6. The Breakup of Yugoslavia and Its Immediate Aftermath



CHAPTER SIX

The Breakup of Yugoslavia and Its Immediate Aftermath

> Yugoslavia's communists tried for more than forty years to "solve" the national question. . . . [U]ltimately they failed. But their failure was not so much a failure of confederalism, but rather a failure of the concept of limited democracy, of the idea that democracy can emerge out of one-party rule. (Ramet 1992a: 279)

1. Introduction: To Balkanize Is to Europeanize

Yugoslavia is just one of the many places in which international boundaries do not coincide with those of ethnic groups. With the exception of Slovenia—which had a 90 percent Slovene population—all other states from the former Yugoslavia are quite mixed. The federal structure created in 1945 made it certain that the largest and most scattered nation, the Serbs, would not be given a sufficiently large republic to enable them to dominate others: "Equality among six republics was used to mobilize support among these national groups for the communist party and its leaders" (Pavkovic 2000: 51). However, ultimately even this strategy could not save the country from disaster.

Two dominant schools of thought exist on the causes of the Balkans war. The popular view asserts that the collapse of the Yugoslav state in 1991 reflected a general trend in post–Cold War politics. According to this explanation, ethnic antagonisms grew, prospered, and took on numerous characteristics—institutional, political, economic, and cultural—when confronted with the simultaneous tasks of political and economic liberalization. This argument is expressed effectively by Cohen (1992: 371): "[H]istorically, the potential for ethnic and religious based violence in the Balkans has been most evident during periods of regime crisis and breakdown (for example the last phase of Ottoman control leading to the Balkan wars, the final throes of Hapsburg rule and the collapse and dismemberment of the Yugoslav state in 1941)."

Less widely held is the view that sees purpose rather than inevitability in the

crisis. The Yugoslav conflict did not represent a direct and certain outcome of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc countries. Nor did the origins of the conflict begin with centuries-old hatreds (Kaufman 2001). On the contrary, Yugoslavia's destruction began as late as the 1980s, with the rise to power of nationalist (as opposed to communist) leaders; the process of ethnic group polarization seems to have started as recently as fifteen years ago (Ramet 1991a; Saideman 1997). From this less common perspective, most recently advanced by Gagnon (1992, 1994, 1994/1995) and Saideman (1997), Serbian territorial and ethnic ambitions constitute a response to both domestic and international opportunities (see, in particular, Gagnon 1994, 1994/1995).

Why, despite the appearance of democratic transition, did Serbia's leaders behave in such divisive ways? Political participation and opportunities in Yugoslavia realigned quickly along narrow bands of ethnic identity (Midlarsky 1997). Coupled with the deliberate suppression of nonethnic issues and unfolding opportunities, the policy options narrowed systematically, which led to interethnic confrontation, crisis, and war.

This chapter assesses the extent to which domestic and international factors conditioned the behavior of key actors in the Balkans conflict, with a principal focus on Serbian and Croatian involvement and some attention to the Slovene and Bosnian cases as well.

The Yugoslavia case is significant for two reasons. First, like the Thai Malay case, elements of both secessionism and irredentism are present. However, the relationship between these types of ethnic strife is the inverse of the Thai Malay case. Whereas irredentist impulses eventually gave way to separatism in the case of the Southeast Asian conflict, separatism sensu stricto (secession), heralded by the breakup of the Yugoslav federation, was followed by efforts at territorial retrieval on the part of Serbian and Croatian regimes. Second, in terms of ethnic diversity, institutional constraints, cleavage, and affinity, the main components of the framework, the Yugoslav case is significantly different. The Balkan conflict provides an opportunity to examine ethnically based security issues from the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum, namely, from the perspective of a Type I_a state.

As described in chapter 2, Type I_a states have low institutional constraints and a dominant ethnic group. Elites therefore can mobilize the population through manipulation of group symbols in order to pursue foreign policy goals. Foreign and domestic policies are designed to appeal to the dominant ethnic group, but not in a way that would threaten the power base of elites. Since elites are unconstrained, they tend not to worry about the ramifications of policy choices. Therefore, Type I_a is associated with *belligerence* in figure 2.1.

After this introduction, the analysis is carried out in five additional parts.

In the second section, the historical background to the current conflict is presented. The third section is an analysis of the precrisis period, including key decisions taken. The fourth section examines the crisis period and focuses on the three "theaters"—Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. The fifth section conveys the analysis and tests the propositions. Conclusions are offered in the sixth and final section.

Faced with the task of disentangling several distinct theater-based crises, namely, the secessionist crises of Slovenia and Croatia and Bosnian irredentism/secessionism, one simplifying procedure is adopted. To provide an account that maintains the continuity, flow, and contextual integrity of the entire Yugoslav crisis, each of the theater-based components will be treated as a separate but integral series of events in the larger Yugoslavian conflict. Phases and periods specific to each crisis will be disaggregated for purposes of clarity, although some events occurred simultaneously.

For two reasons, this analysis addresses the component parts of the individual crises and wars within the broader framework of interstate ethnic conflict. First, at a theoretical level it is important to see how aspects of the framework relate to varying combinations of opportunities and constraints as presented in each specific conflict. Second, the Yugoslav crisis started a civil war, albeit a complex one, which turned into an interstate conflict when Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia became de facto states, processes that occurred while conflicts got underway in each crisis theater. In this sense, the war in Yugoslavia began as a civil war—a foreign policy crisis for Yugoslavia—but escalated to an interstate ethnic conflict (i.e., an international crisis) as each of its republics declared independence (Ramet 1992b; Riga 1992).

2. History and Background to the Crisis: The Panther and the Lynx

Figure 6.1 shows a time line for the Yugoslav conflict that begins with the end of World War II and carries through to the present. Tito maintained cohesion within Yugoslavia through the idea of "panslavism," which had both domestic and international imperatives. Throughout the 1950s, Tito worked very hard to create Yugoslav national unity by reducing the rights of the republics while simultaneously increasing power at the center. This artificially created unity of the South Slavs was the main reason behind the coherent internal structure in Yugoslavia for a long time. Union served to insulate the region from outside interference and promised a harmonious vision of the future that was better and more peaceful than before.



Figure 6.1. The Yugoslavia Conflict

As the epigraph to this chapter observes, while ethnic nationalism provided the foundation for Yugoslav politics, socialism continued to exist as a closed system in which an elite bureaucracy strictly controlled public opinion and ideology, and the country never developed a tradition of legitimate democratic rule of the kind that would permit the cultural and social emergence of a Yugoslav, as opposed to particularist, elite (Flere 1991). In brief, Yugoslav politics always reflected a monopoly over certain institutions by specific ethnic groups, which fits the definition of a "patronage democracy" from Chandra (2004: 6): "a democracy in which the state monopolizes access to jobs and services, *and* in which elected officials have discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state."

Particular identities and competing visions of the future among Yugoslavia's various ethnic groups developed most significantly during the decade immediately after Tito's death in 1980. The confederal structures instituted under his power gradually ceded more and more power to the republics. Subsequent inability of the leaders of these republics to develop a national policy consensus can be traced to the rise to power of Serb nationalist leaders and the failure of the other republics to pursue policies that would balance this domination (Midlarsky 1997). Reformists, who held firmly to the view that the constitution and economy could be restructured along existing political arrangements, became discredited by their failure to respond effectively to Yugoslavia's economic collapse. These leaders could

match neither the populist appeal of ethnic leaders nor their political visions that promised for Croatians and Slovenians a potentially greater role in the Western economic system, and for Serbs the opportunity to control the destiny of the South Slav peoples (Glenny 1992c).

Balancing against competing claims had been effective in the past, largely because the communist leaders of the republics had a common interest in cooperation to ensure their preservation. Mainstream elements in the elite succumbed to leaders with more narrowly defined interests. The inherent problem in this arrangement, as Lake and Rothchild (1996, 1998) observe, is that the potential for intransigence among leaders whose power derives from ethnic sensibilities is very high. At some point there are, at least for the leaders, greater benefits to be had in whittling away at a decentralized structure than maintaining it. As the Yugoslav case exemplifies, these perceptions do not always converge at once; Serbia showed reluctance to embrace change, with Croatia and Slovenia clearly more open to it.

The failure of Yugoslavia's leaders to preserve national unity in the post-communist state can be attributed to the presence of several significant factors, which included (*a*) a society that was never fully integrated, retaining instead a basic segmentary quality and lacking the infrastructure of a civil society; (*b*) the existence of socially separate and culturally different systems throughout the republics and provinces; and (*c*) widespread economic disparities between the republics. It would be erroneous, at the same time, to attribute the sources of the conflict to any single structural factor without paying heed to the political ambitions of specific ethnic leaders.

