Notes



NOTES

Chapter One

1. A classification of all major active conflicts, either internally or externally driven, appears in table 17.3 of M. Brown (1996: 582).

2. In the 1990s, international crises with an ethnic dimension included Yugoslavia, Mauritania, Rwanda-Burundi, Senegal, Togo, Nigeria, Kenya, Papua, New Guinea, Algeria, China, Bhutan, Brazil, Mexico, India, Kosovo, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, East Timor, the Republic of Macedonia, Kashmir, Moldova, Cyprus, Burma, Sudan, Indonesia, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Tadjikistan. Little doubt exists that ethnic conflicts cut across territorial boundaries and influence the interaction of states in the global arena; case studies (Suhrke and Noble 1977; Heraclides 1990, 1991, 1997; Midlarsky 1992; Zartman 1992; Van Evera 1994; M. Brown 1996; Kaufman 1996; Lake and Rothchild 1996, 1998; Midlarsky 1997; Saideman 1997, 1998a, b; Kriesberg 1997; Taras 1997; Taras and Ganguly 2002; Young 1997) and aggregate data analysis (Carment 1993, 1994a; Carment and James 1995, 1996; Davis, Jaggers, and Moore 1997; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997a; Marshall 1997; Maoz 1997a) already have identified a range of factors leading to the internationalization of ethnic conflict.

3. While Suhrke and Noble's (1977) seminal assessment of eight ethnic conflicts produced the conclusion that domestic ethnic conflicts did not constitute a significant source of interstate strife, political scientists have reassessed that result and found that ethnic alliances, to name but one linkage, are a significant source of interstate conflict (Davis, Jaggers, and Moore 1997; Saideman 1997; Lake and Rothchild 1998).

4. Taras and Ganguly (2002) define four alternative processes that can lead to the internationalization of ethnic conflict: international diplomatic activities, partisan intervention, international terrorism, and flow of refugees.

5. For a detailed discussion of diffusion and its conceptual history, see Marshall 1997. There is some divergence in definitions among Starr (1990), Vasquez (1992), Marshall (1997) and the MAR Project (1998, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/). MAR, in particular, refers to diffusion as a demonstration effect of antiregime activity by a group in one country to kindred groups in other (usually adjoining) countries; see also Collins 1973 on conflict diffusion in Africa.

6. For more details on the effects of internal conflicts on regions as whole, and especially on neighboring countries, see M. Brown (1996).

7. For example, Crighton and MacIver (1991) argue that vertical escalation corresponds to at least three necessary and sufficient conditions: a threat to the identity or existence of the ethnic group, elites with the political skills and resources to play

on those fears, and third-party military, political, and economic support for the cause. Van Evera (1994) also addresses interdependence between states as a causal factor in his study of war and nationalism and measures the relative importance of structural (geographic and demographic), political/environmental (institutions), and perceptual (nationalist self-image) variables to determine when and under what conditions nationalist sentiments are more or less likely to lead to interstate confrontation.

8. Our interest is not exclusively with crises, which are understood to form part of more encompassing stories of conflict. The approach here will be inclusive with respect to the makeup of an interstate ethnic conflict.

9. It should be noted that ICB's concept formation includes both foreign policy and international crises. Conditions of finite time, threat to values, and high probability of military hostilities are necessary and sufficient for a foreign policy crisis to occur. An international crisis occurs, as noted in the text a moment ago, when a foreign policy crisis creates a disruption in process and the potential for a change in the international system. Accordingly, ICB data are bifurcated to recognize these related but separate forms of crisis. The actor-level data set on foreign policy crises focuses on decisionmaking and unit-level attributes, while the system-level data on international crises includes the collective experiences of the actors involved. The ICB data are available online at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb.

10. Theoretically, ethnic linkages are not essential for irredenta; efforts toward reunification can be based exclusively on territory (Horowitz 1991; Vasquez 1992: 310–11; Sullivan 1996). In reality, however, many irredenta are associated with ethnic identity, and challenges usually involve mobilization of ethnic groups. For those reasons and because the focus of this investigation is on ethnic factors that encourage interstate conflict, irredentism is defined as territorial *and* ethnic in nature.

11. This type of definition appears to be accepted by Heraclides (1990, 1991), Horowitz (1981), and Suhrke and Noble (1977). Secessions sensu stricto are different from "incremental" secessions that involve political activity aimed at independence or some form of autonomy but that do not entail any formal declarations of independence. Both kinds of cases are included here (Heraclides 1991: 1). Entities that possess a territorial base for a collectivity, a sizable and distinct human grouping, and claim that there is an unequal relationship between the minority group and the center meet the defining elements for secessionism (Heraclides 1991: 13). A minority group's territory also may have international borders; see Zartman (1992) and Grant (1997) for examples drawn from Central Europe and Asia.

Chapter Two

1. The origins of contemporary research on linkage politics, which connects intrastate with interstate behavior, can be traced to Rosenau 1969.

