• Notes
• Chapter
• Johns Hopkins University Press
• pp. 231-264
• View Citation
• Additional Information

NOTES

Abbreviations

Introduction

Epigraphs: Reuther quoted in June 28 UAW press release endorsing filibuster reform, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, box 577, folder 9, WSU. “Labor Looks at Congress, 1963,” Support Services Department, AFL-CIO Publications, Series 1, GMMA. Andrew Stern, interview by Jonathan Cohn, Dec. 18, 2009, New Republic, www.tnr.com/node/72017.

1. Although most of the literature refers to Southern and Northern Democrats, I use the term “non-Southern Democrats” to refer to Democrats from all other regions.

2. For range of American exceptionalist explanations, see Lipset and Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here.

3. Hartz, Liberal Tradition; Lipset, American Exceptionalism.

4. Katznelson, City Trenches.

5. Brecher, Strike!

6. Steinmo, “Rethinking American Exceptionalism.”

7. Lipset and Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here, chap. 2.

8. Oestreicher, “Rules of the Game.”

9. The Knights of Labor briefly posed a reformist challenge in the 1870s and early 1880s but never approached the size or reach of the AFL and CIO in the late 1930s and 1940s.

10. As Walter Reuther told a British journalist about labor’s strategy in the New Deal and postwar periods, “We felt that instead of trying to create a third party—a labor party … that we ought to bring about a realignment and get the liberal forces in one party and the conservatives in another.” Quoted in Brandon, “Conversation with Reuther.”

11. Some scholars suggest that in some ways the United States was ahead of other “liberal” welfare states such as Great Britain and Canada going into World War II. Quadagno and Street, “Ideology and Public Policy,” 62.

12. This criticism is shared by scholars associated with the New Left of the late sixties and seventies such as Ronald Radosh, Stanley Aronowitz, Christopher Tomlins, George Lipsitz, and Nelson Lichtenstein. In a new introduction to his book Labor’s War at Home, rereleased in 2003, Lichtenstein has modified his position somewhat. Some social activists in and outside the labor movement also view labor’s alliance with the Democrats as a strategic failure that has limited labor’s political power throughout the postwar period; see, for example, Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream, and Kim Moody, An Injury to All.

13. Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream.

14. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics, xiv.

15. Goldfield, Decline of Organized Labor, chap. 2.

16. Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes.

17. Gottschalk, Shadow Welfare State.

18. Madison, Federalist 10.

19. As Madison noted of the national government in Federalist 10, “Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests: you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.”

20. Lee and Oppenheimer are among the few scholars to investigate the impact of unequal representation in the Senate on policy outcomes. Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing up the Senate.

21. Dahl, How Democratic? 49.

22. Weaver and Rockman, Do Institutions Matter?; Pierson, New Politics; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, “Social Democracy.”

23. In the measure of fragmentation used by Huber, Ragin, and Stephens in “Social Democracy,” the United States ranks as the most decentralized.

24. Immergut, “Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results” and Health Politics.

25. Steinmo and Watts, “It’s the Institutions, Stupid!”

26. Steinmo, “Rethinking American Exceptionalism.”

27. Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics; Brady and Volden, Revolving Gridlock.

28. Brady and Volden, Revolving Gridlock, 35.

29. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, Polarized America, chap. 6.

30. The issue of free trade, particularly in the 1990s, is an exception. While organized labor and most Democrats supported free trade as long as the United States was the dominant manufacturer in the world, labor’s support started to slide in the 1970s. Although many congressional Democrats shared labor’s growing opposition to free trade agreements, both Democratic and Republican presidents have strongly supported it.

31. Orren and Skowronek, Search for American Political Development, 78.

32. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement; Hattam, Labor Visions.

33. Lowi, “Why Is There No Socialism?”

34. See call for more attention to Congress in the field of APD in Katznelson and Lapinski, “Congress and American Political Development.” Several scholars in the APD tradition have focused on Congress, including Richard Bensel, Eric Schickler, Gregory Wawro, and Julian Zelizer. Scholars like Jacob Hacker and Christopher Howard have also demonstrated how congressional institutions encourage the development of certain types of policies over others. A number of congressional scholars have also taken a historical approach, such as Sarah Binder, Joseph Cooper, Nelson Polsby, and Steven Smith, just to name a few.

35. Farhang and Katznelson, “Southern Imposition.”

36. See, for example, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, Polarized America; Poole and Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress; and Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress.

37. Pierson, “Increasing Returns.”

38. See, for example, Pierson, Politics in Time; Steinmo, “What Is Historical Institutionalism”; and Thelen, How Institutions Evolve.

39. Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, Structuring Politics, 15.

40. In the following chapters, there is also a fair amount of material from the United Auto Workers archives when Walter Reuther was the president of the CIO.

CHAPTER ONE: The Rise of Organized Labor and the Conservative Coalition

1. AFL leaders felt they were not adequately consulted and represented on New Deal boards. Louis Stark, “Grave Labor Issues Facing White House,” New York Times, Mar. 3, 1935.

2. Plotke, Building a Democratic Political Order, 101–2.

3. “President Orders Speed on NRA and Wagner Bills,” New York Times, May 25, 1935.

4. Skocpol, Finegold, and Goldfield, “Explaining New Deal Labor Policy,” 1300–1301.

5. Louis Stark, “Union Labor Reforming Its Line of Battle,” New York Times, June 2, 1935, and “Labor Demands New NRA, Scoring Any Surrender,” New York Times, June 7, 1935.

6. Zieger, American Workers, 55.

7. Horowitz, Political Ideologies, 234–36.

8. Statistics from Bureau of Labor Statistics as reported in Goldfield, “Worker Insurgency,” 1267.

9. Quoted in Lichtenstein, “From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining,” 135.

10. Cohen, Making a New Deal, 333–49.

11. Brody, Workers in Industrial America, 217.

12. Brinkley, End of Reform, 219–24.

13. Ibid., 219.

14. Quoted in Josephson, Sidney Hillman, 395.

15. Brinkley, End of Reform, 223.

16. Horowitz, Political Ideologies, chap. 8.

17. Cohen, Making a New Deal, 359.

18. Zieger, American Workers, 68.

19. Ibid., 67.

20. On labor in the war, see Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at Home.

21. Zieger, American Workers, 84.

22. Dubofsky, State and Labor, 192.

23. Mills, New Men.

24. Turner finds a Northern-Southern split among Democrats on labor issues going back to the 1920s. Turner, Party and Constituency, 176.

25. Although as Plotke notes, “This sweeping approval is misleading, as many who would have preferred a different bill or no bill at all did not oppose it when passage seemed certain.” Plotke, Building a Democratic Political Order, 101.

26. Paired and announced votes for and against the legislation as well as those not voting are included in the totals used to calculate the percentages.

27. Farhang and Katznelson, “Southern Imposition,” 9.

28. Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder, “Limiting Liberalism,” 297.

29. Plotke, Building a Democratic Political Order, 104–6.

30. For the role of worker insurgency in the passage of the NLRA, see Goldfield, “Worker Insurgency,” 1257–82, and Skocpol, Finegold, and Goldfield, “Explaining New Deal Labor Policy.” While not challenging the importance of worker unrest, David Plotke argues that the leading actor in passing the legislation was a coalescing “progressive liberal political leadership.” Plotke, Building a Democratic Political Order, 101–17.

31. Goldfield, “Worker Insurgency,” 1270–77.

32. Communists controlled unions with 20–25% of the membership of the CIO, and Communist or Communist sympathizers occupied numerous staff positions. Bell, “Problem of Ideological Rigidity,” 106.

33. Eric Schickler’s analysis of Gallup and Roper polling data from the 1930s and 1940s, which he and Adam Berinsky have cleaned up and weighted to compensate for skewed samples, suggests deteriorating public attitudes toward organized labor over the course of 1937. The public became particularly critical of the sit-down strike, with 64% of the weighted sample favoring the use of force against the strikers by December 1937. Schickler, “Public Opinion,” 11–15.

34. An American Institute of Public Opinion poll reported in the Washington Post that 52% of those with an opinion favored revision of the NLRA while another 18% favored outright repeal. George Gallup, “Fight on Measure Due in Next Congress,” Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1938.

35. Farhang and Katznelson note that the “CIO’s punitive electoral efforts” were repeatedly brought up by Southerners in debate on the Case bill. Farhang and Katznelson, “Southern Imposition,” 24. Also see Patterson, “Failure of Party Realignment,” 603.

36. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 135.

37. Quoted in Time, Aug. 23, 1937, cited in Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 182.

38. Farhang and Katznelson, “Southern Imposition,” 40.

39. Poole and Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress, 138.

40. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill, 26.

41. Turner, Party and Constituency, 173.

42. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 88.

43. Turner, Party and Constituency, 186.

44. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 163–68.

45. Ibid., 165. Schickler notes that based on Poole and Rosenthal’s nominate scores, Cox and Dies were to the left of the average Democrat when they were appointed while Smith was just “a bit” to the right.

46. Ibid.

47. Congressional scholars who favor a “party cartel” approach to congressional parties argue that the Rules Committee served the majority party’s interest by controlling what went to the floor. The blocking of controversial bills like civil rights legislation was a way to minimize damaging intraparty splits. Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan.

48. The old Gompersian position of the AFL had been that a minimum wage would become a maximum wage and would effectively cap what unions could obtain in collective bargaining. Labor leaders had largely abandoned this position, but both leaders of the AFL and John Lewis were apprehensive about the power of a board that was to be set up to implement the FLSA. Having been burned by government boards before and fearful the board’s rulings might end up in the courts on appeal, AFL president Green insisted on changes to the structure and role of the board. See Horowitz, Political Ideologies, chap. 7. Others speculate that the AFL was afraid the board would favor the CIO. Fraser, Labor Will Rule, 405.

49. Fraser, Labor Will Rule, chap. 14.

50. Douglas and Hackman, “Fair Labor Standards Act.”

51. Ibid., 514.

52. Fraser, Labor Will Rule, 411.

53. Maury Maverick, “Maverick Urges South to Join in Social Progress,” Washington Post, May 9, 1938.

54. Poole and Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress, 138.

55. Fleck, “Opposition to the Fair Labor Standards Act,” 49.

56. Schickler and Pearson, “Agenda Control.”

57. See table in ibid., 468.

58. Ibid., 483.

59. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 318.

60. Dubofsky, State and Labor, 161, 173.

61. Roll calls are taken from Voteview. Percentages include all votes and members who were paired, who announced for or against the legislation, and those not voting.

62. Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at Home, 185.