Yugoslavia's ethnic configuration had ramifications not only for its viability as a state but also at the level of the various republics and provinces. These historical, demographic, and political antecedents are all important components of the ongoing conflict. Each is considered in turn.[1]

2.1 The Battlefield of History

Observers of Yugoslav politics note that processes of integration and disintegration tend to be cyclical. On the one hand, successive efforts by Serbian leaders to bring a unified Yugoslavia under Serbian control take place. On the other hand, different groups, mainly the Croatians, always seek autonomy from the Serb-dominated center. Quests for majority status and protection of minority rights have been dominant features of Yugoslavia's political terrain; these tendencies emerge with the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires and development of Catholicism and a common language (Cohen 1992; *Globe and Mail,* 19 June 1993).[2]

Yugoslavian territory fell under Habsburg rule in the thirteenth century. In the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Empire began to conquer the southern and eastern parts. For a long time fighting continued over this Balkan land. Until the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire extended its boundaries against the Habsburgs and basically dominated the area. However, after the eighteenth century, the Habsburg Empire started to regain its power, and with the Ottoman Empire already in decline, they recaptured some areas. During the First World War, both the Ottoman and Habsburg empires (known as Austria-Hungary after 1867) collapsed. Germany and Russia lost territory and gained new forms of government as a result of the war. In the center of Europe, small independent states started to emerge. When the national council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs declared the independence of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs from Austria-Hungary, Yugoslavia became one of these independent states (Pavkovic 2000; Rogel 1998).

Northern regions of Croatia and Slovenia, which fell under Austrian and Hungarian control, adopted Roman Catholicism and the Latin alphabet. When the southern regions—Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia—came under the Byzantine and later Turkish Ottoman empires, they converted to Orthodox Christianity—or in some cases Islam—and started to use the Cyrillic alphabet (Banac 1984). Composed of distinct religions, these two main groups are as different as the panther and the lynx (West 1941). Although they practice different creeds, Croats, Serbs, and Muslims share a common language, Serbo-Croatian, brought about by the unifying efforts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Waves of external control impacted upon on these disparate pockets of regional nationalities in two ways. First, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century effectively created "oases" of Muslim communities within the southern half of Yugoslavia. Second, the Yugoslav dream of a Slavic state, elaborated mainly by Croatian intellectuals at the beginning of the nineteenth century, took hold (Cohen 1992, 1993). Both the Serbs and the Croats saw each other as oppressed brothers. They believed that the two main religious groups, after throwing off imperial shackles in the late-nineteenth and early- twentieth centuries, could rediscover their commonality and live together under one national roof. The Tsarist Russian Empire strongly supported the unity of Slavic groups. In the course of its dealings with the then-major powers, Russia also attempted to superimpose "panslavism" over Yugoslavia (Stavrou 1976). However, the idea of a union of South Slav peoples attracted little popular support except from the Serbs, the largest among them, who regarded inclusion of the Croats, the Slovenes, and the Macedonians within the borders of an expanded state as fulfillment of their destiny (Stavrou 1976).

As mentioned earlier, in 1918 a unified Yugoslav state, which brought together several South Slav and non-Slav ethnic groups, was created. Serbia annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in that same year. At that point, the Versailles Treaty established Yugoslavia's borders, but the state did not adopt the name of Yugoslavia until 1929, retaining instead the official name, "the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" (Stavrou 1976: 137). Belgrade became the capital of the new Yugoslav state. Under the auspices of a constitutional monarchy and unitary government, Yugoslavia fell under Serbian control.

The Second World War ended with the victory of the communist party in Yugoslavia. In addition, Yugoslavia became a federation of six republics—Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina—and two autonomous units—Kosovo and Vojvodina (both in Serbia). The war also intensified underlying ethnic tensions. The primary ongoing problems reflect wartime atrocities perpetrated among the Serbian and Croatian communities. In 1941, after invading Yugoslavia, Germany set up a puppet regime in Croatia under Ante Pavelic, head of the fascist Ustase, which herded Jews, Gypsies, and Serbs into concentration camps. In retribution, royalist Serbian guerrillas, known as Chetniks, destroyed Croatian villages. Serbia already had lost a quarter of its population in the First World War and an estimated half million more during World War Two (Ramet 1992b).

Yugoslavia's ethnic demography by the end of the Second World War became more or less fixed in composition. Ethnically diverse parts of Croatia and Bosnia served as illustrations of peaceful coexistence.[3] When Tito broke off the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo from the Republic of Serbia and drew new federal boundaries that left millions of Serbs outside its rule, Serbian angst increased. The Serbs then maintained their status as the most numerous ethnic group in Yugoslavia (36 percent of the entire population) but never formed an absolute majority (Flere 1991).[4] They comprised a majority within Serbia (65 percent) itself but not in the province of Kosovo, for example (only 13 percent), where in recent years their numbers have diminished rapidly.[5]

2.2 The Politics of Presecessionist Yugoslavia

Under Tito, the son of Croat and Slovene parents, Yugoslavia emerged as a federation of six reasonably equal republics. Despite its federal nature, Yugoslavia became more centralized than ever under his rule. Disputes often arose concerning ethnic policy and the methods for advancing ethnic group interests. For example, the Tito version of liberalized communism endorsed regional but not political pluralism (Ramet 1992b). In essence, this meant

that Yugoslavia would have two core domestic policy principles and one foreign policy principle. In the case of domestic policies, these were self-management embodied in workers' councils, brotherhood and unity (i.e., the doctrine of ethnic harmony through one-party rule), and a unique path to development, as with economic and social reforms initiated soon after the break with Moscow in 1948. On the foreign policy front, the principle of nonalignment became the cornerstone of Yugoslavia's orientation to the East and West. One of the key purposes of nonalignment derived from domestic concerns, namely, to prevent foreign sponsorship of national conflicts in Yugoslavia. This foreign policy implicitly assumed that ethnic groups would serve as links with their kin across borders and thus help to improve relations with bordering states (Stavrou 1976).

Tito's version of liberalized communism addressed ethnic relations on both domestic and international fronts. The main political structure resembled a federalist, balance-of-power system, characterized by a shifting pattern of flexible coalitions (Ramet 1992a). Under Tito, "the Federal government in Yugoslavia often functioned as *primus inter pares* in a nine-actor universe" (Ramet 1992a: 277). This meant in theory that participation of all ethnic groups in decision making at the federal level had been provided for, with unanimous approval required through interrepublican committees.

At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, decision making shifted from the federation to the republics. A key feature of the federal system in its early years (i.e., 1962–66) had been mobilization of all federal units into the system, previously dominated by Croatia and Serbia (Midlarsky 1997). With the constitution of 1974, Yugoslavia turned into a de facto semiconfederation of semisovereign republics when the federal government became a joint committee of the six republics and two autonomous republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina). Vojvodina and Kosovo, the autonomous provinces within Serbia after the Second World War, acquired a dual status with this constitution, not only as parts of the federation but also as constituents of Serbia. (This technically means that they had equal status with other republics.) According to Ramet (1992a: 277), "Tito hoped to hold together a 'liberal system' not by force but by a common ideology, the ideology of 'conservatism.'" A unified party and dependable instruments of coercion became the two pillars of Tito's nationalities policy (Stavrou 1976).

Until this time, the political landscape had been dominated by Serb-Croat rivalries. Afterward, all of the republics began to engage in a pattern of shifting coalitions. Usually the underdeveloped republics allied with Croatia and Slovenia against Serbia on political issues. This system of shifting coalitions

held together largely because of Tito's astute courting of both liberal and conservative contingents within the central apparatus. All component units, regardless of population, territory, or economic power, had equal representation not only in both chambers of the Federal Assembly, but in all federal decision-making bodies including the presidency of the state; this turned out to be an important feature of federalism in practice (Stanovcic 1992).

After Yugoslavia's independence, the central government in Belgrade faced the difficult task of addressing regional economic disparities among six republics and two regions. These disparities broke down along the main ethnic lines in the 1980s, which made the task even more difficult.

Yugoslav federalism's main deficiency was not the distribution of power between the federation and the constituent republics. The real limitation came from actual participation of republics in framing policy (Stanovcic 1992). The federation's multiethnic configuration and disparate levels of modernization, which presented successive Yugoslavian regimes with a narrow field of policy options, proved to be a key deficiency (Ramet 1992a).

Nationalist leaders who tried to advance the interests of their specific ethnic group began to emerge on the political scene. According to Ramet (1992a, 1992b), Croatia and Serbia often allied on economic issues but consistently opposed each other on political issues. In turn, the underdeveloped republics allied with each other on economic issues, and Slovenia and Croatia did so on political issues. For its part, the federal government, interested perhaps more than anything else in stability, tended to side with the preponderant bloc (Ramet 1992a).

While the central government remained the legitimate arbiter of Yugoslavian political and economic issues, the system worked. When the Yugoslav economy faltered after Tito's death in 1980, reform-minded middle-level bureaucrats waged a policy-based war against nationalist conservatives. Serbian nationalists and conservatives, including Slobodan Milosevic, an executive of an energy firm, came to the forefront of this struggle. However, economic decline and social unrest were not the only factors that led to the collapse of the Yugoslav political and constitutional system. Stability could not be achieved in spite of federal government efforts; the rise of nationalism and increasing ethnic polarization threatened the balance of power among national elites (Pavkovic 2000). One specific incident, as will become apparent, stands out as a precipitant to later conflicts.

When Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo province protested the failure of the Belgrade government to establish an effective and coherent economic policy in 1981, Serb leaders used this confrontation as a pretext for seizing land from ethnic Albanians. Conservative communist factions within the Serbian

party organization stage-managed an internal coup in December 1987, which brought to power Milosevic and ousted most reform-minded politicians from the Serbian party leadership. It did not take long for significant changes to occur; Milosevic saw the opportunity here. He used the Kosovo situation in order to control the Serbian communist party in September 1987, and later he limited the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Even more interesting is that while seizing the opportunity, he also issued a manifesto framing the Serbs as an oppressed and endangered people (Ramet 1992b). Prepared by members of the Serbia Academy of Sciences, the manifesto portrayed Serbia as an imperiled victim of an "anti-Serbian coalition" (Ramet 1992a). Since the late 1960s, Serbs were scared by the possibility that they would lose control in Kosovo. After these events, Serbian nationalism continued to rise and the fear of the non-Serbian population reached its peak (Rogel 1998).

