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A criticism of Ross's hypothetical 'I can'
Mind 69 (273):80-83 (1960)
Abstract
This article argues that the hypothetical 'I Can' position of Sir David Ross is incompatible with his determinism.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
321 (#72,701)
6 months
65 (#84,487)
2009-01-28
Downloads
321 (#72,701)
6 months
65 (#84,487)
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