2. The term "rational" denotes behavior that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation. *Substantive* rationality refers to behavior judged to be optimally adapted to a situation. *Procedural* or *bounded* rationality refers to behavior that is adaptive within the constraints imposed by the external situation and

the capacities of the decision maker. The differences just noted define the gap between advocates of political psychology and rational choice. The former accentuate the capacities of decision makers as sources of foreign policy, while the latter emphasize external environmental conditions as constraints. In this volume, rationality refers to selecting the best means available under a given set of circumstances to accomplish a specified set of objectives. The decision maker must be able to comprehend both the nature of the objective and characteristics of the environment in which it arises (Maoz 1990, 1997b; James 1993). For a summary and applications of rational choice theory, see Booth, James, and Meadwell (1993).

3. Specific ethnic groups within the military and the bureaucracy can dominate the state through different means, notably (*a*) skewed recruitment and (*b*) a situation when the ethnic composition of military and civilian leadership is congruent. The basic challenge to peace is that soldiers who remain on the sidelines will have difficulty putting ethnic affiliations aside, and leaders may use intervention as a means of shoring up domestic support. Consider in that context the place of the military within the states of Eastern and Central Europe. The military suffers from extremely poor social conditions, low morale, high levels of absenteeism, low conscription, corruption, inadequate funding, and a general loss of purpose. The inability of governments to resolve these problems may become a prime reason for the armed forces to support ethnic leaders who promise that their concerns will be addressed. Obvious political benefits accrue to ethnic leaders from such promises.

4. Of course, some of the classic studies raise the possibility of alternative means toward reaching a decision. Allison (1971), for example, suggests that each of his three models—unitary rational actor, organizational process, and bureaucratic politics—captures part of a complex decision-making reality. Stein and Tanter (1980) went further by integrating their three models—analytic, cybernetic, and cognitive—and five functions of the decision process—diagnosis, search estimation and revision, evaluation and choice—into overall multiple paths to choice (see also Brecher 1972).

5. The following summary of the research enterprise on two-level games is based primarily on Evans (1993).

6. This argument suggests a paradox in the behavior of groups in multiethnic societies—common interest in assisting ethnic brethren should lead to a concerted action, but in highly diverse societies this is unlikely to occur unless political entrepreneurs strive to organize relatively homogenous groups that in turn exert pressure on national leaders. Classic expositions on the problems facing collective action appear in Olson (1965) and Sandler (1992).

7. In a more general sense, the purpose of a case study is to investigate the plausibility of the framework and make explicit the relationships between and among the terms specified in the propositions. This has three advantages. First, it allows an evaluation of the underlying assumptions that are embedded in much of the essentially ad hoc and correlational studies on ethnic conflict. Second, it stimulates development of different propositions that later can be tested in different ways. Third, a case study is an illustrative tool to assist readers in understanding how the propositions work (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: introduction). In sum, a case study provides a valuable means for pursuing critical questions of causality and model refinement. Such an

approach is often justified as a tool to evaluate the logical consistency of an argument, clarify the propositions, and examine critical questions of inference.

Chapter Three

1. Quoted in the *Straits Times,* 17 May 1993. McGowan is author of *Only Man Is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri Lanka* (1992).

2. Although addressing the problem of international protracted conflicts, Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin's (1978: 41–60) definition is equally salient to Sri Lanka's domestic strife: "Protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high—the conflicts involve whole societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity."

3. According to the Minorities at Risk Project, the Tamils of Sri Lankan citizenship are ethnonationalists: regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political autonomy with their own state, a traditional ruler, or regional government who have supported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945. Sri Lanka Tamils of Indian citizenship are an ethnoclass—ethnically or culturally distinct peoples, usually descended from slaves or immigrants, most of whom occupy a distinct social and economic status or niche. If an ethnoclass is a politically organized contender for a share in state power, it is designated as a communal contender. See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/home.htm.

4. Thus the Federal Party's separatist demands from the beginning focused on the existence of a definite territorial claim along existing regional boundaries. Without a Tamil majority in any of the provinces, it is likely that opinions would have diverged on separation as a realistic option.

5. Taras and Ganguly (2002), for example, argue that due to strong linguistic identity, language was the most important and divisive issue in ethnic relations in Sri Lanka after independence.

6. The LTTE became the sole Tamil insurgency movement (effectively having removed other rival groups in bloody internecine fighting between 1986 and 1989); in contrast with the LTTE, the leaders of the EPRLF decided to participate in Provincial Council elections.

7. In response to these separatist demands, the Second Republican Constitution of 1978 contained some measures to win back the Tamils but others that clearly favored the Sinhalese: Art. 2—The Republic of Sri Lanka is a unitary state. Art. 3—The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the *Buddha Sasana* while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14. Art. 18—The Official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Art. 19.—The National Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala and Tamil. Art. 20 (1)—The Official Language shall be the language of Administration throughout Sri Lanka. Provided that Tamil is the language of Administration for the maintenance of public records and the transaction of all business in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (Colombo: Department of Census and Statistics 1977, 1981).

8. The claim for a separate state during the 1950s engendered hostility from the Indian government, which had taken legislative steps in its own country to placate the separatist Dravidanadu movement in Tamil Nadu. India also confronted other separatist groups and did not sympathize with the Tamil cause.

