Published as: KaczmarekJ., [2003], Positive and Negative Properties. A Logical Interpretation, [in:] Bulletin of the Section of Logic, vol. 32, No 4, pp. 179 - 189 In the paper we construct a simple sentential logic (L BK) based on the ontology presented in [3]. L BK has internal and external strata, which yield a double characterization of the connectives. This leads to the correspondence of L BK to Bochvar's and Kleene's logics. The connectives of the internal level correspond to the connectives of Bochvar's internal logic and of Kleene's weak logic, while the connectives of the external level correspond to those of Bochvar's external logic and of Kleene's strong logic. The ontological interpretation shows that the former represent the so-called connectives " de re " , the latter the connectives " de dicto ". 1. Inspirations We present a particular problem concerning properties of individuals. Given some representation of statements about individuals by the language of many – valued logic we show simple relations that connect objects and their properties. The problem is a piece of more general topic of formal representation of three categories of objects: universals (that are treated as incomplete objects), individuals (complete objects) and concepts (that are treated by philosophers as incomplete objects; we do not investigate them here). For our analysis we distinguished two types of objects: complete and incomplete. Complete objects can be identified with individuals (like Socrates, Tarski) and incomplete objects with universals (man, horse). The division and terminology are attributed to Meinong [6]. According to him we can also distinguish properties such as redness and compliment properties such as non-redness. So, if redness belongs to an object, then redness is its positive property. Hence, non-redness is its negative one. In accordance with classic ontological approach (Aristotle, medieval philosophers, Wolff) the individuals we talk about are described by these properties. Philosophers point out that one can distinguish three kinds of properties in objects: essential, attributive and accidental properties. Rational is an essential property of the man Socrates, being able to smile is his attribute and being dark-haired is his accidental property. Taking into account the division of properties into positive and negative we propose to say that rational is a positive and essential property of an individual. Non-rational would be an essential and negative property of that individual. Next, if all animals are non-rational then non-rational is positive and (perhaps) essential property of the individual horse. Similarly, in the case of Socrates being a lowyer is his negative and accidental property. For Meinong and Łukasiewicz any property P is a positive or negative property of an object a. In this paper we propose to limit this thesis by showing it appears evident that the properties odd or even can not be referred to a man. It means that the sentences: (1) Socrates is even, (2) Socrates is not even (is odd)

Taylor and Francis

Abstract The ‘net-positive’ concept could serve as both a new direction and aspiration for evolving sustainable design beyond minimizing human damage toward human habitation that is a source of life. This commentary posits that realizing that potential depends on how practitioners define positive. Describing net-positive as “buildings that 'add value' to ecological systems and generate more than they need to fulfill their own needs” moves net-positive beyond simply a technical challenge of creating surpluses to one that requires confronting the widely different interpretations of value and value-adding held within the sustainability movement. ‘Green’ building, like the building industry, generally defines and measures a building’s value in terms of human benefit. Ecological sustainability defines value in terms of benefits to the systemic capability to generate, sustain and evolve the life of a particular place. Reconciling these different definitions could transform how society conceives of and designs the built environment. Building professionals seeking to translate net-positive into practice could play a leading role in that transformation. Practice will need to embrace ecological thinking to create design, construction and ongoing management processes that stimulate dialogue about what it means for humans to play a value-adding role in the ecological systems where they are constituents.

2001

Contrary to the received view, decision theory is not primarily devoted to instrumental (ends-to-means) reasoning. Instead, its major preoccupation is the derivation of ends from other ends. Given preferences over basic alternatives, it constructs preferences over alternatives that have been modified through the addition of value object modifiers (modes) that specify probability, uncertainty, distance in time etc. A typology of the decision-theoretical modes is offered. The modes do not have (even extrinsic) value, but they transform the value of objects to which they are applied. A rational agent's total set of preferences should be coherent, but from this it does not follow that her preferences over mode-containing objects have to be derivable from her preferences over mode-free objects.

Journal of the Learning Sciences, 1994

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1989

The following propositions seem both plausible in their own right and apparently inconsistent: (1) Moral judgements like 'It is right that I V' ('valuations' for short) express beliefs; in this case, a belief about the rightness of my D-ing. (2) There is some sort of a necessary connection between being in the state thejudgement 'It is right that I ' expresses and having a motivating reason, not necessarily overriding, to (D. (3) Motivating reasons are constituted, inter alia, by desires. The apparent inconsistency can be brought out as follows. From (1), the state expressed by a valuation is a belief, which, from (2), is necessarily connected in some way with having a motivating reason; that is, from (3), with having a desire. So (1), (2) and (3) together entail that there is some sort of necessary connection between distinct existences: a certain kind of belief and a certain kind of desire. But there is no such connection. Believing some state of the world obtains is one thing, what I desire to do in the light of that belief is quite another. Therefore we have to reject at least one of (1), (2) or (3). Call this the 'moral problem', and call those who respond 'revisionists' and 'reconciliationists'.1 Revisionists accept the inconsistency, and so seek to explain away the apparent plausibility of at least one of (1), (2) and (3). Thus, for example, emotivists, prescriptivists and projectivists * The three papers that comprise this symposium come out of very extensive discussion between the three symposiasts-so extensive that sometimes we can no longer tell which ideas began with whom. But as will be plain, we have not ended in full agreement. Besides our indebtedness to one another, we are indebted also to

New Ideas in Psychology, 2016

There is a long tradition in both philosophy and psychology that views consciousness as the sine qua non of value. The author draws upon axiological theory to explore how consciousness is related to value and argues that because of this relationship, psychology is, to a large extent, an inquiry into values. The author articulates 14 modes of our conscious life and shows how these modes provide the basis for a cartography of values. In taking our conscious life as its subject matter psychology inevitably both studies values and enters into normative, axiological judgments. However, while psychology studies values, meanings, and their interactions, and makes normative judgments regarding the actualization of values in individuals, psychology can no more dictate the hierarchy or arrangement of values and meanings than chemistry can dictate how elements should be compounded.

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2003

Essential to certain familiar and attractive ways of thinking about value is a distinction between an agent's recognition of a value and her reaction to it. This distinction has recently been rejected by James Griffin, who claims that recognition and reaction cannot be so separated, at least when it comes to prudential values. Griffin's main argument for this radical thesis appeals to the case of the disvalue of pain, where he claims that the reactive element is a constituent of our recognition. As we shall see, however, Griffin's argument fails and there is still good reason to preserve the useful distinction between recognizing and reacting to value.

P. Bouissac (ed.), Encyclopedia of Semiotics New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 624-627., 1998

Perspectives from Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology, 2015

Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be combined with sentimentalism, and we suggest that a plausible account, which we call 'sentimental realism', and according to which evaluative judgements are closely related to emotions, can be developped. Forthcoming in Tobias Brosch, David Sander et al., (dir.), The Handbook of Value: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Forthcoming in Tobias Brosch, David Sander et al., (dir.), The Handbook of Value: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

bisa dilanggar. • Perkembangan (Barat): -Magna Charta Libertatum (1215 di Inggris)  melawan kekuasan mutlak raja, melarang penahanan, penghukuman, dan perampasan benda secara sewenang-wenang. -Habeas Corpus (1679)  dokumen peradaban hukum, orang yang ditahan harus dihadapkan dalam waktu 3 hari kepada seorang hakim dan diberitahu atas tuduhan apa ia ditahan. -Bill of Rights (1689)  hak hak parlemen di Inggris -Déclaration des droits des hommes et de citoyen  pernyataan hak-hak asasi manusia dan warga negara dari Revolusi Perancis 1789 mengenalkan prinsip liberte, egalite, fraterniti.