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7. The Cyprus Puzzle: Two Nations, One Island


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CHAPTER SEVEN

The Cyprus Puzzle: Two Nations, One Island

The “suspicion syndrome” dominating Greek-Turkish relations and perceptions was also transplanted into Cyprus and eliminated any hope for constructive interaction between the rival ethnic groups. (Joseph 1997: 43)

1. A History of Conflict, Crisis, and War

With its long-lasting nature and international dimensions, Cyprus is a classic example of protracted ethnic conflict.¹ Its history is complicated and features numerous third-party interventions by ethnic brethren, superpowers, and regional and global organizations. Although the matter is essentially internal, external powers influence and dominate the Cyprus conflict. Therefore, Cyprus provides scholars with a rich case study for understanding third-party interventions and efforts toward conflict resolution. In virtually all aspects, the Cyprus puzzle still is unsolved. It remains one of the most challenging and potentially informative cases with respect to causal relations between ethnic and other variables on the one hand and third parties and crisis outcomes on the other.

Like the Thai Malay and Yugoslavia cases, Cyprus shows strains of both secessionism and irredentism. In the past, while Greek nationalists demanded union—*enosis*—of Cyprus with Greece, Turkish nationalists demanded partition—*taksim*—of the island. Especially after the 1974 intervention, discourse on both sides has changed; Greek Cypriots supported the idea of a unitary state, while Turkish Cypriots demanded a confederal system or secession.

Cyprus is home to a dispute that forms part of a complex and deep conflict between the homelands. The roots of the conflict between Turkey and Greece go back to 1453, the time of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul). After a long war, Greece gained its independence from Ottoman Rule in 1829. This lengthy association is what makes the case of Cyprus so complex and hard to resolve.

What can be said of the case in the context of crises in world politics? The ICB Project's data set includes no fewer than nine crises under the heading of "Greece/Turkey protracted conflict" from 1920 to 1987. Many issues divide these old rivals and only three cases (Cyprus I [1963–64], Cyprus II [1967], and Cyprus III [1974–75]) are on the troublesome island of Cyprus itself.² In our conceptualization, the 1963 and 1967 cases constitute the background to the 1974 crisis, which featured intervention by Turkey. Our focus will be on the third crisis, which started with the military coup engineered in Cyprus by Greek officers and resulted in the overthrow of the government in Cyprus. This event triggered a crisis for Turkey, which sent troops to the island on 20 July 1974. Turkey's action subsequently served as the crisis trigger for Greece (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997b). Turkish intervention resulted in a *de facto* division of the island. Three decades later, the same situation holds.

To explain the patterns of Turkish and Greek interests and involvement in Cyprus, this chapter will examine issues and events within the larger protracted conflict. The primary focus is on the crisis surrounding Turkey's decision to intervene in Cyprus and its subsequent impact. Many outsiders refer to the Turkish intervention in 1974 as the beginning of the Cyprus "problem"; this designation, however, does not capture the full reality. Indeed, the origins of the problem go back to the establishment of the Cypriot republic. Communal fighting started on the island as a result of a constitutional crisis. Thus, analysis in this chapter will pay specific attention to these earlier developments.

This chapter unfolds in five additional parts. In the second part the historical and political background of the ethnic conflict is presented. Third, the precrisis period is analyzed and key developments that led to the 1974 intervention are explored. In the fourth part, the main focus is on the 1974 Turkish intervention on the island, with some attention to the Greek response and postcrisis developments as well. Fifth, propositions are tested. Sixth, and finally, implications for the framework are assessed.

2. The Origins of Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus: The Road to Independence

Located forty miles south of Turkey and five hundred miles southeast of Greece, Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea. It has an area of 9,250 square kilometers, of which 3,355 square kilometers are in the Turkish Cypriot area. According to Freedom House country and related territory reports (2003), Greek Cypriots constitute 78 percent of the population,

while Turkish Cypriots and others constitute 18 percent and 4 percent, respectively.³

Thanks to its geographic location and strategic importance—being at the crossroads of the continents—Cyprus has always been a strategic location. Cyprus has been ruled by Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Lusignans, and Venetians. In 1571, the Ottoman Empire occupied the island, and it remained in their hands until the Congress of Berlin in 1878. During the Congress of Berlin, Cyprus was “rented” to the British with the condition that Britain would come to the Ottoman Empire’s aid in case of a Russian attack. In 1914, when the Ottoman Empire established an alliance with Germany, Britain annexed Cyprus, and it became a British colony. On 24 July 1923, with the Lausanne treaty, Turkey officially recognized the British annexation. The island remained in British hands as a crown colony until 1959.

In 1910, Greece’s Prime Minister Venizelos asserted his idea of reestablishing the Byzantine Empire or, the *megali idea*. The *megali idea* means unification of the Greeks in the whole region under one nation-state and liberation of Greek land from the Ottoman Empire. The following statement is important because it illustrates the idea that eventually Cyprus would join Greece, that is, *enosis*.⁴

Our immediate needs come to mind when we consider Cyprus. There are various reasons for this project. The most important reason is that the Ionian Islands have permitted the expansion of the Greek Empire and strengthened it in the past. One of the first countries to help Greece in this matter is Britain, which will eventually give Cyprus to Greece. In brief, Greece wants Cyprus, Rhodes . . . and all islands along the Mediterranean. (Quoted from Ismail 2000: 7 in Bamanie 2002: 444)

As a result of the “divide and rule” politics of Britain throughout its reign, the two ethnic groups stayed distant from each other and held in reserve their primary attachments to Greece and Turkey.⁵ Opposing worldviews of the two ethnic groups facilitated further polarization. While Greek Cypriots pursued the goal of *enosis* as a part of the *megali idea*, Turkish Cypriots supported either the idea of *taksim* (partition) or staying under British rule (Salih 1978).⁶ Due to the island’s strategic importance, Britain preferred to keep Cyprus under its rule. Thus the 1950s can be defined as a period of confrontation between Greek Cypriots and the British as well as of Turkish and Greek Cypriots over the issue of the island’s future.

In 1950 the Orthodox Church conducted a plebiscite and 95.7 percent of




Figure 7.1. Cyprus Puzzle

the Greek Cypriot community over eighteen years of age voted for unification with Greece. A delegation from Cyprus submitted a demand to London for *enosis*. The British, however, rejected their demand. Greece then decided to bring the issue to the UN. The UN General Assembly’s political committee preferred to shelve the issue, as Britain did earlier (Salih 1978). The failure of political attempts and a lack of resolution “left the Greek Cypriots with no alternative but to resort to armed warfare,” at least from their point of view (Salih 1978: 8). At first the conflict focused on the armed struggle with Greek Cypriot guerrilla organizations (EOKA).⁷ Later on the conflict enveloped the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) and EOKA.