9. Between July 1983 and January 1985 the Sri Lankan government announced that 356 civilians had died as a result of clashes between Tamils and Sinhalese. Monthly totals of dead, including civilians and soldiers, numbered in the 300s from January to March and then jumped to 842 in June 1986. Furthermore, India could not ignore the thousands of refugees flowing into Indian territory as a result of the violence. By 1986, Tamil Nadu had become the home for 125,000 Tamil refugees (*Asiaweek,* 1 June 1986).

10. As described by the accord, the main principles of the Provincial Councils were as follows: to widen regional participation in government and devolve authority in matters of agriculture and industry, education and culture, internal law and order, and land settlement in each province. A three-tier system of authority would exist: national, provincial, and local. As expected, the national government would retain widespread powers in defense, foreign affairs, state monetary policy, judiciary posts, customs, foreign trade, ports and aviation, broadcasting, and citizenship. Parliament would continue to be elected by districts every six years on a basis of proportional representation. No change would occur in the office of an elected presidency every six years.

11. This description is based on interviews with and notes from Canada's representatives in Sri Lanka (Canadian International Development Agency, Ottawa, October 1989). The less publicized demands of the accord imposed upon Sri Lanka by India had implications that went beyond resolving the ethnic conflict. Jayewardene's military advisers saw these demands as a violation of Sri Lankan independence.

12. This year also brought presidential elections. On 19 December 1988 voters could choose between the SLFP, led by Sirima Bandaranaike (who opposed the implementation of Provincial Councils), the UNP, led by Ranasinghe Premadasa (who had distanced himself from Jayewardene's arrangements with India), and the Sri Lanka Mahajan Party (SLMP), led by Ossie Abeygoonasekera (supported by the TULF and favoring the accord). With 55 percent of the electorate voting, Premadasa polled 2.6 million votes (50.4 percent); Bandaranaike received 2.3 million votes (44.6 percent) and Abeygoonasekera, 0.23 million, 4.5 percent of the vote. The rise to power of Ranasinghe Premadasa, who succeeded Jayewardene as president, signaled an escalation in verbal hostilities between Sri Lanka and India.

13. Bharata Janata Party (BJP) is an Indian political party that advocates Hindu nationalism. The BJP resolved to pull India out of Sri Lanka. The BJP played a major role in India's political life in 1990s. After the 1996, 1998, and 1999 elections the BJP formed governments with Bihari Vajpayee as president.

Chapter Four

1. In August 1963, Mogadishu Radio broadcast a Somali poem calling for all Somalis to be reunited. This quotation is part of the translated text (Drysdale 1964: 16).

2. According to the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project the Somalis of Ethiopia are

an indigenous people, defined as conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are sharply distinct from those of dominant groups. Indigenous peoples who had durable states of their own prior to conquest or who have given sustained support to modern movements aimed at establishing their own state are classified instead as ethnonationalists. See the MAR Project Web site at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/home.htm (9 January 2004).

3. The crises are as follows: Ethiopia-Somalia Crisis (1960), Kenya-Somalia Crisis (1963–64), Ogaden I (1964), Ogaden II (1977–78), East Africa Confrontation (1980–81), Ogaden III (1982), and the Ethiopia-Somalia Crisis (1987). See Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997b) and Brecher and Wilkenfeld et al. (1988) for case summaries and data pertaining to these crises.

4. For details on the MAR Project, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/home.htm.

5. Minorities at Risk Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/home.htm, 01/1010 January 2004.

6. Ratification of the Somali constitution serves as the best example of differences between the two former colonies at this time. In the south (formerly Italian Somaliland) a substantial majority approved the constitution. However, it received less than 50 percent support in the former British colony. In December 1961 an attempted military coup in the north, led by officers, tried to break up the union. The coup failed but revealed the fissures between the north and south (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 72).

7. The following description of events from the 1990s onward is based primarily on a combination of coverage from BBC News, CNN, the *New York Times,* and the UN Web site.

Chapter Five

1. This analysis concentrates on the Malay Muslims of the southern provinces of Thailand as distinct from the smaller population of non-Malay Thai Muslims centered around Bangkok and elsewhere. The four southernmost provinces are Yala, Narathiwat, Patani, and Satul. Satul, however, is different from the other three Muslim provinces since, unlike the others, it does not have a history of separatism and confrontation with the Thai government. There also is lower tension between the Buddhist majority of Thailand and inhabitants of Satul because of their long history of close administrative interactions with Bangkok. Furthermore, the majority of people in Satul speak Thai. The district of Satul, therefore, does not play a very active role in the Muslim separatist movement (Yegar 2002: 89–90). On a separate note, until 1939 Thailand's official name was Siam.

2. According to the MAR Project, the Thai Malay are a "National Minority" defined as: "segments of transitional people with a history of organized political autonomy whose kindred control an adjacent state, but who now constitute a minority in the state in which they reside." The project does not distinguish, however, between Thai Muslims and Thai Malay. For details see http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/grtype.htn http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data/thamuslchro.htm.

3. By the end of the 1980s, Thai Malay leaders obtained several important political and economic concessions from the Thai government. Violence in these provinces subsided but, by some accounts, conflict between the state-center and minority increased in the early 1990s and continues sporadically into the twenty-first century, this time taking on a revived religious and transnational dimension (Chaiwat 1993). Past research on Thai Malay separatism traces the roots of the conflict to poor cultural and political relations between the Malay community and nationalist Thai regimes (Pitsuwan 1985; Forbes 1989; Suhrke 1989; Chaiwat 1993).

