THE PARADOXICAL SPIRIT MOVEMENT This paper concerns a prospective movement, which might be more clearly stated as ‘spiritual criticism’, not because it criticizes the soul, but because it uses spiritual concepts as the basis for critical revisionism of historical concepts, and also critical methods. It is a kind of disposable, reflective movement in the tradition of other movements by Nathan Coppedge, such as Metemphysics (‘the materialism of ideas’ and focus on intermediate concepts) , Literal Criticism, Protocritical Mathematics. Applicationist Psychology, Formal Technicalism, and Meta-Nihilism. Instead of exposing a general theme of critique, I would like to introduce a laundry list of historical revisions, which may be taken as references to the kernels of this or other movements involving criticism or spirituality. 1. THE PRAGMATIC SOUL: Pragmatism may be interpreted for its willingness as a last defense of the soul as a material concept. Thus, the pragmatist ‘leap of pragmatism’ described by James may be interpreted as the ability to take the concept of soul and run with it. The defense of the soul becomes, under pragmatism, the defense of its causal utility for conceptualized situations. The soul is, under this view, a takeaway argument which accesses correlative space through a transcendent function related to its imperativeness. In criticism of this, a countervailing view would state that pragmatism was doing no more than accentuating mere beliefs held by Immanuel Kant, and the soul itself is no more than an imaginon foisted by the victims of torturers, having had their tongues cauterized. However, the paradoxical spirit movement holds that there is, in fact, a transcendent function for the soul, however obscure, and this guarantees a causal function which works in correlative space. A materialist is not obligated to accept the soul, but in so doing, he must be a universalist before he realizes any critique of the transcendent function. If the soul is reduced to a function or emotion (empirically) in paradoxical spiritualism, the materialist is forced to deny its function or emotion before he can deny its reality. Part of this argument follows from the understanding that names are arbitrary constructs, and nothing can make a name expressly false. Again, this would happen by denying its function or emotion. 2. NOUMENON AND APEIRON: Some utility may be had by comparing Kant’s Noumenon with Anaximander’s Apeiron. Simply because the experience of something is unknown ab origine does not mean that the thing is unknown in its sensory properties. This could serve as a possible bridge between empirical and abstract knowledge, e.g. if the noumenon is observable, just not in its original nature, then there may be subjective ways of formulating an understanding of it. The undo insistence on the unknowingness of the Noumenon may be unnecessary. What about us really tells us that it is inherently unknown? What says that it does not communicate? That kind of belief would be like Kant’s version of Atheism. What the Apeiron says about the Noumenon is that it is observable. We cannot gaurantee that its objective properties are observable, but if there are objective properties to subjective experience, this shows that the properties are to some extent objective. Apparently, the highly qualified insights of these earlier sages (Kant and Anaximander), were over-clouded by the tentatively and obsessions with concepts of subjectivity, which were not resolved to any degree until a later time. Some of this could be ascribed to the psychology of new discovery, which always attempts to re-figure the past, without always having the original experiences readily available for subjective importance. The lack of subjective cachet value for these earlier movements ironically undid----for a moment, at least---their objective significance. Only through combination does the image become more clear, of a substance that is not directly against subjective comprehension, and which, at least in a theological view, does not undo the concept of a God, and God’s rational productions, such as things subjectively conceived which refer to an objective world. 3. UNIVERSALS: What does Cartesian Space have to say about arguments for God? One view is that Cartesianism of this type is a defense of atheism. The reason for this is that, outside of the belief that the universal is subjective such as a positive and negative God, there is a new sense of arbitrariness to the formulation of the Cartesian Coordinates. Indeed, why not adopt positive concepts for all of the quadrants? One argument goes that such a form of space is ‘less functional’. But negatives serve little purpose in economics, history, or social science, so why would they have validity in mathematics? The method of using negatives is apparently a way of glossing over an Atheist dogma in which the universalism of God is impossible. It is blatantly assumed that God is the potential universal (ostensibly, because God such as Apeiron had been the basis for prior systems of metaphysics, which were at one time more popular than mathematics). The glossing over is one way in which mathematics may, unpredictably perhaps, remain less logical than the social sciences. A system using ‘four opposites’ to determine a positive solution to the four quadrants has already been proposed in my method of categorical deduction (for 4, 16, 64 quadrants, etc.), and perhaps it is even possible that the method was previously existing in Aristotle’s lost works. In any case, what paradoxical spiritualism has to say about the Cartesian Coordinates is that the Atheist dogma is antiquated, and regardless of belief system, there is a logical imperative to replace negatives with positives. The result is as likely to prove Theism as it is to introduce doxic duplicity, which has conversely been seen as a paragon of philosophical and scientific sophistication. Revising the Cartesian Coordinates also serves to renew the encounter with concepts of the universal, perhaps inviting a revision of materialism, perhaps for a more chemically- or variablistically- integrated view, which is, in my opinion, long overdue. 4. THE SENSIBILIA OF THE ESSENTIAL CAUSE: Historical concepts in military terms are often reduced to conflicts, which are gradually reduced to polemical or economic terms, which are then translated as individuals, which are further broken down into essential ingredients such as motivations, psychology, desires, and beliefs, as well as the material influences that may or may not influence a given people. History in this sense reduces to an essence, which is the essence of history and the essence of motivation. Some of these motivations may occur contingently---that is, unconsciously, or by demand----whereas other motivations may occur directly---by choice, judgment, or concept-formation. However, whether these choices and demands are in fact the determinants of the essence of history depends on a material fulfillment, that is, a sensibilia (‘group of sensible things’) which conveys that such choices and demands have material importance. For example, if God’s voice did not speak to the Jews, but to a people which he deemed was not chosen, then apparently his word would go unheeded. The essence of history is a lot like this: a singular purpose created by its own relevance. So long as people (or gods, or machines) cannot deny their own desires, they also cannot deny that they are also created by their own relevance. The essential cause of history---the soul of history, so to speak---is then not only choices and demands, but they way in which those choices and demands are created by their own relevance. The result of this is a more dimensional view, in which reciprocity is artificially created. It can be determined that ambiguity is the opposite of arbitration to the purpose that ultimately history is determined by its own artificiality and sense of value-lessness. Where there is value, however, there is reciprocity, and choices and demands are created by their own relevance. In general, it is a propo to introduce meaning as a concept at this point, because it is clear that history, like motivation, needs an object for its desire. Since the object may be arbitrary, it becomes important then to introduce a concept that has value----even if only because history is artificial. The value that is introduced must be something created by its own relevance, thus for something as complicated as a person it may be nothing other than a sense of meaning. Remember, this does not deny the role of the will, and demand, and the sensible qualities, it merely proscribes that there is an arbitrated object which is the object of a given thing’s being created by its own relevance. Some of these concepts were anticipated by Jean Paul Sartre, e.g. condemned to be free, but in fact it is more important to be attached to one’s own sense of meaning, both in the sense of sensibilia, and in the purpose of relevance. Nathan Coppedge, SCSU 2/03/2015, p.