During the mid-1950s, numerous attempts to achieve a peaceful resolution occurred. Britain worked hard to find a plan acceptable to both parties, but proposals never materialized. Efforts by the UN and NATO also failed. For example, from 1955 to 1957, the Turkish government asserted that “if the British rule were to end, then the island should be returned to its previous owner—Turkey (as the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire)” (Sözen 1999: 14). Adoption of such a policy ensured continuation of British rule on the island that, for Turkish Cypriots, definitely looked like a better option than unification with Greece. However, when it became clear that the British would withdraw from the island, the Turkish side changed its approach and began to support the idea of *taksim* (Sözen 1999; Lumsden 1973).

Throughout this period, British requests and overtures from the Greek government to the Soviet Union prompted the U.S. government to assume responsibility to act as a primary mediator.

2.1 Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus

Figure 7.1 shows a time line for the conflict over Cyprus, beginning with

independence in 1960 and continuing through to the present. With the failure of third-party attempts at finding a resolution, Britain asked for direct negotiations between Greece and Turkey. After a long period of confrontation, talks among Greece, Turkey, and Britain bore fruit, and an agreement on the future of the island was signed. The 1959 Zurich and London agreements led to the establishment of an independent, bicomunal Republic of Cyprus in 1960, and the Treaties of Establishment, Alliance, and Guarantee laid out the foundations of this new political structure.⁸ According to these agreements, a republican form of government would secure the interests of both sides in Cyprus (Xydis 1967).⁹ Each is described in turn.

The Treaty of Establishment, as its name suggests, established the republic and defined its territory, with the exception of two sovereign military bases—the Akrotiri and the Dhekelia base areas. It essentially secured British interests on the island. According to this treaty, Turkey, Greece, and Britain would consult and cooperate on the common defense of Cyprus.

The Treaty of Alliance originated from a common desire to maintain peace and safeguard security between and among Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. It proposed the establishment of a tripartite headquarters on the territory of Cyprus, as well as stationing of contingents from Turkey and Greece to resist any aggression directed toward changing the status quo in Cyprus (Polyviou 1980).

In the Treaty of Guarantee, the main concern was recognition and maintenance of independence, territorial integrity, and security for the Republic of Cyprus. The Treaty of Guarantee prohibits “any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other state or partition of the island” (Art.1). Article 4 states that in case of a breach of its provisions, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom can take necessary measures to guarantee their observance: “Each of three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty.” Turkey used this very article to justify its intervention in 1974.

The constitution of the republic was based on dualism; in other words, the bicomunal state had the responsibility to regulate and protect its two ethnic communities. Almost all state branches were planned in a way that would have both communities contribute to their composition and functioning at least to some extent. The constitution allowed each side to keep its respective relationship with Greece and Turkey and exercise cultural, religious, and national traditions without any limitation (Joseph 1997; Polyviou 1980).

In terms of executive power, the new republic was presidential. Both the president (Greek Cypriot) and vice president (Turkish Cypriot) had the right

of veto on issues regarding foreign affairs, defense, and security. Three Turkish Cypriot and seven Greek Cypriot ministers made up the Council of Ministers, with the condition that one of the three most important ministries—Ministry of Defense, Finance, or Foreign Affairs—would be given to a Turkish Cypriot. Decisions in the Council of Ministers were taken by absolute majority; however, the right of veto was given to the president and vice president in all circumstances (Sözen 1999).

According to the 1960 constitution, the House of Representatives, with thirty-five Greek Cypriot and fifteen Turkish Cypriot members elected by the two ethnic communities, would exercise legislative power (Republic of Cyprus 1960). The president of the house was to be a Greek Cypriot and the vice president a Turkish Cypriot. This simple division in the legislative branch provided an opportunity for each ethnic group effectively to run its own affairs. In other words, each community had autonomy in matters related to religion, education, culture, family affairs, and so on (Joseph 1997).

Likewise, under this system, the judiciary also reflected dualism. The Supreme Constitutional Court was composed of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot, and one “neutral” president. Public services allowed for 70 percent Greek and 30 percent Turkish Cypriot representation. The constitution also established a police force according to a ratio of seven to three and an army of two thousand men, based on a six-to-four ratio of Greeks to Turks (Polyviou 1980). Last, but not least, the constitution clearly stated that the territory of the republic was one and indivisible and the constitution “cannot, in any way, be amended.”¹⁰

3. The Precrisis Period: 30 November 1963 to 15 July 1974

3.1 *The Road to Intervention: Increasing Tensions*

The establishment of the republic and the constitution led almost immediately to disagreements over provisions of the document and its application. The roots of the Cypriot conflict lay in the institutional foundations of the Cypriot state established in 1960 (Joseph 1997). All of the articles that supported inherent dualism clearly showed the complexity and rigidity of the constitution, and the relationship the two ethnic groups were expected to realize. Therefore, it is not difficult to conclude that while the constitution removed the ideas of *enosis* and partition, it facilitated further fragmentation of the two groups. By keeping the people separate and distinct from each other, the negotiated framework continued the “divide and rule” effect from the British era

and set the stage for a series of crises over territory and ethnic identity. Constitutional rights and provisions granted with the establishment of the republic—especially exclusive power on religious, educational, cultural, and teaching issues—intensified and institutionalized ethnic differences. Mistrust and unwillingness to express loyalty to the new state grew (Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993).

In many respects, the two sides perceived the constitution differently. “Instead of attempting to institutionalize bicomunal cooperation by workable provisions and living institutions based on the traditions and realities of the island, rigid and unworkable patterns and structures were set up” (Polyviou 1980: 23). Specifically, conflict arose over the veto powers of the vice president, application of the ratio of seven to three in the public service and the provision regarding municipalities and income tax legislation.

Greek Cypriots claimed that fundamental change was essential, since the constitution did not work properly. Turkish Cypriots, by contrast, rejected any attempts to bring significant changes to the constitution. They saw efforts toward change as a deliberate attempt by Greek Cypriots to eliminate at least some of their political rights. Factions in each community increasingly became suspicious of the intentions of the other group (Yesilada and Hewitt 1998). The result was increased ethnopolitical tension between the groups. A constitutional crisis marked the end of the newly established republic.

3.2 The Amendment Proposal: Initiation of Fighting and Violence

On November 30, 1963, President Makarios laid out his famous “13-point” amendments to then Vice President Küçük.¹¹ Perceptions of these amendments by both sides produced deadlock and violence on the island. Since amendments targeted the unalterable provisions of the Zurich treaty, Turkish Cypriots interpreted revision as an act against their equal partnership status because it sought to alter the consociational democratic system in which Turkish Cypriots would no longer have a veto power over decisions by the Greek majority. In the eyes of Turkish Cypriots, it represented a tactic or “a springboard for enosis” (Salih 1978: 16). The Turkish side also rejected the Greek argument that the agreement effectively had been imposed—signed only because no viable alternative existed at the time.

For Greek Cypriots, it was an imposed agreement, signed by Greek Cypriot leadership under coercion of guarantor powers. They therefore did not see it as a product of free will but, rather, necessity.¹² Additionally, the system created by the agreement was rigid and unworkable from the beginning.