4. Research on the Thai Malay issue usually locates the primary causes of the conflict at the domestic political level. Conventional wisdom holds that an overall decline in violence in the southern provinces is a function of improved relations between the state-center and its marginalized minorities, namely, a reduction of cleavages within Thailand. For example, in Carment and Joseph's (1999) data set, Thailand scores four out of a possible five for an index of cleavage, which corresponds to moderate-high cleavage where there are high levels of repression and ethnic consciousness against more than one minority and occasional societal unrest leading to interethnic violence. Malaysia scores a five on the index, which corresponds to high cleavage where mass violence is likely, repression is widespread, ethnicity is highly politicized, and interethnic struggle leading to the collapse of the state is imminent.

5. Despite limitations in available data, it is possible to estimate the ethnic composition of the minority sector of the Thai population in a sample year, namely, 1987. Chinese constituted about 11 percent of the population, Malay about 3.5 percent, and long-term resident (as opposed to refugee) Khmer less than 1 percent. The remaining minority groups ranged in number from a few hundred to more than 100,000 (MAR Web link, cited above). More than 85 percent speak a dialect of Thai and share a common culture. This core population includes the central Thai (36 percent of the population), Thai-Lao (32 percent), northern Thai (8 percent), and southern Thai (8 percent). The language of the central Thai population is the language taught in schools and used in government. Several other small Thai-speaking groups include the Shan, Lue, and Phutai. The largest minorities are the Chinese (about 12 percent of the population) and the Malay-speaking Muslims of the south (3 percent). Other groups include the Khmer, the Mon (who are substantially assimilated with the Thai), and the Vietnamese. Smaller, predominantly mountain-dwelling tribes, such as the Hmong, Karen, and Mein, number about 500,000.

6. The language, religion, and culture of this small minority are significantly different from the rest of Thailand. The Malay belong to the Shafi'it Sect of Sunni Islam, the predominant sect of Islamic Southeast Asia. A minority of Malay Muslim are Shi'ite. The Malay converted to Islam in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries A.D. (Che Man 1990: 35).

7. For an informative analysis of Thailand's non-Malay Muslim groups, who are predominately South Asian in origin, see Forbes 1982.

8. The Patani region became incorporated formally into Thailand in 1901. Until 1906, the seven districts had comprised the sultanate of Patani. After this time they were reorganized into the districts of Patani, Narathiwat, and Yala. In 1909 the Thai-Malaysian border was formally fixed, and Malay Muslims became citizens of the new

Thai nation-state. The decline in organized violence in the southern provinces is viewed as a function of improved relations between the state-center and its marginalized minorities.

9. This includes Malay, Chinese, and immigrants of Indian descent. Current figures indicate that the Malay constitute 59 percent, the Chinese 32 percent, and Indians 9 percent of the population, respectively. The percentages for Malays stayed below the 50 percent threshold in the 1960s (*CIA Fact Book,* various years).

10. Based on the lack of reaction from the central government to his comments, it is unclear whether the minister had voiced official Malaysian policy on the issue. Bangkok, however, made a more direct general response (*Straits Times,* 18 June 1974). The government expressed concern over foreigners in the Middle East acting on behalf of separatists (Pitsuwan 1985).

11. This irredentist movement espoused unification of all of Malaya, including Singapore and portions of territory across the straits of Malacca. The leaders of the organization had been arrested in 1961 after staging a revolt, but some managed to flee to Malaya.

12. The organization maintains a website by which to generate support in its ongoing struggles See PULO web page www.pulo.org. In a press realease of 26 October 2004, The Pulo notes that

> unrest in the Patani has been going on for more than 10 months now. There are very strong indications that a tragic ending of it is not far away any more. So, on behalf of justice and the right to live—we have no choice than—once again to appeal to the United Nations Security Council and the UN Human Rights Commission to come and bring about peace. However, the legacy of the brutal more than 100-years long Thai occupation and the effect of the violent aftermath of the consultation will last for long time. We believe that to give the world's newest nation a good beginning is necessary for the international community to pressurize the Thai government to expedite this process.

13. When the Vietnam War culminated in a communist victory in 1975, Bangkok's fear of Vietnamese expansion grew, which ironically led to increased pressure from Thai nationalists to dissolve the border agreement with Malaysia. Bangkok ignored these pleas.

14. The term "near crisis" is used because these internal acts against the state did not generate a full foreign policy crisis. (For more on the idea of failed or near crisis see Brecher 1993 and Brecher and Wilkenfeld et al. 1988.) The internal threat is but one of many developments that accounted for the regime's replacement. The security of the Thai state neither came into question nor did the event to lead to a higher probability of military hostilities between Thailand and any external actor, including Malaysia.

15. A second and related clue is the rise to power in 1976 of a civil authoritarian government in Thailand. This regime ruled without popular participation, brushing aside many problems that had been the concern of the previously democratically elected government of Seni Pramoj (Pitsuwan 1985). The three-year democratic regime of

Pramoj, elected in 1973, had brought about a change in tactics in the Thai Malay struggle. Political protests based on notions of equality, freedom, and guaranteed rights became the rallying cries of the Thai Malay leaders. In 1974, Bangkok had installed troops in the area. Massive demonstrations, including riots in 1975, helped raise awareness among Malay masses and served as constant sources of friction between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.

