PREFACE

Military history teaches us that, generally speaking, success and disaster depend on the application or neglect of certain tactical principles. These principles are few in number and simple in theory; they are the basis of drill, the guiding spirit of all manœuvres; every soldier is more or less familiar with them, but, if there is one fact more conspicuous than another in the records of war, it is that, in practice, they are as readily forgotten as they are difficult to apply. The truth is that the tabulated maxims and official regulations which set forth the rules of war go no deeper than the memory; and in the excitement of battle the memory is useless; habit and instinct are alone to be relied upon.

The habit of acting in accordance with sound principles is developed only by experience. Experience assists us to recognise instinctively what is sound and what is dangerous, what need not be feared and what must not be overlooked. Personal experience of war is, however, given but to few, may be purchased at too great a price, and in point of view is often circumscribed.

Wars are of rare occurrence, says Gizycki, the exception and not the rule, so that the officers’ training takes place not in war but in peace – and personal experience of war is always one-sided, and that in a variety of ways. In the first place, every man’s experience is confined to the narrow circle of his own activity, which, as a rule, is in a different sphere in every new war in which he takes part.

Such experience, it is true, is more comprehensive in preparation as a man rises in rank; but the superior officer misses much which only the subaltern officer experiences. The subaltern officer is mainly occupied with the troubles that have to be overcome with the rank and file; the superior officer with the friction that arises in the distribution of orders and the conduct of the larger units. But even within the same limited sphere, individual experiences of war differ entirely one from another. One man has only been present at successful actions, another only at a defeat, a third has never been under fire at all; one was in the advanced guard which was struggling with all its forces to win the day, another only arrived on the battle field when the enemy’s strength was almost broken.

It is nevertheless possible, by appropriating the experience of others, to find an efficient substitute for practical acquaintance with almost every phase of active service. But if we would make this alien experience our own, it must be dealt with systematically. It is not sufficient to read or to listen to the account of a campaign or battle. A cursory glance at a variety of incidents leaves little behind. To gain from a relation of events the same abiding impressions as were stamped on the minds of those who played a part in them – and it is such impressions that create instinct – it is necessary to examine the situations developed during the operations so closely as to have a clear picture of the whole scene in our mind’s eye; to assume, in imagination, the responsibilities of the leaders who were called upon to meet those situations; to come to a definite decision and to test the soundness of that decision by the actual event. The intellect is thus brought into collision with reality, and the contact is little less impressive than practical experience.

If, having formed our plans to meet an emergency which actually happened, we find, on turning to the relation of the facts, that the neglect of some precaution on our part, or the occurrence of some event which we ought to have foreseen, would have ruined our scheme, the rebuff to our judgment will not be readily forgotten. Our first instinct, when we next confront such a situation, theoretically or practically, will be, to provide against the recurrence of such a misadventure. The first advantage, then, of such a system of self-instruction, is the training of the judgment to act instinctively on sound principles. The student is confronted with a succession of problems, the solution of which – such is the nature of war – is complicated by the intervention of many untoward incidents; fresh factors are introduced at every step and thus, habit of quick resolution, together with a comprehensive coup d’œil, and the power of bringing under consideration everything that may affect the working out of any plan we may have conceived, of observing the effect such and such a manœuvre will produce and the precautions that must be adopted to ensure its execution, will gradually be developed. The tactical examinations for promotion, at least for the higher ranks, no longer mere tests of memory, have, of late years, taken the more practical shape of trials of the capacity for speedy and sound decision, the quality most essential to a soldier; and the surest means of acquiring and improving this capacity is the system here advocated.

2nd: – An acquaintance with the devices which others have adopted in order to avoid violating, or to apply tactical principles, will, if it does not supply an exact model, at least suggest the way in which such devices may be modified to meet circumstances with which we may be confronted.