The agreements “had put the Turkish minority, substantially, on the same level with regard to the exercise of political power with the Greek majority. This had been done despite its numerical strength (18 percent of the population) and its small proportion in land ownership and contribution to public expenditure,” and therefore “it was contrary to every democratic principle” and “completely wrong” (Polyviou 1980: 36–37). Another element that created problems for the Greek side was the right of final veto accorded to the president and the vice president of the republic. The Greek Cypriots believed that the agreement did not serve their main purpose, namely, resolution of the basic communal problems on the island. Makarios, drawing on his thirteen-point proposal, unilaterally amended the constitution and treaties in 1964. On December 6, Turkey announced that it found the proposals to be unacceptable. Turkish Cypriot officials started to withdraw from their positions and stated that the government was no longer legitimate in their eyes (Sözen 1999).

The collapse of bicomunal government in such a short time destroyed internal coherence and increased minority fears; underground military groups emerged. Intercommunal clashes broke out on 21 December 1963, when a Greek police patrol insisted on searching a Turkish car. Fighting quickly spread to other parts of the island. Polarization increased quickly and intercommunal confrontation became violent. The Greek Cypriots gained control of almost the entire island, and a quarter of the Turkish community became refugees, formed enclaves, and isolated themselves from the Greek Cypriots. In this phase, Turkish Cypriots felt especially insecure and vulnerable due to the numerical superiority of Greek Cypriots. In turn, on 24 December, Turkish Cypriots appealed to Turkey for help. Turkey proposed that Britain, Greece, and the United States join her in restoring order on the island; none of them chose, however, to get directly involved (Kyriakides 1968; Volkan 1979; Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993; Mirbagheri 1998; A. James 2002).

With the emergence of fighting, connections with Greece and Turkey became more visible. While the Greek Cypriot organization obtained financial and arms support from the military regime in Greece, the Turkish government supported the Turkish Cypriot side. Both sides, in the meantime, kept busy increasing their military buildup, in the expectation that the conflict would escalate. The Greek government supported not only the idea of revision of the treaties and the constitution but also the eventual aim, *enosis*. Turkey was heavily concerned about its own security, as well as the safety of Turkish Cypriots. Turkey blamed Greek Cypriots for destroying peace on the island and violating the constitutional rights of Turkish Cypriots.

From December 1963 onward, Turkey threatened that if violence continued, it might intervene according to the Treaty of Guarantee in order to protect Turkish Cypriots from the attacks (Salih 1978).

Late in December of that year, escalation of violence led Turkey to take a series of nonviolent, small-scale military acts. Turkey sent two jets over Cyprus to show concern as well as readiness to intervene, if it came to that. Greece and Greek Cypriots interpreted the action as a harbinger of Turkish military action. Not surprisingly, Greece stated that in case Turkey intervened on the island, Greece would do the same thing. Due to its broader security implications, this action alarmed both NATO and the United States. A letter from U.S. President Johnson, with its diplomatic yet firm tone, however, deterred a possible Turkish intervention.

From December 1963 onward and with the consent of all parties, Britain tried to play the mediator role in order to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey and safeguard its interests in the island. Similarly, Johnson attempted to mediate. These attempts at mediation turned out to be unsuccessful. As time passed, both sides became firmer about their opinions. The Greek Cypriot side insisted on the idea of revising the treaties. Turkish Cypriots decided not to insist on the 1960 constitution since recent events had made it obvious that the two groups could not live together peacefully even if the constitution had remained status quo. Therefore, they demanded partition or federation as well as geographical and physical separation between the two communities (Polyviou 1980).

3.3 Renewed Tensions between Turkish and Greek Cypriots

From 1963 to 1967, intercommunal violence continued and numerous mediation attempts took place to prevent war between Greece and Turkey. It appeared more like a complex game between Turkey and Greece than one strictly between the two communities on the island. When the interests and plans of the two homelands entered into the equation, the likelihood of peaceful resolution decreased. On 21 March 1964, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 186, with the consent of the government of Cyprus, which authorized the dispatch of the UN Peacekeeping Force to Cyprus (UNFICYP) to preserve the security in the area, prevent recurrence of fighting, and supervise the cease-fire.

An attack by the Greek-Cypriot National Guard on two Turkish villages in November 1967 brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of full-scale military confrontation. In response, the Turkish government sent military

aircraft to fly over Cyprus and ordered military forces to be ready in case of an intervention. These actions, according to Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997b), constituted the crisis trigger for Cyprus and Greece. Turkey had indicated seriousness about her threat of intervention. U.S. diplomatic involvement and pressure led to a cease-fire, withdrawal of all Greek troops from Cyprus that exceeded the number specified in the London and Zurich agreements, and lifting of the blockade on enclaves (Dodd 1999; Polyviou 1980).

The events of 1967 demonstrated to the great powers and the rest of the world that even a small disturbance and subsequent fighting could spread easily all over the island and produce a war between Greece and Turkey. In the Cold War environment, however, a direct confrontation between Turkey and Greece stood out as too risky for the United States to permit.¹³ The “Cyprus Syndrome” easily could have become part of the global “balance of power” game played by the superpowers. The United States preferred to be assertive only when the possibility of military escalation between Turkey and Greece heightened and did so in order to protect its own—and also NATO’s—interests (Slengesol 2000). For example, after convincing the Turks not to launch a major naval attack, the head of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) proposed a NATO peacekeeping force of ten thousand troops to maintain security in Cyprus for three months while a mediator less threatening to the respective parties could be found. This offer was rejected by Greece and prompted Soviet leaders to declare that NATO occupation of Cyprus represented a threat to global security. Upon the failure of this and subsequent U.S.-NATO initiatives, the UN Security Council moved to send its own peacekeeping force. Yet Turkey’s continuing preparation for an invasion prompted U.S. President Johnson to threaten Turkey: NATO would not defend it should the Russians react to a Turkish offensive in Cyprus. This threat prompted Turkey to reassess its commitments to NATO, and it subsequently cooled relations with its Western allies.¹⁴

Similarly, for the USSR, Cyprus was important because it provided a good opportunity to balance the United States’ influence. In this respect, both the presence of the Communist Party (AKEL) and a common religion—Orthodox Christianity—strengthened ties with the Greek Cypriots. Additionally, due to the multiethnic nature of the former Soviet Union and Russia, there was a tendency to support a solution based on unitary government on the island (Sözen 1999). Thus, the Soviet Union supported the Greek side morally, politically, and militarily.¹⁵

The mid-1960s witnessed a series of third-party attempts at conflict man-

agement. Although these attempts (especially those of the UN and United States, most notably the Johnson Letter) helped to prevent war and further loss of life, no permanent solution to the problem could be found by the parties involved (Bölükbaşı 1993). In spite of a cease-fire established in August 1964—which definitely contributed to crisis abatement—actions by the United States and the UN provided no more than temporary relief to both sides. Tension continued and escalated into other crises in 1967 and 1974. From a broader perspective, despite their effectiveness in terminating individual crises, third-party attempts at intervention in this period cannot be designated as successful in solving the Cyprus puzzle. Since resolution of the conflict remained of secondary importance for the United States and the UN, underlying reasons for the tension were not eliminated and, in 1974, the whole scenario repeated itself with the same players (Theophanous 2000a, 2000b).

