007.
2. *Timesonline*, “US Fury as Israel defies Settlement Freeze Call,” by Sheera Frenkel, September 5, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6822540.ece.
3. See Jewish Virtual Library, “US Vetoes of UN Resolutions Critical of Israel (1972-2006), <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html>
4. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 available online at <http://www.mideastweb.org/3379.htm>, retrieved on October 2, 2007.
5. Herzl, Theodor trans. Sylvie d’Avigdor, *Der Judenstaat*, (New York: Dover Publications), 1988; downloaded from the Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/25282/25282-h/25282-h.htm#I_Introduction, paragraph 96, on September 5, 2009
6. *Ibid.*
7. Herzl, Theodor trans. Sylvie d’Avigdor, *Der Judenstaat*, (New York: Dover Publications), 1988; downloaded from the Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/25282/25282-h/25282-h.htm#I_Introduction, paragraphs 95-96; retrieved on September 5, 2009.
8. The Balfour Resolution of November 2, 1917 was directed to Lord Rothschild and reads as follows:

Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet:
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country".
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federa-

tion.

Yours sincerely
Arthur James Balfour

9. British Mandate for Palestine; San Remo Conference, San Remo Conference; April, 24, 1920; <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/britman.htm>; accessed on March 20, 2010.
10. The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 available online at URL <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm>. Please note that this site lists the vote of each of the member states who participated in the vote.
11. Many of the arguments for Israel's right to statehood were re-articulated by Ruth Gavison in her Zalman C. Bernstein lecture in Jewish Political Thought on January 25, 2001. Professor Gavison serves as the Haim H. Cohn Chair in Human Rights at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This has been published under the title "The Jews Right to Statehood: a Defense" by *Azureonline* in its Summer 2003 Issue and this was accessed at <http://www.azure.org.il/article.php?id=239&page=all> on January 23, 2010
12. The Right to Return contrasts with the Israeli Law of Return.
13. *AlterMedia.Info*, "Israel to Collapse in Twenty Years says CIA Report?" March 14, 1950, See http://www.altermedia.info/civil-rights/israel-will-collapse-in-20-years-says-cia-report_877.html
14. This included even obliging Russian refugees of Jewish origin to settle in Israel rather in the United States.
15. The reasons for this are understandable. If the Right of Return were enacted, it would only be a matter of time before the majority of Israelis would be non-Jews rather than Jews. By majority vote, Israel would again be expected to become Palestine.
16. China and the United Kingdom numbered among the 10 nations who abstained on this vote.
17. See A State of Inequity: The UN Partition Plan of 1947 by Jason D. Söderblom The Terrorism Intelligence Centre, Canberra; 25 September 2003 available at <http://world-ice.com/Articles/Inequity.pdf>.

The Law of Return makes it possible for people who can demonstrate their Israeli heritage to come to Israel as citizens. Palestinians counter that there also needs to be a Right of Return for Palestinians who were forced out of Israel at the time of the creations of the State of Israel.

18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. Here we should point to the view held by Gamal Nasser and some sectors of the Palestine Liberation Organization that Israel served as a front for Western imperialism.
22. (1) Department of State Bulletin of October 21, 1945, p. 623.
23. Chart Taken from: <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=ns&v=93> Index Mundi—Based on CIA World Fact Book as of January 1, 2008, downloaded on July 29, 2009.
24. *Countercurrents.org* “It’s Official: The Era Of Cheap Oil Is Over,” June 12, 2009 by Michael T. Klare, available online at <http://www.countercurrents.org/klare120609.htm> and retrieved on August 5, 2009.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Faundy, Mamoun, *Energy Security—Implications for US-China-Middle East Relations—China vs. US: A View from the Arab World*, (Rice University, Texas: The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy). 2004 Monogrpah, pp. 1-6
27. Faundy, Mamoun, *Energy Security—Implications for US-China-Middle East Relations—China vs. US: A View from the Arab World*, (Rice University, Texas: The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy). 2004 Monogrpah, pp. 1-6.
28. *Ibid.*, p.3.
29. *Ibid.*
30. An edited transcription of Dr. Zhu’s presentation appears in the appendix of this article.
31. Dr. Zhu’s 2005 presentation on China’s “Hunt for Oil” appears in the Appendix of this issue of the *Journal of Global Development and Peace*.
32. Pan, Esther, Council on Foreign Relations “Europe Integrating Islam,” July 13, 2005, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8252/europe.html>; retrieved on August 1, 2009.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. *The Dallas Morning News*, March 18, 2004.
36. *Ibid.*

References:

- *AlterMedia.Info*, “Israel to Collapse in Twenty Years says CIA Report?” March 14, 1950, See http://www.altermedia.info/civil-rights/israel-will-collapse-in-20-years-says-cia-report_877.html
- Arendt, Hannah, *Eichmann in Jerusalem—A Report on the Banality of Evil*, (Penguin Books: New York), 2006, pp. 312.
- Armstrong, Karen, *Muhammad—A Biography of the Prophet*, (Harper: San Francisco), 1993, pp. 290.
- Armstrong, Karen, *A History of God*, (New York: Ballantine Books), 1993, pp. 460.
- *Countercurrents.org* “It's Official: The Era Of Cheap Oil Is Over,” June 12, 2009 by Michael T. Klare; <http://www.countercurrents.org/klare120609.htm>.
- *The Dallas Morning News*, March 18, 2004.
- *Department of State Bulletin*, (Washington, DC: United States Department of State), October 21, 1945.
- Faundy, Mamoun, *Energy Security—Implications for US-China-Middle East Relations—China vs. US: A View from the Arab World*, (Rice University, Texas: The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy). 2004 Monograph, pp. 1-6
- Herzl, Theodor trans. Sylvie d’Avigdor, *Der Judenstaat*, (New York: Dover Publications), 1988.
- *Index Mundi*, January 1, 2008, <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=ns&v=93>, downloaded on July 29, 2009.
- *International Journal for World Peace* vol. XX 2003; in “Max Stackhouse’s Concept of Religious Reason and the Plaintiff of the Rest by Stephen Healey,” 2:15.
- Jewish Virtual Library, “US Vetoes of UN Resolutions Critical of Israel (1972-2006), <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsources/UN/usvetoes.html>
- Johnson, Paul, *Modern Times*, (Harper Colophon: New York), 1985, pp. 817.
- Kaplan Morton, *Why Plans for a Two-State Solution in the Middle East Have Failed*; October 27, 2007, Professors World Peace Academy, available at <http://www.pwpa.org/pwpa/index.php>, retrieved on November 3, 2007.
- Pan, Esther, Council on Foreign Relations “Europe Integrating Islam,” July 13, 2005, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8252/europe.html>; retrieved on August 1, 2009.
- Richards, Alan and Waterbury, John,

A Political Economy of the Middle East,
(Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado),
2008, pp. 474.


- Skeikh Mohammed Khail Saleh Khanneh, *Islam and Peace*, (Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: Bethlehem, Palestine), 2006, pp. 117.
- Soderblom, Jason, D.. *A State of Inequity: The UN Partition Plan of 1947*, (Canberra: The Terrorism Intelligence Centre), 25 September 2003 available online at <http://world-ice.com/Articles/Inequity.pdf>
- Tarnoff, Curt and Nowells, Larry, *Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs and Policy*, (Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service—Library of Congress), April 15, 2004, Available on the web at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf>, referenced on October 27, 2007..
- *Timesonline*, “US Fury as Israel defies Settlement Freeze Call,” by Sheera Frenkel, September 5, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6822540.ece.
- The Yale University Avalon Project, UN General Assembly Resolution 181, available at URL <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm>, retrieved on August 8, 2007.

Israel and Palestine
Looking Ahead 25 Years
Defining Presentations

Changing Demographics and the Middle East

Richard L. Rubenstein

November 14, 2006 (Transcription of a lecture delivered at the University of Bridgeport)



Since I am neither a prophet nor the son of a prophet, to paraphrase the Bible, I cannot tell the future. However, I can discuss what I believe to be long range and irreversible demographic trends in the Middle East and suggest some possible outcomes. I begin our discussion of US policy not with the United States but with Europe.