3rd: – A knowledge of what has already taken place helps us to anticipate what will occur in the time to come. Realising, although only through the eyes of others, the phenomena of the battle-field, they will not appear altogether novel and bewildering when we are called up to face them; we may meditate on the best means of checking or avoiding their disturbing influence, so that they will not find us unprepared. It is in the novelty lies the danger, writes Colonel Hale, for the danger of novelty is surprise, and surprise is the deadliest of foes. Reduce to a minimum the chances of surprise; let a man be always prepared, and it loses half its danger.

4th: – The study of actual operations teaches us the strength of the other arms, the manner in which they can best render support to our own, the circumstances in which they most require support; in a word, it helps us to understand how artillery, cavalry, and infantry, may be best combined to achieve a definite purpose, and in this respect the personal experience of any regimental officer is of little value.

5th: – As the principal duty of the officers of today, at least of the regular forces, is the instruction of their men, the deeper the knowledge of the instructor with what his men have to be trained for, and the clearer his insight into the difficulties he and they will have to encounter, the sounder will be his work.

Lastly: It is only from the experience of others – and this is the true definition of military history – that we can obtain knowledge of the more startling and decisive aspects of the breech-loader battle. The effect of fire, the intense strain on the nerves produced by a protracted engagement, the dispersion of units, the tendency and the temptations to straggling and disorder, the moral effect of flank attacks and turning movements, the difficulty of transmitting orders, and, more than all, the importance and influence of ground, with these, not all the experience and exercises of peace can afford more than the most superficial acquaintance. If we would realize them, we must have recourse to history.

If it be conceded that the study of actual operations is essential, and we are anxious to discover the principles which are applicable to the more recent developments of war, it is evident that we must turn to those campaigns which have been fought under conditions of armament as nearly as possible analogous to the present.

Although, owing to late improvements and inventions, the effects of musketry and artillery will be certainly intensified in the battles of the future, the rapid and long-ranging fire of infantry and of rifled cannon will be then, as in 1870, the chief factor of the fight. Nor will the introduction of smokeless powder, of an effective shrapnel, and of a magazine rifle with a flatter trajectory, have so altered – except in so far that they will have increased – the difficulties of leading and the conduct of troops as to lessen the value of the great engagements of the Franco-Prussian War as most reliable guides to the situations and exigencies of the future.

Moreover, the history of the war of 1870–71 is accessible in such detail, not only in the account compiled by the Prussian General Staff, but in German and French regimental histories, in the narratives, of individuals, of soldiers who witnessed or who actually took part in the events they describe, or of correspondents who were present with the armies, that it is possible to follow the movements of brigades, battalions, companies, and even sections, through every incident of an engagement.

The mass of literature that relates to the battle of Spicheren has been carefully examined; the movements of even single companies and sections have been traced, and in the following pages, therefore, the student has presented to him numerous situations, with the surrounding circumstances in such detail, that, even if he aspire to no more than the leading of a single company, he is in possession of the knowledge requisite not only for the conception of a definite plan of action, but also for testing the wisdom of his resolution.

The volumes issued under the superintendence of the Prussian General Staff form the basis of the whole narrative. So frequent are the extracts that they are not always marked as quotations; but their statements have been amplified, and in some cases corrected, by reference to the Regimental Histories, and to the observations of non-combatants.

A consideration of the battle will also prove of use to those who are interested in the land defence of England, for the ground over which it was fought is in many respects similar to the range of heights which intervene between London and the Channel. There are the same steep hill-sides, covered, as is often the case in Kent and Surrey, with woods, and with the same open plateaux and deep gullies behind the crest. Volunteer officers, whose brigades and regiments have been detailed in case of invasion to occupy portions of this line, will do well to study the manner in which the Spicheren position was defended and attacked.

In the censure or praise bestowed on the commanders, an endeavour has been made to follow Napier’s example, and to justify the verdict by showing how the received maxims and established principles of war, were violated or adhered to. Military critics have often been reproached with being over liberal with their censure, but this charge applies only to those who write history merely. A work which professes to teach cannot avoid showing up errors, however excusable.