16. According to Bodansky and Forrest (1998), Iran and Pakistan transformed Thailand into a safe haven for Islamist terrorists in the entire East Asia region, with dozens of networks operating in the Bangkok area alone, and including members from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Syria (U.S. Congress Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare 1998).

17. See Rand web page, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1344/MR1344.ch9.pdf/, 1October 2004

18. Government provision of health, education, and welfare services proved to be inadequate or nonexistent; schools were established only in the cities, for the benefit of children of Central Thai officials. In the 1980s, King Bhumibol and government leaders, especially those from the South, became involved deeply in rectifying those inequalities, but resentment and suspicion hampered development.

19. However, it also is significant that Malaysia's minority communities are willing to be included in political change. In essence, the fear of a potential left-right split in Malaysian politics during the 1960s led to an alliance between conservative factions within Malaysia's three major ethnic groups.

20. An implication is that both SAARC and the OAU (now the AU) had been designed to advance the interests of only some of the participating states. In this context, consider the overwhelming influence that Ethiopia exerted in structuring the OAU Charter in response to Somalia's claim on its territories. For Sri Lanka, in relation to its internal conflict, India is the only real security threat.

Chapter Six

1. According to the MAR Project, the three major ethnic minorities under discussion here vary in their goals, political formation, and identity. For example, Serbs and Croats residing in what now is the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina are national minorities. Muslims living in Bosnia are ethnonationalists. Those Muslims living in what now is the Montenegrin part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) are referred to as religious sects. The Bosnian Muslims refer to themselves as "Bosniacs" and consider the term "Muslim" derogatory; more importantly, they want to distinguish themselves from Muslims living outside of Bosnia. The term Bosniac will be used to refer to Bosnian Muslims. For more information see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/ home.htm

2. Exceptions exist; in Slovenia the principal language is Slovene and in Macedonia the principal languages are Macedonian and Albanian.

3. The major exception is the exodus of Italian and German minorities after World War II from different regions in Yugoslavia (Flere 1991).

4. In the 1981 census, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, ethnic Muslims,

Albanians, and even smaller groups such as Hungarians and Bulgarians were located in all eight federal units (Ramet 1992b). Serbs also can be found in all of the other former federal units of Yugoslavia. For example, the Serbs constitute roughly 12 percent of the population of Croatia and 32 percent of the population of Bosnia (Gagnon 1994, 1994/95).

5. In 1993, Albanians comprised 20 percent of Serbia's population, with Hungarians being the remaining 4 percent. The decline of Serbs in Kosovo is due to their emigration from that entity—regarded as the birthplace of Serbian nationhood and statehood—a predominantly Albanian populated area. Percentages of the dominant ethnic groups within the other states are as follows: Croatia—Croats 77 percent, Serbs 12 percent; Bosnia and Herzegovina—Slav Muslims 44 percent, Serbs 31 percent, Croats 17 percent; Slovenia—Slovenian 90 percent; Montenegro—Montenegrin 68 percent, Muslims 13 percent, Albanian 6 percent; Macedonia—Macedonians, 60 percent, Albanians 18 percent, Turks 4 percent (*Globe and Mail,* "Yugoslavia: The Roots of the Conflict" 7 March 1992. The percentages for 1991 are as follows: Slovenia—Slovenes 90 percent, Croats 3 percent, Serbs 2 percent, others 5 percent; Croatia—Croats 75 percent, Serbs 12 percent, others 13 percent; Bosnia-Herzegovina—Muslims 40 percent, Serbs 33 percent, Croats 18 percent, others 9 percent; Montenegro—Montenegrins 68 percent, Muslims, 13 percent, Albanians 6 percent, Serbs 3 percent, others 10 percent; Vojvochna—Serbs 56 percent, Hungarians 21 percent, others 23 percent; Serbia—Serbs 65 percent, Albanians 20 percent, Croats 2 percent, others 15 percent; Macedonia—Macedonians 67 percent, Albanians 20 percent, Serbs 2 percent, others 11 percent; Kosovo—Albanians 90 percent, Serbs and Montenegrins 5 percent, others 5 percent (Pavkovic 2000: 49).

6. Under Tito, the constitution invested sovereignty not only in the federal republics but in the nations of Yugoslavia as well. During the 1980s, this dual sovereignty came to mean that should one of the republics want to secede, it first had to secure the agreement of the sovereign nations that made it up. In effect, this mechanism had been designed to prevent the breaking off of Croatia and Bosnia, in which the Serbs are in a minority position. According to the notion of dual sovereignty, the original declarations of independence were illegal because these votes did not have the consensus of all the ethnic nations (Glenny 1993a, b). In contrast, the European Community demands only a simple majority of constituents to vote for independence. Thus, for the EC, all three acts of independence—Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia—were legal, although not by Yugoslavia's standards.

7. A weak and ineffective effort to unify Yugoslavia took place, with a Croatian reformist, Ante Markovic, selected as federal prime minister. He applied some economic reforms to control the inflation and massive labor unrest, believing incorrectly that such measures could save the country from dissolution.

