IN the De caelo Aristotle posits an unchanging intelligent being that exists beyond the heavens, ... more IN the De caelo Aristotle posits an unchanging intelligent being that exists beyond the heavens, enjoying there 'the best and most selfsufficient life' (1. 9, 279 1 21-2). In Physics 8 and Met.a.physics A this entity becomes the Prime Unmoved Mover, ultimately responsible for all movement, change, and generation in the universe. What exactly is the relationship between the Prime Mover and the corporeal universe? It is perhaps natural to think of it as a cause of change that is distinct from and stands outside the various corporeal substances in which change occurs. It is my thesis, however, that we gain a better understanding of some of the things Aristotle says about nature, causation, and the universe if we adopt the following propositions: first , that the corporeal cosmos is a single substance with a motion proprietary to itself, directed towards an end which is good; second, that this corporeal substance constitutes, together with its Prime Mover, a composite whole that can be regarded as a self-mover. Aristotle's universe is appropriately considered to be a composite C> Mohan Manhm 2001 This research W'llS funded by the University of Album and the Social Scim.ces and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The paper is a by-product of collaborative Tesearch with Jim Hankinson, to whom I am, as always, deeply grateful. Earlier versions were delivered lo audiences at the Unh•ers.ity of Albena, rhe Uni,'ersity of Teus ar Austin, and the Uni,oersity of Western Ontario. l am grateful to Rachel Bame)•, Ronnie De Sousa, John King-Farlow, Alex M.ourelatos, John Thorp, and Steve White for helpful comments on these ocasions. Mary Louise Gill, Julius Mora"CSllt., I\1alcolm Schofield, Ch.aTlotte 'Witt, and David Seclley each gave me detailed comments that led to subs12nrial revision. My greatest debt is to Catherine \Vilson for extensive discussion, and for making me aware of the early modern reception of Aristotelian ideas. ' This is clear from the"'". .. Oi construction ranging from 26&"'6 to b8 , where pan:ial bo<lies and the 'totality of which these arc parts' are rontrasted as a ~r with body-as-extension. The latter is an undifferentiated mass, whercas both paroal bodies and the totalirv arc individuals. As I shall now argue, partial bodies arc not inttinsicallv individ~. whereas the total icy is. • Cf. M;Japh. z 2, 1o:z.8b1:z., where Aristotle says that anything made our of the entirccy of the elements (of each one OT of all of rhem?-the phrase is ambiguous) is
The Sensory Ordering Thesis is a ramified version of the Sensory Classification Thesis presented ... more The Sensory Ordering Thesis is a ramified version of the Sensory Classification Thesis presented in Ch.1; it acknowledges that most sensory systems order distal objects, rather than place them in discrete classes. Sense features Agenerate@ their sub-classes in an interesting sense noticed by W. E. Johnson: the perceptual grasp of inclusive features such as red is based on a grasp of graded similarity relations among the sub-classes thereof. Variation with respect to a single sensory parameter such as colour is invariable in a number of significant ways, but ‘overall‘ similarity with respect to several sensory parameters is variable across different graphical representations. This shows that overall similarity is an artefact, while similarity with respect to a single parameter is forced upon us by sensory cognition.
Because culture plays a role in determining the aesthetic merit of a work of art, intrinsically s... more Because culture plays a role in determining the aesthetic merit of a work of art, intrinsically similar works can have different aesthetic merit when assessed in different cultures. This paper argues that a form of aesthetic hedonism is best placed to account for this relativity of aesthetic value. This form of hedonism is based on a functional account of aesthetic pleasure, according to which it motivates and enables mental engagement with artworks, and an account of pleasure-learning, in which it reinforces the appreciation of culture specific ways of engaging with art
Philosophy of Biology is a rapidly expanding field. It is concerned with explanatory concepts in ... more Philosophy of Biology is a rapidly expanding field. It is concerned with explanatory concepts in evolution, genetics, and ecology. This collection of 25 essays by leading researchers provides an overview of the state of the field. These essays are wholly new; none of them could have been written even ten years ago. They demonstrate how philosophical analysis has been able to contribute to sometimes contested areas of scientific theory making.< br>< br>-Written by internationally acknowledged leaders in the field< br>-Entries make ...