On November 10, 2006, Dame Eliza Manningham Buller, Director General of MI5, Britain's intelligence agency responsible for internal security, took the highly unusual step of going public in a speech at the University of London's Queen Mary College. She revealed that her agency is actively monitoring 1,600 people in 200 cells believed to be plotting terrorist acts in Britain and overseas. She declared that more and more people are moving from passive sympathy to active terrorism and that a growing number of people are plotting to kill others and inflict damage on the British economy. The conspirators, she said, are motivated "by

a sense of grievance and injustice driven by their interpretation of the history of the West and the Muslim world."¹

Furthermore, Dame Eliza declared that if public opinion polls conducted in the UK since July 2005 are accurate, over 100,000 British citizens consider that the July 5th suicide-bomber attacks in London were justified. She also stated that she is neither a politician nor a pundit and that she has no political "axe to grind." She stressed the fact that she almost never goes public, as would be the case with any head of an intelligence agency in Britain, but she felt compelled to do so because of the urgency of what she believed Britain and the other nations of Western Europe were facing. She described the terrorist propaganda machine as sophisticated, noting that footage of attacks in Iraq are posted on the internet within thirty minutes of their occurrence, facilitated by skilled teams that edit the video, translate the audio into many languages, and package the material for a global au-

Biography

Dr. Richard L. Rubenstein is President Emeritus of the University of Bridgeport. A Distinguished Professor of Religion at the University and a Life Member of the Board of Trustees, Dr. Rubenstein also serves as Director of the University's Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. An internationally recognized historian of religion whose writings lie at the root of Holocaust writings, his works have been the subject of more than a dozen doctoral dissertations. One of his books entitled "The Cunning of History" was recently translated into French. Professor Rubenstein's writings have also been cited as a key inspiration for the Academy Award winning film Sophie's Choice. Prior to assuming his role as President of the University of Bridgeport, Dr. Rubenstein served as Distinguished Professor of Religion at Florida State University. Recently Florida State University created the Richard L. Rubenstein Chair for Religious Studies in his honor.

dience. She said the struggle against such threats would last at least a generation and that the problem cannot be solved by MI5 alone. Other services “have to address the causes, counter the radicalization and assist in the rehabilitation of those affected.”²

I would, however, suggest that no effort to solve this problem will work in spite of the fact that the majority of British Muslims do not look with favor on terrorism. The fundamental reason is demographics. The reality of the situation has been graphically and concisely described by Canadian writer Mark Steyn who noted that “the salient feature of Europe, Canada, Japan and Russia is that they’re running out of babies.”³ “What’s happening in the developing world,” Steyn continued, “is one of the fastest demographic evolutions in history.”⁴ I would rather have called it one of the fastest demographic devolutions in history and it has gotten to the point where the trend is irreversible.

Demographers say that if a nation gets to the point where its fertility rate per couple is below 2, it is faced with an irreversibly declining population, if it depends solely upon its indigenous population for population growth or stability. The replacement fertility rate needed for a society to reproduce itself without change is 2.1 per couple. In the United Kingdom, the fertility rate was 1.68 in 2001. Even though it increased to 1.8 in 2006, it is still below the requisite 2.1, and we do not know the extent to which that rate includes British citizens of Muslim background.

Greece has the highest fertility rate, 1.3, of any predominantly Christian nation of the Mediterranean region. In Ireland, the rate is 1.87. In New Zealand it is 1.79, Australia, 1.76, Canada, 1.5, Russia and Italy are at 1.2. Spain is at 1.1, and Germany and Austria, 1.3. At some future point, German may cease to be Germany’s majority language.

The most important demographic fact about Europe from the end of World War II to the present is that Europe has ceased to be an *exporter of people* and has become a *net importer of people* on a monumental scale. Moreover, even if Europe were to cease to be an importer of people today, the internal immigration of non-indigenous peoples will continue. What we see is an irreversible long-term trend.

Permit me to suggest some of the dimensions of the trend. Finding fault or blaming one group or another is beside the point. What is at issue is the civilization Western civilization has itself created.

If one looks at a graph showing population increase from ancient times to 1740, we see a slight, gradual population increase in that period. Nevertheless, population remained essentially stable over time although there were demographic crises like the Black Death. Starting in 1740, things began to change. In 1740, there were between 120 and 140 million people in Europe, including European Russia. By 1913, there were 468 million people in Europe and about 250 million people of European origin living outside of the European continent. Today, it is estimated that there are about 728 million

people in Europe, but that population is expected to decline to 623 million in 2050. The population of the United States has recently surpassed 300 million and is estimated to grow partly through immigration to 400 million by 2050.

The population explosion that began in the middle of the 18th century was utterly unprecedented and had monumental social and political consequences. Both the explosion of the European population and its incipient decline can be seen as one of the most important social consequences of what can be called the revolution of rationality, that is, the triumph of an attitude of value-neutral calculated rationality as the predominant mode of problem-solving in practical affairs. Put simply it means getting whatever job one wants done with the most economical expenditure of means.

The German sociologist, Max Weber, to whom we owe some of the most brilliant analyses of modernity, has observed that such rationality involves “the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means.” Let me give you one example of such practical rationality. I am healthy. I am 82 years old. Two years ago, I had a problem with the aortic valve of my heart. Thanks to medical practical rationality, I had a valve replacement. Otherwise I would not be here today. An enormous amount of scientific rationality and medical technology went into that valve replacement. Moreover, I recently had my quarterly exam and my doctor said that the numbers were perfect, low cholesterol, low blood

pressure. It was not simply because I try to be well disciplined, but because of the kind of medicines that are available to keep me healthy. That has long-term consequences not just for one person but for the entire population. People live and are productive much longer.

One of the most important consequences of the triumph of practical or instrumental rationality has been that man’s ability to produce a surplus of both food and manufactured goods was vastly enhanced. In the long run, so too was man’s ability to produce a surplus of people. There was a surplus of goods, a surplus of wealth, and a surplus of people that continues in our time. Nevertheless, there is great irony in this human achievement for *by producing such a surplus, men take the first step toward making themselves superfluous.* The rational division of labor rests upon humanity’s ability to produce a surplus. The division of labor also enlarges that capacity, making it possible for ever fewer people to produce an ever greater output of goods and services.

I am going to take a detour for a moment and discuss some insights of the German philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel in the year 1803. Hegel, whom I consider one of the greatest philosophers who ever lived, understood the connection between surplus goods and surplus people. You will find this in a number of his works: including the *Realphilosophie* from his Jena period and his *Rechtsphilosophie*. Among the excellent books on this subject is Hegel’s *Theory of the Modern State* by Shlomo Avineri.⁵ Hegel, writing in 1803, about the evolving worldwide division of

labor—about which Adam Smith had already written—that was beginning to make it possible for factories in England to supply cheap manufactured goods to people in Asia, Hegel observes, “it thus happens that a far away operation often affects a whole class of people who have hitherto satisfied their needs through their own craftsmanship, all of a sudden the cheap manufacturer of cheap goods limits their works, makes it redundant and useless.”⁶

We see the same thing happening now. Most of our computers are now made in China not the United States, because the distant manufacturer of goods, China, is disrupting the manufacturer of goods in this country. The same phenomenon described by Hegel is still going on but in reverse. If one were thinking in terms of revenge, one might say that the present development is a form of monumental economic revenge that cannot be stopped.

Hegel saw that cheap manufacturing of goods, in this case European goods, would destroy the native craft industries of the lands to which they were exported, thereby rendering the native craftsman superfluous. He also saw that, as modern industry and commerce developed, they were bound to have a destabilizing effect, not only in the target country but also in the country of origin. This was also understood by Marx, Engels and other philosophers of the 19th century.

In 1803 Hegel wrote that it was inherent in the nature of what he called “civil society” (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*), what we would

today identify as modern bourgeois society or modern capitalist society, to over-produce both goods and people. He foresaw that this would lead to the growth of a class of economic outcasts and an underclass within the heart of a society. He described this in a passage that has an amazingly contemporary ring:

When the standard of living of a large mass of people falls below a subsistence level, a level regulated automatically as the one necessary for a member of society, and when there is a consequent loss of a sense of right and wrong [because without work you have no investment in your own community] of honesty and self-respect which makes a man insist on maintaining himself by his own work...⁷

The result is what Hegel called a “rabble of paupers” and what Marx referred to as the “*Lumpen proletariat*.”