It is scarcely necessary to add that if it is to be beneficial, the study of military operations must be thorough. We must seek to place ourselves entirely in the position of the actors; we must work upon the bases of the materials and information which the leader in the case before us had at his disposal; we must try and work for ourselves, not superficially, but entering into the minutest detail, with the map and the compass in our hand, taking into careful account the conditions of time and space.

To assist the reader in following this suggestion, a series of problems for his solution, indicated by numerals in the text, will be found in Appendix III. These should be dealt with when arrived at without further reference to the letter-press.

INTRODUCTION

Fought on the 6th of August, 1870, Spicheren was one of the earliest engagements of the Franco-German war.

Little had as yet occurred to shake or strengthen the morale of either army, and the merits of the systems under which each had been organized and trained were then, for the first time, fairly tested. From a consideration, therefore, of the incidents of the battle, it will not be difficult to arrive at a just conclusion as to the relative efficiency of these systems. A sketch of them will precede the account of the actual combat; and this, with a brief relation of the events which led to the collision, and some account of the temper and discipline of the troops, should give the reader a clear understanding of the various forces which influenced the issue. Armies are bodies of extreme sensibility, affected by a variety of circumstances; and, unless the study of warlike operations is accompanied by a knowledge of the moral and physical condition of the combatants, no useful deductions can be drawn.

Moreover, if we except the action at Weissenburg, fought on the 4th of August, and the battle of Woerth, fought also on the 6th of August, Spicheren was the first great engagement under the new conditions of breech-loader versus breech-loader.

CHAPTER I

THE MOBILIZATION AND

CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMIES

On the evening of the 14th of July, Napoleon and his advisers had resolved on war. His formal declaration was not presented at Berlin until the 19th; but on the 15th, the mobilization of his forces had been ordered, and the regiments which were to form the Field Army immediately moved forward to the frontier.

The French message of defiance had named but a single State.

The quarrel was with Prussia, and with her alone. But Prussia was no isolated kingdom. The principalities and duchies of North Germany were her vassals, those of South Germany her allies.

But Saxony and Hanover in the north; Baden, Bavaria, Wurtemburg and Hesse-Darmstadt in the south, had leagued with Austria against her in 1866. The memories of their defeat were still green in 1870, and Napoleon had some ground for hope that the treaties imposed after the crowning victory of Sadowa, would be as eagerly repudiated as they had been reluctantly subscribed.

Italy, also, was bound by ties of gratitude to the sovereign whose arms had restored Lombardy to her dominion in 1859; and both Denmark and Austria were now offered an opportunity of repaying the debt of vengeance they had incurred in ’64 and ’66.

The French Emperor, therefore, when he so suddenly rushed into war appears to have done so in the expectation of finding allies beyond the Rhine, to have believed that his first success would raise the standard of revolt in Dresden and in Hanover; that it would be no difficult task to bind the South Germans to neutrality, and that Austria and Italy would ultimately lend him active aid.

It would serve no useful purpose to inquire whether, as regards the three European Powers, these expectations were justified—they certainly, were never realised; but, astute as he undoubtedly was, Napoleon was far from comprehending the vitality of that spirit of pride in their common nationality which lies in the heart of every German people. Smouldering indeed during the fratricidal war of 1866 it was still unquenched, and the first threat against the integrity of the Fatherland fanned it into sudden and enduring flame. Prussia was not loved, it is true, beyond the Maine, but France was the hereditary enemy. The Southern States stood staunchly to their bonds. Saxon and Hanoverian soldiers ranged themselves beside the Prussian eagles, to show themselves in the days to come as strong in friendship as once in enmity; and the gauntlet so recklessly cast down was picked up by the strong hand of a United Germany.

By the treaties of 1866, the supreme command of the German forces was vested in the King of Prussia. Ordered to mobilize on the 15th July, they were the next day organized into three distinct Field Armies and a Reserve.

The First Army, composing the Right Wing, under General von Steinmetz.

The Second Army, composing the Centre under Prince Frederick Charles.

Sketch map of the Theatre of War

The Third Army, composing the Left Wing, under the Crown Prince.

The Reserve at the disposal of the