Important 21st Century Works of Formal Epistemology Premier Writings on Epistemology Sensation can be rationalized, just as many other things can also be done with it. Sensation and rationality are not all-inclusive aspects, but rather mostly (physically) hollow concepts which rely on other contingent ideas for their existence. The feeling of an object of sensation such as a piece of fuzz can be smaller in its impression than it's ultimate idea, not just of fuzziness, but of the concepts of interpretation that might apply to rationalizing or sensualizing the object, or applying some other contingent idea. Thus, however irrational, an event once recognized can establish a theory without referring to actual existence of anything but contingent ideas. And, since sensation and rationality may not be perfect, there is no reason to assume that the contingencies are, in fact, ideal qua perfection. Now, by rationality particular behaviors are adopted which may not be universal (e.g. sensing fuzziness), but they create a causal contingency (such as sensation or rationality), which is a sort of vector of interpretation relative to concept, that is, relative to limited observations, rationality, sensation, or other concepts. Thus, in this way the objects of sensation also take a particular form, which is to say they are rational if they are rational, and they are sensational if they are sensational. Nonetheless, reason and sensation remain physically hollow concepts which rely on ideal contingency, and no individual idea or category implies universality by itself except through the adoption of a contingent idea, whether of sensation or reason or some other concept, or more likely many concepts. [The principle is that synthesis occurs through many concepts, and so the definition or contingent idea (which is also the total limit) only occurs through the universal, or through some limitation placed upon the total number of ideas.] Whatever concepts are taken to be primary, some further thing will be a variation of this, only taken to a greater extreme. For example, materialism will lead to abstraction, and categories will lead to systems. The exception to this seems to be when the vector of interpretation is concerned with the universal or takes the ultimate extension of rationality as it's aim, by assuming extremity comes first. Thus, the background of un-formatted reason is either an unmet potential, or an absence of universal or contingent ideas. How Do We Know? Why isn't everything we know wrong? Because there might be something wrong with not knowing. For example, depression. Knowledge can be favored for practical reasons. Does this mean scream at your kid or start a revolution? Probably not! Of what does knowledge consist? Knowledge clearly has a component of meaning, since what we mean by knowledge is not meaningless knowledge. After all, if knowledge were meaningless we would have the same problem we had without knowledge. We should at least know that knowledge involves practical meaning. For example, not screaming at your child or starting a revolution, as these things cause problems. What is the limit of knowledge? Knowledge, it must be said, is a concern for good things insofar as it is a practice of meaning to be concerned with that which has merit in itself. Likewise, knowledge must in a similar sense not be concerned with bad things, insofar as those things must be meaningless to the good, or impractical to sustain. Although knowledge is concerned with the good, that is, meaning and its practice, there is nothing which makes meaning inherently expensive or that should make us assume that when it is meaningful it must be impractical. Thus, if madness is good it may be practical, if it truly is good, and one way for it to be good is if it is meaningful, and another is if it is practical. But nor should we assume that all is madness, or all is practicality, for there may be many kinds of meaning which are good, and which are not yet practical or mad. However, the principle of madness suggests that if it were truly good, it would also have meaning, and so the ultimate determination of meaning is on the basis of whether it is good. And, as I said, what I mean by good is if it is good in every way. And what is meant by good in every way is if it is meaningful to the point of being practical. And, in this way, the practical consists of an elevation of the good, that is, meaning. What is meaning? Meaning is that thing and anything which has a meaningful quality, and what is meant by this is something which signifies, not like the insane dolt that lifts a decapitated head, but rather more like the man who finds life to be full of a rich literature. In fact, we can trace the path of higher meaning beyond mere words, and into the subjects like philosophy and art that are most pleasurable to those who do not risk meaninglessness, such as those who do not declare life to be meaningless. (And these are the people who will not be depressed, and so they are relatively deathless). Meaning then, is at least a lack of meaninglessness. And more than that, it is the elevation of practicality into those arts and literatures (or further concepts, modes, existences, etc) which suit themselves to the person who does not find life meaningless. As such, the concepts are good, and so they have meaning, and so they are an elevation of practicality. And where what is good must have meaning, so too what is meaningful must be the only elevation of practicality. What is the ultimate? The ultimate is any exceptional thing, which has its own meaning, good or bad, and as such can be judged ultimately practical or impractical. It may be good and meaningful to have a home, just as it is good and meaningful to read a favorite book. Excitement is not the only reason to consider something as ultimate. Many ultimate