As noted earlier, in 1988 and 1989 the Serbian communist party had succeeded in gaining power in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro. In the wake of failure by the Communist Party's elders to assert firm control over Serbian conservatives, other regional nationalist leaders jumped to take advantage of the new confederalism. This process became highly visible when the Yugoslav economy collapsed in 1988 and vitriolic nationalism increasingly dictated the federal government's choices. In this context of political weakness, new agendas began to emerge along ethnic lines from the non-Serb republics as well.

In brief, the Yugoslav federation ultimately failed to frame coherent domestic and foreign policies because of Serb dominance in the decision-making process (Gagnon 1994). The internal balance of power, which had brought stability to Yugoslavia, collapsed under the weight of ethnic opportunism. In 1989, the Yugoslav Communist Party began to fracture along ethnic lines. Enmeshed within these processes was the monopolization of certain institutions by specific ethnic groups (Gagnon 1992, 1994/95). Subsequent inability of the leaders of the republics to develop a national consensus on policy can be traced to the rise to power of Serb nationalist leaders and failure of the other republics to pursue balancing policies (Ramet 1992a, 1992b). The emergence of nationalist leaders, chiefly concerned with advancing the interests of their ethnic group, followed the failure of Tito's heir to find a way out of the country's serious economic and political problems.[6]

Yugoslavia by the early 1990s had shifted from a society based on balancing, engendered by decentralized constitutional arrangements, to one in which ethnic control and coercion became central. Slovenian and Croatian leaders quickly took advantage of the formally decentralized structure of both the Yugoslav Communist Party and the state to develop their own strategies for crisis management and reform.

In response, the Belgrade regime shifted toward more coercive measures in an effort to neutralize and marginalize the main threat to Serbian domination: democratic and reformist appeals to greater representation of minorities. Subsequent efforts to create an enlarged Serbia ensured a greater majority of Serbs (who are distributed throughout the republics), and that secured both the continuing existence of the conservative ruling party's hold on power and preservation of the existing power structure (Gagnon 1994, 1994/95)

Reformers, in the waning days of Yugoslavia's life, held fast to the view that the constitution and economy could be restructured along existing political arrangements.[7] The failure of reformist policies to take hold discredited them and their followers. These leaders could match neither the populism of ethnic elites nor their political visions. When power derives from ethnic sensibilities, there is an inherent problem: a high potential for intransigence among leaders. At some point, the benefits from weakening the decentralized structure exceed those of maintaining it (Saideman 1997, 1998b). Domestic ambition then transforms into international conflict.

3. Precrisis: The Road to Secession, April 1990 to 25 June 1991

Multiparty elections occurred throughout the country from April to December 1990 (*Globe and Mail,* 11 December 1990). By the fall of 1990, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina came under noncommunist rule and Macedonia, under a coalition government with a communist minority. Only in Serbia and Montenegro did the communists continue to hold on to power, and those in Serbia already had distanced themselves from Tito by undertaking a strategy that embraced all ethnic Serbs under the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). In Serbia the SPS managed to win 62 percent of the seats and then set its sights on Serbian interests elsewhere, especially in Croatia and Slovenia (Gagnon 1994).

Nationalist political mobilization in Yugoslav politics ended up bringing many new faces to power. In the past, all political elites had the same kind of interest and shared Yugoslav ideology, which held the country together. However, new communist national elites had very different political interests, and this facilitated fragmentation. The newly elected governments led by Kucan in Slovenia and Tudjman in Croatia wanted to achieve a "confederation of sovereign states" and insisted on the right to secede (Kaufmann 2001; Pavkovic 2000). In this sense, elections can be seen as the end of the period

of political fragmentation—under way since the 1960s—and the beginning of the political impasse (Pavkovic 2000).

Two points of contention emerged between the new leaders of the republics. First, who would control the army? (Midlarsky 1997). More specifically, for Serb leaders with an interest in Slovenia, the question referred to control over the Territorial Defense Forces (established by Tito)—the Slovenian Government versus the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA), then under Serbian control (Saideman 1998b). The second point of contention, in Croatia, concerned finding a response to the Serbian question. The Serbian minority already had begun to protest against Croatian political dominance. In response, Belgrade engineered the takeover of Croatia's Serbian party (SDS) by hard-line forces, known as the Krajina, in the Croatian region of Dalmatia. Any Serbs willing to negotiate with Zagreb over their status within Croatia became discredited by the words of the SDS and SPS (Croatia's Serbian party) (Saideman 1998b).

After the elections, the idea of unilateral declaration gained popularity in Slovenia and Croatia. Such a declaration, however, not only would breach the territorial unity of Yugoslavia, but also stimulate a military confrontation with the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA). At the same time, Serbs in the Krajina Region in Croatia would be expected to resist the idea of independence and try to keep their ties with Yugoslavia and Serbia (Pavkovic 2000).

By May 1990, neither the Slovenian nor Croatian governments were ready militarily to fight (or in case of Croatia, with Serb rebels supported by Serbs [Pavkovic 2000]). Therefore, instead of announcing independence right away, both governments tried to negotiate "with other republican leaders the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states while, at the same time, building up their own military forces for any future showdown with their opponents" (Pavkovic 2000: 125).

Armed by the JNA, the SDS-led Croatian Serb minority established numerous enclaves, blocked roads, and seized control of the local facilities by April 1991. In Kosovo, a harsh crackdown by the Serbian government stimulated further Albanian riots. Serb intransigence signaled a decisive shift in Serbian crisis management strategy. Belgrade characterized events in Kosovo and Krajina as "inter-ethnic fighting," thereby necessitating the immediate intervention of the army. In reality, the SPS wanted to bring all Serbs under one state and used these conflicts as a pretext for intervention. To recentralize the system, one that worked to the advantage of the Serbs, Milosevic suggested that force might be necessary. Croatia and Slovenia, by contrast, still held to the now-crumbling dream that the system could be fully decentral-

ized, with retention of only an economic union and coordination in foreign policy and military matters (Ramet 1992b).

When the Slovenian and Croatian governments declared that they wanted to assert sovereignty for their republics and have a confederation of sovereign states, the president's response was clear. Assigning any special rights to nations would not be acceptable under any circumstances (Pavkovic 2000; Cohen 1992, 1993). After that reply, on 23 December, Slovenians voted for independence. The Slovenian president made it public that Slovenia no longer wanted to be a part of a confederal Yugoslavia that could not safeguard its independence (Kaufman 2001).

According to Pavkovic (2000: 128), at the time of independence, Serbs constituted an absolute majority in eleven municipalities of the Krajina region and substantial minorities in fourteen municipalities in Western and Eastern Slavonia. Therefore, in January 1991, the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina became established in four Serb-controlled areas. In May 1991, the Krajina area of Western Croatia proclaimed unification with Serbia, but the Serbian parliament refused to accept this assertion. Serbs in that region got support and aid from Milosevic and his government in different forms. This support came in the first of many attacks on Croatian populations as well as uncooperative Serbs and signaled the beginning of "ethnic cleansing."[8]

On 25 June 1991, Croatia and then Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. With Yugoslavia's territorial integrity threatened, Belgrade issued a warning statement to the Slovenian and Croatian governments. It called the republics' actions illegal and ordered the national army (JNA) and police units to seize control posts along Slovenia's borders (Ramet 1992b).

4. The Yugoslav Crisis

4.1 The Slovenian Crisis Theater—26 June to 6 July 1991

Leaders of Yugoslavia's six republics held a series of meetings on 26 June 1991 designed to avert a crisis.[9] The two chief antagonists, Slovenia and Serbia at this time, showed no sign of compromise. Slovenia and Croatia announced that unless some interrepublican agreement could be reached on a new political formula for Yugoslavia, they would terminate their association with the federation. These statements claimed to be not unilateral acts of secession but declarations of sovereignty in which the authority of the federal organs, including the army, would continue to be recognized.[10] Milosevic

opposed outright secessionism but not the idea of a confederation. The large Serbian contingent in the country's military establishment shared this view. However, Milosevic maintained the idea that Serbia needed to continue its support for the unity of Serbs and particularly the large Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia. If self-determination for other ethnic groups did not infringe on the same right of Serbs, Milosevic could be supportive. If necessary, Milosevic would transform the borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect Serb minorities (Gagnon 1994/1995; Saideman 1998b). Leaders of Bosnia and Macedonia, who sensed the importance of international support in case Milosevic implemented his plans for a greater Serbia, made overtures to the European Community in spite of their preferences also to declare independence (Ramet 1992b).

Under instructions from Milosevic, Yugoslavia's prime minister, Markovic, called for the JNA to take control of all international borders.[11] By that time, however, the federal army was in the process of weakening significantly. Slovenia, starting from autumn 1990, declared its national guards separate from the JNA and began to increase its arms supply. Similarly, Croatia was busy buying special weapons for its forces. As discussed earlier, Serbia had great influence on the JNA throughout the dissolution period (Rogel 1998).