From 1968 to 1974, with the support of third parties, especially the UN, numerous intercommunal negotiations took place. However, the fact that neither community would cooperate to achieve a feasible settlement doomed all discussions to failure: “The objective of the Greek Cypriot leadership throughout the period was to arrive at a solution whereby the Turkish Cypriots were classed as a minority” (Mirbagheri 1998: 60). Turkish Cypriots staunchly rejected the Greek objective. After the events of 1963, they became even more convinced that it was impossible for the communities to live together. Thus, Turkish Cypriots tried to remain apart from Greek Cypriots and run their own affairs. On 28 December 1967, Turkish Cypriots created the Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration to establish law and order within their community. However, effective isolation became unrealistic due to the economic embargo imposed by the Greek side, which in turn stimulated a considerable amount of support from Turkey. Turkish Cypriots came to believe deeply that the Greek side ultimately aimed to achieve unification with Greece. In short, not only reluctance to give concessions but also distrust between the two sides led to failure in talks (Mirbagheri 1998).

4. Beyond International Crisis

4.1 *The Crisis Period—15 July 1974 to 24 February 1975*

On 15 July 1974, the Greek Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers, overthrew the government of Cyprus with the intention of establishing a

puppet government that would realize *enosis* (Necatigil 1989).¹⁶ At that time Greece was controlled by the military. In terms of the future of Cyprus (i.e., the main question being how to achieve *enosis*), the views of the military in Greece and the president of the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios, differed completely. As a result of the coup, Makarios escaped to London, and Nikos Sampson became the president. In the meantime, heavy fighting went on between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Turkey, in response to the coup, asked for resignation of the new regime, withdrawal of Greek officers, and restoration of Makarios as president. When the Greek junta rejected this request, Turkey asked for support from Britain, but the British refused to conduct a joint intervention. As a result, Turkey intervened in the island on 20 January 1974 and claimed that was necessary to stop the bloodshed and human suffering as well as to prevent unification of Cyprus with Greece (Fouskas 2001; Bölükbaşı 1993). Extensive fighting and violence resulted from the intervention. Turkey presented the Treaty of Guarantee, which gave Turkey, Greece, and Britain the right to intervene to restore constitutional order to the island as necessary, as the legal basis for its action.

Turkish leaders argued that the intervention took place due to circumstances that had been created by the Greek Cypriots and Greek government. Along those lines, Hale (2000: 181, quoted in Fouskas 2001: 99) argues that “[As opposed to the crises of 1964 and 1967] the crisis of 1974 was different, in that Turkey appeared to have a clearer mandate for intervention under the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee. If Turkey had not invaded, then Cyprus would probably have been united with Greece, the Turkish Cypriots massacred or expelled, and the Greek colonels’ regime consolidated.”

Greek Cypriots continued to interpret the Turkish action in 1974 as an invasion. Many Greek and Greek Cypriot authors, like Theophanous (2000a, 2000b), believe that for Turkey, the coup against Makarios on 15 July 1974 merely provided an opportunity to invade the island. Prior to 1974, Turkey threatened to invade the island on more than two occasions, so that the invasion and occupation of Northern Cyprus have served Turkish strategic interests over the protection of the Turkish Cypriots and that of Constitutional order in Cyprus. Along those same lines, Fouskas (2001: 100) argues that the second part of the intervention in August 1974 “was not an act of protection of the Turkish Minority. Rather it fulfilled a long-standing Ankara policy aimed at the division of the island along ethnic lines in order to pave the way for the strategic control of the whole of Cyprus and the exclusion of Greece from the Eastern Mediterranean basin.” The size of the Turkish military, as well as the distance between

Cyprus and Greece, served to prevent Greece from responding militarily to the Turkish actions.

On 15 July the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting. The Security Council adopted Resolution 353, which called upon all parties to stop fighting, initiate talks to restore peace, and show full respect to the international status of the UN force. In addition, the UN took humanitarian action on the island and designated the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as Coordinator of UN Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus. On 23 July 1974 civilian rule was restored on the island, and Glafkos Clerides became the acting president (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997b, 2000).

Two rounds of talks—the so-called Geneva talks—with the purpose of restoring peace on the island took place from 25 July to 14 August in that year, between the guarantor powers. These talks occurred in response to the request from the UN Security Council noted above. Due to failure of the talks, on 14 August 1974, Turkish forces carried out the second part of the military operation and gained control of almost one-third of the island's territory in the north. On 16 August 1974, Turkey called for a cease-fire. In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot leadership declared establishment of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” in the area controlled by the Turkish military forces. This event marked the end of the crisis (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997b).

Since 1974, the island has been divided—a de facto partition—by the so-called Green Line, and the two ethnically homogenous groups have lived totally isolated from each other.¹⁷ After the intervention, the character of the conflict was transformed from internal fighting to international crisis and the role and importance of the respective homelands increased extensively.

4.2 Postcrisis: 25 February 1975 to the Present

On 15 November 1983, claiming the right of self-determination, Turkish Cypriots declared their own independent state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Other than Turkey, no other state has officially recognized the TRNC. The Republic of Cyprus, the only recognized state on the island, exerted no control over the northern part of the island.

Under the auspices of the UN, intercommunal talks resumed again in 1975. The five rounds of talks, which took place from 28 April 1975 to 21 February 1976, ended in failure. Neither Turkish nor Greek Cypriots showed willingness to compromise. Greek Cypriots envisioned a unitary federal system; by contrast, Turkish Cypriots demanded a weak federal government or confederation with clear territorial boundaries in order to pre-

serve their homogeneity and security (Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993; Ertekun 1984).

On 27 January 1977, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktas, and his Greek counterpart, Archbishop Makarios, met in the presence of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus. On 12 February 1977, they reached a four-point agreement as the basis for future negotiations.¹⁸ After Makarios's unexpected death, another series of high-level negotiations took place on 19 May 1979 as an extension to the four-point agreement reached between Denktas and Kyprianou under the auspices of the UN. These negotiations produced a ten-point agreement (UN Doc. S/13369). The two agreements remain significant because they are the only criteria that the two sides agreed on formally and keep alive hopes for a solution (Sözen 1999; Mirbagheri 1998).

After the intervention, Turkey became a key actor in the complex game in Cyprus, especially due to a strong military presence in the northern part of the island. Turkey became more assertive, and its influence on the Cypriot government became more significant; any solution not supported by the Turkish government was unlikely to hold. Domestic politics and public opinion heavily influenced Turkey's approach to the Cyprus question. Between 1973 and 1979, seven governments ensued, and only four of them held a majority in the parliament. This made taking unpopular decisions extremely difficult. In addition, in September 1980 the military took power (Mirbagheri 1998), further affecting the future profile of Turkish policy in both general terms and in relation to Cyprus. With the intervention, Turkey had stopped the bloodshed, saved the lives of ethnic brethren, and secured its core interests in the island.

