imamate principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam” (Preamble). Islamists call for “the application of the Sharia” without the Westernizing interpretations of the modernists, but they manifest many characteristics of modern ideology, such as systematic thinking about society and a conscious desire to make fundamental changes, and so appeal to people who have been exposed to ideology. he irst Islamist movement was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (1906– 49). he second group was the Jama‘at-i Islami, founded in India in 1941 by Abu’l A‘la Mawdudi (1903–79), whose writings spread Islamist ideas worldwide. he Egyptian Brotherhood came to be a mass movement that sufered repression from 1954 to 1970. Out of this repression came the radical writings of Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), which have had wide inluence, particularly among the extremists of the following decades. Among other Islamist groups was the Islamic Liberation Party, founded in East Jerusalem in 1952 and still inluential among students worldwide to the present (2010). he “resurgence of Islam,” beginning about 1970, fueled by a perceived failure of secularism and a decrease in Western moral authority, included increased support for Islamism and the appearance of many Islamist groups. Islamists came to power by revolution in Iran (1979), with the distinctively Shi‘i doctrine of vilayat-i faqih (guardianship of the jurist), and by military coup in the Sudan (1989). Islamists along with others struggled against the Communists in Afghanistan and then were ousted by the Taliban, an extremely traditionalist group, in 1996 and these were removed by direct Western intervention in 2001. Elsewhere, secularist governments have resisted Islamist takeovers but have become more “Islamic” in the process. While groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama‘at-i Islami have sought to work within the existing system, often facing government pressure and restriction, many others have responded with violence. Among these are ofshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, such as the al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Particularly notorious are the “martyrdom operations” or “suicide attacks” mounted by al-Qaeda, by Hizbullah in Lebanon, by Hamas in Palestine, and by others (including some secularist groups), mainly against Western targets including Israel. An alternate direction, however, is suggested by the Justice and Development Party, which came to power in Turkey in 2002. Its background is Islamist, but it accepts the oicial secularism of Turkey while retaining some of its Islamic orientation. See also fundamentalism; liberalism; nationalism; Pan-Islamism; revival and reform; socialism; Westernization Further Reading Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, 2003; Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political hought, 1982; Preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/preamble.html; William E. Shepard, “he Diversity of Islamic hought: Towards a Typology,” in Islamic hought in the Twentieth Century, edited by Suha TajiFarouki and Basheer Nai, 2004; John Obert Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, 1994. W I L L I A M E . S H E PA R D imamate Although the word imamate may be used to denote leadership in prayer and prominence in a speciic branch of knowledge or profession, it was more widely used in juristic, theological, and exegetical literature and hadith (reports and sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) to describe a particular political, frequently religiopolitical, leadership and, in modern jargon, a government or state. he scholarly tradition across a wide Islamic spectrum referred to the imamate as supreme leadership (al-imāma al-‛uẓmā). At the core of the idea of the imamate lay the assumption that the Muslim community must have a legitimate leader who would be responsible for, as Ali b. Muhammad al-Mawardi noted, “upholding the faith and managing the afairs of the world,” including such duties as implementing laws, defending borders, leading the army, maintaining social peace, collecting and distributing revenues, and appointing administrators to undertake such responsibilities. Whether the imam also guides his subjects to salvation (as in the case of the Shi‘i imam) was a highly controversial question among various Muslim sects. Medieval Muslims discussed the imamate as the best form of leadership, although it is unclear if this meant the imamate was the only legitimate form of government. he views this entry addresses represent a consciously “religious” 77 imamate take on politics. his is particularly true compared to not only ideas expounded by Muslim philosophers, secretaries, and belles lettres but also dynastic laws derived from non-Islamic traditions that lourished under various Muslim dynasties as laws governing political