Under a 1990 mutual defense pact, Tudjman and Slovenian leaders had agreed to coordinate defense and security policies. When the JNA entered into a ten-day war with Slovenian forces, however, the Croats did not heed the agreement and remained neutral. They feared that involvement would provoke escalation of the conflict.[12] At this stage, international engagement in the Slovenian crisis remained restricted to attempts at mediation in several cease-fires and imposition of sanctions on what then still existed as the state of Yugoslavia.[13]

By mid-July the JNA had moved to Croatia, where intermittent fighting in Serbian-held enclaves—Krajina and Slavonia—already had been underway (Ramet 1992b). Even without the assistance of Croatia, Slovenian forces managed to defeat units of the JNA in a short time period. Additionally, the JNA faced a major international protest. Thus, the Yugoslav president ordered termination of military action and initiated negotiations with the Slovenian government to reach a cease-fire. However, until EC intervention, all attempts at cease-fire failed (Pavkovic 2000). In early July 1991 the European Community (EC) successfully negotiated a cease-fire and an agreement that provided for a three-month moratorium on further moves toward independence by Croatia and Slovenia. The agreement also included EC-sponsored negotiations among the republics about their future. As for crisis abatement, the war in Slovenia effectively ended and JNA forces agreed to

withdraw from Slovenia on 18 July 1991. With the withdrawal process completed on 26 October 1991, Slovenia reiterated its declaration of independence.

The Serb decision to withdraw from Slovenia had two important effects. First came spillover of the conflict into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, triggered by the JNA's decision to step up operations in Serb-dominated areas in the two republics. The second effect consisted of the impact that escalation had on Serbian opposition in Serbia. The war had polarized Serbian society, and a civil war appeared imminent (*Economist,* 5–11 June 1993). With the JNA firmly behind him, Milosevic's political position remained solid, partly because organization among Serb moderates continued to be in shambles and any hopes of a confederal Yugoslavia dissolved with it. Criticism of Milosevic or the army was portrayed as treason or as an attempt to "split the Serbian nation" (Ramet 1992b).

In sum, Slovenia's road to independence, with fewer than seventy Slovenians killed, was relatively short, easy, and less bloody as compared to the efforts of other republics in Yugoslavia. When the military conflict shifted to Croatia, Yugoslavia's civil war—a foreign policy crisis characterized by internal threats to its integrity—had become a full interstate ethnic conflict (Sciolino 1993).

4.2 The Croatian Crisis Theater—20 May 1991 to August 1995

Like the Yugoslav-Slovene war, which set the stage for the Croat-Serbian war, this conflict can be characterized as the event that set the stage for violence in Bosnia. The Croat-Serbian war started with secession of Krajina from Croatia in 1991 and ended with the Croatian army's recapture of these areas in 1995.

Croatia received diplomatic recognition from Austria and Germany on 14 January 1992. Yugoslavia, therefore, no longer existed de facto.[14] Only a rump state, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, remained.[15] Sporadic fighting, led by Serbian irregulars determined to secede from Croatia, spread rapidly. The Serb-dominated JNA laid siege to and bombarded key Croatian cities. Vukovar was hit hardest, while Zagreb escaped relatively unscathed.

On 25 August, 1991, Tudjman, president of Croatia, responded to the JNA offensive by saying that, if the JNA did not stop helping Serb rebels in Croatia and withdraw by the end of August, he would declare the army an occupying force (*Globe and Mail,* 26 August 1991: A1). This statement signaled a shift among Croatian leaders; they showed willingness to escalate the crisis to a full-scale interstate war.

By September 1991, Croatia had lost control of large chunks of its territory either through slow advances made by the Federal Army or by loss of Serb-held territory that seceded from Croatia as enthusiasm for quitting Yugoslavia grew. In a radio interview, Milosevic reinforced the point that Croatian independence would not be accepted "unless the Serbs who live in the republic are permitted to secede" (*Globe and Mail,* 24 September 1991: A1). He continued to hold to the argument that the JNA was being used solely to pull the two sides apart.

At this juncture, the government in Zagreb pleaded for international intervention. In response, the EC remained divided. Germany and Austria advocated both immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and expanded EC involvement, while Britain and France urged a more cautious approach. NATO first declared the crisis to be an out-of-conflict area and would not take action at that time (Cohen 1992, 1993). NATO eventually altered its constitution so that it could provide military assistance to nonmilitary multilateral organizations, which led to the July 1992 deployment of naval forces in the Adriatic Sea to assist in sanctions against Serbia. Throughout the fall, the EC, which appointed Lord Carrington as its crisis representative, attempted a series of unsuccessful cease-fires. In reality, both sides used the cease-fires to reinforce their existing positions (*Globe and Mail,* 18 September 1991: A1).

On 5 October, both Croatia and Slovenia proceeded to full independence. Implementation of their previous independence declarations had been placed on hold for three months as quid pro quo in the peace negotiations (*Economist,* 5 October 1991: 12). At the same time, federal army barracks came under siege in Croatian cities (*Globe and Mail,* 24 September 1991: A1). By November, Serb-dominated forces controlled almost 35 percent of Croatia. Ethnically mixed regions became the preserves of either Serbs or Croatians. The embattled cities of Dubrovnik and Vukovar fell under Serbian control. The enfeebled and barely operating Yugoslavian presidency, under Stipe Mesic, requested that UN peacekeeping troops be sent to Croatia and ordered the army to return to barracks. Both pleas were ignored.

Finally, after four months of brokered mediation efforts and at least fifteen failed cease-fires, the EC turned its mission over to the United Nations. The UN, which previously remained on the sidelines because of its own divisions about the propriety of intervening in a seemingly domestic conflict, successfully negotiated a truce between the leaders of Croatia and Serbia in late November. Under pressure from Belgrade, Serb-led forces in Croatia reluctantly had to agree to the plan. Croatian leaders expressed concern about UN involvement; they wanted a six-month deployment of UN forces and argued

that any long-term deployment would allow Serbian irregulars to reinforce control of their territory. It was decided that the UN peacekeeping mission in Croatia would end on 21 February 1993. The cease-fire called for UN peacekeepers to patrol the one-third of Croatia held by Serbs, called for restoration of those areas to Croatian control, and endorsed the right of an estimated 200,000 Croats, who fled during the fighting in 1991, to return home (*Globe and Mail,* 29 January 1993: A1). By the time of the last UN cease-fire, 10,000 people had been killed, 30,000 soldiers and civilians had been wounded, and 730,000 (230,000 Serbs and 500,000 Croats) had become refugees.

Established in early 1992 as an interim measure to create the conditions of peace and security required for the EC-initiated negotiation of an overall settlement to the Croatian crisis, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) responded to the disintegrating situation in Yugoslavia. It evolved into a traditional disengagement mission in Croatia, a humanitarian support mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a small observation mission in Macedonia (*New York Times,* 14, 15, 18 1992: A1).

In Croatia, UNPROFOR initially separated the two opposing groups. Rogel (1998: 26) interpreted this as follows: "In a way, the UN safeguarded Serb military gains, allowing Milosevic to attend to other matters." Simultaneously, Croats hoped to get these Serb-held areas back, which eventually would occur in August 1995.

After a Croatian cease-fire was in place and peace talks had started at a permanent conference in Geneva, Milosevic's stance regarding union with Serbians in Croatia softened substantially. He cited the UN intervention as "the beginning of a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis" (*New York Times,* 29 February 1992: A1). On 27 February 1992, Milosevic declared the war to be over. The Croat leader, Tudjman, ordered the demobilization of twenty thousand reservists, which signaled a decisive deescalation in tensions in the crisis. This transformation can be attributed to two factors.

First, Serbia had undergone catastrophic economic difficulties during the war. Prices in May 1992 rose 1,915.7 percent higher than in May 1991, and the inflation rate stood at 80.5 percent (Ramet 1992b). Faced with increased domestic pressure from hard-line political opponents, the cease-fire provided Milosevic the opportunity to address both Serbia's economic woes and his opponents.[16]

Second, international involvement, including recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence, indicated that Serbia ultimately would be portrayed as the aggressor in the Balkan War.[17] World opinion already had shifted against Serbia, and Milosevic proved quite willing to leave Croatia's Serbs hanging in the balance to bolster his world image.

Both Tudjman and Milosevic purveyed the image that extremists in all camps constituted the greatest threat to the peaceful management of the conflict. This was true especially in Croatia, where the Serbs of Krajina repeatedly failed to comply with the UN agreement. How Milosevic and Tudjman responded to these extreme pressures can be understood best in events that followed the collapse of the UN peace plan twelve months later. These events are discussed below.

On 2 August 1992, President Franjo Tudjman returned to power in Croatia's first elections since declaring its independence a year earlier.[18] Centralization gave the leader increased freedom to pursue his twin strategies of reclaiming Serb-held Croatian territory and obtaining Croat-dominated territory in Bosnia. More specifically, Tudjman wanted to press Croatian Serbs to accept the creation of an autonomous Serb region under Croatian control. The Serbs, for their part, wanted to be part of a greater Serbia, which was not adjacent to all of the areas of Croatia that they controlled.

Faced with upper-house elections in January 1993, Tudjman intentionally took a risk that at once would bolster his support at home and take advantage of a supportive international community. Tudjman's adroit playing of the Serbian card served as an important part of this calculus. Realizing that Milosevic's greatest international interest was to portray himself as a "peacemaker," Tudjman calculated—correctly—that attacks on Serb-held enclaves would not be matched by military reinforcements from Serbia. Thus, on 22 January 1993, Croatia's army launched an offensive to retake territory held by Serbs in southern Croatia (*Globe and Mail,* 13 February 1993: A1). The important strategic role played by the Krajinas came to the fore as the crucial overland link between the capital Zagreb and Dalmatia along Croatia's Adriatic coast.