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is a philosophical framework for thinking about sensory systems as act... more Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is a philosophical framework for thinking about sensory systems as active devices for data extraction B rather than, in the traditional way, as passive recorders of ambient energy patterns. Sensory systems are automatic sorting machines that assign real-world objects to classes. A sense feature is the property of belonging to such a class. A sensory experience, or sensation, is a label that the system uses in order to allow the organism access to the classifications that it has performed. This Sensory Classification Thesis (SCT), discussed in Chs 1–3, inverts the normally assumed relationship between sensory classes and sensations. Philosophers standardly hold that red is to be defined in terms of the sensation of red; here, sensations derive from sensory classes and are thus unsuitable for defining them. SCT is a simplification: some sensory systems order real-world objects in relations of similarity, and do not just put them into discrete classes (Chs 4–...
This is the published version of an article published by the Philosophy Department at the Univers... more This is the published version of an article published by the Philosophy Department at the University of Notre Dame.
When I am relaxing in an armchair, I can close my eyes and summon up a fairlydetailedandvividimag... more When I am relaxing in an armchair, I can close my eyes and summon up a fairlydetailedandvividimageofmyhandsonablackkeyboard.Thisstateofvisual imagingisdifferentfrommypresentvisualstate.Itdoesnotmakeitseemasifthe keyboardisreallythere,northatiteverwas,orthatitisreallyblack.Icouldjustas wellsummonupanimageofmyhandsplayingonapiano:IknowIneverdidplay thepiano;hence,itisimmaterial,asfarastheveracityofthisimageisconcerned, what colour the keys rae. (Here and in what follows, I shall use 'visual state' to meanstatesthatarisefromlooking-visualimagingdoesnotfallunderthistermas Iamusingithere.) What is the difference between these two states? Why does the keyboard have (as I shall say) afeeling of presence in my present visual state, but not in the state of visual imaging? In this paper, I employ the Two Visual Systems theory to offer a partial answer to this question. Though this answer addresses only one aspectofthefeelingofpresence,whichverylikelytracestomanydifferentcognitive processes, it reveals something important about how the two visual streams function. The problem that I want to tackle in this paper concerns the origin and semantic significance of the Feeling of Presence. It might well be that this feeling attachestoasceneonlywhenthatscenehasbeenidentifiedasreallythere(andnot THEFEELINGOFPRESENCE 2 justdepicted).Thus,thevisualsystemmighthavetosolvetheproblemofwhether whatisseenisrealbeforeitattachestheFeelingofPresencetothingsitdetermines to be real. My problem, though, is not so much the conditions under which the visual system certifies something as present and real,or the method by which the visualsystemproceedstosuchcertification.Myproblemisratherthemeaningof thefeelingofpresence.Whatexactlyisit? I. Introduction:Content-DirectedAttitudes A. Visual experience tells the viewing subject something descriptive about her surroundings.Forinstance: I know by looking that somebody on my left is looking at me and extendinghishand. Twocaveats: a. The italicized portion of the displayed sentence above-the part after 'that'-expresses in English a part of what vision tells me about the world. No sentence will express all of what vision tells me in a normal scene. b. Visiontellsmethisinitsownexpressivemedium,i.e.invisualqualia,not inEnglish. 1 (Thefactthatvisualimageryisinvolvedwillturnouttobe importantinwhatfollows.
Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy, 2020
Author(s): COHEN, Jonathan; Matthen, Mohan | Editor(s): Ferretti, Gabriele; Glenney, Brian | Abst... more Author(s): COHEN, Jonathan; Matthen, Mohan | Editor(s): Ferretti, Gabriele; Glenney, Brian | Abstract: Molyneux asked whether a newly sighted person could distinguish a sphere from a cube by sight alone, given that she was antecedently able to do so by touch. This, we contend, is a question about general ideas. To answer it, we must ask (a) whether spatial locations identified by touch can be identified also by sight, and (b) whether the integration of spatial locations into an idea of shape persists through changes of modality. Posed this way, Molyneux’s Question goes substantially beyond question (a), about spatial locations, alone; for a positive answer to (a) leaves open whether a perceiver might cross-identify locations, but not be able to identify the shapes that collections of locations comprise. We further emphasize that MQ targets general ideas so as to distinguish it from corresponding questions about experiences of shape and about the property of tangible (vs. visual) sha...