63. Dubofsky, State and Labor, 193.

64. McClure, Truman Administration, 68–69.

65. A statement by the United Steelworkers’ International Wage Policy Committee issued on Jan. 23, 1946—after the union had agreed to the terms recommended by the Truman administration but U.S. Steel had refused—declared, “American industry has therefore deliberately set out to destroy labor unions, to provoke strikes and economic chaos, and mulct the American people through uncontrolled profits and inflation.” Found in PSF, box 118, “Strikes: Steel” folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

66. Bernstein, “Truman Administration,” 796.

67. CIO president Philip Murray, “Issues Facing the Special Session of Congress,” speech delivered on American Broadcasting Company Network, July 29, 1948, in WHCF-OF, box 779, 170 (1947–53) folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

68. Lee notes that, despite the efforts of Secretary of Labor Lewis Schwellenbach to make the public aware of enormous corporate profits, the press repeatedly cited labor costs as the source of inflation, which encouraged public opinion to blame organized labor. Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley, 17–18.

69. Gallup poll, Apr.–May 1944, reported in Schickler, “Public Opinion,” table 3.

70. Schickler and Pearson, “Agenda Control,” 476.

71. A June 11, 1946, summation of the public mail coming into the White House on the Case bill noted approximately 40,000 telegrams (so numerous that they had not been broken down into those advocating or opposing the bill), 19,910 postcards, and 13,000 letters. Of the 6,064 letters addressing the issue of a veto, a majority of 3,440 urged the president not to sign the bill. PSF, box 98, “Case bill” folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

72. Noted in President Truman to Senator Ball, Jan. 8, 1947, PSF, box 98, “Ca-Cl” folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

73. A June 10, 1946, letter to President Truman from Representative Andrew Biemiller urged the president to veto the law and included a petition signed by ninety-six members of the House as well as a list of another thirty-one members who were unwilling to sign the petition but were committed to voting to uphold a possible veto. PSF, box 98, “Case bill” folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

74. McClure, Truman Administration, 133.

75. One poll found that 64% of respondents thought the labor laws should be changed; 21% thought the laws gave too much advantage to employers versus 42% to labor. But the same poll found 34% agreeing that Truman was right to disapprove the Case bill versus 23% who thought he should have approved it. Gallup Poll (AIPO), June 1946, retrieved June 6, 2010, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. On the value of the relationship between labor and Democrats, see, for example, Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements; Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at Home; and Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream.

76. Philip Murray to President Truman, undated report, WHCF-OF, box 1122, file #407b, Truman Papers, HSTL.

77. Summaries of editorial content throughout the period prepared by the Division of Press Intelligence in the Truman administration consistently showed strong support for revision of the NLRA and extensive criticism of the labor movement, particularly the actions of John L. Lewis. As one summary prepared by the Government Information Service noted: “Labor is attacked for killing the goose that has been laying golden eggs. Government is condemned for being over liberal in attitude toward labor. The courts in turn come in for their share of criticism for not being just and fair to the employer and the public. Business, as the employer, escapes with comparatively little complaint.” Jan. 2, 1947, summary of editorial content on topic of labor legislation prepared by the Division of Press Intelligence, PSF, box 109, “Legislation: Cabinet” folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

78. Richter, Labor’s Struggles, 67; Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley, 47.

79. Truman, Memoirs, 505.

80. Goldfield, “Worker Insurgency”; Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements.

81. Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at Home.

82. Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley, 47.

83. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting.

84. Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley, 72.

85. Gross, Reshaping of the National Labor Relations Board.

86. Richter, Labor’s Struggles, chap. 4.

87. Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley, 81.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., 87.

90. Collection of memoranda from labor relations experts submitted to President Truman in the summer of 1947, WHCF-CF, box 33, “Taft-Hartley” folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

91. Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley, 95.

92. These and subsequent roll call votes from Congressional Quarterly.

93. Farhang and Katznelson, “Southern Imposition,” 2.

94. Ibid., 3.

95. There is some debate about the impact of right-to-work laws. For example, Lumsden and Petersen find that the effect is mostly symbolic, with little substantive impact on unionization rates, while Ellwood and Fine find that membership is reduced, primarily because of decreased organizing activity following the passage of such laws. Lumsden and Petersen, “Effect of Right-to-Work Laws”; Ellwood and Fine, “Impact of Right-to-Work Laws.”

96. Box 57, folder 2, UAW Washington Office, Legislative Department, Donald Montgomery Files, WSU.

97. Farhang and Katznelson and Troy point to the potential impact of Taft-Hartley, particularly of right-to-work laws, on Southern organizing. Farhang and Katznelson, “Southern Imposition”; Troy, “Growth of Union Membership.”

98. Troy, “Growth of Union Membership,” 410.

99. Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, 162.

100. Farhang and Katznelson, “Southern Imposition.”

101. Troy, “Growth of Union Membership,” 407, 413.

102. For discussion, see Griffith, Crisis of American Labor; Troy, “Growth of Union Membership”; De Vyver, “Present Status”; and Friedman, “Political Economy.”

103. Troy notes that Southern workers showed less support for union representation in NLRB-supervised certification elections than workers in the rest of the country. Troy, “Growth of Union Membership,” 419–20.

104. Clark Clifford to Harry S. Truman, memo, Nov. 19, 1947, Clifford Papers, available at www.trumanlibrary.org.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid. Clifford noted, “President Truman and the Democratic Party cannot win without the active support of organized labor. It is dangerous to assume that labor now has nowhere else to go in 1948. Labor can stay home” (emphasis in the original). An undated draft of a UAW resolution opposing the nomination of Truman indicated that labor’s enthusiasm was certainly at stake. Resolution found in box 430, folder 19, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

107. In 1945, a frustrated Walter Reuther had asserted, “The time is now ripe for labor to divorce itself from the two old parties and resolve to build the base for an independent, indigenous national party.” Quoted in Brody, Workers in Industrial America, 222. In contrast, a resolution adopted by the UAW in March 1948 rejected Henry Wallace’s third-party candidacy because it would undermine “the vital political task” of repealing “the vicious Taft-Hartley Act.” Resolution found in box 2, folder 13, UAW Political Action Department, Roy Reuther Files, WSU.

108. In fact, labor’s experience with the 80th Congress in general pushed labor closer to Truman. Following a meeting with James Carey, secretary-treasurer of the CIO, Clark Clifford noted in a memo to Truman, “The President’s Speech at the Convention made a great impression on labor as did the decision to call a Special Session of the Congress. The failure of the Congress to enact any legislation remotely beneficial to labor has helped crystallize the support of labor for the President.” Carey advised that Truman bring CIO president Murray in for a meeting and expected that a CIO endorsement would soon follow. PSF, box 100, “Clark Clifford” folder, Truman Papers, HSTL. On Taft-Hartley’s impact on labor’s views toward Truman, also see Brody, Workers in Industrial America, 226.

109. Taft, “Political Activity,” 170–72.

110. Many labor leaders were also opposed to Wallace because of their growing commitment to a staunchly anti-Communist foreign policy.

111. Savage, Truman and Democratic Party, 138.

112. Chen, Fifth Freedom.

113. Savage, Truman and Democratic Party, 139.

114. Ibid., 138.

115. In fact, prior to the New Deal, the 1928 election signaled a growing tension in the Democratic Party between the Southern and urban, liberal wings when the Democrats nominated Al Smith, the Catholic governor of New York, who lost a number of Southern states.

116. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics.

117. Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley.

118. Schickler, “Public Opinion,” 3. Ware points to a number of factors that preserved the Republican Party’s strength outside the South during this period, including the strength of long-standing Republican Party organizations, the competitiveness of a moderate strain of Republicanism in the North, and the strength of the Republican Party in rural and suburban areas. The Democrats’ appeal was very urban. Ware, Democratic Party Heads North.

119. Ware, Democratic Party Heads North, 231.

120. Troy, “Growth of Union Membership,” 409.

121. Ibid., 407.

122. Friedman, “Political Economy,” 386.

123. Poole and Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress, 54.

124. Although as recent scholarship has demonstrated, by the 1940s Republican state parties and members of Congress from non-Southern states had begun to show less enthusiasm for civil rights than Democrats from the same states, suggesting a changing dynamic on civil rights. Chen, Fifth Freedom, and Feinstein and Schickler, “Platforms and Partners.”

125. Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream.

126. The only way this dynamic could have been overcome is if a more unambiguously pro-labor party generated more enthusiasm among liberal voters and significantly higher turnout. This is certainly a possibility, but far from likely. A poll found only 10% of respondents interested in joining a party formed by labor. Gallup Poll (AIPO), June 1946, retrieved June 6, 2010, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

127. Quoted in C. P. Trussell, “Poll Tax Repealer Taken Up in Senate,” New York Times, May 10, 1944.

CHAPTER TWO: Labor, the Conservative Coalition, and the Welfare State

1. Paul Sifton to Walter Reuther, memo, June 5, 1950, box 23, folder 3, UAW Political Action Department, Roy Reuther Files, WSU.

2. Hattam, Labor Visions; Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement.

3. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics, 67–70; Horowitz, Political Ideologies, 230.

4. Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address to Congress, Jan. 11, 1944.

5. “Political Aims of Organized Labor.”

6. McClure, Truman Administration, 11–12.

7. Shelley, Permanent Majority, 33.

8. Turner, Party and Constituency, 171–72.

9. Ibid., 187–88.

10. Ibid., 181.

11. Ibid., 89.

12. Key, Southern Politics.

13. Turner, Party and Constituency, 185.

14. Shelley, Permanent Majority, chap. 3.

15. Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder, “Limiting Liberalism,” 286–90.

16. Abram and Cooper demonstrate that deference to seniority in the selection of committee chairs had become the norm by the 1920s. Abram and Cooper, “Rise of Seniority,” 80–81.

17. Louis Hollander, city chairman of the New York AFL-CIO, quoted in Clayton Knowles, “State Labor Asks Congress Reform,” New York Times, Jan. 22, 1964, 34, accessed in ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

18. Andrew J. Biemiller, oral history interview by James R. Fuchs, July 29, 1977, HSTL.

19. From the adoption of Rule 22 in 1917 through 1964, only civil rights bills and proposals to reduce the cloture threshold were successfully filibustered. See Binder and Smith, Politics or Principle, 135.

20. Brinkley, End of Reform, 103.

21. Roosevelt, State of the Union, Jan. 11, 1944 (emphasis added).

22. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law, 80.

23. Ibid., 82.

24. Ibid., 123.

25. Quoted from the House Hearings on H.R. 2202, 390–91, cited in ibid., 141.

26. Sifton to Reuther memo, June 5, 1950.

27. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law, 153.

28. Ibid., 162.

29. Ibid., 167.

30. “Federal Supplement to State Unemployment Compensation,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal45-1403129; originally published in CQ Almanac 1945.

31. Known as the Knowland amendment, it put in place several procedures to delay penalties on states found in noncompliance with the limited federal standards in the unemployment program. The states had to be given ninety days’ notice of non-compliance, and the federal finding of noncompliance had to have received final state court review before funds could be withheld. “Social Security Act,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal50-1377221; originally published in CQ Almanac 1950.

32. “Unemployment Aid Extension,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal54-1357998; originally published in CQ Almanac 1954.