domain. It is fair to state that the theory of the imamate owes its development in a substantial way to intellectual responses to the caliphate, especially the patriarchal caliphate; to competing sectarian positions on politics and other doctrinal questions; to the political views of secretaries and philosophers; and inally to the existing political customs and conventions in the Near East. A wealth of opinions about the imamate was put forth in the books of theology, jurisprudence, exegesis, and hadith. Opinions relect variations not only across different sects (Shi‘is, Sunnis, Kharijis, etc.) but also within a particular sect (e.g., Shi‘ism) for a range of doctrinal and historical reasons. The Emergence of the Debate on the Imamate Like the Roman Empire, the caliphate shaped how people thought about politics and statecraft. he caliphate emerged with the election of Abu Bakr (r. 632–34), a senior Companion of the Prophet Muhammad (ca. 570– 632), to lead the Muslim community after the Prophet’s death. Having been elected the irst caliph, Abu Bakr adopted the title “Successor of the Prophet of God.” His successor, ‘Umar (r. 634–44), is said to have used the title “Successor of the Successor of the Prophet of God,” but noticing how cumbersome this title would become in a few generations, he abbreviated the title to “caliph.” He also adopted the apparently more mundane-sounding title of “Commander of the Faithful.” he caliphs after ‘Umar followed the usage he preferred, but many did not shy away from adopting pompous new titles such as “God’s Caliph.” Although the irst three caliphs were elected by peaceful means, the period afterward was anything but peaceful. he assassination of the third caliph, ‘Uthman b. ‘Afan (r. 644–56), and the controversial reign of ‘Ali (r. 656–61) led to a civil war between the caliph and the governor of Damascus, the Umayyad Mu‘awiya, a member of the Meccan nobility and a junior Companion of the Prophet. his civil war ended with the assassination of the fourth caliph ‘Ali (by a disillusioned supporter) and the transfer of the caliphate to Mu‘awiya (r. 661– 80) and the Umayyad family (661–750). he civil war of 654–61 split the Muslim community into factions (Kharijis, ‘Uthmanis, and Shi‘at ‘Ali), which were the 78 irst to articulate views on the imamate. he supporters of ‘Ali (Shi‘at ‘Ali) repudiated ‘Uthman as illegitimate for having failed to uphold the laws and Mu‘awiya as a usurper for contesting ‘Ali. he supporters of ‘Uthman and Mu‘awiya repudiated ‘Ali as illegitimate and incompetent. he Kharijis, who initially supported ‘Ali against Mu‘awiya, rejected ‘Ali, Mu‘awiya, and ‘Uthman as illegitimate for various reasons. hey withdrew from the broader society to establish their own righteous community. Growing controversies over the legitimacy of the successive Umayyad caliphs led to another civil war between 684 and 692. he civil war ended with the elimination of the non-Umayyad contenders, particularly the powerful ‘Abdallah b. al-Zubayr, and shifted the caliphate from the Sufyanid to the Marwanid branch of the Umayyad family. Under the Umayyads, election gave way to succession, which became even more regular under the Abbasids (750–1258). Only a very few of the Abbasid caliphs had fathers who had not been caliphs. he procedure of ascending to the rule followed either some sort of election (e.g., under the irst four caliphs), designation by the ruling caliph (the most common practice under the Umayyads and Abbasids), or simple force. he caliph was nonetheless expected to have certain qualiications, including Qurashi descent, intelligence, physical ability, military prowess, and moral standing, although there was no constitutional or institutional oversight to verify their fulillment. Often, political expediency and circumstances on the ground dictated the appointment of a particular individual to the oice. here was no duration to the caliph’s rule. As long as he was able, he could rule for life. In the absence of constitutional law outlining his responsibilities and privileges clearly, cultural norms, customs, and religious law, along with the power of social and political forces, provided some guidance to and restrictions on his authority. he initial debates on the imamate came in the wake of the civil war and involved the identity; familial and social ailiation; qualiications (in particular, individual merit and seniority in Islam, prominence in a particular house, even age); and legitimacy of the caliph. he Umayyad period witnessed, alongside a more complex factional development, substantial doctrinal elaborations on the imamate, particularly on questions concerning the legitimacy and the nature of caliph’s authority. In the Umayyad period, competing groups debated such concepts as consultation versus succession and divine appointment versus communal choice. heological imamate arguments such as free will and predestination, nature