<jats:p>Physicalism appears to undermine the autonomy of 'special sciences' such as... more <jats:p>Physicalism appears to undermine the autonomy of 'special sciences' such as biology, and to leave little room for proprietary biological laws or causation. Mendel's 'Laws' are so-called because they are fundamental to the subject-area, but since they describe causal processes that are wholly physical in nature, they seem to reduce to physical laws, given certain propositions about the composition of DNA. The same goes for other principles of the biological sciences.</jats:p> <jats:p>This argument has been challenged by Hilary Putnam, on the grounds that good explanations, for instance in mathematical terms, could range more widely than any given physical realization. Putnam argues that mathematics could thus have an autonomous role in science despite physicalism. Putnam's insight has been applied to classical genetics by Philip Kitcher. A gene is a unit of inheritance that passes unchanged from parent to offspring according to certain rules. It is these rules that are essential to understanding inheritance, not details of interaction in the DNA substrate. Putnam and Kitcher here employ a notion similar to Aristotle's 'formal causes' – functional and structural determinants of biological characteristics that are somewhat independent of material constitution.</jats:p> <jats:p>There are other conceptions of laws to be found in philosophy of science. Some think that they are propositions with the capacity to impart axiomatic structure to what is known about a domain. The principle of natural selection plays this role in biology, though it is a priori. Again, some think that laws are necessary truths: on cladistic systems of classification, the proposition that the common raven is a bird is arguably a law under this understanding.</jats:p> <jats:p>The nature of causal patterns in natural selection has been a matter of some discussion recently. The view that individual-level causes are sufficient to explain selection-outcomes is tempting to the reductionist, but distorts the explanatory aims of evolutionary theory. Clearly, evolutionary theory requires population-level causes. On the other hand, it has been questioned whether natural selection itself should be understood as a 'force' acting on a population, somewhat in the same manner as gravitation acts on a body. Statistical views of natural selection seek alternatives to this way of understanding selection.</jats:p> <jats:p>Finally, what are biological entities? Some ontologies admit no priority among collections of atoms – the argument is that an organism, for instance, is nothing more than such a collection. Many biologists, however, treat of composite entities as internally organized complex systems. On this view, cells, organisms, populations, and ecosystems have privileged ontological status.</jats:p>
Vision is organized around material objects; they are most of what we see. But we also see beams ... more Vision is organized around material objects; they are most of what we see. But we also see beams of light, depictions, shadows, reflections, etc. These things look like material objects in many ways, but it is still visually obvious that they are not material objects. This chapter articulates some principles that allow us to understand how we see these ‘ephemera’. H.P. Grice’s definition of seeing is standard in many discussions; here I clarify and augment it with a criterion drawn from Fred Dretske. This enables me to re-analyse certain ephemera that have received counter-intuitive treatments in the work of Kendall Walton (photographs), Brian O’Shaughnessy (light), and Roy Sorenson (occlusions).
Vision presents features as located in environmental things. In this chapter, the structure of th... more Vision presents features as located in environmental things. In this chapter, the structure of this feature-locating scheme is investigated. Austen Clark argues, correctly, that visual features are presented to us as properties that belong to certain subjects. Clark, however, thinks that these subjects are regions of space: it is argued here that they are material objects capable of motion, not mere regions of space. Thus, vision presents the world in material object-feature terms. Other modalities employ different structures: audition, for example, attributes features to sounds, not material objects. Such differences among sense modalities with regard to their representations of space and their attributions of features argue that a purely a priori or functional treatment will miss philosophically important characteristics of sensation.
Under certain conditions, synaesthesia would properly be understood as perception, i.e. as experi... more Under certain conditions, synaesthesia would properly be understood as perception, i.e. as experience that affords the subject an accurate imagistic representation of some occurrence in the world that the subject understands as such. Perception is a true imagistic representation of the world concurrently around the perceiver, which, moreover, gives the perceiver unmediated reason to believe in what is so represented. Projector synaesthetes have an enhanced experience of what is known as the inducer stimulus. This experience includes a concurrent experience over and above the normal experience. I define direct synaesthesia as enhanced experience that gives direct reason to believe in the existence of the inducer (not the concurrent). Such direct projector synaesthesia is worth investigating because it seems, in short, to be enhanced perception of the inducer.