Greece, by contrast, remained dissatisfied with the status quo; lost was the *enosis*, and a significant portion of territory. However, like Turkey, Greece experienced major changes in its internal politics and did not pursue a path toward retribution. With the collapse of the military government on 22 July 1974 and the reestablishment of democracy, Greece's approach to the Cyprus problem was transformed. With removal of the military junta, which engineered the coup attempt in 1974, the Greek government lost its desire to dictate policy to Cyprus and did not perceive the problem as a main concern (Mirbagheri 1998). The newly established Karamanlis government took a conciliatory position toward Cyprus and consequently initiated backroom dialogue with Turkey.

Over the 1980s, various alternative formulae to resolve the Cyprus dispute were drawn up under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General. For example, following the unilateral Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence on 15

November 1983, the UN condemned it with Resolution 541. UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar made efforts toward a settlement. On 29 March 1985, Perez de Cuellar presented his draft framework agreement, which called for a bicomunal federal republic. This framework agreement differed from others in the sense that, for the first time, the UN abandoned “mini-package” approaches in favor of a presumably comprehensive solution. According to the agreement, the federal republic would include two provinces or federated states, a president, and a legislature composed of two chambers: a lower chamber with a seventy-thirty Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representation and an upper chamber with fifty-fifty representation (Necatigil 1989; Tamkoç 1998; Sözen 1999).

Both Denktas and Kyprianou, signed the agreement on 17 January 1985, but the Greek Cypriot leader encountered bitter criticism at home. After his consultation with Greece, Kyprianou altered his position and announced that the agreement would not be acceptable after all. UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar conducted extensive negotiations with both sides and presented the final draft framework agreement on 26 March 1986.¹⁹ Turkish Cypriots accepted the revised draft, but Greek Cypriots then rejected the altered agreement after consultation with the Greek government. The UN Secretary-General asked Greek Cypriots to reconsider; further negotiations took place but eventually resulted in failure.

Between 1980 and 1986, both Greece and Turkey continued to play a role in the discussions and decisions regarding the future of the island. While the impact of Turkey’s foreign policy on Cyprus stayed the same as in the postintervention period (1974–80), Greece’s impact increased (Mirbagheri 1998). In early 1980, Turkey suffered from domestic violence and disorder and, in September, the military gained power and declared martial law. Important changes also occurred in Greece. In 1981, the Greek Socialist Party (PASOK), whose leader was more persistent than his predecessor, was elected. He strongly suggested that the Greek Cypriot president not sign any draft agreements. In general, the overall attitude of Greece to the peace process in Cyprus was unconstructive (Mirbagheri 1998).

In the last decade of the twentieth century, Boutros Ghali, the new UN Secretary-General, proposed a very long and comprehensive “set of ideals,” which envisaged a Federal Cyprus (Bölükbaşı 1995; Bahçeli and Rizopoulos 1996/97). To discuss the principles, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders came together in New York in October 1992, but like previous efforts, the meeting was destined to fail. The two parties had irreconcilable views and differing perceptions of how a viable settlement would function. In 1995, the UN Security Council recommended a series of “Confidence Building

Measures” in order to eliminate the biggest problem on the way to achieving a peaceful resolution: deep mistrust between the two sides. Most significant among these measures were the opening of Varosha and the Nicosia international airport.

4.3 *Involvement of the EC/EU**

Talks between the two sides changed extensively with entrance of the EU into the equation. Indeed, the EU turned out to be a most significant and influential third party.²⁰ The Association Agreement (1972) and the following protocol (1978) formalized the relationship between the EC and Cyprus. The Association Agreement suggested the establishment of a customs union between Cyprus and the EC over two stages over a ten-year period. In addition to the Association Agreement, from 1979 to 1998 Cyprus and the EC signed four financial protocols. On 4 July 1990, the Republic of Cyprus (i.e., the Greek Cypriot side) formally applied to the EC for membership on behalf of the whole island. Turkey, as one of the guarantors, claimed that the application violated the London-Zurich agreements and therefore asked for the process to be stopped or, otherwise, claimed that the political negotiations in the island would run into difficulties.

In its first opinion (1993), the EU concluded that Cyprus would be eligible for membership. The EU also emphasized, “among other things, the dynamism of the Cypriot economy and expressed the view that no major problems were anticipated in the process of harmonization with the *acquis communautaire*.” However, one provision also designated a solution to the Cyprus problem as a precondition for accession (Theophanous 2000b: 222–23).

The turning point in EU-Cyprus relations occurred in 1995, when the EU General Affairs Council reaffirmed the eligibility of Cyprus for membership and confirmed that it would be included in the next round of enlargement. So accession negotiations started on the basis of commission proposals six months after the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996. At the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, the European Council announced that resolution of the Cyprus problem would not be a precondition for accession of Cyprus. This meant that although a peaceful solution to the political problems had not been obtained, the EU would go ahead and accept Cyprus without the participation of the TRNC (Papaneophytou 1994). Not surprisingly,

*The term EC, referring to the European Community, is used to describe the organization’s involvement up to 1992, when it became the EU (European Union) under the Maastricht Treaty.

Turkey reacted harshly to the decision to give a firm date to Cyprus for beginning accession talks. Cyprus completed the *acquis* screening process in June 1999 (i.e., all thirty-one negotiation chapters were closed) and, in the meantime, substantive negotiations on certain chapters began. The accession negotiations were completed in December 2002. Cyprus signed the Accession Treaty on 16 April and joined the EU on 1 May 2004.

In 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan handed the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities a peace plan that envisages a federation with two constituent parts, presided over by a rotating presidency. Due to deep resentment between the two sides, both Cypriot leader Denktas and Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos formally rejected the formula. “The Greek Cypriot side rejected the document on grounds that it failed to provide return of all Greek Cypriot refugees to the northern Turkish Cypriot part of the island, Denktas rejected the document on charges that it did not meet the fundamental demands of his people, headed by sovereignty, stipulated an unacceptable ratio of territorial concessions and fell contrary to the agreed principle of a bi-zonal settlement” (*Turkish Daily News*, 2 April 2003). The plan suggested a hybrid system of federation and confederation and gave each group a high level of autonomy. This rejection was important because the Annan Plan, 192 pages long even without the addenda, provided the only “comprehensive solution plan” in the history of Cyprus.²¹

Unlike the UN, the EU’s presence as a party in the Cyprus conflict has a more measurable influence. The EU has had two effects on the disputants. First, the EU’s influence changed the course of discussions. The EU never prepared its own peace plan. Instead, it always tried to back the UN’s peace plan, through both political and economic means. Second, the political and economic benefits that come with EU membership encouraged the Turkish side to reconsider the possibility of unification with the Greek side. Another factor that forced Denktas to be softer and more conciliatory originates from Turkey’s own aspiration to become a member of the EU (Kentmen 2003).

