“THE DOCUMENTARY” OF PERPETUAL MOTION ABSTRACT: Originally a script for a video on physics and perpetual motion, I have decided to use this in article format instead. It is my accustomed medium, anyhow. What is evinced is essentially a rhetorical view of perpetual motion, beginning with the ‘outer corners’ of the argument, and proceeding (eventually) towards the core proofs of the theory. This is a work-in-progress. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This is Nathan Coppedge’s overview of the topic of physics and perpetual motion, the state of the art lecture by someone who has been called a scientist against his will. It was actually a good thing. First, the state of science is about confirmation. Evidence is compiled based upon trial-and-error, or, as I suspect, a religious commitment to mathematics or prior belief called conservatism. People, scientists have become obstructed with the meaning of their work, its supposed sophistication, and the fact is, in the physical sciences, physical models often jump ahead of the coherency of theories. There’s a video where creationists are lampooned as always arguing for complexity, complexity, complexity. Well, this isn’t a religious debate, but science is doing the same thing with its devotion to mathematical models. The debate is more apparent in social science, but anyway… When it comes to perpetual motion, you have to see the negative space. It’s one thing to say the Newtonian model is correct, and another altogether to defend thermodynamics of any type. In my view, the statement that the heat energy in the universe is dissipating is a fundamentally philosophical one. In the first place, even if overall energy dissipated, this wouldn’t prove that energy couldn’t be created in exceptional cases. (If it’s not logic, what is it?). And secondly, if energy decreases before, this does not mean it always must occur that way, according to David Hume. This is compounded by a lack of truly definite data about the past, at least in an idealistic sense, since the past is only known from the present. I will abbreviate the theory I’ve introduced so far: science doesn’t know for sure about exceptional things, because the only thing that could prove anything is confirming evidence. Scientists seem to work within a mathematical model, that does not test the best evidence for theories which run against assumptions like thermodynamics. I see it as proven at this point that all that would be necessary is a new theory which had not been tested, which happened to be viable. In other words, science is offering no hard proof against the most obscure theories. The case of a scientist defending the view that simple physics is understood completely in light of every complex theory is not necessarily tenable, in the same way that it is possible---or instead, likely---that new theories of physics will emerge. Let me question some of the assumptions. Recently, it has been a habit of many people to use the terms ‘millions of years’, ‘billions of years’, ‘oodles of time’ to refer to short and sometimes unproductive periods of time. Thus, hypothetically, if a lot of time is useless, there is no necessity that something effective occurred, in the scope of things. Added to this, not as much time has passed as people tend to think. Two thousand years may seem like a long time, but the same time expressed as 400 times five years often does not seem so extreme. And some would not believe that the square root of 2000 is approximately 45, not 500 or 1000 as some people think. Thus, 45 year shas only happened 45 times in the last 2000 years. It is still further to calculate that during part of that time, specialized materials, not to mention concepts of construction, did not exist to any degree whatsoever. At least according to science. Some of the time that passed may have been unproductive, or moreover, productive for things other than perpetual motion. Now, our assessment lead to two conclusions: (1) That perpetual motion must be grasped in its own terms, and (2) That the context of perpetual motion may be recent. Now let us consider some scenarios. Consider that a car runs by a process not dissimilar to burning firewood: the difference is availability and function---that is not a higher-dimensional construct, when it is viewed functionalistically. And frankly, functionalism is what it’s doing. We can see how automobiles---a fancy word invented by English majors perhaps---might have emerged by currency stimulus and gradually improved piecemeal by thousands of laborers and a few narrow-minded specialists (the term “accounting book” comes to mind, or “flow chart”). In this context, with the argument considered so far, perpetual motion doesn’t seem impossible, it just seems unlikely. Consider also that what an automobile does is in some ways very simple: moving forward, and a variety of related functions. These might not be difficult to think about, and thus, improvements may have occurred very quickly, perhaps even by people who believed “on faith” that perpetual motion was fashionably absurd. There could also be historical or psychological reason not to believe, or further, attempt, perpetual motion. For example, a religious fear of God could be cited, or the passing fad of fighter plane models which make young boys interested in diesel engines or serving in combat. Manifold distractions are possible, once a task is considered difficult, or worse, impossible. That impossibility factor