33. “Unemployment Benefits,” CQ Almanac 1958.

34. Ibid.

35. Background in “Minimum Wages,” CQ Almanac 1949, and Louis Stark, “Congress Agreed on 75C Basic Pay; Congress Acts Soon,” New York Times, Oct. 15, 1949.

36. Stark, “Congress Agreed.”

37. “Minimum Wage Bill Dies in Conference,” CQ Almanac 1960.

38. Ibid.

39. Tynes, Turning Points.

40. Ibid., 116.

41. Ibid., 118. Federal workers were the only major occupational group left outside the program.

42. Quadagno, “Physician Sovereignty,” 818.

43. “Social Security Extension,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal49-1399806; originally published in CQ Almanac 1949.

44. “Social Security Act,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal50-1377221; originally published in CQ Almanac 1950.

45. Quadagno, “Physician Sovereignty,” 819.

46. Berkowitz, Disabled Policy, 75.

47. Quadagno, “Physician Sovereignty,” 818; Berkowitz and Wolff, “Disability Insurance,” 76–77. The age limitation also minimized the opposition of the insurance industry.

48. Berkowitz, Disabled Policy, 75.

49. Ibid., 76.

50. “Social Security,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal56-1349073; originally published in CQ Almanac 1956.

51. Berkowitz, Disabled Policy, 79.

52. Poen, Harry S. Truman, 60–61.

53. Ibid., 64.

54. Ibid., 118.

55. One sample in a July 1945 Gallup poll found that 53% of respondents favored a government plan and 34% favored a private-sector plan. Another sample in the same poll found that 47% favored a government plan while 40% favored a private-sector plan. Public opinion remained fairly evenly divided throughout the debate. There was never an indication that the public was either strongly for or against any particular measure.

56. Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured, 44–46.

57. “Health Reinsurance,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal54-1357935; originally published in CQ Almanac 1954.

58. Hacker, Divided Welfare State, 239–41.

59. Hacker also argues that government funding of research and hospitals before a system of cost controls was put in place made future health reform efforts even more difficult because of the soaring cost of health care. Hacker, “Historical Logic.”

60. For summarization of the multiple explanations for the failure of national health insurance in the United States, see, for example, the introduction in Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured, and Hacker, “Historical Logic,” 60–76.

61. Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured; Hacker, “Historical Logic.”

62. Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured.

63. Ibid., 30–31, 34.

64. Hacker, Divided Welfare State.

65. Organized labor targeted congressional supporters of the Taft-Hartley Act in the elections. While the labor effort was unable to defeat the much hated Senator Taft, it did help replace seventy-five Republicans with Democrats in the House and eight in the Senate. Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley.

66. This discussion is drawn from ibid., chap. 7.

67. Truman’s threats on patronage discussed in Savage, Truman and the Democratic Party, 149.

68. William Green, “American Labor Must Be Strong and Free,” speech in San Diego, Calif., Sept. 5, 1949, in Vital Speeches of the Day 15 (Sept. 14, 1949): 715.

69. This discussion is drawn from Gall, Politics of Right to Work, chap. 3.

70. Labor also launched a full-scale lobbying campaign to ensure this bill was recommitted and worked closely with the Senate Democratic leadership. Walter Reuther to International Union Presidents, memo, Apr. 7, 1954, box 422, folder 1, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

71. Witwer, Corruption and Reform, chap. 9.

72. Ibid., 188–91.

73. ORC Public Opinion Index, Nov. 1958 and Jan. 1959, retrieved June 13, 2010, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

74. Witwer, Corruption and Reform, 206. Republicans put out a pamphlet in 1956 entitled “The Labor Bosses: America’s Third Party” that made this case.

75. Representative Bolling noted that others faced pressure from business not to bring up the bill because it contained a provision for increased oversight of management. Bolling, House out of Order, 157. Representative Udall noted the efforts on the House Education and Labor Committee. Stewart L. Udall Oral History Interview—JFK #1, Jan. 12, 1970, John F. Kennedy Library collection.

76. Bolling, House out of Order, chap. 8.

77. Much of this discussion is drawn from Bolling, House out of Order, “Congress Passes Anti-Corruption Labor Bill,” CQ Almanac 1959, and McAdams, Power and Politics.

78. “Congress Passes Anti-Corruption Labor Bill.”

79. Robinson, George Meany, 212.

80. Report of James McDevitt, national director of COPE, to Administrative Committee of AFL-CIO COPE, Feb. 10, 1960, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 8, GMMA.

81. CIO press release, Nov. 17, 1952, in WHCF-OF, box 779, 170 (1947–53) folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

82. Bensel, Sectionalism, 175.

83. Walter Reuther to William Boyle, undated, box 23, folder 3, UAW Political Action Department, Roy Reuther Files, WSU.

84. Ibid.

85. Donald E. Montgomery to Walter P. Reuther, memo, Sept. 4, 1953, box 431, folder 8, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

86. Frustration highlighted in unsigned, undated memo, “Relations with the Demo-cratic Party,” box 24, folder 23, UAW Political Action Department, Roy Reuther Files, WSU.

87. Discussion of rift in Roscoe Born, “Labor Sits It Out,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 1961, article found in Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 8, GMMA.

88. AFL-CIO pamphlet, 1961, reprinted from article in American Federationist (Jan. 5, 1961), Support Service Department, AFL-CIO Publications, Series 1, GMMA.

89. Kennedy had also tried to include the common situs picketing provision in the Landrum-Griffin bill, but he lost the battle in conference committee.

90. Statistic from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

91. For example, Kevin Boyle discusses the UAW’s embrace of the “new liberalism” of the Truman years over its social democratic agenda and the UAW’s adaptation to the Democratic Party’s “truncated agenda.” Boyle, UAW, 60, 84. Similarly, Alan Brinkley sees the period as the “end of reform” as a commitment to consumer Keynesianism replaced the desire to fundamentally transform capitalism among elements in the New Deal and the CIO. Brinkley, End of Reform. Nelson Lichtenstein discusses the “eclipse of social democracy” and the “forced retreat [that] narrowed the political appeal of labor-liberalism and contributed both to the demobilization and division of those social forces which had long sustained it.” Lichtenstein, “From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining,” 123. Ira Katznelson notes that “by the end of the 1940s labor’s vision and potential contracted.” Katznelson, “Was the Great Society a Lost Opportunity,” 191.

92. Boyle, UAW, chaps. 3 and 4; Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at Home, 240.

93. Plotke, Building a Democratic Political Order, 336, 363.

CHAPTER THREE: Possibilities and Limits in the Great Society

1. A display of all the signing pens from this period still hangs in the AFL-CIO’s legislative office.

2. Incremental expansions of the welfare state do not necessarily follow this pattern, as indicated in the previous chapter’s discussion of expansion of the minimum wage. Moreover, as scholars such as Christopher Howard have pointed out, in contrast to major spending programs, policy innovations like tax expenditures, which are adjustments to tax policy to encourage private-sector behavior like the mortgage interest deduction, have been pursued by bipartisan coalitions over extended periods of time. Howard, Hidden Side.

3. Quotes from 1963 AFL-CIO Convention resolutions in Harrington, Socialism, 264.

4. Boyle, UAW, 187–88.

5. Orren has further argued that labor lobbied for diverse programs to expand demand and increase government spending from Medicare to agricultural subsidies that forced the Federal Reserve to pursue an expansionary monetary policy. This facilitated sizable wage gains in collective bargaining and put downward pressure on unemployment. Orren, “Union Politics.”

6. Kennedy was able to reward labor in some ways through NLRB appointments, the responsiveness of the Labor Department, and an executive order permitting federal employees to engage in collective bargaining.

7. Excerpts from report by the Textile Workers Union prepared by John W. Edelman “What Will the 1962 Congressional Election Mean to Labor and Liberals?” box 434, folder 3, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

8. Henry Wilson to Lawrence O’Brien, memo, July 18, 1962, box 4, Larry O’Brien folder 1/3, Office Files of Henry Wilson, LBJL.

9. Polsby, How Congress Evolves, 40–50.

10. “Helping to Write Your Nation’s Laws,” AFL-CIO pamphlet, 1963, Support Services Department, AFL-CIO Publications, Series 1, GMMA.

11. “Labor Looks at Congress, 1963,” Support Services Department, AFL-CIO Publications, Series 1, GMMA.

12. Quote in Robinson, George Meany, 240–41.

13. Cooper and Bombardier, “Presidential Leadership,” 1017.

14. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics, 55.

15. Quoted in Draper, Rope of Sand, 38.

16. Zieger, American Workers, 162.

17. Ibid., 183.

18. Area Conference Summary, 1962, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 9, GMMA.

19. Ibid.

20. In 1963 the AFL-CIO Executive Council decided to levy on the affiliates an assessment of five cents per member for a special voter registration fund. There was a massive registration drive going into the 1964 elections of union members and, as discussed in Chapter 4, of other liberal constituencies such as African Americans. COPE report, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 11, GMMA. A record number of international unions participated in the AFL-CIO’s electoral efforts, and the affiliates released numerous upper-level staffers to work on the campaign under AFL-CIO direction. COPE report, Feb. 1965, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 12, GMMA.

21. Harrington, Socialism, 266; Greenstone, Labor in American Politics, xiii.

22. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics, xiv.

23. Harrington, Socialism, 266, 269.

24. Quoted in Brown, “Bargaining for Social Rights,” 653.

25. Stevens, “Blurring the Boundaries,” 137.

26. Gottschalk, Shadow Welfare State. Also see Klein, For All These Rights, and Stevens, “Blurring the Boundaries.”

27. Press release on Case bill veto, WHCF-OF, box 1122, “Case Bill” folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

28. In a May 15, 1946, memo to the president, the administrator of the Federal Security Agency underlined this point and suggested that “if the demands of the miners for a special welfare fund are incorporated into their contract, other unions will be encouraged to press for similar benefits.” WHCF-OF, box 1256, folder 419b, Truman Papers, HSTL.

29. Operators’ Negotiating Committee for the National Bituminous Coal Wage Conference to President Truman, May 16, 1946, PSF, box 118, Strikes: coal folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

30. Stevens, “Blurring the Boundaries,” 140–41; Brown, “Bargaining for Social Rights,” 669.

31. Stevens, “Blurring the Boundaries,” 141.

32. Brown, “Bargaining for Social Rights,” 653.

33. Stevens, “Blurring the Boundaries,” 146.

34. Hacker, Divided Welfare State.

35. Ibid., 61.

36. Lichtenstein, “From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining,” 143.

37. Brown, “Bargaining for Social Rights.”

38. Marmor, Politics of Medicare, 23.

39. Ibid., 14.

40. At this same time COPE showed growing interest in mobilizing senior citizens to vote. COPE research files contain numerous breakdowns by congressional district of the percentage of the population registered to vote and the percentage of the senior population registered to vote and voting with an eye to targeting districts for registration and get-out-the-vote drives.