8. Massive demonstrations in Belgrade that condemned Milosevic's policies led to a softening of his hard-line position in April 1991. He accepted the principle of confederal arrangement and later agreed to the principles upon which such a compromise would be based (Gagnon 1994/95). At the same time, however, the Serb regime and SDS had stepped up anti-Croatian rhetoric, which relied on sensationalist media reports that portrayed the Croatians as fascists. Milosevic blamed Germany and Austria as coconspirators in the Croatian fight for independence.

9. Designation of crisis onset and termination at the system level and the foreign policy level have no impact on the interpretation of events or their causal factors. It should be noted that Croatia already had adopted a new constitution in 1990, one that referred to Croatia as the sovereign state of the Croats (and other nations living in Croatia) but did not explicitly recognize the Serbian community (Cohen 1992).

10. Various countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Greece, Romania, Poland, and Hungary, initially rejected the new republics' declaration of independence; see Saideman 1998b for details.

11. Both the EC and the United States issued statements on 25 June 1991 that they would not recognize the republics if the latter voted for secession (*New York Times,* 25 June 1991). When the external allies of Slovenia and Croatia—as well as Macedonia and Bosnia, which later declared independence—threatened intervention, the crisis became fully internationalized. Only then did internal disruptions threaten regional stability (Ramet 1992a: 267).

12. At this time Slovenia had yet to gain recognition as an independent state. In November 1992, Germany and Austria became the first external actors to recognize Slovenia (*Globe and Mail,* 11 November 1992).

13. The United States halted trade with all six republics under a generalized system of preferences. Sanctions imposed by the European Community applied only to Serbia and its ally Montenegro (*Globe and Mail,* 7 December 1991). None of these sanctions prevented the illegal shipment of arms. For example, the JNA captured a Canadian, Anton Kikas, a Croatian by birth, on 1 September 1991. His chartered aircraft was found to be carrying eighteen tonnes of Singapore-made SAR-80 rifles.

14. The United States recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, along with that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in April. Toward the end of the war in Bosnia, Serbia proper became known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). For purposes of consistency, "Serbia" will be used throughout.

15. Macedonians already had voted for a looser association with Yugoslavia. Full independence followed shortly thereafter.

16. Serbian general elections took place on 21 December 1992. Amid accusations of fraud, Milosevic returned to power, defeating his chief opponent, Prime Minister Milan Panic, by a margin of 57 percent to 33 percent (*Globe and Mail,* 22 December 1992: A1).

17. In August 1992 the UN formally expelled rump-Yugoslavia from the General Assembly (Cohen 1992).

18. Tudjman's governing Croatian Democratic Union won 57 percent of the vote in the 120-seat parliament; 3.5 million Croatians in and outside of Croatia were eligible to vote (*Globe and Mail,* 4 August 1992: A1).

19. Brcko is a strategically important town located in the northeastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the only territorial issue left unresolved in the 1995 Dayton agreement. The International Arbitration Commission declared Brcko to be a district of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 8 March 2000. Before the war the population in Brcko was around 88,000—44 percent Bosniac, 25 percent Croat, 21 percent Serb, and 10 percent others. For more details see the official Web site of the government of Brcko district of Bosnia Herzegovina (www.brcko.ba) and NATO Web page (www.nato.int, 1October 2004).

20. Tito elevated the Bosniacs in 1971 to the status of a Yugoslav "nation." In Bosnia-Herzegovina, three constituent "nations" were said to coexist. Before any constitutional changes regarding secession could be made, all three communities in Bosnia would have to agree, which they did not.

21. Russia's Yeltsin already had made it clear that Serbia no longer would receive arms from Russia; on 27 April 1993 this decision was announced formally (Glenny 1993a, b).

22. Achieving consensus among the NATO member states was a painfully slow process; see *Globe and Mail,* 6 December 1992: A1.

23. As before, the Bosnian Croatian leader Mate Boban and Muslim leader Izetbegovic proved receptive to the idea of the plan, which included a cease-fire, a political agreement, and a map reorganizing the former Yugoslav republic into ten separate regions under a central government. Karadzic's willingness to sign the agreement came only after immense pressure from Milosevic (*Globe and Mail,* 10 January 1993: A1).

24. After it had been negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, the General Framework Agreement for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. On 16 December 1995 the North Atlantic Council (NAC) authorized SACEUR to deploy Enabling Forces into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to implement military aspects of this agreement. IFOR, a NATO-led multinational force, started its functions on 20 December 1995 with a one-year mandate. Its main duties were to supervise (a) selective marking of boundaries and (b) establishment of interentity boundary lines between the Republic of Srpska (RS) on the one hand and the Federation (Bosnian Croat and Bosniac forces) on the other. After the September 1996 elections, IFOR completed its mission, although a need to stabilize the region and keep the peace was very clear. SFOR was authorized by the UN Security Council and started its mission on 12 December 1996 as a successor of IFOR. Among other things, SFOR provided a secure and stable environment for the national elections in October 1998. For details see the official Web page of NATO at www.nato.int.

25. Portions of this chapter are based on interviews of IFOR/NATO personnel by David Carment while in Croatia, Bosnia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 14–24 March 1998.