Among the problems faced by all modern societies is the growth of certain populations that have no investment in society because society has no investment in them. Let us consider, for example, the case of drug dealing in the United States. Undoubtedly, many people become drug dealers who do not see other opportunities for gainful employment, and, perhaps more importantly, because they see such an endeavor as a way to accumulate things they think they are entitled to. They see drug dealing not as a means of achieving social status but as a means of acquiring the accoutrements of status. They are smart, think they can beat the

odds and use their brains to operate outside the limits of society.

Leo von Caprivi, Chancellor of Germany in 1891 and successor to Bismarck, observed that “Germany must export goods or people.”⁸ Caprivi understood that, if Germany kept its population employed, it would not have a social problem. If it could not keep its population employed, it would have to export a large number of its people, and export them Germany did. The largest single white ethnic group in the United States is of German descent. It was the habit of many German towns to say, “We will give you a one-way passage to the United States. Just don’t you dare come back.”

Something similar happened in Australia. Australia was a penal colony. Initially, those sent to Australia were told that, if they returned to Britain, they could be sentenced to death. That was how Australia was started. The export of people began very, very early and it has continued.

Elsewhere in his writings, Hegel observed that as labor’s productivity increased, a point would be reached at which more goods would be produced than could be consumed. That is the contradiction between production and consumption that Marxists talk about. This would force factory owners to cut back on the number of people that they employed. As the number of unemployed grew, society would be faced with a problem for which Hegel saw no solution, save emigration. Hegel was dubious about welfare assistance for the unemployed with or without

a work requirement. He saw this as at best a temporary solution. Without a work requirement, public assistance was likely to intensify the poor’s sense of dependence and lack of self-respect. On the other hand, if the unemployed were compelled to produce goods for a saturated market, that would only aggravate the problem that made them unemployed to begin with.

Hegel also saw that this overproduction of goods would push hitherto relatively stable societies beyond their territorial limits and drive them to found colonies. It was thought that, to solve the problems of population growth and unemployment, large-scale colonization projects would need to be undertaken. This movement started in the 18th century and continued into the 19th century.

The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of European imperialism. I cannot go into an analysis of imperialism here. Imperialism sought to create spheres of influence and control outside of the mother country. Within those spheres, extra risks were taken by entrepreneurs and capitalists in order to find useful employment of their money and to have territories to export both their surplus goods and their surplus people.

The risks of imperialism could not be controlled directly by the home country but could be overseen by the home country’s agents. There was always a conflict between the nation as a defined community with a common inheritance and usually a common faith and imperialism that created distant territories in which the

bounds of community and faith were broken.

The Western world has made two fundamentally contradictory choices. It has opted for both anti-natalism and for a social welfare state that makes the care and sustenance of both the aged and the infirm a public responsibility. Unfortunately, in the long run, one cannot have both an anti-natalist society and a social welfare society. In Europe the price has been most obvious: an aging population and a diminution of the people needed to provide the economic base for their support. Our current social welfare problems cannot be solved by continuing to borrow money from China. Yet, that, in essence, is what we are doing and, sooner or later, it will have catastrophic effects. No society can have it both ways.

When a society extends life without providing the labor force that can generate the wealth necessary to meet the needs of the elderly and the infirm, it can solve the problem by increasing the public debt, in the short run. In the long run, such policies lead to public bankruptcy and social chaos and that is happening right now. I remember when I thought that \$3500 was a lot of money to pay for a luxury car. Today, I am now willing to pay \$40,000 for my modest, entry-level, luxury car. Money has been devalued because we are not able to pay for what we are getting without enormous borrowing and the borrowing keeps growing.

There are many reasons that Europe opted for massive Muslim immigration. According to reliable United States De-

partment of State reports, there are more than 23 million Muslims in Western Europe. Europe needs a labor force to provide the resources for the social welfare state that its own indigenous labor force cannot provide. There are other reasons such as oil, but the lack of the needed workforce is the fundamental reason. The same problem exists in the United States, to an extent, but the United States has available a very large predominantly Christian immigrant source to meet such needs, I refer of course to our Hispanic immigrants. Europe has no such force available. It has had to turn to its Muslim neighbors and to former colonies which are also largely Muslim. Those countries have now experienced the same population surplus caused by modernity that centuries ago Europe began to experience itself.

The European decision to permit large-scale Muslim immigration was fostered by what Max Weber has described as “religiously unmusical” public officials. Why do I employ Weber’s term.? In the previous section, I suggested that the *revolution of rationality* was one of the most consequential of all revolutions, an important aspect of which was the conviction that religion is a private matter of individual choice. Basically, the governing officials of France, England, Germany, Holland and Belgium decided that Muslims could be permitted to immigrate into their respective countries, confident that, as the immigrants became acculturated to their superior culture of free choice and individualism, they would become loyal Britons, Norwegians, Danes,

Frenchmen, etc.” They never asked Muslims whether they regarded their civilization as inferior to the West. And, it is quite clear that Muslims did not regard their own civilization as inferior.

Take the case of suicide bombers. Osama bin Laden has declared, “We will win. The Americans love life; we love death.”⁹ There is something that few people are prepared to face. In effect, the suicide bomber is saying:

My individuality is less important than my community. I am willing to give up my life for my group because my individuality and my individual freedom is not my ultimate ambition. If that means that I must sacrifice my life, so be it.

There was a time when Jews and Christians preferred martyrdom to conversion. Today, Muslims are far more likely to sacrifice themselves for their faith. To say that they do so because they are terrorists is fundamentally to misread what is going on. What the Muslims understand is that religion is not a private matter, something their hosts do not fully understand.

Data on Muslim identity in Europe show that Muslims born in Europe are less disposed to integrate than were their immigrant parents. This trend can be explained in one word: alienation. Whatever their experiences as British, Dutch, or French citizens, they do not feel truly British, French, Dutch or German. Take for example the Danish cartoon controversy. There are over 100,000 Muslims in Denmark. Certainly, if the first genera-

tion has not learned to speak the Danish language fluently, the second generation has. Can you in your wildest imagination see young Muslims able to say, “I am a Dane, I identify with the Viking Christian heritage of Denmark”? It is ridiculous. Not only that. The Danes do not want Muslims to take such a position. The Danish way of multi-culturalism is: “You stay on your side of the fence. I’ll stay on mine.”

We may have a different solution in America. I can say that I am American and Jewish at the same time and mean it. To be an American does not necessarily mean to be a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant. It can mean being a black Protestant. It can mean being a Hispanic. It can mean being a Roman Catholic of various sorts. Ethnic identity and nationality are not identical in the United States. One of the things that may save the United States from Europe’s fate is the predominance of our churches. The church provides for the ethnic community in such a way that it can function as a mediating institution for the larger national identity.

Europeans do not have anything like that. In England there is the Church of England with its history. In Germany and Scandinavia, there are the Lutheran Churches. These are not welcoming institutions for Muslims. When Muslims are confronted with this situation, they come to their own conclusions about their place in their new societies. Oliver Roy, a French student of the world of Islam has observed that second generation Muslims from Algeria do not have any nostalgia for Algeria. Where then do they find

their identity? They find it in the *umma*, the global nation of Islam.¹⁰ The radicals insist that the *umma* is not only divinely legitimated but that it is destined to rule the world. In their eyes, this aspiration is not vicious; it is simply an extension of their idea of religion. And, these are people who have an identity they are willing to die for.

Most European Muslims are not radicals, but, as the Muslim population of Europe increases, there will be a critical mass of Muslims for whom radical Islam is the only coherent religio-political philosophy. For example, in Lebanon in 2006 most Lebanese did not want war with Israel. Nevertheless, they had no choice when Hezbollah decided on war. If there is a critical mass of people in Europe sympathetic to radical Islam, they will create conflict situations with the Christian population, not today, but the day after tomorrow as their number grows.

How shall we understand this? Basically, the European situation has been described by a brilliant commentator by the name of Bat Ye'or. "Europe," she says "has become Eurabia." Instead of a Europe that is truly an ally of the United States, the United States will soon be faced with an increasingly hostile Eurabia. That trend is already quite visible. If the United States is faced with a hostile Eurabia and as the number of Muslims grow in Europe- I am not talking about American Muslims who may perhaps be different- the situation in Israel will only get worse.