41. Zelizer, Taxing America, 213.

42. Marmor, Politics of Medicare, 43.

43. Marmor notes that in 1963 eighteen states had still not set up programs under Kerr-Mills and the provision of funds varied widely from state to state. Marmor, Politics of Medicare, 36–37.

44. Marmor notes that a June 1961 Gallup poll found that two out of three people interviewed were in favor of increasing the Social Security tax to pay for medical insurance for the elderly. Ibid., 41.

45. Nelson Cruikshank to George Meany, memo, June 9, 1961, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 52, folder 23, GMMA.

46. Quoted in Zelizer, Taxing America, 135–36.

47. Polsby, How Congress Evolves, 50.

48. Excerpts from report by the Textile Workers Union prepared by John W. Edelman, “What Will the 1962 Congressional Election Mean to Labor and Liberals?” box 434, folder 3, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

49. Noted in “Labor Looks at the 88^th Congress,” Oct. 1964, Support Services Department, AFL-CIO Publications, Series 1, GMMA. Ross Bass (D-TN) and Pat Jennings (D-VA) were appointed.

50. CQ Almanac 1965, 244.

51. “Senate Kills Social Security Health Care Plan,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal62-1326016; originally published in CQ Almanac 1962.

52. Henry Wilson to Lawrence O’Brien, memo, Apr. 20, 1964, box 4, Larry O’Brien folder 1/3, Office Files of Henry Wilson, LBJL.

53. Zelizer, Taxing America, 227.

54. Memo, Sept. 4, 1964, box 3, Medicare folder, Office Files of Henry Wilson, LBJL.

55. Lawrence O’Brien to President Johnson, memo, Sept. 13, 1964, box 3, Medicare folder, Office Files of Henry Wilson, LBJL.

56. Quoted in Zelizer, Taxing America, 229.

57. In stressing the need for the administration to pressure the House congressional leadership to ensure committee assignments were conducive to the president’s program, one of Johnson’s legislative staffers, Henry Wilson, noted, “Rearrangement of ratios on House committees and subcommittees, the assignment of members so as best to effectuate Administration programs, and, in the few cases where possible, the reshuffling of subcommittee chairmanships and areas of authority can be as impt. as the level of the Congressional majority itself.” Henry Wilson to Larry O’Brien, memo, Dec. 7, 1964, box 4, Larry O’Brien folder 1/3, Office Files of Henry Wilson, LBJL.

58. Trying to kill the social insurance bill, the AMA publicly attacked the plan’s limited coverage, which, according to Wilbur Mills, actually pushed the Ways and Means Committee to find a way to expand the social insurance proposal rather than to dump it in favor of the AMA’s “eldercare” approach. Wilbur Cohen, assistant secretary of health, education, and welfare, to Johnson staffer Douglass Cater, memo, Mar. 10, 1965, WHCF-LE, box 75, 3/1/65–5/31/65, LBJL.

59. Senator Abraham Ribicoff to President Johnson, Mar. 3, 1965, WHCF-LE, box 75, LBJL.

60. Poen, Harry S. Truman, 220.

61. Signatures on discharge petitions were not made publicly available, but House leaders and committee chairs could view them, so there was a chance of retribution but little chance of reward.

62. “Labor Looks at Congress 1965,” Nov. 1965, Support Services Department, AFL-CIO Publications, Series 1, GMMA.

63. See Gall, Politics of Right to Work, 77–85.

64. Much of this discussion is drawn from a chronology of the 1965–66 battle over repeal of 14(b) prepared by Andrew Biemiller, the AFL-CIO’s chief lobbyist, for President Meany. “Chronology,” Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 48, folder 18, GMMA.

65. The administration apparently considered trying to trade votes for 14(b) for votes on the administration’s farm bill to try to maximize the coalition for both pieces of legislation, but it found that the only Southerners willing to vote for 14(b) came from urban areas and that Northern Democrats weren’t willing to trade a vote on the farm bill. A July 20, 1965, memo from Henry Wilson to Larry O’Brien concluded, “The proposal gets us not one vote for Repeal of 14-B and … it will seriously jeopardize many votes on the Farm bill.” Box 9, Larry O’Brien folder, Office Files of Henry Wilson, LBJL.

66. “Chronology.”

67. The AFL-CIO Department of Education even offered locals a film entitled “The Beat Majority” to stress to union members the importance of the “one man, one vote” concept and the need for proportional reapportionment of state and federal legislative districts.

68. “Chronology.”

69. This is noted in ibid. as well as an Aug. 2, 1965, memo from Lyndon Johnson’s aide responsible for the Senate, Mike Manatos, to his chief legislative representative, Larry O’Brien, box 9, Poverty folder, Office Files of Mike Manatos, LBJL.

70. Mansfield’s pessimism described in several memos such as a Sept. 2, 1965, memo from Mike Manatos to Larry O’Brien, box 12, Mike Mansfield folder, Office Files of Mike Manatos, LBJL, and another from Sept. 9, 1965, noting that Mansfield had told Biemiller “he was in trouble on 14(b) because the votes are not available to invoke cloture.” Box 2, Legislative 1965, Jan.–Sept. folder, Office Files of Mike Manatos, LBJL.

71. Numbers reported in various newspapers and AFL-CIO Department of Legislation documents.

72. AFL-CIO Executive Council Minutes, Oct. 28, 1965, GMMA.

73. A Jan. 15, 1965, memo from Biemiller to Meany estimated 53 votes in the Senate in support of cloture reform. Thus, a filibuster of cloture reform was likely to be successful. Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 19, folder 38, GMMA.

74. A Jan. 25, 1966, memo to Marie Fehmer from Mike Manatos summing up a meeting of the congressional leadership with the president noted that the leaders assured the president they would move speedily on 14(b) in the congressional session but that “Mansfield was not encouraging about 14(b).” Box 2, Legislative 1965, Jan.–Sept. folder, Office Files of Mike Manatos, LBJL.

75. Conversation with Reuther recounted by Larry O’Brien to President Johnson, memo, Dec. 5, 1965, WHCF-LE, box 6, 10/9/65–12/19/65 folder, LBJL

76. Andrew Biemiller, Alexander Barkan, and Albert Zack to President Meany, memo, Oct. 25, 1965, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 100, folder 17, GMMA.

77. Meeting summed up in a Feb. 3, 1966, memo from Mike Manatos to President Johnson. Senator Pell, for example, noted that “14(b) was not like Civil Rights when an aroused nation forced the issue.” Box 3, Legislative-General-1966, Jan.–Mar. folder, Office Files of Mike Manatos, LBJL.

78. Only two Democrats actively participated in the filibuster. Copy of a newspaper article (Robert Allen and Paul Scott, “Mansfield Infuriates Labor,” The State, Sept. 20, 1965) found in Legislation Department, Congressional Correspondence, box 70, folder 2, GMMA.

79. A Nov. 25, 1966, memo from Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz to President Johnson noted that the election results made a range of labor bills less likely to pass. He also suggested that there was likely to be a bill introduced in Congress to prohibit union-shop contracts unless states passed legislation specifically allowing such contracts, and he noted that Republican gains in the state legislatures would likely mean renewed efforts to pass more right-to-work laws. WHCF-LE, box 134, 9/29/65 folder, LBJL.

80. A Mar. 23, 1966, memo from George Reedy to President Johnson noted that while the national leadership of the AFL-CIO might have a good relationship with the president, there was dissatisfaction at the secondary level of labor leadership and among other labor legislative representatives in Washington regarding 14(b) and issues of access to the administration. WHCF-CF, box 60, Labor Management Relations folder, LBJL. The Texas AFL-CIO, which of course had a long-standing relationship with Johnson, was particularly critical. A Feb. 12, 1966, letter to President Johnson from the president of the Odessa Central Labor Council was representative of the sentiment in noting, “We are deeply shocked and disappointed at the failure of the Administration and the Democratic Party to keep its promise on repeal of Section 14B of the Taft-Hartley Act. We have supported the Party and its program as long as I can remember. Every Democratic President has had our support when he needed it. While we have supported others, not a single one of our own legislative goals have been enacted by your Administration. We are just plain angry about it.” WHCF-LE, box 137, 2/16/66–4/26/66 folder, LBJL.

81. The Lyndon Johnson archives show repeated requests by Meany for meetings with the president on short notice during the 14(b) fight, and all were granted by Johnson.

82. July 30, 1965, memo from the vice president to Larry O’Brien outlining his activities on lobbying for 14(b) in the House. Of forty-two members he was assigned, all but two voted for repeal. WHCF-LE, box 134, 9/29/65 folder, LBJL.

83. Joe Califano to President Johnson, memo, Feb. 16, 1966, WHCF-CF, box 60, Labor Management Relations folder, LBJL.

84. Transcript, Lawrence F. O’Brien Oral History Interview XIII, Sept. 10, 1986, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet copy, LBJL, 13.

85. Box 8, 14(b) folder, Office Files of Mike Manatos, LBJL.

86. Marvin Watson to President Johnson, memo, Feb. 15, 1966, box 6, 1/15/65–2/15/65 folder, Handwriting File, White House Special Files, LBJL.

87. Quoted in Robinson, George Meany, 244.

88. Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz to President Johnson, memo, Dec. 1, 1964, WHCF-LA, box 1, LA 2/2 folder, LBJL.

89. Willard Wirtz to President Johnson, memo, Feb. 9, 1965, WHCF-LA, box 1, LA 2/2 folder, LBJL.

90. If votes in the Senate are weighted for population, comparable to the proportional representation in the House, the support for cloture increases from 52% to 60.7%, indicating that senators from low-population states were more likely to oppose cloture and senators from higher-population states were more likely to support cloture.

91. Quoted in Robinson, George Meany, 247.

92. “Common-Site Picketing,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal66–1300498; originally published in CQ Almanac 1966.

93. Willard Wirtz to Lawrence O’Brien, undated memo, WHCF-LE, box 7, LE 1/1/66–2/3/66 folder, LBJL.

94. Willard Wirtz to President Johnson, memo, Aug. 4, 1965, WHCF-CF, box 63, LE/HI-LE/LE 3 folder, LBJL.

95. “Expansion of Minimum Wage Law Approved,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal66-1300503; originally published in CQ Almanac 1966.

96. Ibid.

97. The garment workers’ unions had the most interest in the bill and wanted a minimum wage increase to $1.60 to be effective in 1967, whereas the administration stood firm at an effective date of 1968. AFL-CIO president Meany grudgingly conceded to the later date, in part because it was more feasible in Congress. Issues with the effective date covered in Willard Wirtz to President Johnson, memo, Feb. 12, 1966, WHCF-LE, box 134, LE/LA 9/29/65 folder, LBJL. Negotiations over details reviewed in Willard Wirtz to President Johnson, memo, Mar. 9, 1965, WHCF-LA, box 16, LA 3 folder, LBJL; and Henry Wilson to President Johnson, memo, Mar. 9, 1966, White House Special Files, Legislative Background Minimum Wage Increase 1966, box 1, LBJL.

