It is a largely ignored or insufficiently valued thing that the perception of qualities by the human mind in itself provides incontestable natural philosophic arguments against modern materialism based on the mechanistic, quantitative view of matter. The simple fact that in the human perception, there exist for instance green leaves, demonstrates that materialism is false. The present work aims at illustrating, based on the reality of qualities, that modern materialist reductionism is philosophically untenable. Hence, the error of materialism can be shown without reference to any higher -spiritual or ethical -viewpoints, merely on the level of natural philosophy, by that this modern view is incapable of accounting for the qualities perceived in the most casual way by humans .

The Journal of Philosophy, 1995

A discussion of the three major forms of materialism, reductive, eliminative, and functional, showing that all three are incorrect. In their place I suggest a form of methodological materialism.

2007

By now it is a cliché to observe that so-called reductionism is not one mammoth doctrine. There are, as it were, many reductionisms. Needless to say, there are at least as many antireductionisms. Despite the fact that neither reductionisms nor their counterparts are single and unified doctrines, there do seem to be some family resemblances. One, it seems to me, is that both reductionisms and antireductionisms are acute responses to certain metaphysical worries.

Zygon®, 2004

Oxford University Online Encyclopedia, 2018

https://sda.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/sda/#!/themes/article/379 (In case of display problems, try using a different browser.)

[Draft] An analysis of reductionism in connection with the unity of science. The paper is organized into two parts: the first containing a logical analysis of the concepts of reduction and emergence, in both logical and ontological terms; the second containing an examination of the plausibility of reductionism.

The philosophical concept of reductionism involves breaking down a complex system into a sum of its parts and explain the workings of the system in terms of its constituents. It is an explanatory mechanism which seeks to reduce complex theories or phenomena to simpler and more fundamental theories. Under the purview of philosophy, most commonly propounded is the reductionism of all scientific theories to physical sciences, often termed as physicalism or materialism. The distinction between the various sciences is presented in the form of a hierarchy wherein social sciences occupy the topmost position. These include economics, sociology, anthropology and political sciences, with internal hierarchies of their own, followed by psychology which forms the basis of sociology as the most basic social science and is itself based on biology. Next in line are the fundamental branches sciences, biology and geology which are premised on Chemistry which in turn is based on the most fundamental science, Physics. Hence, simply put, all phenomena postulated by the special sciences (which lie above the fundamental sciences) can be explained in the vocabulary of physical sciences.

Neuroscience and Critique: Exploring the Limits of the Neurological Turn, 2015

The Concept of Reduction, 2014

Reduction, in the sense of 'reduction' we are interested in, reconciles diversity and directionality with strong unity. 'Reduction', however, can be given different interpretations; it is a technical term whose meaning largely depends on the theoretical goals of those who use the term. This chapter offers a disambiguation of the term, and it addresses methodological issues regarding the philosophical analysis of technical expressions such as 'reduction' in general. In order to establish a common ground, a taxonomy of notions in the vicinity of the concept of reduction is introduced, and the target of this book is located within this taxonomy. It is then argued that an appropriate characterization of the concept of reduction builds upon an explication, rather than an empirical investigation of alleged cases of reduction, or upon mere stipulation. Finally, the relevant terminology is introduced. 2.1 Reduction, Elimination, and Monism-A Taxonomy How should we approach an appropriate characterization of the notion of reduction? This partly depends upon what we mean by 'reduction'. Among philosophers, it is common courtesy to acknowledge that 'reduction' may come with many different intended meanings. The concept of reduction, as conceived of here, is supposed to reconcile diversity and directionality with strong unity, without relying on elimination. This characterization may help to some extent. However, it employs notions such as unification and elimination, so that one may fear that it tries to illuminate the obscure with the opaque. To ensure that the introduction of the present book's target is not flawed by ambiguities in the use of 'reduction', 'elimination' and 'unification', or the distracting associations these terms may provoke, we should try to distinguish different "kinds" of reduction, or different conceptions thereof, thereby pointing to a taxonomy within which the target concept can be located. In passing, this will enable us to clarify the conservatism/eliminativism distinction and shed light on the connection between reductionist commitments and scientific realism.