I cannot foresee whether the U.S. policy toward Israel will follow the Eurabian model, but I would hazard a guess that those who favor the rhetoric of an unsustainable social welfare state—and they have now taken over Congress and will probably take over the Presidency—will tend towards an increasingly hostile attitude toward Israel. Moreover, the Jews themselves will be hopelessly divided between elite liberals for whom Israel will end up being expendable, provided it can be done subtly and in the name of democracy, and those who understand that the end of Israel will have utterly devastating effects on Judaism itself.

There are a very significant group of non-Jews that favor a policy sympathetic to Israel, especially as Europe becomes more Eurabian. They are the Evangelicals and those parts of the American public who understand that a Europe with a critical mass of Muslims will have policies inimical to the United States itself.

Finally, I strongly doubt that after Auschwitz Israel will be a passive bystander waiting to be manipulated by the rest of the world. David Ben Gurion, the first and arguably the greatest Prime Minister Israel ever had, understood population trends. He understood that the Muslims far outnumbered the Israelis and would continue to do so. Therefore, he sought an equalizer which he found in nuclear weapons. The equalizer might not work but it is the only chance an outnumbered Israel might have.

Iran will get its nuclear weapons, with the Europeans, the Russians, and perhaps the Americans calculating that the worst the

Iranians can do with their nukes is take out Israel. In reality, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan have much to fear. They do not want an Iranian dominated, Shi'ite hegemony in the Middle East.

In any event, I believe that the minute Iran goes *really* nuclear and, perhaps before, Israel is likely seriously to contemplate using its nuclear weapons either to defend itself or to go down in an apocalyptic finale such as the world has never seen before. I do not believe Israel will wait passively until Iran chooses its moment to strike.

That is, what I believe, the demographics of the situation represent.

References:

1. Militant Islam Monitor.org, "On the international terrorist threat to the UK," Speech by Dame Eliza Mannigham, November 10, 2006, <http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/2532>, retrieved on November 20, 2006. *Ibid.*
2. *Ibid.*
3. Steyn, Mark, *America Alone—The End of the World as we know it*, p. 4, <http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5216P.pdf>, retrieved November 20, 2009.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Avineri, Shlomo, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1972, pp. 252.
6. G. W. F. Hegel, *Jenaer Philosophie I, Die Vorlesungen von 1803/4*, ed. J. Hoffmeister, p. 239. I am indebted to Avineri, *op. cit.*, for the reading of Hegel's economic thought presented in this section.
7. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox, (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), par. 244. References in the *Philosophy of Right* are to the enumerated paragraphs rather than to pages.
8. A. J. Ryder, *Twentieth-Century Germany: From Bismarck to Brandt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 40.
9. Nissen, Thomas Elkjer, *The Taliban's Information Warfare*, (Royal Danish Defence College), December, 2007, p. 8, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2919/The_Talibans_information_warfare.pdf, retrieved on November 20, 2009.
10. Olivier Roy, "The Political Imagination of Islam," Olivier Roy Interview, February 2007, Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, p. 3., <http://www.google.com/search?q=Conversations+with+Olivier+Roy%2C+p.+3&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a>, accessed March 26, 2010.

China's Global Hunt for Oil

Dr. Zhiqun Zhu

October 19, 2006 (Transcription of a lecture delivered at the University of Bridgeport)



During a recent trip back to China, I saw that it was not the China I recognized. I found a dynamic, booming and ever-changing new China. China's economy, which has averaged 9 percent growth per year over the past twenty-five years, requires massive supplies of natural resources to sustain its growth. It is a huge dragon that needs to be fed. According to China's own calculations, 94 percent of its energy needs are still being met by domestic supplies, only 6 percent of its energy needs are imported and 67 percent of China's energy supply is still from coal burning. China currently consumes about 6 million barrels of oil per day. That represents less than one-third of America's consumption of approximately 21 million barrels a day.

As its economy continues to grow at a high rate, China is becoming increasingly thirsty for energy from abroad. It became an oil importer in 1993 and in 2003 replaced Japan as the second largest oil consumer in the world. Currently China im-

ports nearly 3 million barrels of oil a day. However, as you know, with the continued modernization of the Chinese economy and the rising living standards of the average Chinese citizen, the demand for oil, gas and other energy sources is expected to increase dramatically. China accounted for 40 percent of the total growth in the global demand for oil over the last four years but, since its domestic oil production capacity is outdated and limited, it will have to import more oil from abroad as it goes forward in its modernization.

Since the early 1990s, China has considered the development of diplomatic relations with oil rich countries to be a national priority. In addition to its strategic focus on BRIC power relations along with its tradition of emphasizing relations with its Asian neighbors, Chinese diplomatic activities have now expanded to Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Pacific. We have reached the point that if

Biography

Zhiqun Zhu is currently John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Chair in East Asian Politics and Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania. His recent publications include *US-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace* (Routledge, 2006), *Understanding East Asia's Economic "Miracles"* (AAS Publisher, 2009), *Global Studies: China* (ed. McGraw-Hill, 2010), and *China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance* (Ashgate, 2010). His teaching and research interests include Chinese politics, East Asian political economy, and US-East Asian relations. He has received several research grants and fellowships and was named a POSCO Fellow by the East-West Center in Hawaii in 2006 and a Senior Visiting Fellow by the National University of Singapore in 2010.

one does not know China's policy toward the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, one does not understand Chinese diplomacy as a whole. Nor can one fully understand these regions without knowing about these regions' expanding relations with China.

Aware of the vulnerability of the energy market, China has attempted to diversify the sources of its energy supply as much as possible. It has oil and other energy deals with many energy rich countries including Canada, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia, Angola, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Libya, Myanmar, Brazil, and Venezuela among others. The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, once considered too distant for any significant political and economic investments, have become newfound locations to advance key objectives of Chinese foreign policy.

China's economic and political activities in the Middle East are part of its new global diplomacy. A major pillar of its Middle East policy is obtaining oil from that region. More than 45 percent of China's oil import was estimated to come from the Middle East in 2004. The top three suppliers of crude oil to China are Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Iran. Iran alone already accounts for 11 percent of China's oil imports. Chinese relations with Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer, are also very strong. The Saudi Oil Corporation has been expanding in recent years and the Saudi Oil Minister, Ali Naimi, has made at least six trips to China in the past two years. King Abdullah's

first official visit abroad was to Asia in January 2006. His first stop was China.

An oil refinery project jointly owned in by Saudi Arabian and Chinese companies began production in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 2006. The Saudi state oil companies are already in talks with China concerning joint refinery projects to process heavy oil which is more difficult to refine. During the Saudi King's visit in January 2006, the two countries signed an agreement of oil, natural gas and mineral cooperation in which Saudi Arabia promised to increase annual oil and natural gas exports to China by 39 percent. As part of the agreement, a 100 million ton crude oil storage facility is also planned for construction in China's Henan province.

China has also negotiated a free trade agreement with the six Gulf Corporation Council countries. The Middle East has served as China's largest supplier of oil. In 1998 and 1999, for example, imports from that region accounted for about 60 percent of the total Chinese oil imports. More recently, China has attempted to diversify sources of energy and it has increased imports from other regions. Nevertheless, China's growing influence in the Middle East is unmistakably evident. In Egypt, the most populous Arab country, China is considered a trusted friend and has been invited to participate in the joint development of the Suez Canal special economic zone. Sino-Egyptian trade is growing rapidly and it was expected to reach \$2 billion by the end of 2006 and cultural and educational exchanges are also robust. We have heard a lot about the American University of Cairo but

very soon there will also be a Chinese university there as well. China and Egypt have signed an agreement to establish a Chinese University of Egypt in Cairo.

China now imports about 28 percent of its oil and gas from Africa. Its voracious demand for oil has led it to seek oil supplies from countries such as Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Top Chinese leaders, including President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen and Foreign Minister Li, have all visited Africa in recent years and China's leading energy companies have signed oil contracts with nearly a dozen African countries. Chinese oil companies have been aggressive in these initiatives. For example, according to the business manager of the national petroleum corporation of Nigeria, an OPEC country and the largest oil producer in Africa, the Chinese call and e-mail him every day seeking oil deals. In July 2005, China and Nigeria signed an 800 million barrel crude oil agreement for Nigeria to provide 30,000 barrels of oil a day to China for five years.