98. Noted in Henry Wilson to President Johnson, Mar. 8, 1966, White House Special Files, Legislative Background Minimum Wage Increase 1966, box 1, LBJL. The memo noted, “This probably will be the toughest fight all year. But Ways and Means is a basically favorable Committee, Mills is a great Chairman, and I am sure that we can bring out a bill and can convince labor of our sincerity.”

99. Andy Biemiller’s optimism noted in Joe Califano to President Johnson, memo, Mar. 8, 1966, WHCF-CF, box 60, Labor Management Relations folder, LBJL. Meany quote in “Unemployment Compensation Changes Die in Conference Committee,” CQ Almanac 1966.

100. Willard Wirtz to President Johnson, memo, Nov. 10, 1966, WHCF-LA, box 19, Strikes–Work Stoppages folder, LBJL.

101. Quoted in Barefoot Sanders to President Johnson, memo, July 20, 1967, WHCF-LE, box 170, LE5 9/7/66–6/30/67 folder, LBJL.

102. Discussion of conflict found in copy of article from Inside Labor attached to May 17, 1968, memo from Joe Califano to President Johnson, WHCF-LA, box 31, LA 7 folder, LBJL.

103. After attending several union conventions, Willard Wirtz observed in May 1966 that the Vietnam issue was becoming a concern and that the guidelines were attacked in every speech. He noted, “What I find is support, but a shortage of enthusiasm; and the reasons for the shortage are 5% 14(b), 20% guidelines, and 75% Vietnam. Willard Wirtz to President Johnson, memo, May 25, 1966, WHCF-CF, box 60, Labor Management Relations folder, LBJL.

104. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics.

CHAPTER FOUR: Changing the Rules of the Game

1. For discussion of this coalition and its activities, see Zelizer, On Capitol Hill, chap. 3.

2. Karol, Party Position Change, 109.

3. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, chap. 5.

4. Report from Emil Mazey, secretary-treasurer of the UAW, addressed to “Officers, Board Members and International Representatives,” Feb. 16, 1956, box 577, folder 8, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

5. For discussion of labor’s goals in the South, see Draper, Conflict of Interests, chap. 4.

6. King speech to AFL-CIO Convention in Proceedings of the Fourth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, vol. 1, Dec. 7–13, 1961, 287.

7. Gall, Politics of Right to Work, 142–44.

8. Quoted in Allen P. Sindler, “The Unsolid South: A Challenge to the Democratic Party,” in Allen Sindler, ed., The Uses of Power: Seven Cases in American Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1962), 233, cited in Feinstein and Schickler, “Platforms and Partners,” 16.

9. Feinstein and Schickler, “Platforms and Partners,” 16.

10. Ibid.

11. Chen, Mickey, and Van Houweling, “Explaining the Contemporary Alignment.”

12. Schickler, “Public Opinion.”

13. Quoted in Foner, Organized Labor, 310.

14. Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein, “Congressional Parties,” 6.

15. Ibid., 14.

16. C. P. Trussell, “Poll Tax Repealer Taken Up in Senate,” New York Times, May 10, 1944; Chen, Fifth Freedom, 67.

17. The Republican Party was becoming less supportive of civil rights over this period in part because of business opposition to fair employment practices legislation. Chen, Fifth Freedom; Karol, Party Position Change.

18. Berman, Bill Becomes a Law, 125.

19. Quoted in Robinson, George Meany, 236–37.

20. Noted in John Herling’s Labor Letter from June 13, 1964, found in box 430, folder 13, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU. Biemiller discussed the strategy for getting the fair employment provision included and passed in oral history interview with James R. Fuchs, July 29, 1977, HSTL.

21. Multiple references in Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 9, folder 13, GMMA.

22. Letter, Feb. 5, 1964, in Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 9, folder 15, GMMA.

23. Andrew Biemiller to various senators, Mar. 13, 1964, Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 9, folder 16, GMMA.

24. “Civil Rights Act of 1964,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal64-1304542; originally published in CQ Almanac 1964.

25. Draper, Conflict of Interests, chap. 1.

26. Report from Emil Mazey, secretary-treasurer of the UAW, addressed to “Officers, Board Members and International Representatives,” Feb. 16, 1956, box 577, folder 8, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

27. Foner, Organized Labor, 317.

28. Draper, Conflict of Interests, 26.

29. Ibid., 34.

30. Claude Ramsay to Meany, June 9, 1961, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 31, folder 16, GMMA.

31. Draper, Conflict of Interests, 92.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 104.

34. Meier and Rudwick, Black Detroit, 219–21.

35. Foner, Organized Labor, 323

36. Ibid., 348.

37. Ibid., 325.

38. Ibid., 335.

39. Draper, Conflict of Interest, 3–5.

40. Foner, Organized Labor, 349.

41. The emerging black radical wing of the civil rights movement continued to criticize organized labor, but the relationship between mainstream civil rights leaders and organized labor was cooperative.

42. Clarence Mitchell, director of Washington Bureau of the NAACP, to Andrew Bie-miller, Feb. 24, 1964, Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 9, folder 15, GMMA.

43. Organized labor also organized “sympathy rallies” in other cities. Levy, New Left and Labor, 42.

44. Foner, Organized Labor, chap. 24.

45. Lichtenstein, State of the Union, 82.

46. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics, 16.

47. Report of James McDevitt, national director of COPE, to Administrative Committee of COPE, Feb. 10, 1960, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 8, GMMA.

48. Hank Brown, president of Texas AFL-CIO, and Roy Evans, secretary-treasurer of AFL-CIO, to Walter Reuther, May 26, 1964, box 430, folder 13, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

49. Report of McDevitt to COPE Administrative Committee, June 1961, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 8, GMMA.

50. Ibid.

51. An Oct. 23, 1964, memo from Larry O’Brien to President Johnson noted that the “Negro vote could well mean the difference between victory or defeat in South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. It is possible Virginia and Tennessee could also be added to this list.” Box 3, Memos to President—O’Brien trip folder, Office Files of Henry Wilson, LBJL.

52. Quoted in Boyle, UAW, 200.

53. The AFL-CIO continued to contribute two thousand dollars a month to the institute, and while the organization also obtained outside funding, it was very closely allied with the AFL-CIO.

54. Don Slaiman to President Meany, memo, May 6, 1966, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 49, folder 16, GMMA.

55. Al Barkan to President Meany, memo, Nov. 12, 1974, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 19, GMMA.

56. Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction, chap. 4.

57. Battista, Revival of Labor Liberalism, chap. 3.

58. Excerpts of letter in “To Clear the Record,” Supplemental Report No. 1 of the AFL-CIO Executive Council on the disaffiliation of the UAW to the Eighth Constitutional Convention, 1969.

59. Lichtenstein, Most Dangerous Man, 353.

60. Chen stresses that the civil rights movement did not suddenly set its sights on the North after the mid-1960s legislative victories but had been active there since the 1940s. Chen, Fifth Freedom.

61. A July 13, 1967, memo from Marvin Watson to President Johnson included the labor memo as an attachment. Author is not noted. WHCF-Political Affairs, box 87, 6/3/67–8/22/67 folder, LBJL.

62. Quoted in Haynes Johnson and Nick Kotz, “Presidents Come and Go, but Labor’s Might Stays,” Washington Post, Apr. 13, 1972.

63. Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 81.

64. Victor Riesel, “New ‘Party’? Union Chiefs Fight to Elect First Labor President of U.S.,” Inside Labor, Aug. 27, 1968, found in box 437, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

65. Preliminary COPE report on 1968 elections, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 16, GMMA.

66. Ibid. In Pittsburgh, pro-Humphrey sentiment among union members rose from 69% on Oct. 25 to 80.7% on Oct. 31. In Baltimore, Humphrey support more than doubled, from 30% in September to 65% by the end of October. In Binghamton, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; and Connecticut, Humphrey support was increased by more than 10% in the last weeks of the campaign.

67. Battista, Revival of Labor Liberalism, 47–52.

68. The UAW, CWA, IAM, and AFSCME went on record in support of the reforms to open up the nominating system.

69. Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 87–92.

70. Scammon and Wattenberg, Real Majority, 2.

71. Battista, Revival of Labor Liberalism, chap. 3.

72. Noted in an attachment to an Aug. 5, 1952, memo from Don Montgomery to Walter Reuther. Box 430, folder 22, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

73. Poston cites Wall Street and big business pressure on several New York Republi-cans, who had previously voted for adoption of the twenty-one-day rule, to vote against it at the opening of Congress in 1951. Ted Poston, “Truman Seeks Help of NY Congressmen in House Rules Fight,” New York Post, Jan. 18, 1950.

74. “Limitation of Debate,” CQ Almanac 1949.

75. Ibid.

76. J. A. Beirne to Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas, Mar. 10, 1949, WHCF-OF, box 1106, #407, Mar.–Oct. 1949 folder, Truman Papers, HSTL.

77. An undated, unsigned report entitled “The Record of the 82nd Congress” noted, “The Dixiegop coalition had been riding high ever since March 17, 1949 when it worked out a two-point program for 1) stifling Civil Rights by the threat of filibuster under the new Rule 22 adopted to satisfy the Southern Democrats, and 2) blocking repeal of Taft-Hartley, to satisfy Taft and heavy contributors to the Republican Party including employers from all sections of the country.” Box 430, folder 23, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

78. An Aug. 5, 1952, memo from Don Montgomery to Walter Reuther outlined issues to raise with Adlai Stevenson including cloture reform and reinstatement of the twenty-one-day rule. Box 430, folder 22, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU. A June 10, 1952, memo from William H. Oliver to Walter Reuther notes strategy on getting cloture reform included as part of the civil rights plank in the 1952 Democratic platform. Box 430, folder 20, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

79. The memo is undated but is after the 1954 and before the 1956 elections. Found in box 24, folder 23, UAW Political Action Department, Roy Reuther Files, WSU.

80. A November 1964 collection of typewritten and handwritten “Notes on Democratic Party Organization” presumably prepared for and by Walter Reuther suggested a number of proposals for strengthening the party organization, including a year-round director of organization for the Democratic National Committee and a review of “the working relationship between the DNC and the various Senatorial and Congressional Committees and other specialized committees.” Handwritten notes stressed the “party responsibility on congressional reform” and the need to make the Democratic policy committees more representative in both houses and to strengthen the party caucus. Box 434, folder 5, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

81. Copy of speech by Senator Clark on Senate floor, June 22, 1959, found in Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 98, folder 8, GMMA.

82. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill, 55.