Justification for the offensive into the Krajina, shielded by UNPROFOR troops, derived from the belief that the UN had failed to oversee the return of Serb-held areas of Croatia to the Croatian government. Tudjman's calculation of the outcome proved to be astute. Milosevic and the international community reacted weakly; furthermore, the UN did not match condemnation of the attack with any punitive action. A second attack on the remaining parts of the Krajina, this time forcing ethnic Serbs to flee their homeland, occurred in August 1995. The mission succeeded dramatically; all of the Krajinas were retaken, save Brcko, which remained a neutral city under the watchful eye of NATO and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) until such time it could be determined to whom the city should be returned.[19]

The Croatian offensive against Serb-held territory was matched by an

effort to stake a claim to territory in Bosnia. As Croatian forces in Croatia held fast, their counterparts in Bosnia-Herzegovina had entered a three-way fight for control. The crisis in Croatia had not ended, but merely shifted venues to the most destructive of the three war zones.

Throughout the spring of 1992, Serb forces already had managed to carve out a substantial portion of territory in Bosnia, including Sarajevo, by ignoring a series of cease-fires (*New York Times,* 19 April 1992: A1). Now the Croats prepared for a third confrontation with Serb forces, this time with Bosnian Muslims (i.e., Bosniacs) as their nominal allies.

There is no doubt that Croatia's war was much longer and harder than Slovenia's. The case of Croatia included two wars. The first was for liberation of Croatia from the Yugoslavian army and the second was in the Krajina region. In both wars the removal of the JNA was the highest priority (Pavkovic 2000). Neither Slovenian nor Croat forces had enough power to remove the JNA. Since the Yugoslav federal army did not threaten any state beyond Yugoslavia, "the Slovenian and Croatian governments could not hope for outside military intervention which would force the Yugoslav army to withdraw from the two republics" (Pavkovic 2000: 155). Therefore, they "played it safe" and neutralized the army by restricting its movements through international monitoring and pressure. For the Croatian war in particular, this tactic worked very well and brought about withdrawal of the JNA (Pavkovic 2000).

4.3 The Bosnian Crisis Theater, 2 March 1992–21 November 1995: Crisis Spillover

Two key factors must be recognized from the beginning. First, the war was different than in Slovenia and Croatia; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, conflict focused on the constitutional setup of the state itself. Second, out of six Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina were most diverse, with no majority national group. The three major parties were organized along ethnic lines: The Party of Democratic Union-Muslim (SDA), the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS). Each had different perceptions about the country's future. These parties continuously formed coalitions and ruled the country after 1990 (Pavkovic 2000).

When an overwhelming number of Bosnians chose independence in the referendum on 2 March 1992, the act had the simultaneous effect of triggering foreign policy crises for both Croatia and Serbia.[20] In the referendum, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs outside of Serb-controlled areas voted overwhelmingly for a "democratic" and independent Bosnia. On 6 April 1992 the

EC extended diplomatic recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to recognition by the EC and later the United States, Serb officials decided to withdraw from the government. This was the harbinger of the crisis.

Among the three crisis theaters, Bosnia-Herzegovina is the most complex. First, although the Bosniacs are a numerical plurality (somewhat more than 40 percent of the population), they did not possess the equivalent political clout and military power of their numerically smaller Serbian and Croatian counterparts. One party to that coalition, the Bosnian SDS, armed with JNA equipment, already had proved successful in stalling any political solution to the future of Bosnia. The fact that the majority of the JNA was stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the conflict and that the republic was the site of most of the federal army's weapons factories aided this stalling tactic (Allcock 1988; *New York Times,* 3 March 1992: A1). The other two parties, the SDA and HDZ, established an alliance to balance the SDS.

As the conflict in Croatia diminished in January of 1992, the SDS declared an independent "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" made up of regions that the SDS had taken over during the summer of 1991. This signaled the beginning of the armed conflict. Around the time of the referendum, Serb and Croat forces began fighting in key regions of Bosnia. Serbian guerrilla forces threw up roadblocks around Sarajevo and other cities and began a process of orchestrated terror against dissenters.

After all, in their view, the Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic, head of the Serbian Democratic Party, had not agreed to independence according to the principle of three constituent nations. The real concern for Milosevic focused on controlling the unpredictable zealotry of the Bosnian-Serb leadership in order to reduce the possibility that their "ethnic cleansing" would stimulate outside military intervention.[21] This could be achieved best by maintaining a controlling interest in the Bosnian conflict and by staking claims to much of Bosnia.

Again, domestic interests became paramount in this calculation. By portraying itself as the sole arbiter of Serbian politics, in and outside of Serbia, the SPS could justify both its continuation and preservation of the existing power structure (Gagnon 1994). Since Serbia itself is only 65 percent Serbian, by bringing the approximately 30 percent of Bosnian Serbs into the political fold, the SPS would be able to increase the total Serbian proportion substantially. This strategy, combined with nullification of internal appeals for increased democratization, in effect would secure the SPS's hold on power for many years to come. In the event that democracy did come to Serbia, the elected leadership undoubtedly would be sympathetic to the Serbian cause. A key ingredient in Milosevic's ability to consolidate his power within Serbia

was his ability to appeal to nationalist sensibilities and control the hypernationalism of his allies in Croatia and Bosnia (Saideman 1998b). Milosevic's Serbian Socialist Party supported the Serb's mobilizing efforts in Croatia and Bosnia, providing them with money, weapons, and strategic advice (Glenny 1993b).

By the summer of 1992, especially after the Bosnian proclamation of independence in April 1992, the number of Bosnians escaping from ethnic cleansing increased extensively. The Muslim population became the main target, and the Bosnian government was not ready for war at this time. Thus, Izetbegovic, the leader of Bosnia's collective presidency and leader of the Bosniacs, requested weapons for Bosnia's defense and a peacekeeping force for Bosnia in March 1992. The United States and other Western governments knew that, but chose not to become involved right away (Rogel 1998). After recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as separate independent state, the UN responded positively to this call and imposed sanctions on the Serbian side. As in Croatia, the request was met by foot dragging and a series of unsuccessful cease-fires that lasted throughout the year. In August the number of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina rose to eight thousand, most of these concerned with ensuring the flow of humanitarian assistance (Lefebvre and Jakubow 1993).

On 8 August 1992 the warring factions agreed to a cease-fire to begin talks in Geneva on a constitutional settlement (*Globe and Mail,* 28 August 1992: A1). For his part, the leader of Bosnia's breakaway Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, vowed to end immediately the shelling of four besieged cities—Sarajevo, Bihac, Goražde, and Jajce. Both Karadzic and Mate Boban, the leader of the self-styled Croatian state of Herzeg-Bosnia, favored the canonization of the republic, with Muslims allocated patches of territory neither the Serbs nor Croats claimed. This agreement, known as the Cutilier Plan, had two weaknesses. First, the leaders of the main participants in the conflict would not be parties to the negotiation process. (Since his state remained internationally unrecognized, Karadzic was not present [*Globe and Mail,* 28 August 1992: A1].) Second, there remained no international military presence to enforce the pact, only the threat of tighter sanctions and increasing isolation for Serbia.

With no constitutional settlement in sight, international opinion about the conflict had shifted by December 1992. The apparent willingness of the Western powers to intervene in the conflict became notable. For example, President Clinton suggested that, unlike his predecessor, he would use force to aid the UN in its humanitarian assistance (*Globe and Mail,* 30 July 1993: A1). The problem had become even more complicated, as all three factions

showed intensified hostility toward each other. The alliance that once suited Muslims and Croats against the Serbs crumbled. Clashes between them already had broken out in the central Bosnian towns of Vitez and Novi Travnik (*Globe and Mail,* 26 November 1992: A1). The U.S. administration had been considering all options except for sending ground troops to Bosnia. The United States rejected the latter plan as too provocative; it would endanger the peace talks and the lives of aid workers. In effect, the international community signaled the Serb leader, Milosevic, who held a tight reign on Karadzic, to either resolve the conflict through negotiations or face tighter sanctions.[22] Initially, this strategy worked.

UN-imposed sanctions that included a naval blockade and condemnation of Serb involvement clearly had only a partial effect. Oil continued to get to Serbia, and both sides still used heavy armaments. The international community had three options: (*a*) lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnia government (designed to aid the Bosniacs); (*b*) selective air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions; or (*c*) both in some combination. Simultaneously, to ensure safe havens for civilians ensnared in the conflict, NATO began to implement plans for military enforcement of a no-fly zone. The actual enforcement could not take place, however, until the UN Security Council had approved it.

Bosnian-Serb leaders dropped their demands for a separate state and signed a short-lived peace plan, Vance-Owen, proposed by the international community, on 11 January 1993. The plan gave each of the three ethnic groups control of ten nominally equal "provinces" within Bosnia. Sarajevo would become an open city—effectively, a UN supervised province. The concession coincided with the arrival of Milosevic at the Geneva Peace Talks, and for a time at least, it appeared that the long-held dream of a greater Serbia would be achieved. The proposed map of the new Bosnian state showed that both the EC and the United States, now parties to the talks, would be willing to allow Bosnia to be redrawn along ethnic lines, with the Serbs controlling almost 70 percent of the former Yugoslav territory. In effect, territorial boundaries gained through military means became legitimate (*Globe and Mail,* 10 January 1993: A1).