Since 2001 China has developed several oil fields, built a 930 mile long pipeline, a refinery and a port in Sudan. Chinese companies have been pumping crude oil from oil fields in Sudan. They send it through a Chinese-made pipeline to the Red Sea where tankers await to ferry it to China's industrial centers. Oil from Sudan makes up about 10 percent of all of China's imported oil. In 2005 China bought half of Sudan's total oil exports.

China is also the largest foreign investor in Zimbabwe, where President Robert

Mugabe's policies have impoverished the country and left millions homeless. Zimbabwe does not have oil but it is the world's second largest exporter of platinum, a key import for China's auto industry. In Angola, ethnic Chinese have become the largest immigrant group. In 2005, China offered Angola a \$2 billion soft loan as part of a long-term aid package and won its bid for exploratory drilling to find potential oil fields in Angola. China's closest competitor in the bidding was not the United States or Japan but India.

China is now Africa's third largest trading partner; it is offering poor African countries comprehensive and sometimes exploitative trade deals combined with aid. China's aid for oil strategy has resulted in increasing supplies of oil from African countries, but unlike Western countries that often demand African countries to deal with issues of corruption and democratization, these financial aid packages have no political conditions attached. African governments view China as a more cooperative partner than the West and generally welcome China's investment in business. Today more than 900 Chinese doctors are working in Africa and China has built roads, bridges, dams and power plants for many African countries. With each new deal, China's role in Africa deepens.

Securing reliable access to petroleum products from Latin America is an important element of China's engagement in the region especially with Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil and Ecuador. Chinese interests have also included iron, tin, soy-

beans, and other resources and foodstuffs from the region. Latin America has become a vital source of raw materials for China. In the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six fold or by nearly 60 percent per year. The Chinese President, Hu Jintao, travelled to Latin America twice in the past two years, spending a total of sixteen days there and President Hu's trips have been reciprocated by a series of visits to China by Latin American heads of state, economic officials and corporate leaders. At a speech to the Brazilian Congress, President Hu stated that China would invest 100 million USD in Latin America over the next ten years. Given the overall decline of net FDI flows to Latin America in recent years, Latin American countries welcome trade with China.

Venezuela has the largest oil reserves outside of the Middle East and it has a President who says that his country needs to diversify its energy business beyond the United States. Venezuela has obviously emerged as an ideal oil source for China. China now imports only small quantities of oil from Venezuela since it does not have the refining technology needed to process Venezuela's heavy crude, but the potential for cooperation between the two countries is huge. In December 2004, President Chavez traveled to China to sign 19 cooperation agreements, including plans for Chinese investment in oil and gas exploration. The China National Petroleum Corporation, which already operates two Venezuelan oil fields, agreed to spend an additional \$400 million in developing Venezuelan oil and gas

reserves. China will develop 15 declining oil fields in eastern Venezuela and buy 120,000 barrels of oil a month. Venezuela is also exploring plans to rebuild a pipeline to Panama to pump crude oil to the Pacific where it will be loaded on super tankers that are too big to use the Panama Canal. Venezuela and Colombia are also considering the construction of a pipeline across Colombia to carry Venezuelan oil to be shipped to Asia from Colombia's Pacific ports.

China and Brazil formed what they call an "all-weather strategic partnership" during President Hu's visit to Brazil in November 2004 and China has become the third leading destination of Brazilian oil exports. It invested one billion USD in a joint venture with Brazil for the construction of a gas pipeline linking southern Brazil to the northeast. In addition, China has concluded oil and other energy deals with Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Colombia and the Bahamas.

Quests for energy and securing its north and northwest borders have been the focus of China's policy toward Central Asia. It has set up trade missions in each Central Asian nation in recent years. China and Kazakhstan, for example, are discussing the construction of a natural gas transportation system following the oil pipeline linking the two countries that was built in December 2005. The \$700 million pipeline is expected to start operations in May 2006 and bilateral trade is expected to increase to \$10 billion by the end of this year.

China is also Russia's top customer for oil and weapons. Trade between the two former communist countries reached more than \$29 billion last year and is expected to double during the next four years. For now Russia exports roughly 55 billion barrels of oil to China annually by less efficient railroad tankers. Therefore China hopes that Russia will build a far eastern oil pipeline to China, not to Japan. Most recently Russia agreed to build two natural gas pipelines to China in the coming years.

What can we learn about China's diplomacy from this brief survey of its hunt for energy sources? When talking about the major patterns and major characteristics of Chinese new diplomacy, these are my evaluations. Number one, energy has become the top objective of the new Chinese foreign policy. Thomas Friedman in his book, *The World Is Flat*, summarized two major foreign policy objectives of China: one is unifying with Taiwan and the other is looking for oil. The Taiwan issue is not new. China has always wanted Taiwan back, but this energy issue is a new issue in China's foreign policy. In fact, energy has become a top priority for Chinese foreign and security policies in recent years. We have witnessed increased top level involvement in this new Chinese diplomacy. The President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and all other economic-related top officials have all visited Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East and many leaders from these regions have also visited China, often accompanied by huge trade delegations.

Huge energy demand is drawing China into deeper involvement in politically unstable regions around the world. From the U.S. perspective, China's foray into what was traditionally American spheres of influence, particularly in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, is disturbing to say the least. Strategically speaking, the United States is uncomfortable with China's growing activities in the regions where the United States has enjoyed a near monopoly on international influence since the end of the Cold War. I think China's diplomatic activities have been primarily driven by economic interests. There is no solid evidence to show that China is engaged in any strategic competition with the United States or any other powers around the world.

The second characteristic of China's new diplomacy is what I call separation of business and politics. It is almost impossible to separate politics, business and economics but China is trying to achieve separation of business and politics. While the Western countries have tried to impose a market economy and democracy on developing countries that are often not ready for it, the Chinese are trying to separate politics from business. It is entering the market without political expectations or any other political demands. There are no political or other conditions attached and the Chinese government is also against embargoes which some Western countries seem to favor against rogue developing countries. China has provided investment and development aid to Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and other regions where the West has been reluctant to make deals. This practice of

separating politics and business worries many people. China's willingness to deal with rogue nations such as Sudan, Iran and Libya, overlooking corruption, and ignoring safety and environmental concerns may undermine democratic institutions and Western efforts to promote transparency and good governance in those regions.

Thirdly, China is trying to avoid direct confrontation with the United States in all the regions that we have mentioned. China is aware that the United States is watching closely China's new multidirectional diplomacy. However, China is not seeking to replace the United States as the global power. For example, despite its long standing opposition to UN sanctions on Iran for Iran's nuclear programs, China has agreed with the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council to report Iran to the Security Council of its nuclear program if Iran fails to account for its nuclear activities to the International Atomic Agency (IAEA). In Latin America China has kept some distance from President Chavez of Venezuela. Despite growing Chinese activities in Latin America, most analysts doubt that any of China's initiatives will provoke a confrontation with the United States in the Western hemisphere.

Fourthly, China's political and diplomatic influence in the world is still very limited. The United States, due to its preoccupation with Iraq in recent years has paid little attention to Latin America and Africa. This provides opportunities for other countries like China and India to fill a vacuum. However, China's global inter-

est is overwhelmed by America's stronger ties with key players in every region. For example, in 2000, Israel bowed to pressure from the United States and cancelled its plan to sell \$1 billion worth of early warning radar systems to China. For Israel, its relations with the United States are still more important than any other set of relations Israel has. Although China and Saudi Arabia are likely to expand their ties, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to compromise U.S. interests to please China in the near future.

Fifthly, as China continues to expand economic and diplomatic activities in the Middle East, Middle Eastern countries also expect China to play a bigger role in regional issues. Increasingly, Middle Eastern countries are beginning to turn to China for help in conflict resolution. For example, China has become very involved in the Middle East process and Egypt expects it to play a more active role. Israeli President Moshe Katsav also remarked that China has good relations with both Israel and Arab countries. Very few big powers have good relations with both sides, so China can contribute positively to relations between Israel and the Arab world. Those are five major points that I summarized based on my observations.