26. Debate continues as to whether states external to the conflict—Germany, the United States, Turkey, Greece, Hungary, and Albania—were crisis actors. Although in some instances these states place the military on higher than normal alert, only one of the three conditions necessary for a foreign policy crisis is present in all cases: threat to values (i.e., not finite time or heightened probability of military hostilities). Insufficient evidence exists to conclude that perceptions of these actors included a sense of limited time or probability of violence involving direct threats to themselves (Saideman 1998b).

27. Different phases of change among the republics, as mentioned above, led to varying perceptions of economic payoffs to each ethnic group within this structure. For Slovenia and Croatia the payoffs were low. The leaders of these republics, having activated the popular sector through carefully orchestrated elections and referendums, faced the prospect of further unrest among their minorities. To convince potential

external support that internal unrest was not so divisive as to scare off capital, the leaders of these new states had to present an image of unity and democracy, one that could be achieved most easily through appeals to nationalist identities. In Slovenia, perhaps due to its relative homogeneity, this strategy appears to have been successful. For Croatia under Tudjman, however, even greater repression followed internal unrest.

28. These affinities may have been vague from the outset, a view that finds support from a Belgrade political scientist, who comments, "[O]ur concept of Serbian ethnicity is linked with orthodoxy, but not with any cultural and historical totality which is much broader and which is generally accepted [elsewhere] in Europe" (Ramet 1992a: 264).

29. A second aspect of the positive and negative reverberations engendered by ethnic affinities in this conflict is the set of linkages between each ethnic group within Yugoslavia and the various regional actors. Most notable in this regard is the Serb-Russian linkage, which ensured Serbia a flow of oil and arms despite embargoes. Greece also has exhibited a perceptible pro-Serbian tilt throughout the crisis, a result both of Greek-Serbian economic interdependence and of long-standing Greek animosity toward Macedonia. Despite a substantial Serbian domestic arms industry and significant stockpiles, arms flowed from Greece and Romania to Serbia during this time (Saideman 1998b).

30. This does not mean that force is the only means to prevent states from escalating a conflict. In the Yugoslavian case, for example, failure by many outside states to comply with the sanctions on Serbia and Croatia also must be considered.

Chapter Seven

1. "Cyprus is a case study of ethnic conflict" (Kissinger 1999: 193, quoted from Fouskas 2001).

2. Cyprus, Smyrna, and the Aegean Sea are indicated as the main issues in the ICB data set. While the Aegean Sea disputes (case numbers 272, 349, 376) focus on the islands, most notably their continental shelf and territorial waters, the Smyrna dispute (case numbers 16, 18, 25) is about territory in Anatolia.

3. http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/cyprusgreek.htm, 24 February 2003.

4. *Enosis* refers to the idea of unification of Cyprus with Greece. Turkish Cypriots fear this idea because, in the case of unification, they would become an ethnic minority in a Greek state. For more details on the historical evolution of the *enosis,* see Fouskas 2001.

5. The main reason behind politicizing communal differences between Greeks and Turks was to serve British interests in the Middle East. For more information on the impact of British rule, see Pollis 1973.

6. Turkish Cypriots initially preferred continuation of British rule to *enosis.* Starting from 1957, however, Turkish Cypriots began to support the idea of partition as the exact opposite of *enosis. Taksim,* the Turkish reply to the idea of *enosis,* refers to division of the island between Greece and Turkey (Lumsden 1973).

7. EOKA (the national organization of Cypriot fighters) was a guerrilla organization established under the military leadership of Colonel Grivas. The main purpose of this organization was to end colonial rule on the island and implement the idea of *enosis* (Holland 1998). On 1 April 1955, EOKA began an armed struggle (http://www.pio.gov.cy/cyprus/history/modern.htm, 25 November 2003).

8. The London and Zurich Agreements are the treaties that led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus. For the texts of the Treaties of Establishment, Alliance, and Guarantee, see http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/f612.htm, 24 November 2003.

9. According to the census conducted by the Department of Statistics and Research in 1960 the island's population was 573,566, with 442,138 (77.1 percent) Greek and 104,320 (18.2 percent) Turkish. Figures from the Turkish-Cypriot administration are slightly different; they include the British sovereign bases. The total population of the island is said to be 577,615 inhabitants—448,857 (77.7 percent) Greek and 104,350 (18.1 percent) Turkish. For more demographic information, see the Republic of Cyprus Web page (http://www.pio.gov.cy/docs/euro/council_of_europe/parl_assembly/cuco/memorandum/demographic_data_upto_1997.htm, 24 November 2003).

10. *Art 182*: The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. Subject to paragraph 1 of this Article any provision of this Constitution may be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article. Such amendment shall be made by a law passed by a majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Greek Community and at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Turkish Community. *Art 185*: The territory of the Republic is one and indivisible. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist independence is excluded; see http://www.pio.gov.cy/cygov/constitution/appendix_d_part13.htm, 25 November 2003.

11. The amendment proposed by Makarios to change the constitution of Cyprus included the following aspects: abandonment of the right of veto of the president and the vice president, establishment of unified municipalities, unification of the administration of Cyprus, abolition of the separate majority votes in the parliament, and participation of the two communities in the public service in proportion to their population. The Republic of Cyprus Web page lists the thirteen points (http://www.pio.gov.cy/docs/proposals/13points/index.htm, 22 November 2003); for further details about the amendment, see Necatigil 1977.