On 6 May 1993 the Bosnian-Serb parliament met and rejected the Vance-Owen peace initiative, as they would the later Owen-Stoltenberg Plan (*International Herald Tribune,* 7 May 1993: A1). In response to the Vance-Owen Plan, the Serb parliament decided instead to put the issues to a May referendum that also failed to provide support. International reaction turned out to be mixed (Lewis 1993a, 1993b). The rump-Yugoslavia government, buckling under sanctions, cut off aid to Bosnian Serb forces in an attempt to

force them to agree to peace. In Europe there remained no consensus on whether to lift the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia or to allow the Muslims to defend themselves through access to weapons.

At the peace talks that began on 27 July 1993, a revised constitutional plan for the future "United Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina" was unveiled. The proposal would create a union of three "constituent republics"—a confederation of three ethnic units—comprising "three constituent peoples" and "others" (*Globe and Mail,* 27 July 1993: A1). A key change in the plan was that at least 31 percent of Bosnian territory would be yielded to Bosnian Muslims, who controlled only 15 percent at the time. The Croats and Serbs would be allowed to retain 17 percent and 52 percent of Bosnia, respectively. The plan also called for a rotating presidency and a weak central government responsible only for conducting foreign affairs. Known as Owen-Stoltenberg, the plan required acceptance from Bosnia's ten-member collective presidency and the Bosnian parliament (Lewis 1993a, 1993b).

Izetbegovic remained unconvinced about dividing the country based on ethnic lines and insisted on keeping the state united but multinational (Rogel 1998). In August 1993 the Bosnian leader indicated that he would not ask the Bosnian parliament to approve the plan. It would be difficult, in his view, to wrest the necessary 15 percent of the territory from either the Serbs or the Croats. The leaders of the other two groups showed intransigence. The Bosnian Serb leader, Karadzic, said that "there will be no more negotiations" on further Serb concessions at the Geneva peace negotiations (*Globe and Mail,* 24 August 1993: A1). Thus, the peace talks of August 1993 had two purposes: (1) to convince all three Bosnian leaders and their supporting coalitions to recognize the separation of Bosnia into three distinct republics and (2) to prevent Serb and Croat forces from making gains on the territory they already held. On 24 August 1993 the Bosnian wing of Croatia's ruling party formally proclaimed the Croat state entity as "Herzeg-Bosnia." Later in 1993, Bosnian Croats wanted to expand their territory by military action at the Muslims' expense, which meant "ending a formal alliance with the Muslims and fighting against the Bosnian government" (Rogel 1998: 35). As a result, war and ethnic cleansing began on both sides.

Serb forces already had been requested to withdraw from areas surrounding Sarajevo. To assure they would comply by 30 August 1993, the deadline for the plan to take effect, U.S. President Clinton requested on 30 July that NATO make its strike aircraft operational. This effort ensured that the momentum that began with the Vance-Owen Plan would not be lost. The influence of ethnic allies—Milosevic and Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman in

particular—became integral to the process. In combination with sanctions and an embargo, the Western powers proved reasonably effective in containing the conflict and directing its flow. In effect, NATO hoped to isolate the Bosnian-Serb militia in order to drive a political wedge between them and their main line of support in Serbia. In turn, it is unlikely that without diplomatic pressure on Milosevic and Tudjman as well, a mediated settlement would have been possible in so short a period.[23] To escape the constraints imposed on Serbia, Milosevic withdrew tangible support for the Serb breakaway leadership in Bosnia.

NATO air strikes had very important consequences for the war. The first set of strikes targeted the Bosnian Serb command and troop barracks as well as communication centers. The main purpose was to prevent Serbian attack. NATO continued bombing until 14 September 1995, although the alliance suspended it twice to let Serbian artillery withdraw and allow for negotiations (Pavkovic 2000).

Although the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg Plans did not succeed, they provided the basis for the negotiated settlement that would take place almost three years later. The Dayton Accord, known also as the General Framework Agreement for Peace, signed in 1995, came at a price: exclusion of the Bosnian-Serb leaders from the negotiating table and substantial territorial gains for Bosnia-Croats in comparison to what had been offered to them under Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg. In essence, territorial boundaries gained through military means became legitimate through the agreement. While it confirmed the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a two-part state, the Bosnian Serbs' territorial stranglehold would be reduced to 49 percent of Bosnian territory and the Bosnian Croat and Muslim federation would control the rest of the Bosnian land. By most standards, the accord merely reaffirmed what long had been recognized: Bosnia would be two effectively independent nations—the Republic of Srpska and the Bosnia Federation. The two territories would be separated by an interentity boundary line, and both sides would be monitored closely by NATO forces—first the Implementation Force, or IFOR, and its successor, the Stabilization Force (SFOR).[24]

Two and a half years after the Dayton Accord, immediate and ongoing sources of insecurity included the return of thousands of displaced ethnic minorities to their homes in areas dominated by other ethnic groups. These refugees, whether Serbian, Croat, or Bosniac, returned only to find their homes either completely demolished by the war, occupied, surrounded by minefields or booby traps, or destroyed by arson shortly thereafter.[25] Many, mostly the young and skilled, continue to stay away—preferring instead

refuge in Germany or Italy, or in resort towns along the Adriatic coast with better employment opportunities. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), for example, became the home to more than 200,000 Serbian refugees.

4.4 Postcrisis Period: December 1995–Present

Some observers claim that the Dayton agreement was accepted by the parties not because it was seen as the best solution to the problem but due to NATO actions and international pressure on all parties. According to this view, there is still a potential for renewed hostilities between and among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs (Pavkovic 2000).

The previously mentioned city of Brcko, a tiny island of neutrality in a sea of hostility, is a case in point. In March 1998, SFOR troops trained in anticipation that Brcko would be handed back to one of the warring factions. It was anticipated widely that any concrete decision, one way or the other, would precipitate renewed clashes. To prevent this from happening, SFOR troops performed daily armed patrols in villages and towns, monitored all significant movements of the three armed forces, and controlled access to heavy weapons by maintaining cantonment sites throughout the region. Eventually the issue was resolved peacefully and Brcko became a district of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2000. Similarly, claims about the possibility of renewed hostilities came to be true with the developments in Kosovo after 1996.

In the postcrisis period, even starting from 1991, Slovenia seemed stable and peaceful. After its formal recognition by the EU and United States in 1992, Slovenia joined the UN, with Milan Kucan reelected as president. Based on the results of the referendum held in March 2003, 89.61 percent of the population voted for joining the EU and 66.02 percent supported NATO membership. Slovenia became a member of NATO in March 2004 and joined the EU along with nine other states on 1 May 2004. (In February 2005, Slovenia's parliament ratified the EU's constitution.) Slovenia seems past its most difficult days and is proceeding with caution along a new path to the future.

Croatia restored its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in 1996, and the parliamentary elections held in 2000 resulted in a coalition of social democrats and social liberals. In September 2001, Milosevic was charged for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the war against Croatia. Like Slovenia, Croatia seeks closer ties with the EU and formally applied for EU membership in 2003.

Bosnia-Herzegovina seems much more stable after the Dayton agreement.

In the 2000 elections, moderate parties won on the Muslim-Croat side but nationalists gained the upper hand in the Serb entity. A coalition government was formed and headed by moderate Prime Minister Mladen Ivanic. However, in the 2002 elections, nationalists regained power in presidential, parliamentary, and local elections.

Milosevic was elected president of Yugoslavia in July 1997 and in 1998. The Kosovo Liberation Army rebelled against Serbian rule. NATO launched air strikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999. These strikes ended on 10 June, with the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo. In the September 2000 elections, Milosevic lost and Vojislav Kostunica became the new president. In April 2001, Milosevic was detained and handed over to The Hague war crimes tribunal. His trial began at The Hague in February 2002 and continues at this time of writing. In May 2002 the accord ending the federation was ratified by the federal parliament, and this act cleared the way for the new constitution of Serbia and Montenegro. In February 2003, the Yugoslav parliament approved the constitution of the new union of Serbia and Montenegro.

What remains of Yugoslavia is a loose union between Serbia and Montenegro. Tensions between different ethnic groups still exist, as with Serbs and Albanians in the Presevo valley in late 2000 and in Macedonia in 2001. The worst clashes between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo since 1999 took place in March 2004 in the town of Mitrovica. The future of the former Yugoslavia remains clouded but seems to be improving.

5. Analysis and Propositions

Three stages of interaction took place. At stage 1, an aggressive Serbian foreign policy emerges with respect to the newly created states of Bosnia and Croatia. Slovenia and Macedonia, in contrast, depart Yugoslavia with very little violence (Saideman 1998b). This difference reflects the varying ability of the Serb leader, Milosevic, to build a coalition of forces willing to restructure the neighboring states to create a Greater Serbia. At stage 2, Serb aggression is reinterpreted as an international security issue because of the perceived threat to Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia. Serb leaders take advantage of the cleavages created by Serb-held enclaves in Croatia and Bosnia and escalate the crisis to war in stage 3.