You may wonder what is the future. What kind of future can we look for? I have three points. Number one, China will continue to integrate into international political economy. Its active participation in international political economy is good for China and good for many developing countries. China has contributed positively to global develop-

ment and it has become and will continue to be a key player in the global energy equation. China's political influence in the world will continue to grow responding to its expanding economic power. It is impossible and also unwise for the United States or any other power to try to exclude China from the Middle East, Latin America or Africa.

Secondly, China's thirst for energy poses a counter-development problem for the international community. There is a lot of competition for China's growing demand for oil, but remember that even without China, energy demands from India and other emerging markets are expected to jump drastically in the next few decades. How to reduce the cost of organization and how to improve development efficiency has become a serious challenge for the international community. We may have to develop alternative energy sources such as ethanol, biomass, solar, wind power and nuclear energy. The international community needs to pay more attention to energy conservation and the efficient use of energy. That is another area in which the United States, China and other developing countries can cooperate.

Finally, what can the United States do? The United States and China, according to news reports, will launch a dialogue to understand each other's policies, interests and intentions in Latin America. That is good news. This kind of dialogue should cover every region we just talked about. For the United States, paranoia about a coming China threat and misguided policies based on this assumption will be the


wrong choice. What the United States can do now is to engage China and work together with other powers to assure the healthy development of China. On the other hand, to become a respected and responsible power, China in its trading with countries in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa must also help Western countries to address their interests such as increasing transparency, establishing rule of law, and improving human rights in those countries. After all, such policies are also in the long term interest of China.

China's hunt for energy sources is largely driven by its domestic growth and searching for energy has become a major Chinese foreign policy objective. Its global activities have contributed positively to global development although they have had some problems and, admittedly, there are some concerns from the United States and other countries. What the international community and especially the United States can do is to work with China, address its legitimate needs and concerns and help China to develop peacefully as a responsible and respectable power.

“Will the President be able to resolve the Middle East crisis?”

Richard L. Rubenstein

November 2008 (Transcription of a lecture delivered at the University of Bridgeport)



I have a short and long answer for the question: “Will the President be able to resolve the Middle East crisis?” The short answer is “No.” The longer answer follows: I believe in discussions of the Middle East crisis, I believe both sides neglect an important element that renders the crisis impossible to resolve. Moreover, even were that element recognized, it would still not be possible to resolve the crisis. *That element is religion.*

In reality, religion plays a more crucial role in the conflict than most people trained in Middle Eastern studies understand. I have some knowledge of the career paths taken by senior government officials trained at both Harvard and Yale. Certain trusted professors recommend their most promising graduates who start at entry-level positions at the State Department and other government agencies and then quickly move up. Henry Kissinger is an excellent example. A graduate of Harvard College, he has a Harvard

PhD. His skills and promise were recognized by Nelson Rockefeller and that led him into international politics. Unfortunately, such people tend, in the words of the great German sociologist, Max Weber, to be “religiously unmusical.”

To get ahead of the story, it is my view that the Middle East conflict is not unlike the narrative that unfolds in what the German philosopher Hegel regarded as the nuclear Greek tragedy, Sophocles’ *Antigone* composed in or around 442 BCE. Antigone and Creon, king of Thebes are the two dominant figures in the drama. Antigone’s two brothers, Eteocles and Polyneices, were rivals for the crown of Thebes and had led opposing sides in Thebes’ civil war. Both perished in the war and Creon, who succeeded to the throne, decreed that Eteocles was to be honored in death while Polyneices was to be punished as a rebel by being left unburied where vultures and other carrion-feeding animals could feed

Biography

Dr. Richard L. Rubenstein is President Emeritus of the University of Bridgeport. A Distinguished Professor of Religion at the University and a Life Member of the Board of Trustees, Dr. Rubenstein also serves as Director of the University's Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. An internationally recognized historian of religion whose writings lie at the root of Holocaust writings, his works have been the subject of more than a dozen doctoral dissertations. One of his books entitled "The Cunning of History" was recently translated into French. Professor Rubenstein's writings have also been cited as a key inspiration for the Academy Award winning film Sophie's Choice. Prior to assuming his role as President of the University of Bridgeport, Dr. Rubenstein served as Distinguished Professor of Religion at Florida State University. Recently Florida State University created the Richard L. Rubenstein Chair for Religious Studies in his honor.

on his corpse. In the world of ancient Greece that was the most terrible of punishments. Moreover, the penalty for disobeying Creon’s edict was death.

A sentry subsequently reports to Creon that Polyneices has been buried. Creon soon learns that it is Antigone who has buried her brother and decrees that she is to be buried alive in a cave. Antigone has no regrets. She insists that she has obeyed a higher law, the law of family loyalty in which her highest obligation was to bury her brother. By contrast, Creon is convinced that he has done right by punishing the rebel. As ruler, his primary responsibility is to maintain order and punish those who disturb it.

For Hegel, the flaw in the tragic hero is not *hubris* but an *ethical collision* between conflicting values that make an exclusive and irreconcilable claim on each side. As he wrote:

The original essence of tragedy consists then in the fact that within such a conflict each of the opposed sides, if taken by itself, has *justification*, while on the other hand each can establish the true and positive content of its own aim and character only by negating and *damaging* the equally justified power of the other.¹

Given his role as ruler, Creon acted in accordance with what he saw as right. We might regard his actions as cruel, but he saw no alternative. Antigone’s place was entirely different and, hence, she was bound by a very different set of impera-

tives, the law of family loyalty, that all members of the family, no matter what their offense, must be given an honorable burial.

In this clash, both Antigone and Creon are destroyed. Creon loses his son and heir, Haemon, who is engaged to Antigone and who enters the burial cave with her. In Hegel’s thinking, oppositions are always partial, always partly right and partly wrong. In such a situation, when two rights come into conflict, there can be no non-tragic resolution.

I have begun this discussion by referring to these reflections on Greek tragedy because, I believe, it helps to contextualize the Middle East conflict. I also want to distinguish between two terms, *enemy* and *villain*. I imagine it is clear to you that I am Jewish. When I think of that part of the Arab world that opposed the creation of the State of Israel and its continued existence, I do not regard them as villains. A villain is a person or group that deliberately and gratuitously injures without cause or reason. That is not the case here. Those persons and groups believe that they have good reason to fight with whatever tools they have in order to dislodge the Israelis from what they see as their historic territory.

Nevertheless, though they are not villains, they are most certainly my enemies. There is in my tradition an historic memory of Israel being a Jewish possession. Some people will argue, and not only Jews, but a very large number of American Protestants known as Dispensationalists, that this land was promised to the Jews. Per-

sonally, I do not make such a claim although many Jews do.

If I were a Muslim, I would claim that this land is, as stated in the charter of Hamas, an irrevocable, sacred trust (*waqf*) granted by Allah for all eternity to those who believe in him.²

I also think that it is confusing simply to dismiss Hamas as a terrorist group. They certainly have used strategies that others have called “terrorist,” but they are a religious group that is convinced that the whole territory of Palestine is part or should be part of *Dar al Islam*, that is, part of that territory in which Islam is dominant and that they are under an unconditional religious imperative to regain the entire land of Israel by whatever means are necessary.

Let me now tell you the story of my grandmother’s paper bag, a story I first told in Cordoba, Spain in the nineteen-nineties at a conference of Jewish and Muslim scholars. When I was about sixteen years old, I visited my grandmother, an Orthodox Jewish woman, who had emigrated from Lithuania as a young girl in the late nineteenth century. During the visit, I noticed an open drawer and a paper bag within. The bag was addressed to her and carried a cancelled postage stamp of the British mandate of Palestine. When I looked into the bag, I found nothing but dirt. At the time, I couldn’t understand what possible meaning the dirt had for my grandmother or why she wanted dirt from Palestine. The next time I saw the bag was when her coffin was lowered into the grave and her oldest son took the

bag and poured its contents on the coffin. I then understood the symbolism of the bag. This was her way of saying, “I have been a wanderer all my life, exiled, as have been my people, from my true home, Palestine. When I am buried, I will return home to the land of Palestine, at least symbolically.”