things are in fact the boring things we ought to take for granted (because they have practical meaning). Now, what is truly or extremely ultimate is just something we choose to consider highly exceptional, and this choice should maximize practical meaning. There are techniques for doing this. For example, finding significance. Or strategizing for happy events. Many of these things, since they aim at the extreme, involve a kind of madness (exaggeration) or higher meaning (intelligence) bringing about the strategy or significance. So, for example, there might be a practical and also an exaggerated view of an object, which puts it somewhere in the space of finding significance. In this manner, one may be connected to the idea of the sometimes extremely useful practical meaning of each object. On the exaggeration of significance It may be important to remember the importance of exaggeration in finding the meaning of objects. If something could be bad when it is exaggerated, it clearly does not have practical meaning, and so, it must be unrelated to the good, and so, it must be somewhat unethical to consider it. And when it is unethical to consider it, it is unlikely to involve itself in any kind of good life. And so, there is a sense of ethical virtues related to the exaggeration of practical meaning. The ethical person is one who can exaggerate his every sensation and still find meaning. This means that everything is subject to critique, and it also means that if he is to be virtuous there will be no forgiveness, nor will there be any punishment other than meaninglessness. And so, we see it that the difference between the good life and the bad life is that the good life has significance, and the bad life is merely superficial, because the bad life is full of the meaningless things. In this way, we cannot take the bad life seriously, because there is no way that it is doing anything other than sharing in the misery of other bad lives. For if a victim of injustice were living a meaningful life, then there is nothing wrong with the thing that happens to him, and so the good life follows simply from the capacity for meaning, and the acceptance of universal exaggeration. When one is honest, or even willing to exaggerate how bad things are, then this awareness prevents bad things from happening. It is similar to the awareness about bad things opposing significance. When there is a desire to exaggerate the good things, the result will be perception of practicality and overwhelming meaning, which will together create practical meaning. Thus, exaggeration is part of the good life. Definitional Knowledge Taking as an example “nominality, objects qua sense” a general approach to definitions may be found. The primary word(s) of the definition (such as ‘nominality’) are what is being talked about or explained. They presuppose knowledge of some kind, such as (symbolism: ‘the = 1’, association: x network partially equals y network formerly 'x is the thing to do’, intelligence: x and y have certain qualifications x and y, and understanding ignorance: if one doesn't understand at all one should claim ignorance and choose something simpler and more familiar). Given knowledge of this kind it ought to be possible to understand the words being defined. And, understanding the words being defined, one has a platform for interpreting how the words are being used in the remainder of the sentence. For example, we know ‘nom’ symbolizes names like words spoken and written, and that 'ality’ symbolizes a quality. So we know that 'nominality’ means 'a quality of words’. Now we can determine that the most understandable interpretation of 'objects qua sense’ is that 'objects’ refers to 'names’ and 'sense’ refers to 'quality’. If we know qua means 'of or about or in the sense of’ we now know to translate the whole sentence in the following form: “Nominality: A quality of words, words / objects of or about or in the sense of senses / qualities” or even just “names: about sensing”. The Nature of Meaning A. The first property of meaning is sensation, impression, interpretation, or synthesis, all of which require an intellectual experience and often a lack of discomfort. The second property of meaning is a state, quality, dynamic, or symbolism that makes meaning possible. A meaningful experience is not just sensation, impression, interpretation, or synthesis, but some specific state, quality, dynamic, or symbolism that has a particular fascination, pleasure, curiosity, or charm. The third property of meaning is the context, existence, pursuit, or impetus which makes the fascination, pleasure, curiosity, or charm substantial enough to take part in the intellectual experience that is not uncomfortable. The context, existence, pursuit, or impetus may be involved with languages (logic), systems (elaborate structures and organizations), guarantees (physical laws), and ideas (intellectually justified events and information) which motivate and permit substantiality. The fourth property of meaning is it's activity, usefulness, value, and consequence for sensations, impressions, interpretations, and syntheses. For example, meaning may affect the manner in which substance (infinity), improbability (commonness), uniqueness (universalism), and perfection (qualification or evolution) are activated, effective, valued, and consequential. B. Twelve Forms of Encounters with Meaning: 1. An insignificant encounter with a significant substance. 2. A significant encounter of any kind. 3. A significant encounter with an insignificant thing. 4. Realizing the insignificance of insignificance. 5. Being a significant substance. 6. An encounter with greater significance. 7. A symbolic encounter. 8. Significant thought. 9. Meaningful purpose. 10. Immortal souls. 11. Powerful attributes. 12. Meaningful metaphysics. Coppedge, Nathan 2017/09/28, p.