is what I often return to as the ultimate historical reasoning behind the lack of progress. More about history. After history’s earliest failures in perpetual motion, failures which may not have had adequate theory, it became standard to think of a successful inventor as a devil who could do the impossible. This may have added obviously to the dislike of perpetual motion by religious people. This image was encouraged by figures such as Leonardo Da Vinci (who actually occurred somewhat late in the timeline, after 1200 AD). This image was further exacerbated by the growth of fantasy art movements. However, in my view, this evidence of imagination was part of a real collective effort towards greater ingenuity---perhaps even guided by the search for free energy. It is no accident that the personal computer, one of history’s greatest inventions, occurred after a Modernist renaissance in abstract artistic imagination. Even if engineers did not directly observe art, which is impossible, art fulfilled a similar niche of mental ambition, which was at least concurrent, and thus interacting, with the progress of technology. The upshot of this argument, however, is that the early failures were concurrent with limited technological development, and also limited abstract knowledge. At this point I would argue, physicists should be looking for evidence of perpetual motion, even if it requires theories as bold as a modernist painting. Perhaps, it may be said that physicists aren’t engineers---I can anticipate people sneering at this, but I’m not sure why they would. What if physicists are closer to metaphysicians than they think? The Greek physiologoi may be a far cry from the physics of today, but unless they set the model, the conclusion to be drawn is that physics knowledge is recent---less than 45 squared years ago. Apparently, in either case, either philosophically or technically, physics could be open to new theories. Otherwise, it is just following the bandwagon, which might lead to a cannibalistic and regurgitative process in which old tools sadly become self-interpretive. I can sense some of this with the recent emergence of string theory---the process is becoming too math-laden, and too reliant on new ideas. The clear answer is that physics needs engineering. But engineering means new theories---at least new applied theories---after all. And, I’m arguing that perpetual motion is no more than an applied theory. My basic refutation of the physics model which is used against perpetual motion theories does not require a refutation of Newtonian mechanics, but only a refutation of some of the assumptions added to Newton with thermodynamics. In my view it goes far, so far as theory is concerned, to say that a perpetual motion machine is an exceptional system. This means that there is no necessity for the properties of a machine that occupies space to operate exclusively by referring to reducible points in space with finite energy values (----I prefer a categorical view, which is at least two-dimensional, or abstractive of two dimensions). While I am not assuming infinite energy, I am not saying it is impossible in some special cases, and in this way I am making fewer of the most basic assumptions than standard physical models (it would be another case to add that these fundamental assumptions are the most determinative for the functionality of a model). Because of the finite-energy-reducible-to-points theory, Newtonian physics with added thermodynamics looks like an assumption about heat energy (as you will see, I take some of the same conclusions, and find a different ultimate result). That assumption about heat energy, it turns out, is absurd in the context of studying closed and open systems. For, as it is said, there is no such thing as a closed system, and so I can conclude, there is no such thing as a finite energy which has no source. Speaking in absolute terms about the two properties of energy and causation, one conclusion is that there is no energy. Another conclusion is that energy doesn’t have to be finite. In a relativistic view, the second answer is preferable, suggesting finite cases of in-some-way-infinite energy. Given the alternatives, this view that energy is always directed from somewhere, equivalent to a large or infinite source, is irrefutable. Remember, science depends on confirming evidence, if we say there is energy, it is actually unreasonable to say it cannot be created in some way. After all, it might be relative. We know dynamite has energy because of stored energy, but this does not remove the possibility of other types of stored energy---perhaps even permanent, stored forms of reusable energy. For example, dominoes have energy with directional potential: an additional attribute which streamlines the use of energy. The dominoes aren’t obviously destroyed. We also know that gravity gives a certain amount of potential force to an object, a force which transfers when an object rolls (or walks) horizontally. This force may seem minimal, but it exists, as proven by the role of mass in the equation ‘momentum = mass * velocity’. We already know that in some sense energy doesn’t exist in the past (vis. ‘now’), except as a measurement of future potential. Otherwise we are breaking it into more complex properties, or applying some greater-dimensional point of view which opens to new theory. If the energy of a present object consists of enacted-potential, the only way energy could manifest is if it exists