Hedonism is the view that pleasure is the only thing that has final, or non-derivative, value: ot... more Hedonism is the view that pleasure is the only thing that has final, or non-derivative, value: other things are valuable only to the extent that they produce pleasure. In this context, pleasure may be narrowly conceived as an agreeable sensation, or functionally as a psychological response that reinforces a subject’s propensity to perform the action that evokes the response. (Critics of aesthetic hedonism [AH] have often assumed the former, but criticism narrowly based on this conception does not work when leveled against a functional conception.) Either way, it makes value depend on human response, not on objective qualities. AH applies this thesis to aesthetic value, holding that it derives from aesthetic pleasure. AH runs contrary to objectivism—the idea that aesthetic value is independent of the value of experience (experience being, at most, an apprehension of value). AH starts from the fact that human beings “like” art; aesthetic value is then understood as the instrumental value of giving them what they like. However, great tragedy arouses negative emotions, and the best art is cognitively difficult to understand. These are psychological barriers to engagement and appreciation. AH must show why these barriers do not reduce value. Most aesthetic hedonists address the difficulty by delimiting the scope either of hedonism or of aesthetic pleasure. Some scholars, e.g. Hume, say that art must be valued relative to the response of somebody who has been sufficiently exposed to it, and has thus developed “taste”; only the pleasure that such subjects take in art is probative. Others, e.g. Kant, posit a special kind of pleasure characteristic of aesthetic appreciation. This, he says, is “disinterested,” and thus different from the mere “agreeability” of food and sex, and also of low art—it is, nevertheless, a form of pleasure. In other treatments, other human motivations are invoked, including emotional immersion in Indian “rasa” theory, social harmony in Confucius, forms of eroticism (an idea that traces back to Plato), Freudian negative impulses such as the death wish, and vitalistic life forces. These are not forms of hedonism in the strict sense, but they are founded on human response, and so they are anti-objectivist in tenor. More recently, ideas from other areas of philosophy—specifically philosophy of mind and value theory—have been employed for and against AH, including nontraditional ways of understanding the nature of pleasure. The authors would like to acknowledge research support from the Australian Research Council DP 150103143 as part of the research project Taste and Community led by Jennifer A. McMahon, on which Mohan Matthen was a co-investigator.
IN the De caelo Aristotle posits an unchanging intelligent being that exists beyond the heavens, ... more IN the De caelo Aristotle posits an unchanging intelligent being that exists beyond the heavens, enjoying there 'the best and most selfsufficient life' (1. 9, 279 1 21-2). In Physics 8 and Met.a.physics A this entity becomes the Prime Unmoved Mover, ultimately responsible for all movement, change, and generation in the universe. What exactly is the relationship between the Prime Mover and the corporeal universe? It is perhaps natural to think of it as a cause of change that is distinct from and stands outside the various corporeal substances in which change occurs. It is my thesis, however, that we gain a better understanding of some of the things Aristotle says about nature, causation, and the universe if we adopt the following propositions: first , that the corporeal cosmos is a single substance with a motion proprietary to itself, directed towards an end which is good; second, that this corporeal substance constitutes, together with its Prime Mover, a composite whole that can be regarded as a self-mover. Aristotle's universe is appropriately considered to be a composite C> Mohan Manhm 2001 This research W'llS funded by the University of Album and the Social Scim.ces and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The paper is a by-product of collaborative Tesearch with Jim Hankinson, to whom I am, as always, deeply grateful. Earlier versions were delivered lo audiences at the Unh•ers.ity of Albena, rhe Uni,'ersity of Teus ar Austin, and the Uni,oersity of Western Ontario. l am grateful to Rachel Bame)•, Ronnie De Sousa, John King-Farlow, Alex M.ourelatos, John Thorp, and Steve White for helpful comments on these ocasions. Mary Louise Gill, Julius Mora"CSllt., I\1alcolm Schofield, Ch.aTlotte 'Witt, and David Seclley each gave me detailed comments that led to subs12nrial revision. My greatest debt is to Catherine \Vilson for extensive discussion, and for making me aware of the early modern reception of Aristotelian ideas. ' This is clear from the"'". .. Oi construction ranging from 26&"'6 to b8 , where pan:ial bo<lies and the 'totality of which these arc parts' are rontrasted as a ~r with body-as-extension. The latter is an undifferentiated mass, whercas both paroal bodies and the totalirv arc individuals. As I shall now argue, partial bodies arc not inttinsicallv individ~. whereas the total icy is. • Cf. M;Japh. z 2, 1o:z.8b1:z., where Aristotle says that anything made our of the entirccy of the elements (of each one OT of all of rhem?-the phrase is ambiguous) is
The Sensory Ordering Thesis is a ramified version of the Sensory Classification Thesis presented ... more The Sensory Ordering Thesis is a ramified version of the Sensory Classification Thesis presented in Ch.1; it acknowledges that most sensory systems order distal objects, rather than place them in discrete classes. Sense features Agenerate@ their sub-classes in an interesting sense noticed by W. E. Johnson: the perceptual grasp of inclusive features such as red is based on a grasp of graded similarity relations among the sub-classes thereof. Variation with respect to a single sensory parameter such as colour is invariable in a number of significant ways, but ‘overall‘ similarity with respect to several sensory parameters is variable across different graphical representations. This shows that overall similarity is an artefact, while similarity with respect to a single parameter is forced upon us by sensory cognition.
