APPLICATIONIST PSYCHOLOGY ABSTRACT In this short introduction, I propose a modification of Social Cognitive Theory, called Applicationist Psychology. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Let me define Applicational Psychology: expanding on the work of Bandura (1986), I propose a theory in which behavior is radically conditioned upon the specifically contingent nature of environment, in addition to using specifically applicational cognition. Accepting this view may not be difficult in today’s culture, and I argue it is only unacceptable in previous cases due to the dependence on naturalistic arguments. What is the value of an applications-based view of cognition? First let me address the subject of the contingency of environment. Environmental contingency is a fact that has at times of human history been addressed as a ‘great unknown.’ However, following a variablist model, there is no denying the materiability and definability of contingency. It is summed up in factors like change, differences between the past and the future, and the ability or inability to establish a volition or self-development through life. Further, there is no reason to divide these factors as if they are discrete from reality. Instead, contingency is a compound of real factors changing, and the real factors really do relate with personal development. With that established, it is easy to see how contingency could relate with the environment. However, what makes events-in-the-world relate with what we call behavior? I argue the answer is cognition. With that established. We can see now that cognition is the key to understanding environmental contingency. That is all well and good when an individual’s cognition is perfect, but what if it isn’t? In that case, we must look to internal development, or else external contributions to experience. However, it is not fair to divide internal from external if experience involves both. Instead, what is required is an applicational model. In an applicational model, four factors to consider are variables, variability, decidability, and definability. Specifically, it may be difficult to define important factors like these in any absolute way. A first point is that life depends on the nature of definitions, whatever it may be, for decision-making. Definitions are not variables-first. They are stimulations, or else concepts (‘virtuals’) of stimulation. Secondly, the definitions must be decidable before they are even confirmed as realitities. Therefore, there is a strong dependence on a decision-making application. This could be factors as mundane as using visuals like bulleted lists, or being prompted to make a decision without risk factors. Thirdly, impressions (defined as definitions) must be expressed as variables, which requires an additional concept of what something is. This requires a knowledge of metaphysics (how things are), which depends on concepts about how things are in reality. It may help to ask questions about reality, or this dimension of analysis goes forward thoughtlessly. Finally, as opposed to variables, variability is really the first factor to address when someone is fully situated in reality. Variability does not depend on outward experiences or cognition, but instead, upon applications used for cognition and experience. If appropriate formal concepts do not supplement emotions, a number of problems may ultimately emerge, such as cognitive distancing, impulsivity, and false beliefs. This is not to say that every formal concept is adequate. Far to the contrary, by formal concepts what I mean is only those best suited to experience. Additionally, in addressing all the above items, it is important to realize the radical contingency of the entire applicationist agenda. By no means is there an obstruction to personal concepts of what it means to have a formal concept, or what it means to be stimulated. Far from being foolish questions, these exact questions give important clues to solving every type of psychological dilemma. The kind of ‘pick-up mentality’ to cognition incorporated in an applicationist view may be one of the most fundamental aspects of learning, putting post-social-cognitive models squarely in the terrain of nurture-oriented theories (as opposed to natural ones). Amenable to this is the view that nurture is a narrow-minded view of nurture, that essentially nurture exists as one sort of contingency in the spectrum of possible nurture-related concepts, the limited ways that humans physically express nurture notwithstanding. In defending this case, it may be helpful to use a soupcon of relativity, as it turns out that it is possible to re-conceive natural models as nurture ones. It may help to realize that nature itself may be perceived as a kind of fixed form of nurture, e.g. a nurture that is not reciprocal or responsive. The view that nurture is reciprocal fits into an applicationist view by accommodating cognitive applications. In an environment plagued by deadly diseases, violent weapons, images, or, as Daniel Ellsberg (e.g. the Ellsberg Paradox) observed, untrustworthy unknowns, the nature version of images becomes undesirable, leading to a particularly unhelpful form of civilized-yet-terrorized attitude. In a more traditional society, delusions may instead be offered as a supplement for the negativity. In an applicationist view, normativity, however delusional, must be judged in terms of its value as an application, providing a platform for standardized rational assessment across historic contexts. Works Cited Bandura, Albert. Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986. Ellsberg, Daniel. "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms". Quarterly Journal of Economics 75 (4): 643–669. doi:10.2307/1884324. JSTOR 1884324. 1961. Nathan Coppedge, SCSU 9/30/2014 p.