in a fixed form. If energy only exists in a fixed form, except as potential energy, then time or some unknown factor of extension appears to be the only way energy would be lost. In this view, heat, far from being the source of energy, is in fact a source of entropy, or else a symptom of some other form of extension. What is pointed to is that all forms of energy lost are a function or symptom of extension, and therefore hypothetically, efficient extension results in less energy lost. Now, if the universe in a finite space and time, time guarantees that infinite energy was retained, unless infinite energy doesn’t exist. On the other hand, if the universe is an infinite space and time, replication of energy over infinite time guarantees some form of infinite energy exists in a relative sense. It is still another matter whether energy could be extracted, but at least in these cases it becomes clear that it is a function of functionality and extractability. It seems reasonable to conclude that beings of x-dimensions could extract a similar x-dimensions of energy. Otherwise, the energy is not extractable, or there is a question of function. However, I think the question of function is the important lemma. We are more likely to have technical understanding of our context than universal knowledge about the meaning of our context. That is not to say that we understand our context relative to understanding itself. So it goes without saying that any new accomplishment would also be old, and perhaps exist in different forms. But let us return to the principle of unbalance, which is really a larger problem than the question of specific dysfunction in this case (a device can be unbalanced even if it doesn’t work, but only temporarily). Must a device be “perfect”, or only meet criteria? I think it is misleading to hold that simple unity independent of over-unity, is the standard of perfection, because, according to my earlier view, unity is equatable with zero energy in the entire universe. That seems exceptionally unfair, and obviously comes from an engineering standpoint of artificially ‘inserting’ energy. In real life there are many examples of dynamic systems where energy is borrowed from previous cases. This may be more obvious in economics than psychology, but the principle of motivation and stored energy---or even purely functional resources such as money---may be effective in any case. Humans may rely on food, but it is evident that the energy exists, and that second point is what is fundamentally being rejected by the thermodynamics model. I don’t expect my audience to agree with me in these terms, but it can be seen in relation to the closed system argument, that isolated cases would produce a universe which is infinite yet lacks measurment, or finite and dead, unless there is infinite energy under some definition. And given that we know energy takes forms, it is then apparent that some forms have more potential energy than others, in absolute terms, qua universe. If some forms have more potential energy than others, in absolute terms, qua universe, I take this to mean that energy can be created by some forms and not others. Otherwise, we are taking Parmenides’ view that the world doesn’t change, or we are taking the view that there is no energy. Clearly a dynamic model must defend the view that distant particles may interact---the more dimensions, the more crossover between different times---and so, the model for higher dimensions tends to posit infinite time, and so it also tends to posit energy retention, in order to compensate for transference between times. In this way, life is always dimensional, because there is always at least one dimension of time, or some more complete idea. Thus, objects or persons always have some potential energy, and potential energy is roughly equatable with energy per se. Translating relative energy into perpetual energy requires more than engineering. It requires an object-oriented model. In an object-oriented model, just as in biology, there is no sense of the properties of an object independent of its specific nature or identity (a development of earlier context models). When there are exceptional identities, engineering requires exceptional properties. Thus, the properties of a given world scale to its level of dimension, and by implication, the number of dimensions of time. An account of the progress of engineering: First, engineers look for physical properties, like chemical reactions and radioactivity, in their basic form, or through testing instruments. Then they look for functions and complexity----say, a student’s work on understanding a phenomenon. Then they look for special properties and interactions---professional lab work. Finally, they look for abstract relationships---the culmination of their science. It is this last stage of abstraction (or perhaps not the last), where perpetual motion may be designed and invented. Although it involves simple properties (the understanding of properties not being the first stage), it requires a degree of interpolation which is not automatic. In a finite time frame, with finite resources, it is possible not to invent perpetual motion. Perhaps, in this context of understanding, its existence is just as probable as its non-existence. The relativist is always free to argue that it doesn’t yet exist (even if it does), which may have been the fullest extent of its debatability in the cosmic scheme of things. Nathan Coppedge 2/22/2014