Because culture plays a role in determining the aesthetic merit of a work of art, intrinsically s... more Because culture plays a role in determining the aesthetic merit of a work of art, intrinsically similar works can have different aesthetic merit when assessed in different cultures. This paper argues that a form of aesthetic hedonism is best placed to account for this relativity of aesthetic value. This form of hedonism is based on a functional account of aesthetic pleasure, according to which it motivates and enables mental engagement with artworks, and an account of pleasure-learning, in which it reinforces the appreciation of culture specific ways of engaging with art
Philosophy of Biology is a rapidly expanding field. It is concerned with explanatory concepts in ... more Philosophy of Biology is a rapidly expanding field. It is concerned with explanatory concepts in evolution, genetics, and ecology. This collection of 25 essays by leading researchers provides an overview of the state of the field. These essays are wholly new; none of them could have been written even ten years ago. They demonstrate how philosophical analysis has been able to contribute to sometimes contested areas of scientific theory making.< br>< br>-Written by internationally acknowledged leaders in the field< br>-Entries make ...
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is a philosophical framework for thinking about sensory systems as act... more Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is a philosophical framework for thinking about sensory systems as active devices for data extraction B rather than, in the traditional way, as passive recorders of ambient energy patterns. Sensory systems are automatic sorting machines that assign real-world objects to classes. A sense feature is the property of belonging to such a class. A sensory experience, or sensation, is a label that the system uses in order to allow the organism access to the classifications that it has performed. This Sensory Classification Thesis (SCT), discussed in Chs 1–3, inverts the normally assumed relationship between sensory classes and sensations. Philosophers standardly hold that red is to be defined in terms of the sensation of red; here, sensations derive from sensory classes and are thus unsuitable for defining them. SCT is a simplification: some sensory systems order real-world objects in relations of similarity, and do not just put them into discrete classes (Chs 4–...
This is the published version of an article published by the Philosophy Department at the Univers... more This is the published version of an article published by the Philosophy Department at the University of Notre Dame.
When I am relaxing in an armchair, I can close my eyes and summon up a fairlydetailedandvividimag... more When I am relaxing in an armchair, I can close my eyes and summon up a fairlydetailedandvividimageofmyhandsonablackkeyboard.Thisstateofvisual imagingisdifferentfrommypresentvisualstate.Itdoesnotmakeitseemasifthe keyboardisreallythere,northatiteverwas,orthatitisreallyblack.Icouldjustas wellsummonupanimageofmyhandsplayingonapiano:IknowIneverdidplay thepiano;hence,itisimmaterial,asfarastheveracityofthisimageisconcerned, what colour the keys rae. (Here and in what follows, I shall use 'visual state' to meanstatesthatarisefromlooking-visualimagingdoesnotfallunderthistermas Iamusingithere.) What is the difference between these two states? Why does the keyboard have (as I shall say) afeeling of presence in my present visual state, but not in the state of visual imaging? In this paper, I employ the Two Visual Systems theory to offer a partial answer to this question. Though this answer addresses only one aspectofthefeelingofpresence,whichverylikelytracestomanydifferentcognitive processes, it reveals something important about how the two visual streams function. The problem that I want to tackle in this paper concerns the origin and semantic significance of the Feeling of Presence. It might well be that this feeling attachestoasceneonlywhenthatscenehasbeenidentifiedasreallythere(andnot THEFEELINGOFPRESENCE 2 justdepicted).Thus,thevisualsystemmighthavetosolvetheproblemofwhether whatisseenisrealbeforeitattachestheFeelingofPresencetothingsitdetermines to be real. My problem, though, is not so much the conditions under which the visual system certifies something as present and real,or the method by which the visualsystemproceedstosuchcertification.Myproblemisratherthemeaningof thefeelingofpresence.Whatexactlyisit? I. Introduction:Content-DirectedAttitudes A. Visual experience tells the viewing subject something descriptive about her surroundings.Forinstance: I know by looking that somebody on my left is looking at me and extendinghishand. Twocaveats: a. The italicized portion of the displayed sentence above-the part after 'that'-expresses in English a part of what vision tells me about the world. No sentence will express all of what vision tells me in a normal scene. b. Visiontellsmethisinitsownexpressivemedium,i.e.invisualqualia,not inEnglish. 1 (Thefactthatvisualimageryisinvolvedwillturnouttobe importantinwhatfollows.
Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy, 2020
Author(s): COHEN, Jonathan; Matthen, Mohan | Editor(s): Ferretti, Gabriele; Glenney, Brian | Abst... more Author(s): COHEN, Jonathan; Matthen, Mohan | Editor(s): Ferretti, Gabriele; Glenney, Brian | Abstract: Molyneux asked whether a newly sighted person could distinguish a sphere from a cube by sight alone, given that she was antecedently able to do so by touch. This, we contend, is a question about general ideas. To answer it, we must ask (a) whether spatial locations identified by touch can be identified also by sight, and (b) whether the integration of spatial locations into an idea of shape persists through changes of modality. Posed this way, Molyneux’s Question goes substantially beyond question (a), about spatial locations, alone; for a positive answer to (a) leaves open whether a perceiver might cross-identify locations, but not be able to identify the shapes that collections of locations comprise. We further emphasize that MQ targets general ideas so as to distinguish it from corresponding questions about experiences of shape and about the property of tangible (vs. visual) sha...
<jats:p>Physicalism appears to undermine the autonomy of 'special sciences' such as... more <jats:p>Physicalism appears to undermine the autonomy of 'special sciences' such as biology, and to leave little room for proprietary biological laws or causation. Mendel's 'Laws' are so-called because they are fundamental to the subject-area, but since they describe causal processes that are wholly physical in nature, they seem to reduce to physical laws, given certain propositions about the composition of DNA. The same goes for other principles of the biological sciences.</jats:p> <jats:p>This argument has been challenged by Hilary Putnam, on the grounds that good explanations, for instance in mathematical terms, could range more widely than any given physical realization. Putnam argues that mathematics could thus have an autonomous role in science despite physicalism. Putnam's insight has been applied to classical genetics by Philip Kitcher. A gene is a unit of inheritance that passes unchanged from parent to offspring according to certain rules. It is these rules that are essential to understanding inheritance, not details of interaction in the DNA substrate. Putnam and Kitcher here employ a notion similar to Aristotle's 'formal causes' – functional and structural determinants of biological characteristics that are somewhat independent of material constitution.</jats:p> <jats:p>There are other conceptions of laws to be found in philosophy of science. Some think that they are propositions with the capacity to impart axiomatic structure to what is known about a domain. The principle of natural selection plays this role in biology, though it is a priori. Again, some think that laws are necessary truths: on cladistic systems of classification, the proposition that the common raven is a bird is arguably a law under this understanding.</jats:p> <jats:p>The nature of causal patterns in natural selection has been a matter of some discussion recently. The view that individual-level causes are sufficient to explain selection-outcomes is tempting to the reductionist, but distorts the explanatory aims of evolutionary theory. Clearly, evolutionary theory requires population-level causes. On the other hand, it has been questioned whether natural selection itself should be understood as a 'force' acting on a population, somewhat in the same manner as gravitation acts on a body. Statistical views of natural selection seek alternatives to this way of understanding selection.</jats:p> <jats:p>Finally, what are biological entities? Some ontologies admit no priority among collections of atoms – the argument is that an organism, for instance, is nothing more than such a collection. Many biologists, however, treat of composite entities as internally organized complex systems. On this view, cells, organisms, populations, and ecosystems have privileged ontological status.</jats:p>
Vision is organized around material objects; they are most of what we see. But we also see beams ... more Vision is organized around material objects; they are most of what we see. But we also see beams of light, depictions, shadows, reflections, etc. These things look like material objects in many ways, but it is still visually obvious that they are not material objects. This chapter articulates some principles that allow us to understand how we see these ‘ephemera’. H.P. Grice’s definition of seeing is standard in many discussions; here I clarify and augment it with a criterion drawn from Fred Dretske. This enables me to re-analyse certain ephemera that have received counter-intuitive treatments in the work of Kendall Walton (photographs), Brian O’Shaughnessy (light), and Roy Sorenson (occlusions).