and deinition of faith, and the status of the sinner also acquired substantial political implications. During the Abbasid period, sectarian views expanded and matured thanks to the proliferating paper industry and the articulate and socially engaged scholars. By the 13th century, all major sects and groups had produced substantial literature on the subject of the imamate in a scope far wider than the initial debates. Necessity of Imamate Scholars made a great deal of efort to show why and for which reason the imamate was necessary. Except for a small but articulate and intellectually rigorous group of scholars among the Mu‘tazilis and the Kharijis, the great majority of Muslim sects asserted that instituting an imam was necessary. According to those scholars, the imamate was neither rationally necessary nor religiously obligatory. hey reasoned that an ultimately perfect imamate was not possible. Even if it were possible it might not always be practical, and a less-thanperfect imamate might not be conducive to peaceful life. It was better for the community to have either multiple imams or no imam at all. hose who saw the imamate as necessary could not agree if it was necessary rationally by virtue of a human being’s need for social life, which requires political organization (this was the view of the Mu‘tazilis), or by virtue of God’s command. he Shi‘i theorists saw the imamate as both rationally necessary and a grace of God. hey argued that reason alone could arrive at its necessity since the welfare and salvation of human beings depended on it, but nevertheless its institution and maintenance was incumbent upon God and not human beings. God simply could not leave his creatures without guidance. By and large Sunni scholars argued for the necessity of the imamate from the perspective of divine command, but they saw it as a communal duty and denied the imam the privilege of being a guide to salvation. Many jurists and theologians also tried to explain the rational need for an imam and rationalize religious arguments. Appointing the Imam he Sunnis, Mu‘tazilis, and Kharijis emphasized election as the sole medium of appointing the imam. hey meant that the process of instituting the imam was a mundane and voluntary task that could be fulilled only by the community’s preference for one candidate or another. While the principle of election opposed the Shi‘i concept of divine appointment (that the imam should be singled out by the previous imam upon speciic and binding instructions from God), it also shaped how the nonShi‘is thought about the nature of the imam’s authority in relation to the Muslim community. he idea of election manifested itself in the actual practice of choosing the caliph. he views about election varied widely and could range from popular consensus to nomination by a single well-qualiied individual, as well as any number of practices in between: majority opinion and decision by a speciic group of qualiied electors, whose number luctuated depending on circumstances. As stipulated by Abu Hamid Muhammad Ghazali (d. 1111) in the age of the sultanates, election could also take the form of acknowledgement by the holders of coercive power (i.e., sultans). he imam could also be appointed by his predecessor or could win the seat for himself through a successful military coup. In all cases, however, the consent and approval of the community was sought, even if it was merely symbolic. he Sunnis made the point that the imamate was by election and that the community was the source of legitimacy; the imamate was neither a dynastic right nor a divine appointment. Furthermore, election required a mechanism to function. he idea of an “electoral body” arose as a palpable way to represent the will of the community at large. he Sunnis therefore needed to seek certain qualiications from the members of the electoral body, such as probity, knowledge, prudence, and wisdom. It was also accepted that qualiied individuals might be more available in the capital, although there was no requirement to reside in a particular region. Despite acknowledging the Umayyad and Abbasid dynastic succession practices as legitimate, the Sunnis made sure that, at least theoretically, elections remained a part of the succession process. For the Shi‘is divine appointment rather than election was the rule. Qualiication of the Imam Whether the imam must be the most excellent of his generation reveals a fascinating debate about the historical caliphate. By the 10th century, the Sunnis believed that the irst four caliphs were the most excellent of their generations and the order of their caliphate relected their order in merit. Part of this debate was, of course, about the legitimacy of the irst four caliphs, but another part was about elaborating an ideal model to be pursued by the historical caliphate. he Sunnis required that the caliph should be the most excellent in the true imamate, but