In the land of Israel/Palestine, there are two peoples, both of whom believe that they have a divinely-legitimated claim. Notice that I have not said that one claim is stronger than the other. I have been trained as an historian of religion, and, as such, I do not do take sides. Of course, I personally do take sides, but not as an historian of religion. As an historian, I do not have a side: I try to understand both sides. Now I suspect, and it is more than a suspicion, that there are men in the State Department and the Department of Defense who do not appreciate the depth of the religious feeling involved on either side. Or, if they do, they do not care. There is, however, at least one element other than religion that we must take into account, and that is the related elements of humiliation, defeat and rage.

To understand the relevance of humiliation, defeat, and rage, I suggest that we turn our attention momentarily from the conflict between Arabs and Israelis and consider events that took place in Europe in the summer and fall of 1918. Ninety years ago this month, an armistice, a cessation of military activities, was signed between Germany and the Western powers, namely France, Britain and the United States, which signaled the end of hostilities on the Western Front during

World War I, hostilities that had been going on with horrendous loss of life on both sides since September 1914. An armistice is not a peace treaty. It is simply an agreement to stop fighting.

On March 13, 1918, Bolshevik Russia signed a peace treaty with Imperial Russia. Less than three weeks later, General Erich Ludendorff, second in command only to Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg, launched the first of four German offensives in the west against the Allies. By July 1918 the German offensive had spent itself.³ On September 29, 1918, Ludendorff summoned Germany’s political leaders and demanded that they ask for an immediate armistice.⁴ In seeking an armistice, Ludendorff and Hindenburg were partly driven by fear of the imminent collapse of German arms and its likely consequences, the worst being a Bolshevik-type revolution in Germany.⁵ Nevertheless, with the German army still in northern France and Belgium, and the former Tsarist Empire defeated, a number of senior officers strongly opposed the armistice initiative.⁶ Their resolve was strengthened after receiving Woodrow Wilson’s uncompromising replies to the German armistice request between October 10 and 14. Ludendorff and Hindenburg became convinced that the Allies would never offer peace terms Germany would deem acceptable.⁷

According to historian Michael Geyer, the High Command became convinced that surrender was incompatible with German honor which could only be saved by an apocalyptic *Endkampf* (terminal struggle) involving the systematic devastation of

the population and infrastructure of occupied French and Belgian territory, as well as a possible war to the death involving the entire German population. The *Endkampf* would be both a war of annihilation against the enemy and the self-annihilation of the German nation.⁸

German defeat did not result in an *Endkampf* because the government of the newly appointed Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, and the Reichstag majority rejected the High Command’s plans. Prince Max pointed out that the first responsibility of the government was to assure the *survival* of the nation. If that meant acknowledging defeat, the humiliation had to be accepted. By contrast, the High Command insisted that the Allied terms were dishonorable. Hence, *total military catastrophe was to be preferred to a humiliating surrender.*

In late October, Hindenburg and Ludendorff attempted to persuade the Kaiser to reject the armistice and call for a *Volkskrieg*, a total “people’s war.” The Kaiser refused and sent them with several other senior commanders, to meet with the Imperial Vice Chancellor Friedrich von Payer, Prince Max being unavailable because of illness. Ludendorff sought to persuade Payer to abandon peace negotiations and call for a popular insurrection. The issue for both the military and the German ultra-right was no longer victory or even territorial defense but the “honor” involved in preferring catastrophic national destruction to surrender.

Payer rejected Ludendorff’s demand for an end to peace negotiations whereupon

Ludendorff declared, “Then, your Excellency, *I throw the entire shame of the Fatherland into your and your colleague’s faces* (emphasis added).”⁹ In his memoir of the war years, Payer spelled out his fundamental disagreement with Ludendorff:

An army commander with his entourage may well end his illustrious career [*Ruhmeslaufbahn*] with a ride into death [*Todesritt*], but a people of seventy million cannot make the decision about life and death according to the terms of honor of a single estate [i.e., the military]¹⁰

The idea of fighting to the death, rejected in the First World War, was accepted by Adolf Hitler in the Second World War. For example, the Battle of Stalingrad was the turning point of that war. The German attack was launched on July 17, 1942. The German surrender took place on January 31, 1943. It is estimated that a total of 750,000 Germans were killed or wounded and 91,000 captured; 478,471 Soviet military were killed or missing; 650,878 were wounded or sick and 40,000 Russian civilians were killed. The Battle of Stalingrad was the bloodiest military battle of the war and arguably the bloodiest of all time. By mid-January 1943, it was clear to the German commander Friedrich Paulus Friedrich Paulus that the German situation was hopeless and he asked Hitler for permission to surrender. Permission was denied and Paulus was ordered to hold Stalingrad to the death. On January 30, 1943, Paulus informed Hitler that his men were hours from collapse. Hitler responded by promoting

Paulus to the rank of Field Marshal, the highest rank in the German army, noting that no Prussian or German field marshal had ever surrendered. In effect, Hitler was telling Paulus to die with his troops, but allowing him to do so as a field marshal. The next day, Paulus, a Roman Catholic who did not believe in suicide, surrendered to the Russians.

A second example of Hitler’s determination to bring Germany down with him can be seen in the way the Second World War ended. It only ended when the Americans, British and Russians arrived in Berlin. By any normal logic, the Germans should have surrendered before, but under Hitler, they fought to the bitter end. Hitler even commanded Albert Speer, his Minister of Arms and War Production, to destroy Germany’s infrastructure rather than permit it to fall into Allied hands. Speer, fearful that implementation of the order would cripple Germany’s ability to recover, refused to comply.¹¹

How does this history relate to the Middle East crisis? For those who have been socialized with the values of a dominant military caste or who believe in military virtues, (and I do not necessarily criticize these virtues because countries sometimes survive because of the military virtues), there is often nothing worse than defeat. For 1400 years, Muslims saw Jews as a defeated, conquered people. As such, they were objects of condescension or contempt. Much has been written about the fact that there were times when Islam’s tolerance of Jews was greater than that of the Christian West. When the Jews were

expelled from Christian Spain in 1492, a large number were permitted to enter the Ottoman Empire which believed that there was a place for them. The Jews were received as subordinates into a society of structured inequality under strictly regulated conditions. This was also true of the way the Muslims dealt with Christians. They could not, for example, bear arms. They were permitted domicile solely under conditions in which their inferior standing was always apparent. For us to say that such practices were wrong is to measure their society and its imperative in terms of our own.

Moreover, the Christians behaved in very much the same way. How then did the Muslims regard the Jews? There's a term for it, *dhimmis*, that is, people who had either surrendered or their ancestors had. Every Muslim, regardless of how humble, could look down on the *dhimmis*. Even the poorest Muslim was part of the dominant group and the richest *dhimmi* was not. Notice that I am not criticizing this system. This is the way it was.

As noted above, the Muslims had a somewhat similar attitude towards the Christians. Christians were also *dhimmis*, but there was one big difference between them. The Christians had fought and defeated the Muslims in the naval Battle of Lepanto (1571), a naval battle, and had defeated the Muslims in the Siege of Vienna in 1683. Although never defeating them, they had pushed the Muslims back. Like the Muslims, they had a military caste. The Jews were completely non-military and had been since 70 C.E. when the Romans put down a violent Jewish

rebellion that had lasted four years and destroyed the Temple in Jerusalem.

As defeat became certain, the Jews had two choices. They could fight to the death. And, some did at Masada, a desert fortress some 900 feet above the Dead Sea. 930 Jews resisted the Romans for almost 3 years. Finally, the Jews of Masada could no longer hold out and Eleazar ben Ya'ir, their leader, convinced the people that surrender was not an option. Eleazar persuaded his followers that if they killed themselves, they would never know slavery. They knew that if the Romans took them, the men would have become slaves and the women used sexually and then sold as slaves.¹² 930 Jews, imbued with military virtues in the sense that defeat and surrender were absolutely unacceptable, committed suicide up on Masada. They had made their grim choice.

