Biologists say that different genetic frequencies give rise to different physical characteristics but not to any fixed system for using these characteristics to partition the human species into distinct racial groups, l Moreover, the direction of cytogenic research indicates that observable differences between individuals -even contrasts as grossly obvious as those between a mouse and an ear of corn-are due to diminish in significance with future breakthroughs in DNA grafting. 2 As it stands now, the full scope of human genetic inheritance varies statistically among individuals with roughly uniform significance throughout the world. 3 So the recalcitrant salience of subtle differences between people's skin tones and facial structures must be accounted for indirectly, perhaps in the way we must account indirectly for the earth's surface appearing to be more or less flat, since it is not.

Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities special issue The African Other, 2020

This essay examines the implicit role that philosophical analysis plays in sustaining indefensible imbalances of group power and privilege in stratified societies where racial disparities are ostensibly deplored while being tacitly reinforced. The United States is an example of this kind of society. The works discussed here emerge from growing lines of inquiry in philosophy of cognition (e.g., as compiled recently by Brownstein and Saul, and earlier publications of Gendler, Kriegl, Machery, Mandelbaum, and Schwitzgebel) and applied phenomenology (e.g., Freeman) that address recent results in empirical psychology. In the majority of referenced studies, the social and neurological research yields data from experimental subjects who share a racially privileged group status and carry a subliminal racial bias which is unintended.

A core question of contemporary social morality concerns how we ought to handle racial categorization. By this we mean, for instance, classifying or thinking of a person as Black, Korean, Latino, White, etc.² While it is widely FN:2 agreed that racial categorization played a crucial role in past racial oppression, there remains disagreement among philosophers and social theorists about the ideal role for racial categorization in future endeavors. At one extreme of this disagreement are short-term eliminativists who want to do away with racial categorization relatively quickly (e.g. because they view it as mistaken and oppressive. At the opposite end of the spectrum, long-term conservationists hold that racial identities and communities are beneficial, and that racial categorization-suitably reformed-is essential to fostering them (e.g. Outlaw, , 1996. While extreme forms of conservationism have fewer proponents in academia than the most radical eliminativist positions, many theorists advocate more moderate positions. In between the two poles, there are many who believe that racial categorization is valuable (and perhaps necessary) given the continued existence of racial inequality and the lingering effects of past racism (e.g.

Angelaki Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 2019

This essay examines the implicit role that philosophical analysis plays in sustaining indefensible imbalances of group power and privilege in stratified societies where racial disparities are ostensibly deplored while being tacitly reinforced. The United States is an example of this kind of society. The works discussed here emerge from growing lines of inquiry in philosophy of cognition (e.g., as compiled recently by Brownstein and Saul, and earlier publications of Gendler, Kriegl, Machery, Mandelbaum, and Schwitzgebel) and applied phenomenology (e.g., Freeman) that address recent results in empirical psychology. In the majority of referenced studies, the social and neurological research yields data from experimental subjects who share a racially privileged group status and carry a subliminal racial bias which is unintended.

2015

IntroductionI begin this paper with a reflection on an event in honor of a well-known, well-respected feminist scholar of color; one who has inspired my work and much of the work of my friends and colleagues. During the celebration of this scholar's contributions to the field of academic research, scholars, academics and researchers argued, publicly, over whether the honoree's contributions were in the form of theory (having enriched the scholarly canon with theoretical concepts and frameworks) or in speaking from her experience (from her location as a racialised woman, offering insightful gains for research in general). The room felt tense, divided, and very uncomfortable. That a woman of color's contributions to scholarship could be either theoretical or lived experience, but not both, angered quite a few attendees. That certain bodies in the room could even reduce her contributions to experience angered many others, who felt that the comments reflected the tendency of...

The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Civic and Political Studies, 2019

One goal of social justice is to overcome discrimination. This goal implies that discrimination needs to be well understood so that once an endpoint has been reached people will know that justice has been achieved. Moreover, equal opportunity legislation in some legal jurisdictions requires a predefined endpoint to enable distinction between "lawful" and "unlawful" discrimination. In this article, we show that the concept of an endpoint is logically flawed. We also illustrate how the concept of discrimination is utilized inconsistently due to a shift between deontological and utilitarian frames of reference. This shift is a major factor leading writers of an EEO training module to fall into the traps of inaccuracy and "doublespeak." Finally, we argue that futures-oriented thinking about social issues should entail a temporally open ended removal of barriers rather than imposition of quotas based on ostensible endpoints that have been invoked in legislation. This would enable avoidance of inconsistency and illogicality, without diminishing relevance to social justice.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

Canadian Journal of Law & Society, 19(2), 177-197, 2004

The texts discussed illustrate general methodological and pedagogical problems faced by the social sciences. Because of their illustrative nature each of these texts makes a significant contribution to our understanding of how it is that social scientists conceive of and deploy 'race' as an analytic category and how this impacts on the production of knowledge about crime control and social justice. In this way, the texts are telling in terms of how analytic categories, more generally, are treated in teaching and research. Through a comparative approach this essay takes three recent texts as a vehicle to argue that the consideration of epistemological issues stemming from the employment of central analytic categories cannot be avoided and that attempts to do so yield a passive rather than active engagement with the object of analysis. Moreover, passive approaches do not serve to represent a critically engaged, social scientific enquiry.

2005

Discrimination is a moral and a legal issue. It is regulated in national and international law. The rationale for regulation is the assumption that discrimination is unfair; the legal issue presupposes the moral one. If discrimination does not measure up as a moral concept, the legal regulation is not a regulation of “it” but of an ad hoc set of behaviors that we dislike, possibly for good reason. I start by trying to identify what discrimination is taken to be in the moral and legal discourse. I will go on to set up a number of requirements an account of discrimination should meet and assess what I understand to be the standard view in light of these requirements. Pinning discrimination down as a legal issue in need of regulation makes it more difficult to account for it in a meaningful way as a moral issue. There seems to be a conflict between these two concerns. I will end by spelling that conflict out.