they allowed the inferior or the less excellent to be 79 imamate appointed to oice under kingship. he Zaydis advocated the imamate of the most excellent from the family of the Prophet, while the Mu‘tazilis, though arguing for the appointment of the most excellent, allowed the imamate of a less-qualiied person for practical reasons (i.e., to prevent dissention). For the Imami (Twelver) Shi‘is, no one could tell who was the most excellent except the current imam, who alone was entitled to identify and designate his successor. he Shi‘is required family ailiation for the imam, the Imamis being more restrictive than the Zaydis. he Shi‘is restricted the imamate to the descendants of ‘Ali from the line of Husayn (Imamis) or to any meritorious and politically active member of the ‘Alid house (Zaydis). Generally the Sunnis required that the candidate belong to the tribe of Quraysh, although there were strong voices (Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Jama‘a) for opening the candidacy to individuals outside Quraysh, including non-Arabic speaking people. he majority of the Kharijis and the Mu‘tazilis did not see tribal and ethnic ailiation as a condition for the imamate. hey even rejected such an argument as unfair, biased, and entirely impractical. he Sunnis added some qualifying conditions to Qurashi lineage: like the members of the electoral body, the candidate should have probity and knowledge. He should have sound vision, hearing, and speech as well as physical itness. He should be prudent and courageous to undertake the task of governing and leading the military. Military juntas used some of these conditions as an excuse to depose the ruling caliphs in the late ninth and early tenth centuries: they blinded the caliph irst, then asked the chief judge to declare him unit for rule so that they could install another one of their liking. One of the fundamental diferences between Shi‘i and non-Shi‘i views on qualiications was the presence and absence of the imam. he Sunnis (as well as the Kharijis and the Mu‘tazilis) required that the imam must be alive, present, in charge of afairs, and reachable, while the Shi‘is allowed him to be absent and not ruling a state. In fact, only one of the Twelver Shi‘i imams ruled (‘Ali). Religious Authority versus Temporal Authority One of the fundamental questions about the imamate in political thought was whether the imam’s authority extended over both religious and temporal matters. In general, Sunni, Khariji, and Mu‘tazili views did not allow the imam any authority over doctrinal matters, while most of the Shi‘is (except for the Zaydis) attributed religious authority (not only as a law giver but also 80 as a guide to salvation) to the imam regardless of whether he held an actual political oice. Many modern scholars have argued that the caliphs inherited only Muhammad’s temporal authority, as prophecy ended with Muhammad while religious authority rested within the corporeal body of the community. he question of who would legitimately represent and articulate this authority led to a two-century-long competition between the caliphs (who adopted for themselves titles suggesting this prerogative, such as “God’s Caliph”) and scholars specializing in jurisprudence and hadith (‘ulama’). Other arguments suggest that the caliphate was instituted from the beginning for leadership not only in temporal governance but also in matters of salvation: the caliph was both king and priest, so to speak, following the prophetic model exercised by Muhammad. It was only with the rise of the ‘ulama’ that the caliph’s authority became a subject of contestation. In the ninth century, the caliphs had to recognize the power of the ‘ulama’ and relinquish their claims on religious authority. True Imamate versus Kingship Regardless of sectarian ailiation, medieval thinkers generally made a distinction between the true imamate and kingship. For the majority of the Imami Shi‘is, the true imamate existed only during the reign of ‘Ali. For the Zaydis, both the Umayyads and the Abbasids were certainly kings and, although legitimate, the irst three caliphs after Muhammad were of lesser merit than ‘Ali, the true imam. he true imamate afterward existed only in isolated regions where Zaydi imams ruled. he Kharijis rejected all the caliphs after ‘Umar as illegitimate tyrants. For the Sunnis, the true imamate was the period of the irst four caliphs, followed by kingship. hey did not, however, mean by this that kingship was unlawful and that the Umayyads and Abbasids were illegitimate. On the one hand, the Sunni theorists wanted to make clear that the true imamate was possible and in fact existed under the irst four caliphs, although it could not continue in perpetuity. On the other hand, the Umayyads and Abbasids were legitimate, though not ideal, caliphs since they complied with the minimum requirements of the law, keeping the Muslim community