Sophia, 1981

1) Religious and perceptual belief.

New Blackfriars, 1983

The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 1980

Philosophical Perspectives, 2021

European Journal of Philosophy, 1996

Page 1. Solipsism and Self-Reference Lucy F. O'Brien I. Introduction In this paper I want to propose that we see solipsism as arising from certain problems we have about identifying ourselves as subjects in an objective world. ...

Theoria: Historical Aspects of Music Theory

A persistent problematic for Milton Babbitt (1916–2011) and his students—whom I shall call the Princeton Theorists—has been that of solipsism. While commentators such as Brown and Dempster (1989), Korsyn (2003), Subotnik (2004), and Wright (2005) have noted this, they have done so without fully considering historical context. Under-discussed has been the notion that the problematic of Princeton Theory’s solipsism rests upon philosophical antecedents and is cognitive as well as phenomenological: if music takes place solely within the subject’s mind, then that subject does not know if other musical minds exist. This article historicizes this problematic alongside its philosophical precursors. I do so by discussing Princeton Theory’s efforts to communicate musical experiences despite the apparent isolation of the composer-theorist. I discuss the problematic of solipsism in the writings of the logical positivists who influenced Babbitt, including the early Wittgenstein and Carnap. I demonstrate the influence of Carnap and Goodman on writings by the Princeton Theorists Godfrey Winham, Benjamin Boretz, and John Rahn, specifically as regards the philosophical position of phenomenalism, which begins theoretical systems from the foundation of the listener’s “elementary experiences.” I trace a phenomenological solipsism from Descartes to Husserl and situate the recent Boretz against this history. I show how Boretz’s later radical relativism entails solipsism. I discuss a subtype of solipsism, the “solipsism of the present moment,” which temporalizes solipsism, as it appears in Russell, Wittgenstein, and the recent Boretz. I discuss a Babbitt quotation accusing Marion Guck of sliding close to a “private language,” which is the language the solipsist speaks. Lastly, I question whether solipsism can support an ethics. This study, then, shines light on the philosophical traditions upon which Princeton Theory’s solipsistic problematic rests, argues that we can articulate these as a rationale for Princeton Theory’s solipsism, and that further discussions of Princeton Theory’s solipsism should begin from a foundation grounded in the problematic the authors were addressing: how the solipsistic theorist can communicate with others, if they exist.

2017

It seems that the previous title doesn't appear too attractive to the readers. The problem is that some "philosophers" absolutely deny the role of the material brain in the process of emergence of mind!

Aristotle's Ethics Eudemia (EE) and Ethica Nicomachea (EN), as is well known, contain three books in common (EE 4-6 = EN 5-7). The text of these books as found in EE mss. however is little known.(1) Happily a collation of them in several mss. was published by Walter Ashburner early in the 1900s.(2) These collations are the more valuable because taken from (among others) the one ms. that in the learned stemma of Dieter Harlfinger(3) appears as the archetype for all the rest. The following translation of these Common Books is of the text as reported by Ashburner with footnotes drawing attention to differences between the EN and EE versions. Many of these differences are of little consequence; others are not. A discussion of some of the more significant ones can be found in my article: "Aristotle's EE: the Text and Character of the Common Books as found in EE mss." Classical Quarterly, 2019, volume 69, pp. 1-15. The translation of Book Four begins on page 2; of Book Five on p.25, and of Book Six on p.41. Note that the headings, subheadings, and summaries are additions by the translator meant to aid the reader. They are not part of the Greek or the translation proper.