83. Sundquist, Decline and Resurgence of Congress, 392–94.

84. “Rule 22: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to Democratic Legislation. A Concrete Plan submitted by the UAW-CIO to the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration.” Box 416, folder 13, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

85. Draft of Walter Reuther’s speech given to the NAACP in advance of the 1953 fight over cloture reform, box 430, folder 20, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

86. Quoted in UAW news release from June 28, 1957. Box 577, folder 9, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

87. Conversation was relayed in a Jan. 16, 1959, letter from Frank McCulloch, a high-level Senate staffer, to Walter Reuther, box 409, folder 8, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU

88. Bolling, House Out of Order, 205.

89. Discussion drawn from Stevens, Miller, and Mann, “Mobilization of Strength,” 668.

90. Ibid.

91. Kofmehl, “Institutionalization,” 265.

92. Figure arrived at by comparing DSG membership speculated on in a Jan. 5, 1960, Congressional Quarterly Fact Sheet, “On Democratic Study Group,” and the listing of union contributions in another Congressional Quarterly Fact Sheet, “On Labor’s Campaign Spending,” in the CQ Almanac 1959, 806–7. Prior to the 1970s there were very loose requirements on the reporting of campaign contributions, and these figures likely underestimate the number of DSG members who received union support.

93. Stevens, Miller, and Mann, “Mobilization of Strength,” 670.

94. “Congressional Report,” prepared by the National Committee for an Effective Congress,” Dec. 2, 1965, WHCF-Federal Government Organizations, box 332, House of Reps. 11/23/63–3/17/66 folder, LBJL.

95. Stevens and colleagues found that there was greater cohesion among DSG members even when compared with other non-Southern, non-DSG members. Stevens, Miller, and Mann, “Mobilization of Strength.”

96. Quoted in Jones, “Joseph G. Cannon,” 640.

97. Discussion drawn from “House Enlarges Rules Committee,” CQ Almanac 1961, 402–6.

98. Bolling, House Out of Order, 210.

99. “House Enlarges Rules Committee,” 402–6.

100. Ibid.

101. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights assigned the AFL-CIO and member unions certain House members to lobby on the rules changes. William H. Oliver to Walter P. Reuther, memo, Dec. 16, 1964, box 493, folder 32, UAW President’s Office, Walter P. Reuther Collection, WSU.

102. Sheppard, Rethinking Congressional Reform, 40–41.

103. Ibid., 43.

104. Douglass Cater to President Johnson, memo, Nov. 25, 1966, WHCF-LE, box 45, 400 folder, LBJL.

105. Rohde, Parties and Leaders, 21.

106. Sheppard, Rethinking Congressional Reform, 62.

107. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill, 99–105.

108. The exception is the reforms in the presidential nomination process first used in the 1972 election.

109. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill, chaps. 6 and 7.

110. Sinclair, Majority Leadership, 5. Poole and Rosenthal find a slight shift to the left among Democrats outside the South in the mean nominate score on the liberal-conservative dimension. Poole and Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress, 84

111. Platform posted on the American Presidency Project’s Web site at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29605.

112. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, chap. 5.

113. Sheppard, Rethinking Congressional Reform, 195.

114. Because of other proposed jurisdictional changes, the maritime unions and various government workers unions also strongly opposed the proposal. Zelizer notes that the UAW and the Steelworkers did not take a stand on Bolling’s recommendations. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill, 148.

115. “Labor Looks at the 93rd Congress,” 1975, Support Services Department, AFL-CIO Publications, Series 1, GMMA.

116. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 201.

117. “Congressional Reforms Made in 1975,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal75-1210820; originally published in CQ Almanac 1975.

118. Rohde, Parties and Leaders, 22.

119. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill, 168.

120. One of these chairs, Wright Patman (D-TX), was an old-style populist, and he was actually defended by many liberals. At eighty-one years old, regardless of his policy preferences, he was viewed by the freshmen as ineffective and entrenched.

121. Quoted in Sheppard, Rethinking Congressional Reform, 206.

122. McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congress, the Courts, and Public Policy,” 391.

123. Cox and Katz, “The Reapportionment Revolution.”

124. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill, chap. 4.

125. Ibid., 72.

126. Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes, 211.

127. Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 99, folder 3, GMMA.

CHAPTER FIVE: Postreform Stalemate on Labor’s Agenda

1. Edsall, New Politics of Inequality; Berman, America’s Right Turn; Lichtenstein, State of the Union; Moody, Injury to All.

2. Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes, 150–59, and Edsall, New Politics of Inequality, 148–50.

3. Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream, 135.

4. Dark reaches a similar conclusion in his discussion of the failure of labor law reform. Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 109–13.

5. Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes, 59.

6. Boyle, UAW.

7. Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes; Battista, Revival of Labor Liberalism, 46.

8. For example, the mine workers bill preserved a role for the states in distributing black lung benefits; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) bill took three years to pass and involved a compromise on adoption and enforcement of safety standards; the clean water bill in 1972 had to overcome Nixon’s veto; and the creation of a consumer protection agency was repeatedly filibustered.

9. The AFL-CIO’s COPE (as well as the unaffiliated UAW and UMW) endorsed more candidates and more challengers to incumbents in 1974 than normal but had a surprising 70% victory rate for endorsed candidates. “Labor and Manpower 1974: Overview,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal74-1224465; originally published in CQ Almanac 1974.

10. In 1975, the AFL-CIO won on 78% of the COPE-identified votes in the House and 74% in the Senate.

11. “Labor Looks at Congress 1975,” Support Services Department, AFL-CIO Publications, Series 1, GMMA.

12. Ibid.

13. Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 103.

14. Ibid., 101–2; Halpern, “Jimmy Carter.”

15. Binder and Smith, Politics or Principle, 10, 135; Sinclair, “New World of U.S. Senators,” 7.

16. Palazzolo, “From Decentralization to Centralization.”

17. Dodd and Oppenheimer, “Maintaining Order.”

18. Rohde, Parties and Leaders.

19. Oppenheimer, “Process Hurdles,” 292, and “Congress and the New Obstructionism.”

20. Rudder, “Committee Reform”; Arnold, Logic of Congressional Action.

21. “Reflections on the People’s Lobby: An Interview with Andrew J. Biemiller,” AFL-CIO American Federationist, Jan. 1979, 15.

22. Quoted in Robinson, George Meany, 369.

23. Mike Gildea, formerly in the AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, interview by author, July 23, 1999.

24. Davis, “Legislative Reform,” 475–76.

25. Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes. As noted in the previous chapter, labor dominance of PAC contributions to Democratic candidates was overtaken by business in the late seventies. On the proliferation of new politics groups, see Berry, New Liberalism.

26. Stated in Aug. 8, 1978, press conference.

27. Davis, “Legislative Reform.”

28. As computed by Congressional Quarterly, Johnson was supported by Congress on 93% of the roll calls on which he had a clear position in 1965 compared with 79% in 1966 and 1967 and 75% in 1968. Carter’s success rate varied between a low of 75.1% in 1980 to a high of 78.3% in 1978.

29. “Nixon Signs Minimum Wage Increase” CQ Almanac 1974.

30. Ibid.

31. Quoted in Tim Nicholson, “Big Labor’s Big Defeat,” Newsweek, Apr. 4, 1977.

32. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, Polarized America, 166–69. On the minimum wage and income inequality, see Lee, “Wage Inequality.”

33. Background and votes in “Ford Vetoes Common-Site Picketing Bill,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal75-1214784; originally published in CQ Almanac 1975.

34. Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes, 204.

35. “House Rejects Labor-Backed Picketing Bill,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal77-1201876; originally published in CQ Almanac 1977.

36. Ibid.

37. “Labor Lost to ‘Intense’ Targeted Lobby Effort,” CQ Almanac 1977, 124.

38. Ibid.

39. Andrew Biemiller noted before retiring in 1979, “Very frankly, we have to do a better job of trying to excite the grass roots. I’ve been asked so many times that I’ve lost track, ‘are you sure you are really representing the people back home?’” “Reflections on the People’s Lobby,” 16.

40. Gross, Broken Promise, 241.

41. Labor law reform was listed among twelve top-tier legislative priorities for Carter’s first congressional session among other bills such as Carter’s energy plan, the 1978 budget, and countercyclical spending. Les Francis and Bert Carp to Frank Moore and Stu Eizenstat, memo, Apr. 15, 1977, Records of the Domestic Policy Staff, box 232, Legislation folder, JCL.

42. Stu Eizenstat to President Carter, memo, June 30, 1977, Records of the Council of Economic Advisers, box 47, Labor Law Reform (1) folder, JCL.

43. Summary of negotiations in ibid.

44. Robinson, George Meany, 376.

45. Quoted in “Labor Law Revision,” CQ Almanac 1977, 145.

46. “Weekly Legislative Report” from Frank Moore to President Carter, Apr. 22, 1978, PHF, box 82, 4/24/78 folder 2, JCL.

47. Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall to President Carter, memo, May 12, 1978, PHF, box 87, 5/30/78 folder, JCL.

48. Landon Butler to President Carter, memo, Apr. 25, 1978, PHF, box 85, 5/10/78 folder, JCL.

49. Landon Butler to President Carter, memo, May 8, 1978, PHF, box 84, 5/9/78 folder, JCL.

50. Ibid.

51. A June 19, 1978, memo from Stu Eizenstat and Bill Johnson to President Carter finally sounded a note of pessimism about the prospects for labor law reform, noting, “As you know, the labor law bill is in trouble—it appears that it will be more difficult to get the additional two Senators needed to invoke cloture than had been originally thought. … The present circumstances do present us with an unusual opportunity to show the depth of our commitment to labor.” PHF, box 91, 6/19/78 folder, JCL.

52. Frank Moore and Bob Thomson to President Carter, memo, May 24, 1978, PHF, box 87, 5/30/78 folder 2, JCL.

53. Also noted in Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 110.

54. Senators Charles Percy (R-IL), John Heinz III (R-PA), and Lowell Weicker (R-CT) supported cloture. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), a traditional labor supporter, tied his vote to postponement of consideration of an Alaskan public lands bill he opposed. Discussion of Stevens’s maneuverings found in a May 16, 1978, memo from Frank Moore, Bill Cable, and Bob Thomson to President Carter, PHF, box 87, 5/30/78 folder 1, JCL.

55. Handwritten note from President Carter on June 19, 1978, memo from Stu Eizenstat and Bill Johnston indicates he called Hollings.

56. A June 22, 1978, memo from Hamilton Jordan, Frank Moore, and the vice president to President Carter requested a last-minute contact by Carter with the wavering Sparkman. PHF, box 92, 6/22/78 folder, JCL.