12. For the arguments of Greek Cypriots regarding the reasons for amendment, see http://www.pio.gov.cy/docs/proposals/13points/intro.htm, 23 November 2003.

13. Joseph (1997) and Sambanis (1994) argue that due to the transformation of the ethnic conflict into a case study in East-West polarization, the ability of the superpowers to settle the problems remained very limited. They could offer only superficial, blanket, Cold War–oriented approaches to the conflict.

14. For the purposes of this investigation, the significance of the Cyprus conflict is twofold. First, the Cyprus conflict is not resolved, but it has been successfully con-

tained and managed. Yet, according to critics of NATO, the incapacity of collective efforts to resolve ethnic conflict, whether it be Cyprus or Yugoslavia, indicate a crisis of authority in the alliance, characterized by a decline in regime effectiveness. This interpretation holds that the dynamics of these internal conflicts far outpace the rules and norms that the international community has in its possession to resolve them. Other, more conventional positions submit that NATO is an appropriate tool for managing ethnic strife. NATO was never created for the purpose of resolving ethnic strife insofar as it impinges on the interests and security of the alliance. Evidence from the conflict over Cyprus supports the view that NATO and other international instruments remain important elements in the management of ethnic strife.

15. Sözen (1999) interprets the behavior of the USSR/Russia as contradictory because as a member of the UN Security Council, it should have supported demilitarization, nonviolent resolution of the conflict, and the necessity of refraining from actions that could increase tension on the island. The decision to sell S-300 missiles to the Greek Cypriot side, despite condemnation from the international community, reflects the above-mentioned contradiction.

16. The Department of Statistics and Research of the Republic of Cyprus estimates the total population in 1974 at 641,000, with 506,000 (78.9 percent) Greek and 118,000 (18.4 percent) Turkish. The figure for the Greek-Cypriot population includes Maronite, Armenian, and Latin Christian minorities; they designated themselves as members of that community as permitted under the constitution. The Turkish-Cypriot administration provides a marginally different figure for the population of this community for that year, 115,758, but does not offer any figure for the island's total population. (The Republic of Cyprus Web page, http://www.pio.gov.cy/docs/euro/coucil_of_europe/parl_assembly/cuco/memorandum/demographic_data_upto_1997.htm, 24 November 2003).

17. Like the Berlin Wall of the past, the Green Line divides Nicosia/Lefkosa into two parts. Major differences separate the two parts in ways beyond mere location; for example, per capita GDP income (2002) is $14,466 in the Greek Cypriot and $4,610 in Turkish Cypriot areas, respectively (U.S. Department of State, background note on Cyprus, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5376.htm, 25 November 2003). For detailed analysis of the differences between the two sides of the Green Line, in terms of culture, religion, economy, infrastructure, banking, entrepreneurship, and tourism, see Dana and Dana (2000).

18. The Denktas-Makarios summit in 1977 produced four principles that are accepted as the basis of future mediation attempts (UN Doc S/12723): (1) An independent, nonaligned bicommunal federal republic; (2) the territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability and productivity and land ownership; (3) questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property, and other specific matters are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis for a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties that may arise for the Turkish community; and (4) the powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bicommunal character of the state. See Russinow 1981 for more details on mediation attempts after 1974.

19. According to this agreement, Turkish Cypriots would have at least 29 percent of the island, the new state would be bizonal and bicommunal, the president would be Greek Cypriot and vice president Turkish Cypriot, the cabinet would have seven Greek Cypriot ministers and three Turkish Cypriots, and each community would have its own police force.

20. According to Yesilada and Hewitt (1998), "the decision of the ECJ and TRNC exports to UK and the decision of the European Council to include Cyprus among the first group of countries for next expansion of membership," which is against the treaties of 1959 and the constitution, worked against attempts made by the UN and United States in 1993 to bring the sides back to the negotiation table within the framework of confidence-building measures. For detailed information about discussions on settlement that emerged as a result of EU pressure, see Bahçeli 2000; Bahçeli and Rizopaulos 1996/97; Theophanaous 2000a, b; Brewin 2000; Vassiliou 2002; and Yesilada and Sözen 2002.

21. CNN "Cyprus Peace Talks End in Failure," Tuesday, 11 March 200

22. Bölükbasi (1998) regards Prime Minister Inönü's cautiousness as the most important factor in determining Turkey's decision not to intervene in 1964. By no means a risk taker, and aware of the fact that intervention could result with a war with Greece, Inönü exhibited great caution in making his decision.

23. The authoritative Polity data set codes Turkey at 9 out of 10 in terms of institutional democracy and 0 out of 10 for institutional autocracy for 1974.

24. For details about the impact of cross-boundary ethnic ties on polarization and widening of the conflict, see Joseph 1997.

25. See Kaufman 2001 for an exegesis of the idea of "modern hatreds" that come about through elite manipulation of the way in which mass populations "remember" history.

26. CIA World Fact Book (2003). The Greek nationalist right-wing military junta came to power in April 1967; however, the country returned to democracy two days after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus.