Determinism - the philosophical belief of the irresponsible and incorrectly assumed to be a Fact of Nature, when it is really needed for most mathematical models of Reality.

APPON Philosophical Quarterly: A Journal of the Association of Philosophy Professionals of Nigeria, 2024

Are human beings actually free beings? The doctrine of determinism gives a negative response to this question. Determinism therefore claims that humans are not free to act or make choices, since they are always constrained in some way. By so doing, determinism denies human freedom and human moral responsibility. It rejects the idea that humans act freely, or that humans can be regarded as responsible for their actions and inactions. This outright denial of human freedom and human moral responsibility is certainly pregnant with several implications, which this article is aimed at exposing. This article adopts the expository, analytic and critical methods. It begins with a clarification of the concept of determinism and then goes on to discuss five types of determinism, namely: (a) physical, (b) psychological, (c) historical, (d) ethical and (e) theological determinism, respectively. Also, this article discusses two categories of determinism known as soft and hard determinism. Furthermore, this article exposes some implications of determinism for events and humanity. Finally, adopting eclecticism as its theoretical framework, this article proposes that it is best to approach the doctrine of determinism by simply recognising and accepting the fact that there are aspects of humans that are determined, and there are equally aspects of humans that are not determined. By so doing, this article establishes that approaching the doctrine of determinism eclectically is the surest way of accommodating the opposing doctrines of determinism and 'freewillism.'

Many philosophers tend to defend the view that there is a significant relation between the problem of determinism / indeterminism and the problem of free will. The belief that there exists such a significant relation is supported by our intuitions; however, in this thesis, I defend just the opposite view: free will has no significant dependence on the deterministic or indeterministic character of causal relations. In the same way, I propose that the question, whether or not determinism is true, cannot be answered based on observations about the problem of free will. I believe that the genuine question whose answer would illuminate the darkness surrounding free will is whether or not will supervenes on anything other than itself. Therefore, in order to decide whether or not we are free, the question we should ask is “Does will supervene upon something other than itself?” Moreover, I defend the position that no matter whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, if physicalism is true, i.e. if properties of free will supervene upon physical properties, then we cannot enjoy genuine freedom. The position of the thesis has some important ethical implications: If we cannot be genuinely free, we cannot be genuinely responsible for our actions either. This implies that retributive and admirative desires towards other persons are rationally untenable. I defend the view that only practical attitudes like reinforcement and punishment or isolation and inclusion are rationally tenable.

Open Journal of Philosophy, vol. 4, no. 11, 482-498, 2021

Progress may be made in resolving the tension between free will and determinism by analysis of the necessary conditions of freedom. It is of the essence that these conditions include causal and deterministic regularities. Furthermore, the human expression of free will is informed by understanding some of those regularities, and increments in that understanding have served to enhance freedom. When the possible character of a deterministic system based on physical theory is considered, it is judged that, far from implying the elimination of human freedom, such a theory might simply set parameters for it; indeed knowledge of that system could again prove to be in some respects liberating. On the other hand, it is of the essence that the overarching biological framework is not a deterministic system and it foregrounds the behavioural flexibility of humans in being able to choose within a range of options and react to chance occurrences. Furthermore, an issue for determinism flows from the way in which randomness (e.g. using a true random number generator) and chance events could and do enter human life. Once the implications of that issue are fully understood, other elements fit comfortably together in our understanding of freely undertaken action: the contribution of reasons and causes; the fact that reasons are never sufficient to account for outcomes; the rationale for the attribution of praise and blame.

The best way to advance in the analysis of the relationship between determinism and freedom is not to take these concepts as primitive and indivisible terms. It is usual to identify-if not in their entirety, at least preferentially-determinism with causal determinism, against which and concerning the freedom of actions, two positions have been proposed, the so-called compatibilistic and incompatibilistic conceptions. The first argues that freedom, understood under certain conditions, has a place within a causally determined world.

Oxford University Online Encyclopedia, 2018

https://sda.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/sda/#!/themes/article/278 (In case of display problems, try again using a different browser.)

This paper tries to sum up the criticism that turns around structuration theory to help the applications in MIS field. The literature review allow to advance three categories of criticisms: (1) the conflation of structure and human agent, (2) the complexity and the outspread of the theory that lead to contradictions, and (3) the lack of assumptions and methodological guidelines. Some recommendations are given to direct future researches.

2. Descartes and Free Will. René Descartes's voluntarist descriptions of the will and free will are found mainly in his Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditationes de prima philosophia, 1641 in Latin in Paris, 1642 in Latin in Amsterdam, 1647 in French, Les Méditations métaphysiques), the Principles of Philosophy (Principia philosophiae, 1644 in Latin, 1647 in French), and The Passions of the Soul (1649 in French, Des passions de l'âme). 16 Voluntarist descriptions of the will and free will are also contained in some of his letters (e.g., the two letters to Denis Mesland [May 2, 1644 and February 9, 1645]), his Notes Directed Against a Certain Programme, and in the Göttingen manuscript copy (made by an anonymous hand) of Johannes Clauberg's copy text of Descartes' Conversation with Burman (1648 in Latin [Adam-Tannery, vol. V, 146ff.]). In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes states that it is obvious that we have free will, that the existence of human free will is a most certain and evident truth. It is self-evident. 17 He repeatedly stresses in his writings that we have free will. However, his voluntarist descriptions of the will, free will, freedom of choice, judgment, affirmation, and negation, must be critiqued. For example, he oftentimes erroneously identifies freedom of choice or free choice (liberum arbitrium) and will (voluntas). In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes writes: "it is only the will (voluntas), or freedom of choice (liberum arbitrium), which I experience within me to be so great that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp." 18 Now, voluntas and liberum arbitrium are not the same, as William A. Wallace, O.P. explains: "the will is the rational or intellectual appetite in man, i.e., the source of volition whereby he seeks goods as perceived by the power of the intellect…The will is a free power in man, basically because it is the appetite that follows reason. Because reason can see several alternatives equally feasable as means of reaching one end, the will has freedom to elect from among them. Thus free will is an ability characterizing man in the voluntary activity of choosing or not choosing a limited good when this is presented to him. Such voluntary activity is also called free choice or free decision, from the Latin expression liberum arbitrium." 19 Descartes also erroneously assigns acts that belong to the faculty of the intellect, like that of judgments of affirmation and judgments of negation (or denial), to that of the will. In the Fourth Meditation, for example, he writes: "the will simply consists in our ability to do or not to do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid)…" 20 In his Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Principle 32, Descartes states that "desiring, holding in aversion, affirming, denying, doubting, all these are the different modes of willing." In his Notes Directed Against a Certain Programme, Descartes notes that "I referred the act of judging, which consists in nothing but assent, i.e., affirmation and negation, not to the perception of the understanding but to the

2022

Do man really have a free will? Since God is omnipotent where is the place of choice in human destiny, find out in this paper presentation.