57. A June 19, 1978, memo from Frank Moore and Bob Thomson to President Carter alerted Carter that “we may ask you on short notice to meet with any or all of [these three senators] during the next 48 hours. Our trading stock is the equal access provision and a ‘guarantee’ that the final bill emerging from Congress will be no tougher than the Senate bill. On equal access, labor will push for weakening modifications, but in the final analysis will accept elimination of the provision entirely. As for the ‘guarantee,’ it appears that labor will agree to push for House acceptance of the Senate bill, thereby eliminating the need for Senate consideration of a conference report. If concessions are made on the bill, they should be made by labor in bargaining sessions with the target Senators. Our role should remain that of a catalyst. We must also be prepared to consider requests not directly related to labor law reform. We are within one vote of defeating the most expensive and powerful lobby ever mounted against a bill in the nation’s history. Our attitude should remain upbeat and positive. We still believe we are going to win.” PHF, box 92, 6/19/78 folder 2, JCL.

58. “Filibuster Kills Labor Law Reform Bill,” CQ Almanac 1978, 286.

59. Ibid.

60. Moreover, the senators voting for the bill reflected 62% of the population, suggesting that the balance of opposition of senators in small states was dragging down labor’s support.

61. For discussion, see Fink, “Labor Law Revision,” and Halpern, “Jimmy Carter.”

62. Fraser to President Carter, Aug. 11, 1978, Records of the Domestic Policy Staff, box 232, Labor Law Reform folder 4, JCL.

63. Press conference transcript, Aug. 8, 1978.

64. Background for this discussion in Weir, Politics and Jobs, 132.

65. “The Coalition behind Full Employment,” Business Week, July 12, 1976, 76.

66. Charlie Schultze, chairman of the CEA, to the Economic Policy Group, memo, Mar. 14, 1977, Records of the Council of Economic Advisers, box 108, EPG Meetings 1977 folder 1, JCL.

67. The Humphrey-Hawkins process set up a planning mechanism very similar to the way the budget process has functioned since the 1974 reforms but with the added factor of the independent Federal Reserve and the state and local governments thrown in the mix. The negotiating, compromise, and just plain horse-trading that goes into the process has not been, and would not be, very conducive to coherent, long-range economic planning.

68. Representative Augustus Hawkins to Charles Schultze, May 11, 1977, Records of the Council of Economic Advisers, box 108, EPG Meetings 1977 folder 3, JCL.

69. “Full Employment,” CQ Almanac 1977, 176.

70. “Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill,” CQ Almanac 1978, 275.

71. An October 9, 1978, memo from Anne Wexler, Louis Martin, and Frank Moore to President Carter noted, “We are working to get a fair hearing on the floor of the Senate. Although Senator Byrd is committed to obtaining this and is making extraordinary efforts, the situation is made very difficult by the opposition of certain Republican Senators.” PHF, box 105, 10/10/78 folder, JCL.

72. Stu Eizenstat, Charlie Schultze, Frank Moore, Jerry Rafshoon, and Anne Wexler to President Carter, undated memo, PHF, box 105, 10/6/78 folder, JCL.

73. Anne Wexler and Louis Martin to President Carter, memo, Oct. 7, 1978, and Anne Wexler, Louis Martin, and Frank Moore to President Carter, memo, Oct. 9, 1978, both in PHF, box 105, 10/10/78 folder, JCL.

74. “Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill,” CQ Almanac 1978.

75. Ibid., 279.

76. Quoted in ibid., 272.

77. “Plans for AFL-CIO Drive for National Health Insurance,” Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 25, folder 26, GMMA.

78. “Health Insurance: No Action in 1974,” CQ Almanac 1974, 386.

79. Ibid., 387; Wainess, “Ways and Means,” 311.

80. Wainess, “Ways and Means,” 311.

81. “Health Insurance: No Action in 1974,” CQ Almanac 1974, 387.

82. “A New Approach to National Health Insurance,” Apr. 1, 1974, Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 25, folder 35, GMMA.

83. This was reported in a “Washington-insider” type publication published by McGraw-Hill, “Washington Report on Medicine & Health,” March 13, 1974, found in Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 25, folder 35 GMMA.

84. Starr, “Social Transformation of Medicine, 404.

85. “Health Insurance: No Action in 1974,” CQ Almanac 1974, 387.

86. Ibid.

87. Noted in interview with Representative Roy, a Democratic physician from Kansas, in American Medical News, Dec. 1974.

88. Notes of Dec. 16, 1974, meeting, Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 25, folder 39, GMMA.

89. Ibid.; Dick Shoemaker to Bert Seidman, memo, Nov. 21, 1974, and draft of proposals considered by the Subcommittee of the Technical Committee meeting of the CNHI, Nov. 22, 1974, both in Legislation Department, Legislative Reference Files, box 25, folder 39, GMMA.

90. “Health Care for Unemployed,” CQ Almanac 1975, 628.

91. Bert Seidman to President Meany, memo, July 28, 1978, Office of the President, George Meany Files, box 39, folder 2, GMMA.

92. Joe Califano to President Carter, May 30, 1978, PHF, box 90, folder 6/8/78, JCL.

93. Stu Eizenstat, Joe Onek and Peter Bourne to President Carter, memo, Apr. 6, 1978, PHF, box 79, 4/6/78 folder, JCL.

94. Joe Califano to President Carter, memo, May 15, 1978, PHF, box 85, 5/16/78 folder, JCL. A number of other important committee chairs and subcommittee chairs also opposed taking up a bill before the election. A May 31, 1978, memo from Stu Eizenstat to President Carter noted that the House and Senate caucuses opposed taking up a bill because it might hurt vulnerable members but had no chance of becoming law before the election. PHF, box 88, 6/1/78 folder, JCL.

95. Joe Califano and Stu Eizenstat to President Carter, memo, July 22, 1978, PHF, box 96, 7/24/78 folder 2, JCL.

96. “National Health Insurance,” CQ Almanac 1978, 630.

97. Stu Eizenstat and Joe Onek to President Carter, memo, July 27, 1978, PHF, box 97, 7/27/78 folder, JCL.

98. Joe Califano to President Carter, memo, May 30, 1978, PHF, box 90, 6/8/78 folder, JCL (emphasis in original).

99. “House Kills Carter Hospital Cost Control Plan,” CQ Almanac 1979.

100. Joe Califano, Stu Eizenstat, Jim McIntyre, Charlie Schultze to President Carter, memo, May 16, 1979, PHF, box 131, 5/16/79 folder 3, JCL.

101. Jody Powell to President Carter, memo, May 18, 1979, PHF, box 132, 5/23/79 folder 2, JCL.

102. “National Health Insurance,” CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Almanac Online Edition, cqal79-1185951; originally published in CQ Almanac 1979.

103. Marmor, Politics of Medicare; Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured; Starr, Social Transformation; Steinmo and Watts, “It’s the Institutions, Stupid!”; Wainess, “Ways and Means.”

104. Steinmo, “American Exceptionalism Reconsidered.”

CHAPTER SIX: The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same

1. 1996 State of the Union Address.

2. When the Social Security program faced a solvency crisis in the early 1980s, Reagan and Congress reached a bipartisan compromise to raise the retirement age for future retirees from sixty-five to sixty-seven.

3. However, NLRB rulings and court interpretations of existing labor laws have further constrained labor.

4. Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State.

5. Quoted in Jay Nordlinger, “Our Splendid Cuss: The Likeable Phil Gramm,” National Review, Oct. 1, 2001.

6. Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, a conservative Democrat from Colorado, also switched parties, indicating that the ideological purification of the parties went beyond the South.

7. Polsby, How Congress Evolves, 77. Dixiecrats are defined as Southern Democrats “who have a party support to party opposition ratio of less than 2:1.” All other Southern Democrats are referred to as “mainstream Democrats.”

8. Shafer and Johnston, End of Southern Exceptionalism, chap. 2.

9. Stephen Gettinger, “R.I.P. to a Conservative Force,” CQ Weekly, Jan. 9, 1999, 82–83.

10. The regional average was 62.6% in 1990 and 80.7% in 2000; author’s calculations from COPE scores.

11. The following members of the Congressional Black Caucus from the South all have 2007 lifetime COPE scores of 95% or above: Corrine Brown (D-FL), John Lewis (D-GA), Hank Johnson (D-GA), Bennie Thompson (D-MS), Melvin Watt (D-NC), James Cly-burn (D-SC), Al Green (D-TX), Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX), and Robert Scott (D-VA).

12. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 78.

13. Despite the low rates of unionization in Florida, labor has been effective at mobilizing retired union members and allied constituencies like African Americans.

14. Francia, Future of Organized Labor, chap. 3.

15. Based on exit surveys from the Voter News Service, Francia reports union household turnout rose from 19% in 1992 to 24% in 1996 and 26% in 2000. He cites AFL-CIO estimates that there were 4.6 million more voters from union households in 2000 than in 1992, while votes from nonunion households fell 15.5 million. Voters from union households are estimated to have represented 24% of the electorate in 2004. See ibid., 75, 158.

16. There are some exceptions. Alaska, for example, is one of the most heavily unionized states, but it trends Republican. There are also some New England states with low rates of unionization that consistently vote Democratic. But the Plains and Southern states with their low rates of unionization are the heart of Republican strength, while the Democrats’ strength is in the heavily unionized areas of the Northeast and West Coast.

17. Of the twenty-seven states with union density over 10%, eighteen are represented by two Democrats and eight are represented by one Democrat and one Republican.

18. Black and Black, Divided America, 95. In 2004 exit polls, union members (as opposed to union households) were 18% of Northeastern voters and 17% of Pacific Coast voters, compared with 7% in the South and Plains states.

19. Ronald Brownstein, “For GOP, a Southern Exposure,” National Journal, May 23, 2009.

20. Abramowitz and Saunders, “Exploring the Bases”; Levendusky, Partisan Sort.

21. Rohde, Parties and Leaders.

22. Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking.

23. Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 142–47.

24. Ibid., 146; Barry, Ambition and the Power, 279–80.

25. Mike Gildea, formerly in the AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, interview by author, July 23, 1999.

26. Sinclair, “New World.”

27. It is difficult to quantify the number of filibusters over time because no formal request or petition must be filed to launch a filibuster and it is not always clear when a filibuster is under way. Barbara Sinclair estimates that the average number of filibusters per Congress has gone from 11.2 in the 1970s to 52 in the 110th Congress (2007–8). Ibid., 7.

28. David Nather, “Switching Parties: Great Expectations.” CQ Weekly, May 4, 2009, 1024–32.

29. On the rise of gridlock, see Brady and Volden, Revolving Gridlock.

30. Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 141–42.

31. “A Report on Congress: 1986,” Support Services Department, AFL-CIO Publications, Series 1, GMMA.

32. On the Reagan administration and organized labor, see Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream, 138–40; Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn, 130–37; Gross, Broken Promise, chap. 13; and Moody, Injury to All, 139–42.

33. Ginsburg, Full Employment, 76; Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn, 118–19.

34. Geoghegan, Which Side Are You On?

35. Edsall, New Politics of Inequality; Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn; Phillips, Politics of Rich and Poor.

36. For a discussion of the relationship between organized labor and Clinton, see Dark, Unions and the Democrats, chap. 8.

37. Quoted in Helen Dewar and David Von Drehle, “Stimulus Stalled, White House Seeks New Deal,” Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1993.

38. Quoted in Kollman, Outside Lobbying, 143.

39. Uslaner, “Let the Chits Fall.”

40. Mike Synar (D-OK), the chairman of the DSG, pointed out the feebleness of this argument by noting, “The only people complaining are the same people who voted against reconciliation. If you don’t like voting, you shouldn’t be a congressman.” Quoted in “Striker Replacement Bill Stalls in Senate,” CQ Almanac 1993, 396.

41. The Democrats’ majority had fallen to fifty-six seats in June 1993 in a special election to fill a Texas Senate seat.

42. For example, a March 1993 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll found 74% of respondents supported an overhaul and 66% were willing to pay higher taxes to fix the system. Poll cited in “Clinton’s Health Care Plan Laid to Rest,” 1994 CQ Almanac. Steinmo and Watts cite Roper polls with 70–82% support for universal health care. Steinmo and Watts, “It’s the Institutions, Stupid.”

43. Skocpol, Boomerang, 27.

44. On the development of the plan, see Hacker, Road to Nowhere, and Johnson and Broder, System.

45. Skocpol, Boomerang, 39.

46. Gottschalk discusses the evolution of labor’s position. She is quite critical of labor’s willingness to give up on the single-payer option in the interest of political expediency, arguing that this concession prevented organized labor from building a viable political coalition in favor of comprehensive health care reform. Gottschalk, Shadow Welfare State, chap. 7.

47. Hacker, Road to Nowhere, 133.

48. Christina Del Valle, “Even Cheerleaders Get the Blues,” Business Week, May 30, 1994, 60; Gottschalk, Shadow Welfare State, 143–46.

49. Kenneth Crowe, “Health Care Solidarity,” Newsday, Feb. 22, 1994.

50. Ibid.

51. Bennett Roth, “Labor Is Cool to Compromise on Health Plan,” Houston Chronicle, Feb. 22, 1994.

52. Steinmo and Watts, “It’s the Institutions, Stupid,” 366.

53. Skocpol, Boomerang, 98.

54. Explanations discussed in Hacker, Road to Nowhere; Johnson and Broder, System; and Skocpol, Boomerang.

55. “Clinton’s Health Care Plan Laid to Rest,” 320.

56. Ibid., 336.

57. This was necessary if the committee was to produce a bill at all. The committee was composed of nine Republicans and eleven Democrats, two of whom were adamantly opposed to the Clinton plan.

58. Quoted in “Clinton’s Health Care Plan Laid to Rest,” 320.

59. Skocpol, Boomerang, 145.

60. Quoted in “Clinton’s Health Care Plan Laid to Rest,” 355.

61. Skocpol, Boomerang.

62. Hager and Pianin, Balancing Act.

63. Noble, Welfare As We Knew It, 123–25.

64. Gimpel, Legislating the Revolution, 13.

65. Hager and Pianin, Balancing Act, 276.

66. The executive order was later invalidated by a federal appeals court.

67. In most of the cloture votes Republicans D’Amato and Specter joined all the Democrats in opposing cloture.

68. “Congress Clears Wage Increase with Tax Breaks for Business,” CQ Almanac 1996.

69. Frank Swoboda, “Labor Believes It’s Gotten a Lift,” Washington Post, Oct. 25, 1996.

70. Steven Greenhouse, “Organized Labor Outlines Ambitious Goals for the Next Congress,” New York Times, Dec. 17, 1996.

71. Masters, “Unions in the 2000 Election.”

72. In the 91st Congress (1969–70) the House overwhelmingly passed a constitutional amendment to eliminate the electoral college, but cloture failed 54–36 to shut off a Senate filibuster.

73. “GOP Rejects Ergonomics Rules,” CQ Almanac 2001, 133.

74. Background for this discussion in “Homeland Department Created,” CQ Almanac 2002.

75. Harold Meyerson, “New Labor,” American Prospect, Jan. 14, 2005, found at www.prospect.org.

76. Ultimately a bipartisan group of senators brokered a compromise to avert the change in Senate rules, and President Bush’s two Supreme Court appointments were easily confirmed.

77. Steven Greenhouse, “Unions Protest against Bush’s Social Security Proposal,” New York Times, Apr. 1, 2005.

78. Lafer, “Neither Free nor Fair”; Friedman et al., Restoring the Promise.

79. In keeping with the practice that Speakers do not typically sponsor legislation, Speaker Pelosi joined these eight Democrats in not signing on as a cosponsor of the bill.

80. Bensel, Sectionalism, 253.

81. Quoted in Associated Press story by Tom Krisher, “Angry UAW Members Lash Out at Southern Senators,” Dec. 12, 2008, found at www.abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=6447769.

82. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, Polarized America, chap. 6.

83. Hacker, “Privatizing Risk.”

84. Brady and Volden, Revolving Gridlock.

85. For theory on polarization and inertia, see Tsebelis, Veto Players.

86. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, Polarized America, 177.

Conclusion

1. Lichtenstein, “From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining.”

2. See, for example, Goldfield, Decline of Organized Labor; Lichtenstein, Labor’s War; and Moody, Injury to All.

3. Orren and Skowronek, Search for American Political Development, 113.

4. Theriault, Party Polarization.

5. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill, 61.

6. Ware, Democratic Party Heads North, 255.

7. Steinmo, “Rethinking American Exceptionalism.”

8. According to exit polls, Obama carried 95% of African Americans, 67% of Latinos, 60% of union members, and 59% of union households. Exit polls found at www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/. The union vote was particularly important in states like Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan. Obama won an 18-point margin with white male union members, compared with a McCain margin among white, male nonunion members of 16 points. Steven Greenhouse, “Still with Obama but Worried,” New York Times, Mar. 3, 2010.

9. The AFL-CIO and many of the affiliates are cooperating with environmentalists to back efforts to create “green” jobs, and they have also been heavily involved with consumer groups on financial regulation, often leading protests on Wall Street.

10. Hopkins, “2008 Election,” 381–84. Adam Nossiter, “For South, a Waning Hold on National Politics,” New York Times, Nov. 11, 2008.

11. Ronald Brownstein, “For GOP, a Southern Exposure,” National Journal, May 23, 2009.

12. AFL-CIO 2009 Convention, Resolution 2.

13. Jack Calmes and Robert Pear, “Rift over Stimulus Embroils G.O.P.” New York Times, Feb. 22, 2009.

14. AFL-CIO 2009 Convention, Resolution 4.

15. Matthew Murray, “Solidarity with Health Reform,” Roll Call, Sept. 8, 2009.

16. Steven Greenhouse, “New Yorker Leads Labor Charge for Health Care Reform,” New York Times, Aug. 27, 2009.

17. Various polls at www.pollster.com; Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, Jan. 2010. www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/8042.cfm.

18. Tracey D. Samuelson, “Brown, Coakley Try to Get Out the Vote,” Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 19, 2010. In fact, a slim plurality of union members voted for Brown. Jacobs and Skocpol suggest confusion over the status of the tax on high-cost health care plans likely contributed to this result. Jacobs and Skocpol, Health Care Reform, 105.

19. Washington Post, Landmark, 52.

20. Richard Trumka, “Time for Hill to Get Health Care Right.” Roll Call, Feb. 9, 2010.

21. Washington Post, Landmark, 52.

22. The AFL-CIO Executive Council did not officially endorse the bill until days before the House vote on the Senate bill because of divisions over the benefits tax. The International Association of Machinists was particularly strident in its opposition. But powerful affiliates, like AFSCME, came out for the bill much earlier, and the AFL-CIO mobilized behind reform throughout the entire debate, even though it had not given its official endorsement to any particular plan.

23. Kevin Bogardus, “Harkin: Kennedy’s Illness Stalled Card-Check,” The Hill, Sept. 11, 2009; Kevin Bogardus and J. Taylor Rushing, “Senate Democrats Pull Back on Specter’s Card-Check Prediction,” The Hill, Sept. 17, 2009.

24. Max Fraser, “Labor’s Love Lost: Is the Battle for EFCA a Quixotic Crusade?” New Labor Forum, Fall 2009, 23–27.

25. Bennett Roth, “Lincoln’s Victory Tests the State of the Unions,” Roll Call, June 9, 2010.

26. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2009, Jan. 22, 2010.

27. Moody, “American Labor’s Civil War,” 8.

28. Quoted in Kirk Victor, “Letdown on the Left,” National Journal, Dec. 5, 2009, 26.

29. Esther Kaplan, “A Rump Group at Labor,” Nation, Apr. 12, 2010, 18–22; Steven Greenhouse, “Plan to Seek Use of U.S. Contracts as a Wage Lever,” New York Times, Feb. 26, 2010.

30. Steven Greenhouse, “Deadlock Is Ending on Labor Board,” New York Times, Mar. 31, 2010.

31. See, for example, Asher et al., American Labor Unions; Delaney, Fiorito, and Masters, “Effects of Union Organizational and Environmental Characteristics”; Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau, “Union Membership and Voting”; Francia, Future of Organized Labor; Greenstone, Labor in American Politics; Jacobson, “Effect of AFL-CIO’s Voter Education Campaigns”; Masters, “Unions in the 2000 Election”; and Sousa, “Organized Labor in the Electorate.”

32. In terms of the political orientation of union members, their support for Democratic presidential candidates has followed the ups and downs of the larger electorate, peaking with 85.9% support for Johnson in 1964 and falling to a low point of 43.1% support for McGovern in 1972, with support typically falling at around 60%. Union members have typically supported Democratic presidential candidates at rates 10–20% higher than those of the larger electorate. The contrast between white union and non-union members is even more pronounced. Union support for Democratic House and Senate candidates has been more consistent, averaging around two-thirds. Union membership has had an appreciable impact on voting behavior even if labor union members do not vote as a monolithic block. Sousa, “Organized Labor.”

33. Al Barkan to William Kircher, director of Department of Organization, following 1966 elections, Department of Organization Files, box 49, folder 2, GMMA.

34. Edison Media Research exit polls reported at cnn.com.

35. Anjeanette Damon, “Working on Winning Union Vote in Nevada,” USA Today, Oct. 30, 2008; John Nichols, “Repainting Statehouses Blue,” Nation, Oct. 23, 2007, 27.

36. AFL-CIO 2009 Convention, Resolution 2.

37. Joseph Schatz, “Looking for Room to Maneuver,” CQ Weekly, Apr. 19, 2010.

38. Hacker, “Privatizing Risk,” 257.

39. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2009, Jan. 22, 2010.

40. Estimates from 1994 and 2000 studies by Kate Brofenbrenner, a 1998 study by James Rundle, and a 2005 study by Nik Theodore reported in Lafer, Neither Free nor Fair, 42.

41. Although SEIU president Andrew Stern came under increasing criticism for being too top-down, too conciliatory with employers, and making the addition of new members a priority at all costs, including the interests of existing members.

42. Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, “Changing to Organize,” 54.

43. Ibid., 40.