united, the transactions lawful, and the borders safe. Many of the Sunnis reasoned that, for the common good, working with the system was better than going against it. In medieval jargon, two fundamental concepts explained the Sunni attitude of acknowledging international relations the legitimacy of the caliphate without fully endorsing it theoretically: welfare or utility and necessity. One or Multiple Imams Medieval scholars have generally argued for one imam at a time, except for some Mu‘tazilis and anarchists, who allowed and even advocated the appointment of more than one imam. he singularity of the imam was true also for the majority of Sunni theologians and jurists, although after the demise of the Abbasid caliphate, this argument was no longer sustainable. Even before that, the community was ruled by three competing imamates despite theoretical rejection of multiple imams: the Abbasid caliphate, the Fatimid caliphate in North Africa and Egypt, and the Spanish Umayyad caliphate in Spain. he Sunni ‘Abd al-Qahir Baghdadi (d. 1037) was one such theologian who read the situation pragmatically and accommodated the practice as legitimate. He stipulated that it was possible to have more than one imam if the imams ruled over regions separated from each other by a signiicant barrier, such as a large body of water. he Shi‘is also argued for the singularity of the imam, although they allowed the imam to be hidden. hey also argued for the possibility of the existence of two imams at a time—one silent and another articulate. one should not obey anyone in matters against God’s ordinances. hey did emphasize the right to remove the caliph from oice for reasons of apostasy, loss of freedom or sanity, and even consistent acts of injustice. Yet they did not elaborate on how the caliph would be removed from oice, nor did they propose any institutional framework to assure peaceful removal. For the Kharijis and the Mu‘tazilis, violation of the law by the caliph was a valid reason for removal by either peaceful means or force. hey did not share the same sentiments with the Sunnis that one should endure injustice, oppression, and violation of the law for the sake of community’s welfare. Such actions were crimes signiicant enough to disturb the order itself. See also caliph, caliphate; leadership; Shi‘ism Further Reading Anthony Black, he History of Islamic Political hought: From the Prophet to the Present, 2001; Patricia Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam, 2004; Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political heory: he Jurists, 1981; Ali b. Muhammad al-Mawardi, he Ordinances of Government: A Translation of al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya wa al-Wilayat al-Diniyya, translated by Wafaa H. Wahba, 1996; W. M. Watt, Islamic Political hought, 1998. Duties of the Imam Generally the Sunnis, the Mu‘tazilis, and the Kharijis restricted the duties of the imam to the administration of mundane matters and to the promotion and protection of the faith. His duties comprised the guardianship of the faith, enforcing the laws, leading public acts of worship, protecting the community from outside and inside threats, dispensing legal criminal punishments, maintaining and leading the army in military activities, collecting revenues and distributing them to their appropriate places, building and maintaining public amenities and spaces, and appointing and overseeing lesser administrators. Sunni scholars guarded religious authority from the encroachment of the caliph, but they bestowed holiness on the caliph and advocated obedience to his authority as long as he did not confront the fundamental tenets of the faith. Another reason they advocated obedience was for the unity and welfare of the community. hey feared that any dissention and violence would disturb order, prevent the application of law, lead to the demise of religion, and the loss of this world as well as the next. Yet the Sunnis were far from a paciist crowd, as exempliied in a widespread norm that H AY R E T T I N Y Ü C E S O Y international relations Islamic views on the nature of relations between political communities have varied considerably throughout history. Well before the rise of the modern system of nationstates at the core of contemporary international relations, Muslim political thinkers engaged in debates on matters of sovereignty, diplomacy, war, and peace. Central to these discussions was a tension between the theoretical precept of the umma (world community of believers) as a universal polity under divine law (sharī‘a) and the considerable territorial pluralism that has constituted the historical reality of Muslim societies. Another focal point in these debates was an apparent conlict between classical doctrines that seem to urge the expansion of Islam— by war, if necessary—into non-Muslim lands and other Islamic teachings that stress the permissibility, even the 81