Serbia used force to expand its influence and support brethren in Croatia and Bosnia. It proved less willing to do so in Slovenia. The security issue became problematic for the international community because each ethnic

group had made its basis of security the discomfort of another ethnic group. Even if the extremists in Serb-held enclaves did not want violence, they knew that intransigence rather than compromise would be the best strategy to follow. Compromise by any of the leaders, but especially Milosevic (who had come to power on the basis of protecting Serb interests), would have meant a loss of both relevance and power (Harvey 1998).

Elements of both secessionism and irredentism appear throughout the conflict (Saideman 1998b). Over time, the enthusiasm for irredenta waned, while support for secession, especially among Bosnian Serbs, remained high. At stages 1 and 2, Milosevic's government supported extremist breakaway leaders in Bosnia and Croatia. The important implication is that the support entailed a narrowing of policy options for Milosevic. Once extremist leaders of an ethnic group gain credibility, as in the case of those in Bosnia, moderates may find it difficult to maintain control.

June 26, 1991 marked the onset of Yugoslavia's foreign policy crisis. At that time, Yugoslavia's already crumbling federal government faced two major internal threats, to territory and regime, as a result of political acts. The perception of crisis conditions came about because of Slovenian and Croatian claims to independence. The military conflict following onset of the crisis initially took the form of a civil war. After Germany and then the EC recognized Slovenian and Croatian claims to sovereignty, the crisis setting transformed because of the introduction of these two republics as independent states. (See Saideman 1997, 1998b for a discussion of the motivations of other actors in the conflict.) The claims to independence of these states *and* their subsequent international recognition therefore serve as the triggers to an international crisis and an interstate ethnic conflict. Conflict in Croatia had decisive spillover effects for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not the least of which was the forcing of Bosnian (as well as Macedonian) leadership to choose independence or to be incorporated into a truncated Yugoslavia. The entire crisis period is marked by fluctuations in intensity, characteristic of a protracted conflict.

Initial deescalation of the interstate ethnic conflict in Slovenia during June 1991 signaled termination of a foreign policy crisis for Slovenian leaders. Croatia's leaders then experienced a foreign policy crisis in August 1991 when Croatian territory succumbed to Serbian attacks. The conflict appeared to be winding down until Croatian counteroffensives in February 1992 and again in 1995 regained most Serb-held territory in the Krajinas. Until this period, Serb forces continued to hold on to at least 10 percent of the Croatian territory that is geographically contiguous with Serbia. Sporadic fighting between Serb and Croatian forces through the fall of 1993 and 1994 made

the division of Serb- and Croatian-held territory by lightly armed UNPROFOR troops difficult.

The decisive shift to the Bosnian crisis theater occurred in March 1992, as both Serbian and Croatian leaders staked claims to Bosnian territory. March 2, 1992 constitutes an escalation in the larger Yugoslavian interstate ethnic conflict, with the direct involvement of Bosnia-Herzegovina and several nonstate actors (i.e., breakaway Bosnia-Croatian and Bosnia-Serbian self-styled governments). Bosnian declarations of independence at that time triggered foreign policy crises for both Croatia and Serbia.[26]

Cessation of hostilities between JNA forces and the breakaway republics marked the beginning of a slow but steady deescalation of the crisis through 1994 and 1995. The Bosnian crisis, in particular, is marked by sporadic attempts at peaceful negotiation, failed cease-fires, and international debate over various strategies of conflict management (ranging from sanctions to military intervention). The Bosnian crisis theater also is characterized by at least three failed peace plans: the Cutilier Plan in 1992, Vance-Owen in April 1993, and Owen-Stoltenberg in October 1993. The effects of the fourth, the Dayton Peace Accord, are inconclusive but encouraging.

Deescalation of the interstate ethnic conflict is marked by two sets of events. First came the compliance of two of the three Bosnian ethnic groups with the Vance-Owen Plan in 1993, which coincided with the decision by Serbia's leader Milosevic to desist from support for the Bosnian Serbs. The second set of events refers to acceptance by all three states' leaders of the Dayton Accords in 1995.

Politicization of ethnicity as the primary means of mobilization and subsequent polarization of political issues on the basis of Serb-Croat rivalries represented key factors in the initial escalation of the conflict. Milosevic, faced with an ethnically dominant society and limited institutional constraints, acted in ways that are compatible with Proposition P_1 regarding strategies of commitment. While exploring limited variations in tactics, the overall strategy stayed consistent and highly coercive. Milosevic's responsiveness to nationalist extremism correlated with signals issued by the Serbian elite, although he did soften (temporarily) in response to massive public demonstrations. Critics in the early 1990s would seize upon signs of weakness relative to ethnic adversaries, and that encouraged Milosevic to act very firmly toward rival ethnic groups. Thus, in comparison to the highly constrained leaders, Milosevic could commit in advance to a more consistent and highly confrontational strategy.

Subsequent political maneuvering by Milosevic, which included initial intransigence, participation in peace talks, and eventually sanctions against

Bosnian Serbs, suggests that domestic and international factors conditioned his strategies on the Bosnian and Croatian fronts. Serb leadership had to convince Serb opposition (including hard-liners) that it had engaged in actions sufficient to protect Serb interests elsewhere, while also limiting the effects of international condemnation (including sanctions and continuing threats of armed intervention).

The most important characteristics of Milosevic's commitment problem stem from demography. Yugoslavia's ethno-religious groups, which included Croatians, Slovenians, Muslims, and Serbs, tend toward geographic concentration. The Serbs also constituted significant portions of the populations of other states, including Croatia and Bosnia. While not a majority of Yugoslavia's population, the Serbs always were its single largest ethnic group. Instrumental in shaping Serb domination is the fact that the Serb leaders controlled the army and political apparatus for at least ten years before the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia.

Transnational ethnic affinities, as in the cases from earlier chapters, created a security dilemma for Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia (although less so for Slovenia) and had ramifications for the subsequent formation of Serb policy toward each of the seceding states. For example, in relative terms, far fewer Serbs are found in Slovenia and Macedonia as compared to Croatia and Bosnia. Thus, the primary concern in the conflict between Slovenia and Serbia was to prevent further decentralization within the Yugoslavian political structure. Efforts to protect, retrieve, or even use the small minority of Slovenian Serbs for organizational leverage stayed secondary in importance to the larger issue of maintaining Yugoslavian integrity (Gagnon 1994/95; Saideman 1997). This setting of priorities may explain, in part, why Serbia relinquished control of Slovenia so quickly as compared to the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. Perceived benefits to Serb leaders did not match the costs of attempting to retain Slovenia (Gagnon 1994/95; Saideman 1998b).

Affinities do not wholly explain the use of force in all three crisis theaters. Like Croatia, Slovenia had strong ties to the West and its own defense forces. According to Saideman (1998b), the ties to the West showed through when Germany sponsored Slovenia's transition to independence. Potential confrontation with the West, coupled with fewer domestic benefits to the Serb leadership, converged to create a situation of relatively peaceful political transition. Force could be used as long as the international community viewed the conflict as a civil war and an internal affair of the still-existing Yugoslavian regime, which it did.

Short-lived attempts at second-order secessionism by Serbs in Croatia and

Serbs *and* Croatians in Bosnia (i.e., minorities within minorities) characterized the Bosnian conflict. As a result, three processes of interstate ethnic conflict occurred simultaneously. The secessions of Yugoslavia's republics comprised the first process. The second, which consisted of retrieval by the Serb-dominated JNA and irregular forces, is the irredentist struggle. The third phase is made up of the simultaneous declarations of independence by the self-styled minority Serb and Croatian governments. A fourth and as yet undecided phase would include the absorption of parts of Bosnia into Croatia and Serbia.

For Serbia, the main source of cleavage was not interethnic rivalry but intraethnic discord. Milosevic faced the prospect of uniting a broad spectrum of Serbian opinion on the conflict, ranging from far right ultranationalist perspectives, which framed the conflict as a Croatian/Muslim conspiracy, to more moderate sensibilities, which had as their chief concern the effects of sanctions on the Serbian economy. The latter appear to have surfaced in the early stages of the conflict when mass protests against the Milosevic regime took place. However, as the conflict wore on and Milosevic's position softened, these protests diminished.

Proposition P_2, which focuses on pacific strategies in diverse settings, is supported by the way that Yugoslavia as an ethnically diverse state framed its foreign policy and then how the more homogenous units within it approached the problem of transition. The last ten years of Yugoslavia's existence witnessed the gradual turning away from an overarching arrangement of elite-based consensus in which all republics participated in framing policy. However, such an arrangement had not been designed to cope with rapid change, especially in economic terms, in which regional disparities increased dramatically over the short term. Consequently, Yugoslavia's political arrangements had three distinct dimensions that all led to reduced constraints on the leaders of each republic. At the national level, levels of repression and electoral competition appear to have been defined along interrepublic and ethnic lines. Party coalitions also followed those patterns. Finally, over time, policies were implemented to advance the interests of specific ethnic groups (Saideman 1998b).