During initial private negotiations hosted by the UN in New York, Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders reached an agreement regarding peace talks and committed themselves to simultaneous referenda on 21 April 2004. Unfortunately, the UN-brokered direct talks to reach an agreement to reunite the island also ended in collapse. While the Turkish side accepted the plan in the referendum, the Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected the UN settlement plan. As a result, the Greek Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004, while the Turkish side remained isolated. In December 2004, Turkey agreed to recognize Cyprus as a member of the EU before the initiation of its own accession talks, scheduled for 2005.

5. Analysis and Propositions

As noted earlier, the Cyprus problem has gone through three main stages: (a) the establishment of the republic in 1960; (b) protracted conflict and crisis from 1960 to 1974; and (c) deescalation in tensions following Turkish military intervention in 1974. As the problem evolved through these periods, the scope and intensity of involvement for Greece and Turkey changed accordingly. More specifically, at stage 1, the two sides had different views about how the island should be governed after British rule. Greek Cypriots and Greece wanted unification, while Turkish Cypriots and Turkey preferred the idea of partition or of staying under British rule as a second choice. In these years, Greece and Turkey exerted little direct influence—mostly the result of diplomacy rather than actual military intervention.

At Stage 2, as the level of violence increased on the island, the influence of the homelands became more direct and extensive. The homelands backed their ethnic brethren's point of view on both the constitution and the future of ethnic partnership. Eventually, both Greek and Turkish involvement took an aggressive, even violent form: Greece engineered a bloody coup to set up a puppet regime to achieve its ideal of unification, while Turkey responded with a full-scale military intervention.

De facto division of the island continued on into stage 3. This stage, characterized by continuous third-party attempts at conflict management and negotiations for peaceful resolution of the problem, represents a deescalation but also is protracted. The homelands became directly involved in the talks. The lurking presence of Greece and Turkey behind the discussions served as the main reason for ongoing complications and deadlock but also ensured that direct confrontation, already inhibited by membership in NATO and a strong U.S. presence, would be minimized.

This protracted conflict shows characteristics of both secessionism and irredentism. In this case, Greece stands out as the state that seeks to redeem Cyprus. Throughout history, Greeks have regarded Cyprus as a part of a cultural homeland, that is, the historic state. The claim to territory is based on transnational ethnic affinities and conditioned by the deep cleavage between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Greek nationalist concept of *megali idea* refers to Greek irredentism of the Byzantine Empire (Joseph 1997). As an extension of the nationalist movement, Greeks supported unification of Cyprus with Greece.

Irredentist conflicts are by definition interstate in scope and involve third-party support. Similarly, since irredentism pertains to another state's territory, which is a core value, there is a high potential for crisis and war. As

expected, when the idea of unification with Greece rose to the surface, Turkish Cypriots and Turks felt threatened and sought out partition, that is, secession. In general, secessionist interstate ethnic crises refer to formal and informal aspects of political alienation in which one or more ethnic groups seek, through political means, reduced control by a central authority. In these kinds of ethnic conflicts, the group trying to secede seeks external support. This usually intensifies the level of internal cleavage and disruption and leads to interstate conflict and third-party intervention (Carment 1994b). Secession may not be formal or declared separation as in secession *sensu stricto* (Heraclides 1990, 1991). As a response to Greek demands for unification with Greece, Turkish Cypriots asked for partition. Turkish Cypriots appealed to Turkey for support, and the result was a military confrontation between two politically mobilized, organized, externally supported ethnic groups and *de facto* division of the island.

As mentioned in the first chapter, it is well known that affective and instrumental ties can play a decisive role in shaping the decisions of potential third parties (Suhrke and Noble 1977; Smith 1986a; cf. Heraclides 1990, 1991; Carment 1994b). Although some pragmatic concerns are involved, this case study is extremely useful in showing the importance of ethnic ties in third-party interventions. While Greek intervention mostly reflected ethnic ties, Turkish involvement originated from ethnic affinity as well as strategic concerns.

Starting in 1963, “ethnic ties served as the primary cause and vehicle for Greek and Turkish involvement in Cyprus” (Joseph 1997: 129). Eventually, these interventions damaged and even prevented communication and interaction—not only between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also between Turks and Greeks as a whole. External, ethnic intervention “sharpened and widened the conflict, thus shifting the focus of repeated crisis from the domestic Cypriot setting to the likelihood of an all-out confrontation across the Aegean” (129).

Testing of the framework’s propositions focuses mainly on the Turkish military intervention of 1974. However, assuming that Turkish intervention responded to the coup staged by Greek officials, we also pay some attention to that event. Of course, until 1974, continuous non-military interventions and crises took place within the protracted conflict. The coup staged by Greek forces and the Greek National Guard on Cyprus in order to bring a *pro-enosis* government to power signaled the beginning of Cyprus’s foreign policy crisis. The already crumbling internal balance totally collapsed with the overthrow of the government. Heavy fighting broke out between the two ethnic groups. Subsequent Turkish intervention triggered an international crisis and an interstate ethnic conflict.

Proposition P₁ asserts that constrained states will pursue multiple strategies when intervening in ethnic conflict. The Cyprus case supports this proposition. Although ethnic cleavage within Cyprus provided an occasion for Turkish leaders to maximize their domestic political fortunes, that did not occur. While it seemed that, due to the ethnic affinities, the public supported the idea of intervention most of the time, it still was a very hard step for Turkish leaders to take. The timing of the intervention—in the middle of the Cold War—made it especially risky. Being accountable to their people, leaders in Ankara did not accept the risks of intervention lightly. Despite the fact that Turkey is classified as ethnically dominant, for a long time, ethnic affinities alone proved to be an insufficient justification for direct interstate intervention. On two occasions, Turkey threatened Greek Cypriots that she would not hesitate to intervene if the situation on the island got any worse. These threats, however, did not result in intervention until 1974. For example, when Makarios demanded reduction of the powers of the Turkish minority in 1963, fighting broke out and violence quickly spread all over the island. As a response, Turkey basically used two tactics: threat of intervention and small-scale military acts. Turkish leaders, due especially to domestic pressure, believed that they had to defend Turkish Cypriots. The method used, however, remained limited to small-scale military acts due primarily to the letter from President Johnson, the high costs and risks of military intervention, and Prime Minister Ismet İnönü's predominant personality trait—cautiousness (Bölükbaşı 1998).²²

Up to 1974, Turkey applied several strategies—diplomatic, economic, and political—all less costly than military intervention. Turkey backed the Turkish insurgency groups, and especially TMT, politically, militarily, and financially. When a coup attempt with the purpose of unification with Greece took place, Turkish leaders became convinced that they had no choice other than a potentially costly military intervention. A greatly heightened sense of danger to ethnic brethren, along with domestic costs from not pursuing involvement in Cyprus's internal conflict, became too intense for the Turkish leaders to ignore. Public pressure in favor of intervention became extensive and sustained.