There was another choice the Jews could have made. It was, as a matter of fact, the dominant choice. In the year 70, the most important Jewish leader in Jerusalem was a rabbi named Yochanan ben Zakkai (30-90 C.E.). There was a group in Jerusalem, the Zealots, who like the men and women of Masada, believed that death was preferable to surrender just as did Ludendorff and Hindenburg in 1918. Yochanan did not agree. He understood that if the Jews died fighting the Romans, Judaism would come to an end. However, the Zealots controlled the city. To evade them, Yochanan ordered his disciples to place him in a coffin and take him outside the city for burial. In spite of the bitter war, the Romans permitted the Jews to bury

their dead outside Jerusalem. At the Jewish checkpoint, one of the Zealots wanted to take his spear and put it through the seemingly dead rabbi. He was persuaded to refrain on the basis of the honor due to the dead.

As soon as he was outside of the city, he requested an audience with Vespasian, the Roman commander and soon to be emperor. It was in Vespasian's interest to end the war that had lasted almost four years, with Roman forces stretched out from Persia to the gates of Scotland. Vespasian asked Yochanan, “What do you want?” The rabbi replied, “Give me the yeshiva (religious academy) at Yavneh and its wise men.” In effect, speaking on behalf of the Jews, Yochanan was willing to surrender and forgo sovereignty, putting Jewish safety in the hands of Vespasian and his imperial successors. An agreement was struck that rendered Jews powerless people until 1948 and the birth of the State of Israel which regained Jewish sovereignty the same way an earlier generation had lost it, by force of arms.

From the Muslim point of view, the Jews were for 1400 years a dependent, powerless people and, to repeat, as such the object of either condescension or contempt. The idea that in 1948 and afterward, 650,000 of these people could defeat them in three wars was totally unacceptable. At the end of the 1948 war, the Arabs refused to make peace which would have been a confession of defeat. The same thing happened at the end of the Six Day War of 1967. The Arab nations adopted a policy of “Three No's”—“No peace, no recognition, no commerce.”

The idea of admitting defeat on the land of Allah, especially to the Jews, would have been an irredeemable disgrace.

There were leaders in the Muslim world who were willing to broker a compromise peace with the Jews. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was one. He was assassinated in 1981. It is also well known that King Abdullah of Jordan, the grandfather of the current king, preferred to have the Jews in control of part of a Palestine rather than have Mufti Muhammad Amin al Husseini in control. He tried to work out a deal with the Jews. He too was assassinated in 1981 and a street was named in Tehran in honor of his assassin Khalid Al-Islambouli.¹³ One wonders what might happen to Mahmoud Abbas if he ever signs a *real* peace treaty with Israel.

From a strictly pragmatic point of view, an Arab-Jewish peace would benefit both parties.¹⁴ Jews possess certain skills with which to enrich the Middle East. As a matter of fact that was the illusion that the Jews had when they came to Palestine. They were under the illusion that because they had the skills the Muslims would see them as an asset. The Muslims weren't interested. People who are willing to sacrifice themselves in suicide bombings aren't thinking about material advantage.

One cannot solve a problem where honor and religion are involved on the basis of economic compromise. Obama and the State Department may try. But there will always be a critical mass of Muslims who will refuse anything other than the destruction of the State of Israel. That

means that the Jews have picked—some would say God had picked for them—an especially difficult piece of real estate. Notice I speak of enemies, not villains. Simply by being there, the Israelis are facing the fundamental enmity of a significant portion of the Arab population. That will never go away.

Let me close by recounting an incident that took place on Masada in 1976. I was there with my two sons. The day before, my youngest son had his Bar Mitzvah at Jerusalem’s Western Wall. At Masada, I told them about how Yochanan ben Zakkai had surrendered to the Romans. I pointed out that Yochanan ben Zakkai only surrendered because he assumed that Caesar could be trusted. That was the basis of Yochanan’s surrender. And for 2,000 years, the surrender agreement held. Neither Vespasian nor any of his successors, Roman or European, sought to annihilate the Jews. Some expelled them; others persecuted them, but none sought to exterminate them until Adolf Hitler, who took full advantage of the powerlessness implicit in the original surrender. I told this to my sons and asked, “What would you have done had you been there in the years 70 and 73? Would you have surrendered like Yochanan ben Zakkai or fought to death like the men and women of Masada?” Being young and virile, their answer was simple: “We would have fought to the death.”

I then told them my answer. It was not unlike that of the Kaiser when Ludendorff and Hindenburg wanted the entire German nation to go down in flames. I said, “You had better remember that you

and I are alive today because Yochanan ben Zakkai surrendered and that those who surrender always do so because they hope, if not for themselves, that a later generation of their descendants who would live in freedom.”

As a footnote, let me add that those of you who studied the dialectic of the master and the slave in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of the Spirit* will recall that the slave surrenders to the master at least partly for that reason.¹⁵ I therefore conclude that there may be a truce, a *hudna*, but there will never be genuine peace.

References:

1. G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: lectures on fine art*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 2 vols., p. 1196)
2. Avalon Project of the Yale Law School, “ Hamas Covenant 1988,” Chapter 11, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp
3. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery* (New York: Henry Holt, 2003), p. 190.
4. Schivelbusch, *Culture of Defeat*, p. 197.
5. Michael Geyer, “Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate about a Levée en Masse in October 1918,” *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), 464 and 467-468, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3079705>> (6 Mar. 2009).
6. Geyer, “Insurrectionary Warfare,” 470. These included Max von Gallwitz and Bruno von Mudra.
7. Wilson stipulated that the Central Powers would be required “immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territories.” He further insisted on “absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees” for the maintenance “of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and its allies in the field.” And, Wilson explicitly demanded a new government in Germany because “the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy.” The text of Wilson’s replies is to be found in Oliver Marble Gale, *Americanism: Woodrow Wilson’s Speeches on the War* (Chicago: Baldwin Syndicate, 1918), 141-144. This book was digitized and made available by Google from the Harvard University Library.
8. Geyer, “Insurrectionary Warfare,” 475-502.
9. Wilhelm Deist, ed., *Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg, 1914-1918* (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1970), Vol. 2, 1338-40; I am indebted to Geyer, “Insurrectionary Warfare,” 506, for this citation.
10. Deist, *Militär und Innenpolitik*, 1338-40.
11. Hugh R. Trevor Roper (ed) *Blitzkrieg to Defeat: Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945* (NY: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1971) pp. 206-207
12. The mass suicide of the Jews on Masada has been described by Flavius Josephus (37-101 C.E.). It is available on the internet at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/religion/>

“Will the President be able to resolve the Middle East crisis?”

maps/primary/
josephusmasada.html .

13. The name of the street was changed to Intifada Street in 2004 in an effort to improve Egyptian-Iranian relations. “Egypt Wooed with New Street Name,” *BBC News*, January 5, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3369821.stm.
14. An important account of Israel’s technological capabilities is available in Dan Senor and Saul Singer, *Start-Up Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle*, a Council on Foreign Relations Book (New York: Twelve, 2009).
15. *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 111-119.



Masters in Global Development and Peace

The University of Bridgeport's International College is pleased to announce the creation of its Master of Arts in Global Development and Peace is a four semester graduate course of study that includes an overseas internship.

This Master's degree is designed to prepare future civil servants and business professionals for careers in global development, human security and diplomacy and mediation.

Students in the Global Development and Peace program can focus on one of the three areas of study:

- 1) Political Economy and Development for students interested in working in less developed countries or in international development agencies and organizations.
- 2) Culture and Conflict Resolution for students interested in a career in government or a non-governmental organization.
- 3) Global Management for students with an interest in international business.

Students will be expected to demonstrate or to develop a working knowledge of one foreign language during the course of the program.

Students will spend a minimum of two months in an overseas internship.

The program can be completed in two years.

For more info please see the [Master's Program fact sheet](#).

Internship Opportunities

The Masters of Arts in Global Development and Peace includes a two month overseas internship for all domestic students.. Non-US may do their intermship if their first language is not English. Domestic students are expected to intern in a country where they can practice the foregin language that they have studied. Students will normally work with an international organization, a governmental agency or an international non-governmental organization.

Career Opportunities

International College graduates have gone on to work for the United Nations, for international agencies, for International Non-Governmental Organizations. Many have also gone on to work in the corporate world in venues such as General Electric, UBS Warburg, Goldman Sachs, BNY-Mellon, Pitney-Bowes. We anticipate students with the Masters of Arts in Global Development will integrate well into International organizations, development agencies and into corporations which have a significant overseas presence.