Consequently, Yugoslavia's political structures, originally designed to be inclusive, became mechanisms for exclusion of specific groups and leaders. For example, Milosevic's national party (SPS) came to power through an internal coup. In Croatia and Serbia, political parties formed on the basis of ethnic allegiance and parliaments became the domains of demagogues and chauvinists. Despite apparent regulation of participation and constraints on executives, it is reasonable to assume that during the period of transition,

Yugoslavia's republics did not feature high levels of institutional constraint. Prewar Yugoslavia's political system was on its way to becoming an ethnically based, bureaucratic-authoritarian system—an exclusionary political arrangement led by Serb technocrats and the military in order to bring Yugoslavia more fully into an open market economy.[27]

With the outbreak of war, Serbian leaders began to pursue more "hawkish" policies, defying both international condemnation and those within the Serbian camp considered to be soft on secession. The positioning of Milosevic as a "hawk" meant that any response by either Croatian or Bosnian leaders to Serbian hostilities would be portrayed as unacceptable to the Serbian people. This observation implies, up to a point, greater autonomy for the Serbian elite. Serbia's leaders proved especially effective in building on nationalist claims by convincing their supporters that Serbs could be safe only if the state obtained the capability to attack and defeat rival states in which Serbs existed as a minority. An aggressive campaign against Croatia and Bosnia came as the final, logical step in this process. To escape the constraints imposed on Serbia (namely, sanctions and embargoes), Milosevic had to find an alternative strategy to building support at home, which eventually resulted in sanctions on the Serb breakaway leaders in Croatia and Bosnia.

Extremism among all ethnic groups that resulted from the breakup of Yugoslavia did not indicate an intraethnic consensus. For example, some Croatian leaders, including Tudjman, were willing to offer autonomy to Serb minorities (including local self-management), while those opposed preferred a hard line of no compromises. Illegal, private Croatian militia began to form in response, although Tudjman arrested the leaders of the Party of Rights in part because of its use of neofascist symbols. These and other opposition leaders were accused of having "considerably contributed to the difficult political and security situation in Croatia" (Ramet 1992a: 261).

Extreme views on both sides of the issue existed in Serbia as well; Milosevic took a position in the middle. Accusations of selling out the Serbian interest forced Milosevic to harden his position: "Questions of borders are essential questions of state. And borders, as you know, are always dictated by the strong, never by the weak. Accordingly, it is essential that we be strong" (Ramet 1992a: 264).

Proposition P_3 focuses on forceful intervention and concentration of costs and benefits. The proposition finds support from Serbian behavior (and that of Croatia, which also could be highlighted in much the same way as what follows). In particular, the decision to use force had low-cost implications for the Serbian regime. Internal opposition to the use of force was countered

through manipulation of repression, while two processes nullified international condemnation: circumvention of embargoes and constant control of Serb secessionist leaders. When international pressures did appear to have some effect, the Serb regime reined in the Serb minority leaders.

Where political resistance is low or support is "general purpose" (as in the case of Serbia), more confrontational tactics are expected. For an authoritarian regime, payoffs from a successful ethnically based intervention are immense. A systematic connection between domestic political gain and initiation of interventionist strategies is clear in the Serbian case. Pursuit of domestic political benefits is obvious. However, the benefits accrued mainly to the Serbian political elite, as did the longer-term costs of overexpansion. Had the Serb regime pursued and lost a sustained, all-out war with either Slovenia or Croatia, there is little doubt that the regime would have been overthrown (Midlarsky 1997).

Within Serbia, opposition to using force was primarily elite generated and concentrated within the military. For example, Milosevic's plan to grant Slovenia and Croatia greater autonomy ran into considerable opposition. Many Yugoslav-oriented officers wanted to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia and, consequently, Milosevic hardened his position on the question of deconfederation (Cohen 1992, 1993).

The main problem facing Milosevic was to manage the resistance that Serb policies engendered in the international arena. The primary constraint facing the Serb leaders was the array of international factors shaping the implementation of confrontational policies. In this instance, sanctions and the threat of intervention served as the primary constraints on Serb policy. Neither appears to have been fully successful in deterring Serbia's expansionist policies or from achieving most of its objectives. Failure by all members of the international community to comply with the agreement to enforce sanctions became fundamental to Serbia's ability to press its advantage (Midlarsky 1997).

The threat of international involvement, however, presented Serb leaders with a second-best solution. If Serbia could not maintain sovereignty over an integrated Yugoslavia, then it would at least control all that territory with significant Serb populations through proxy militias established in Serb-held enclaves. Of course, the organizational leverage that Serbia had at its disposal, namely, control of the JNA and well-armed and loyal Serb irregulars in Croatia and Bosnia, played key roles (Glenny 1992a, b, c).

Proposition P_4 focuses on the impact of affinities and cleavage on crisis escalation. Lack of control over ethnic insurgents in Bosnia and Croatia generated significant uncertainty for Serb leaders. In general terms, manipulation

of foreign perceptions through the control of ethnic allies is a risky strategy, even for heads of authoritarian states. Serbia and leaders of the self-styled breakaway Serb republics of Bosnia and Croatia also had an uneasy relationship. This alliance was based on the Serb assumption that support would create a more predictable environment for undertaking and controlling activities beyond its borders. Unfortunately, despite their initial involvement in mediation (i.e., Vance-Owen Peace Plan), these breakaway leaders also turned out to be the most opposed to a final negotiated settlement as manifested in the Dayton Peace Accord.

Ethnic linkages provided Serb leaders with the leverage necessary to stake a claim to portions of Croatia and Bosnia (Saideman 1998b). These affinities also created negative reverberations by enhancing Serb perceptions of insecurity. The most important aspect in this regard is the behavior of Serbian leader Milosevic toward the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia. Evidence indicates that under international pressure for compliance, Milosevic was willing to apply pressure on the Serb breakaway leaders in these republics (Saideman 1998b). This is because the extremist strategies of Serb minority leaders, including Karadzic, threatened to draw in extraregional powers and produce tighter sanctions on Serbia. Milosevic's response is notable because it suggests that the usefulness of transnational linkages is conditioned by a broader spectrum of foreign policy objectives and domestic concerns.[28]

Another possibility is that Milosevic recognized these leaders (including Karadzic) as potentially unstable adversaries in his plans to control territories outside Serbia. The evidence for this is based on the assumption that Milosevic eventually would seek the support of Serbians outside Serbia in his plans to restructure the Serbian economy. To do this, the Serb leader would require the compliance of a dependent Serb minority leadership in Croatia and Bosnia.[29]

Presumably, Milosevic would not have pursued involvement in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia (and Kosovo) if he had believed that would threaten his power. Evidence indicates that Milosevic formulated policies that appealed to his ethnic constituency even at the expense of other ethnic groups. He did so in order to mobilize his followers and potentially increase his share of domestic power. Subsequent efforts toward territorial retrieval must be seen in the context of Milosevic's domestic political situation.

When interelite competition within a dominant ethnic group is high, elites in some instances will introduce novel issues that discredit their opponents and thereby create new avenues of securing power. In other instances, elites will rely on manipulation of mass sentiment (Kaufman 1996). Serb leaders appear to have utilized both processes while securing power within Serbia.

For example, political opponents considered "soft" on relations with Croatia were either discredited or jailed. Repression in Kosovo appears to have stemmed from similar concerns. Indeed, based on the evidence, Serbian nationalist rhetoric was so fundamental to policy formation that overwhelming mass sentiment and hard-line opposition may have been prevented Milosevic, initially at least, from pursuing conciliatory or accommodating strategies with the other ethnic groups (Harvey 1998).

Proposition P_5 pertains to the relative likelihood and character of intervention. Serbia, taken to represent the former Yugoslavia in the postcollapse period, would be classified as an ethnically dominant, low-constraint state or Type I_a within figure 2.1. A state of this type is expected to show belligerence, and that is confirmed strongly by Serbia's conduct in the years following the breakdown of Yugoslavia. From the outset of the conflict, the main interest of Serbia's elites was retention of Serbian minorities first in Croatia and then in Bosnia. Milosevic wanted to bring all Serbs under one state and used conflicts in Kosovo and Krajina to justify intervention by the army in order to restrain interethnic warfare. Irredentism took a belligerent, violent form, accompanied by ongoing anti-Croatian rhetoric that emphasized a connection with the fascist past.

Consistent also with Serbia's Type I_a status are the respective roles played by the leadership versus the elite. Belligerence took an elite-led form, with mobilization of followers and aggrandizement of Milosevic's position as a key by-product of the entire process. At the same time, manipulation of group symbols and repression countered potential internal opposition to the use of force. In sum, both the form and substance of Serbia's ethnic intervention offer support to P_5.

6. Conclusions

Evidence from this case makes it is clear that leaders of ethnically dominant and institutionally underdeveloped states face a different set of opportunities than their more constrained and diverse counterparts in pursuing foreign policy objectives. International policies implemented to deter these states at the domestic level, like sanctions or embargoes, may be less effective than anticipated. In these situations, elites can become adept at creating ethnic solidarity and manipulating mass opinion in order to bring it in line with their foreign policy objectives. More specifically, sanctions and international condemnation may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for management of conflicts involving low-constraint, ethnically dominant states.[30] Would force-

ful and early intervention have resulted in a shorter, less intense conflict for the former Yugoslavia? The implications of the framework are favorable to that conclusion.

The paradox of diversity indicates that ethnically divided states attempting to make the simultaneous transition to a more economically open and democratic system face certain dangers. If the political system is arranged along ethnic lines and one group is allowed to become dominant, it will succumb to the politics of intransigence, confrontation, hypernationalism, and conflict. Leaders of ethnically based political parties will lack, over the short term, the capacity to widen the policy agenda to encompass nonethnic issues. When other bases of mobilization are weak, ethnic elites depend on direct support from their constituency (Kaufman 1996; Saideman 1997).

These and other concerns are taken up in chapter 8, where the propositions are reviewed in terms of their performance across the case studies as a whole.



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