From 1967 to 1974, the regime lacked a base of popular support and stayed in power primarily if not exclusively through terror. In 1969, Greece withdrew from the EC and, since the military government did not have any other need to legitimize its actions, it became relatively attractive to stage a coup in Cyprus. The military junta was ready to go to war with Turkey at the time of Turkish intervention. Collapse of the military junta and its successor prevented further military action (Joseph 1997). As noted earlier, in a Type I_a

state, power is concentrated at the top, and therefore the elite is free from domestic pressures. In this kind of setting, an elite is unlikely to face criticism at home as a result of external confrontation. The people at the top have much greater room to adopt an interventionist, hawklike strategy without incurring high political costs. Right after Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, the military government ended, and Greece returned to democracy under the leadership of Konstantinos Karamanlis. A referendum in December 1974 abolished the monarchy. After 1974, Greece could be classified as a Type II_a state, with high institutional constraint and a dominant ethnic group.

Proposition P₂ focuses on the preference for nonviolent strategies by ethnically diverse states. The underlying assumption behind this proposition is that ethnic diversity in a society can limit or redirect actions by the COG. When constituencies have political influence, leaders face difficulty in mobilizing an optimal response to an international opportunity. The demographic characteristics of Greece and Turkey do not allow us to evaluate this proposition directly since both of them are ethnically dominant states. However the behavior of the homelands is basically consistent with the underlying assumptions of this proposition. Therefore, in an indirect way, P₂ gets some support.

When a society is ethnically diverse, leaders experience constraints as different groups demand varying strategies for handling of issues related to secessionism or irredentism. Elites depend on the support of more than one ethnic group, so domestic forces easily can limit the options available to leaders. This, in turn, leads to a reduced likelihood of violent methods of intervention. By contrast, when a society is ethnically dominant, as in the case of Greece and Turkey, elites may prefer policies that will appeal to their ethnic constituency at the expense of smaller groups. This is done, most of the time, to increase their popularity and share of power. Since elites in these kinds of societies neither depend on support from other groups nor see any significant threat to their power, the likelihood of pursuing more aggressive methods, such as initiating an intervention with violence, is higher than in ethnically diverse societies.

Although the level of institutionalization may have changed, basic demographic characteristics have stayed the same. Despite the ethnic dominance in their societies, both Greece and Turkey preferred nonviolent strategies until institutional change in 1974. Thus developments up to 1974 would seem to work against P₂, while the events of that year support it.

Proposition P₃ concerns forceful intervention as related to concentration of costs and benefits. According to this proposition, forceful intervention is

more likely when institutional constraints are low, along with minimal political resistance among constituents or all-purpose support from members of the same ethnic group (i.e., ethnic group dominance) as with Type I_a states. This proposition finds support from the Cyprus case. Force ultimately became a central component of both Turkish and Greek foreign policy as related to Cyprus. Most notably, Greece sponsored a coup in 1974, and that ultimately produced Turkish military intervention.

When constraints are low or one ethnic group is dominant, these kinds of states can be expected to show belligerence or forceful intervention as third-party interveners. While the level of institutionalization differed between the two interveners, both of these ethnically dominant states ended up utilizing violent means in their policy toward Cyprus. Institutionalization did not play a restraining role. Apparently, even the existence of a high level of institutionalization did not prevent Turkey from conducting forceful intervention, which clearly suggests the importance of ethnic dominance and cross-boundary ethnic ties.

Since the Turkish experience with democracy is not a uniform one, it is useful to focus briefly on events from 1971 to 1973 in attempting to explain why the state might have acted toward Cyprus as it did in 1974. Turkey was democratic from 1961 till 1971 and from 1973 to 1979. The role of the military within those intervening years creates some “question marks” regarding the level of institutionalization in Turkey. Rather than taking over the government directly, on 12 March 1971, commanders of the Turkish armed forces presented a memorandum to the president. The memo demanded establishment of a credible government with real power, an end to socioeconomic unrest and violence prevailing in the country, and application of some economic and social reforms. The military commanders also made it clear that in case these demands were not met, they would overthrow the elected government—“a coup by memorandum” as labeled in the Turkish politics literature. The prime minister, Süleyman Demirel, resigned immediately, and chiefs of the armed forces asked Nihat Erim to form an above-party government. The military appointed a series of above-party cabinets that governed the country until the 14 October 1973 elections. The result was a coalition government set up by the Republican People’s Party, National Salvation Party, and Republican Reliance Party. With these elections, Turkey returned to democracy (Hale 1994).

Bearing in mind the problems with Turkish democracy, the country still exhibited enough institutional limitations on elite power to be counted as a high-constraint state in 1974.²³ Thus domestic institutions, as well the Cold War environment, stand out as the main reasons why Turkey preferred a rel-

atively mild strategy of nonviolent intervention until 1974. Ethnic affinities and cleavage did not prove powerful enough to produce forceful action from the Turkish side. However, when *enosis* became a real possibility and huge pressure emerged from the public, the dominant ethnic elite in Turkey moved forward and conducted a forceful intervention. At that point, ethnic dominance, along with ethnic affinity and cleavage, proved to be more powerful in determining the outcome (the nature of the intervention). Similarly, as expected, low levels of institutionalization increased the likelihood of noncooperative and even aggressive foreign policy in Greece. Therefore, the Greeks provided relatively strong support for autonomy of ethnic brethren in Cyprus.

Proposition P₄ concerns the role of high affinities and cleavage in exacerbating tensions between states. As noted, the presence of ethnic ties, as well as cleavages between groups, can increase the chances of a state initiating an ethnically oriented policy that leads to a crisis. Ethnic ties and cleavage can create opportunities to be exploited and therefore increase the likelihood of involvement in ethnic conflict. Along those lines, it is clear that the two ethnic groups in Cyprus are connected to their homelands in many respects. The two communal groups have regarded themselves as different from each other, based on origin, culture, language, and religion. Both sides have maintained ethnonationalist rhetoric for many years, and eventually, this behavior facilitated expansion of the conflict and interventions by the respective homelands. Historically, Greece and Turkey have strong relations with the island and continuously have expressed their interest in the issue of its permanent disposition regarding sovereignty. Even after the establishment of the republic in 1960, loyalties to Greece and Turkey continued to exist in the form of strong historical, educational, cultural, and religious ties. Granting of the right to use the Greek and Turkish flags and celebration of national holidays that belong to the homelands are examples that show the lasting power of these ties (Joseph 1997).

In sum, “outside intervention along ethnic lines has been an important and influential factor in the society and politics of Cyprus since independence” (Joseph 1997: 39). Removal of colonial administration prepared suitable grounds for Greece and Turkey to establish close relations with the new state, increase their ties with, and voice in, Cyprus, with the idea of promoting national goals (Joseph 1997). Despite establishment of an independent state, Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not identify themselves with the new entity as much as they did with their homelands.

Even a cursory review of the establishment of a constitution, dualism and nonstop interventions of Turkish and Greek governments in the internal

affairs of Cyprus (i.e., rejection of amendments from Makarios by Turkey and coup d'état attempts by the Greek junta) is sufficient to show how

- (a) the two sides are inclined to intervene along ethnic lines;
- (b) external interventions increase misperceptions;
- (c) interventions deepened the antagonisms; and lastly
- (d) third-party actions decreased the chances of a stable and peaceful resolution.²⁴

Perhaps old ethnic animosities and external involvement are equally important in understanding the current impasse.²⁵ Political and social interactions between Cypriots have reflected “instruction on one level by ‘ancient affections’—that is, lessons of history, past communal relations, stereotypes, prejudices, religious and other cultural and social factors—and on another level by external influences, both direct and indirect” (Sambanis 1994: 130). While interventions may have resulted from long-standing hatreds, mistrust between the two sides increased with respective actions by Greece and Turkey.

The 1959 treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, decided mainly by Britain, Greece, and Turkey, are examples of direct external influence (Sambanis 1994). These agreements are significant reasons for deadlock and aggravation of existing tensions between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. (An instance of indirect external influence is the educational system designed by the British, which emphasized the differences between the two communities [Sambanis 1994].) Efforts by Greece and Turkey throughout the history of the case stand out as mainly self-serving and unproductive. Most of the time, the actions of the homelands limited the options of the Cypriots and deepened divisions between the ethnic groups. Therefore, rather than bringing about a solution, Greece and Turkey have helped to perpetuate the conflict (Sambanis 1994).

Proposition P₅, which concerns the relative likelihood of ethnic intervention, also finds support from this case. In the typology presented in figure 2.1, Turkey and Greece would be classified as ethnically dominant, high-constraint (Type II_a) and ethnically dominant, low-constraint (Type I_a) states, respectively.²⁶

According to our framework as presented in chapter 2, options for decision makers are affected mainly by the relative size of ethnic groups, affinity, and cleavage (the affective variables) and the level of institutionalization within the state (the political variable). The basic reason for expecting sporadic interventionism from a Type II_a state is its mixture of ethnic dominance

and high institutional constraints. While institutions make third-party involvement harder, ethnic dominance makes it easier.

Why did forceful intervention occur despite a high level of institutionalization? Two competing arguments can be offered. One explanation focuses on the underlying nature of the conflict. Due to high costs—both domestic and international—Turkey for a long time refrained from utilizing military means. But when no other means worked, Turkish leaders ordered military intervention. Turkey's apparent attitude and nonviolent actions prior to 1974 support the claim that institutions mattered in the decision to intervene. The other argument, which emphasizes the importance of ethnic dominance, is in essence the contrary. Although a democracy since 1946, Turkish armed forces overthrew the elected government in three instances—1960, 1971, and 1980. Thus, it might be argued that at the time of intervention, Turkey was not a vibrant democracy in *practice* and unconstrained ethnic dominance led to intervention. Turkey's *attitude and behavior* are in line with expectations.

For Greece, a low-constraint, ethnically dominant state in 1974, the expectation is belligerence. Elites seized power and disregarded the results of popular elections. Between 1967 and 1974, the military dictatorship in power remained relatively immune from domestic pressure.

6. Conclusions

The goal of this chapter was to evaluate the interstate dimensions of ethnic conflict and the impact of institutions and ethnic constraints on intervention in a setting with both irredentist and secessionist characteristics. The results indicate that ethnic diversity and institutional constraints have the capacity to explain Turkish and Greek decisions to get involved in the Cyprus conflict. We also have looked at the role that linkage variables, ethnic affinity, and cleavage played in third-party interventions and found them to be important sources of elite involvement in an ethnic conflict.

In order to understand the patterns of Turkish and Greek interests and involvement in the Cyprus conflict, we started with an account of the events that led to crisis in 1974. Greek and Turkish interventions in 1974 have been examined in detail, and the five propositions developed in chapter 2 have been tested. Based on the historical evidence, we can claim that developments in Cyprus generally are in line with expectations. In evaluating the Greek-staged coup and Turkish military intervention, not only affective and political variables, but also enabling conditions, played a major role. The high level of ethnic ties with homelands and the deep cleavage between the groups

in Cyprus increased the likelihood of Turkey and Greece applying ethnically oriented policies. Indeed, these are the two main reasons behind the protractedness of the conflict.

Another interesting finding is that, as seen in the Somalia and Indo-Sri Lankan cases, high-constraint states (both diverse and dominant) are not as immune to using force. Turkey, a high constraint–dominant state, preferred support for insurgency movements to direct military involvement for a long time. Elites used the threat of intervention as a means to achieve their goal in the short term. However, in 1974, the level of cleavage, hostility, and fighting reached a point that caused Turkey to intervene militarily. At that point the role of institutions seemed relatively less influential as compared to the impact of ethnic dominance, affinity, and cleavage.

Finally, in evaluating this case, it is essential to take into consideration the relationship between Greece and Turkey as parties to a protracted conflict while also members of a defensive alliance. Results of previous studies show that conflicts within that type of setting work differently from the ones outside that context (Colaresi and Thompson 2002). Crisis actors within protracted conflicts are more likely to experience violent triggers, to perceive a more basic threat, and to employ violence with high severity and prominence in crisis management. A prolonged history of conflict and violence between the same adversaries creates mistrust and expectation of further hostility. Moreover, the periodic resort to violence in the past reinforces the expectation of violence in the future (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997b). In this case, mutual distrust between the two ethnic groups and between Turkey and Greece played a decisive role in the evolution of the conflict. Similarly, the mistrust and the protracted conflict setting affected the calculations of the elites on both sides when they were thinking about intervention. Therefore, the context of this conflict needs to be taken into consideration in explaining the actions of Greece and Turkey in 1974. To this day, Cyprus continues to complicate the relationship between Greece and Turkey. However, like the Thai Malay case, it is important to note how countries facing a common security problem can be brought together. In this case NATO membership had a constraining effect on both states. Granted, immense U.S. pressure was brought to bear, especially on Turkey—which militarily had the upper hand. One can only imagine what kind of wars would have raged had neither country been a member of NATO or had the UN not become involved. NATO involvement reduced levels of conflict between ethnic groups and their alliance members.

In this case, there was a sense of collective responsibility to respond to regional conflicts based on the fear that such conflict would draw in the

major powers or lead to regional instability. This may still be the case for some conflicts, but the absence of a “Cold War mentality” as an additional factor may influence and alter a state’s decision’s to act in harmony with others. This suggests a paradox; the Cold War provided elements of order whose dissipation has changed the context within which military intervention is possible and yet perhaps less desirable from the perspective of some states (Cooper and Berdal 1993). The Cyprus conflict holds one further lesson. The Cyprus case could be an instructive guide whose rules NATO should apply with respect to the inclusion of members from the former Warsaw Pact. Regional conflicts between these members have been and will prove to be as intractable as those between Greece and Turkey. Unless ongoing efforts are taken to resolve these differences, NATO will again be in a precarious position whereby its (in)action may divide the alliance.