Vision presents features as located in environmental things. In this chapter, the structure of th... more Vision presents features as located in environmental things. In this chapter, the structure of this feature-locating scheme is investigated. Austen Clark argues, correctly, that visual features are presented to us as properties that belong to certain subjects. Clark, however, thinks that these subjects are regions of space: it is argued here that they are material objects capable of motion, not mere regions of space. Thus, vision presents the world in material object-feature terms. Other modalities employ different structures: audition, for example, attributes features to sounds, not material objects. Such differences among sense modalities with regard to their representations of space and their attributions of features argue that a purely a priori or functional treatment will miss philosophically important characteristics of sensation.
Under certain conditions, synaesthesia would properly be understood as perception, i.e. as experi... more Under certain conditions, synaesthesia would properly be understood as perception, i.e. as experience that affords the subject an accurate imagistic representation of some occurrence in the world that the subject understands as such. Perception is a true imagistic representation of the world concurrently around the perceiver, which, moreover, gives the perceiver unmediated reason to believe in what is so represented. Projector synaesthetes have an enhanced experience of what is known as the inducer stimulus. This experience includes a concurrent experience over and above the normal experience. I define direct synaesthesia as enhanced experience that gives direct reason to believe in the existence of the inducer (not the concurrent). Such direct projector synaesthesia is worth investigating because it seems, in short, to be enhanced perception of the inducer.
Hedonism is the view that pleasure is the only thing that has final, or non-derivative, value: ot... more Hedonism is the view that pleasure is the only thing that has final, or non-derivative, value: other things are valuable only to the extent that they produce pleasure. In this context, pleasure may be narrowly conceived as an agreeable sensation, or functionally as a psychological response that reinforces a subject’s propensity to perform the action that evokes the response. (Critics of aesthetic hedonism [AH] have often assumed the former, but criticism narrowly based on this conception does not work when leveled against a functional conception.) Either way, it makes value depend on human response, not on objective qualities. AH applies this thesis to aesthetic value, holding that it derives from aesthetic pleasure. AH runs contrary to objectivism—the idea that aesthetic value is independent of the value of experience (experience being, at most, an apprehension of value). AH starts from the fact that human beings “like” art; aesthetic value is then understood as the instrumental value of giving them what they like. However, great tragedy arouses negative emotions, and the best art is cognitively difficult to understand. These are psychological barriers to engagement and appreciation. AH must show why these barriers do not reduce value. Most aesthetic hedonists address the difficulty by delimiting the scope either of hedonism or of aesthetic pleasure. Some scholars, e.g. Hume, say that art must be valued relative to the response of somebody who has been sufficiently exposed to it, and has thus developed “taste”; only the pleasure that such subjects take in art is probative. Others, e.g. Kant, posit a special kind of pleasure characteristic of aesthetic appreciation. This, he says, is “disinterested,” and thus different from the mere “agreeability” of food and sex, and also of low art—it is, nevertheless, a form of pleasure. In other treatments, other human motivations are invoked, including emotional immersion in Indian “rasa” theory, social harmony in Confucius, forms of eroticism (an idea that traces back to Plato), Freudian negative impulses such as the death wish, and vitalistic life forces. These are not forms of hedonism in the strict sense, but they are founded on human response, and so they are anti-objectivist in tenor. More recently, ideas from other areas of philosophy—specifically philosophy of mind and value theory—have been employed for and against AH, including nontraditional ways of understanding the nature of pleasure. The authors would like to acknowledge research support from the Australian Research Council DP 150103143 as part of the research project Taste and Community led by Jennifer A. McMahon, on which Mohan Matthen was a co-investigator.
H.P. Grice's Causal Theory of Perception was advanced as a place-holder, advanced in order to dis... more H.P. Grice's Causal Theory of Perception was advanced as a place-holder, advanced in order to discuss the differing roles of semantics and pragamatics of 'looks as if' locutions. However, it became very influential in the theory of perception, where it has typically been treated as a completely articulated analysis of direct-object uses of 'see.' In this paper, I examine several counter-intuitive (and somewhat sensational) applications of the Causal Theory and show how they depend on such an understanding. I propose that if we fill our our understanding of visual perception in terms of the modalities and functional benefits of vision, these applications can be corrected. On this understanding, some sensory states will turn out not to be material object seeings because they are either not created in the normal way or fail to provide information in the normal way.
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Papers by Mohan Matthen