Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
…
4 pages
1 file
AI-generated Abstract
This paper investigates the concept of pure reflection and diagonalization through the lens of phenomenological philosophy. It critiques certain philosophies, notably empirico-criticism and psychologism, highlighting Husserl's assertion regarding consciousness and its relationship with the external world. The text explores different kinds of reflection and their implications for understanding intentional states and presents an analogy between the physical and mental realms, challenging the notion of psychophysical laws.
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2020
As a phenomenological concept, absorption refers to the ego's capacity to experience the world from a displaced standpoint. The paper traces the emergence and development of this concept in Husserl's and Fink's writings and demonstrates that while Fink conceived of absorption as a class of intuitive representations , Husserl transformed it into a limit phenomenon, whose analysis calls for a new method. A careful study of absorption compels us to rethink fundamental themes in phenomenology: it forces us to broaden our understanding of sensuous intuition, reconceptualize the nature of self-awareness, stretch the limits of intuitive representations , and rethink the portrayal of phenomenology as a metaphysics of presence. The paper demonstrates that absorbed experiences are characterized by a specific form of self-awareness, that they constitute a distinct type of intuitive representations , that a new method is needed to investigate them, and that their analysis leads towards a phenomenology of the unconscious.
Philosophy Today, 1999
2016
The philosophical investigation of consciousness has a long-standing history in both Indian and Western thought. The conceptual models and analyses that have emerged in one cultural framework may be profitably reviewed in the light of another. In this context, a study of the notion of consciousness in the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is not only important as a focus on a remarkable achievement in the context of Western thought, but is also useful for an appreciation of the concern with this question in the Indian philosophical tradition, and especially in the tradition of Advaita Vedānta of Ādi Śamkara. The starting point for this paper is the belief that phenomenology has a recognizably common face for both these traditions. This paper investigates the possibility of a parallel notion of consciousness in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the Advaita Vedānta of Śamkara, with particular emphasis on Husserl’s ‘Transcendental I ’ and Śamkara’s ‘Witness C...
Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for phenomenological considerations. Often however the term 'phenomenology' is being used simply as a synonym for 'folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, we criticize Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory as well as Strawson's recent contribution in this journal, and argue that a phenomenological analysis of the nature of self-awareness can provide us with a more sophisticated and accurate model for understanding both phenomenal consciousness and the notion of self.
This dissertation explores and argues for the import of the imagination (Phantasie) in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry. It contends that Husserl's extensive analyses of the imagination influenced how he came to conceive the phenomenological method throughout the main stages of his philosophical career. The work clarifies Husserl's complex method of investigation by considering the role of the imagination in his main methodological apparatuses: the phenomenological, eidetic, and transcendental reductions, and eidetic variation - all of which remained ambiguous despite his extensive programmatic discussions. The work illuminates and clarifies aspects of the Husserlian phenomenological method never before explored. In order to clarify Husserl's eidetic method of inquiry, I propose a new way of thinking about the imagination - as direct intuitive presentation (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung) and as horizonal-nexic level of consciousness exhibiting the neutrality, freedom, and possibility as its essential features. Following Husserl's studies of the imagination, I propose a three-level model of consciousness (realizing, imagining, and eidetic) and explore the dynamic flexibility of each level (as horizon within which acts such as judgments or memories can unfold). This model of consciousness allows for a rethinking of the sources and conditions for the possibility of eidetic phenomenological inquiry - topics Husserl was mostly silent about. Through a rethinking of the model of consciousness, I propose a tight and substantial relationship between the natural (everyday) and artificial (methodological, theoretical) attitudes. I argue that the structure and systems of possibilities pertaining to the artificial attitude - i.e., our actual as well as possible methodological tools - are structurally and well as informationally bound to the structure and system of possibilities pertaining to the natural attitude. In order to explore the nature of the relationship between these two attitudes I argue that we must take a closer look at the structure and abilities of imagining consciousness - the sole nexic-horizonal level that can function both naturally and artificially. This insight regarding the nature of consciousness clarifies Husserl's transcendental idealism in its intimate connection to the everyday. Understanding Husserl's philosophical stance is thus purged of all possibility of mistakenly labeling it as entailing immanent detachment, solipsism, or Platonic idealism.
Human Studies, 2024
Although Husserl's analyses of the unconscious are scattered throughout various writings, many of which have been published in Hua III/2, Hua VI, Hua X, Hua XI, Hua XV, Hua XVII, Hua XXXIX and Experience and Judgment, nowhere else has he addressed the unconscious in such fascinating detail as in the manuscripts collected in Hua XLII. The publication of this volume has made it patently clear that the unconscious has many meanings in Husserl. A clarification of the different ways in which Husserl has spoken of the unconscious is still missing in the literature and it is much needed. With the aim of developing a taxonomy of the unconscious in Husserl, here I trace the different meanings Husserl has given to this concept and I argue that in his phenomenology, the unconscious can be understood at least in seven ways: as the horizonal unconscious, the time-constituting unconscious, the sedimented unconscious, the repressed unconscious, the absorbed unconscious, the dormant unconscious, and the instinctual unconscious. Besides articulating the essential features of each determination, I also clarify what they all share. With the aim of showing what is distinctive of Husserl's approach to the unconscious, I offer some reflections on what differentiates Husserl's phenomenology of the unconscious vis-à-vis Freud's psychoanalysis. In general, I maintain that while it is a limit problem in phenomenology, the unconscious should also be considered a central phenomenological theme, for as Husserl's reflections show, without offering a phenomenology of the unconscious, phenomenology can only operate with a preliminary and insufficient conception of consciousness.
Edmund Husserl's "Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology" serves as a pivotal work in the development of phenomenological philosophy, offering a profound and systematic exploration of the structures of consciousness and the foundational principles of phenomenology. This essay delves into Husserl's articulation of the phenomenological method, and the intricate process of phenomenological reduction, all framed within the context of his engagement with the determination of the nature and structure of the human conscious experience. This essay aims to illuminate Husserl's aim to move beyond the everyday, unreflective natural attitude to explore how experiences and meanings are constituted in consciousness. By doing this, Husserl seeks to clarify how we can achieve objective knowledge and shared understanding in a common lifeworld, ultimately providing a deeper, transcendental understanding of the conditions that make all experience and knowledge possible.
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 2002
A clarification of Husserl's changing conceptions of imaginary consciousness ("phantasy") and memory, especially at the level of auto-affective time-consciousness, suggests an interpretation of Freud's concept of the Unconscious. Phenomenology of consciousness can show how it is possible that consciousness can bring to present appearance something unconscious, that is, something foreign or absent to consciousness, without incorporating it into or subordinating it to the conscious present. This phenomenological analysis of Freud's concept of the Unconscious leads to a partial critique of Freud's metapsychological determination of the Unconscious as a simple, internally unperceived representational consciousness. It also suggests an account of how a reproductive inner consciousness can free the subject from the experience of anxiety by allowing for possibilities of self-distanciation and symbolic self-representation that protect the subject from traumatic affection by and through its own instinctual drives.
STAR: Science & Technology of Archaeological Research, 2019
Optics and Lasers in Engineering, 2017
ANNALS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CRAIOVA, Biology, Horticulture, Food products processing technology, Environmental engineering
Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 2006
Nano Energy, 2021
Przegląd Organizacji
Zeszyty Teoretyczne Rachunkowości, 2016
Revista chilena de nutrición, 2010
Informador Técnico, 2017
Journal of Hymenoptera Research, 2009