Bismarck –

the Epic Chase

Bismarck –

the Epic Chase

by

Jim Crossley

First published in Great Britain in 2010 by

Pen & Sword Maritime

an imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

47 Church Street

Barnsley

South Yorkshire

S70 2AS

Copyright © Jim Crossley 2010

ISBN: 978-1-84884-250-2

The right of Jim Crossley to be identified as Author of this Work

has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs

and Patents Act 1988.

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Contents

Plans and Charts

CHAPTER 1

Strategic Situation May 1941

– Britain Stands Alone

Just after 11 a.m. on 18 May 1941 two massive grey shapes slipped out of the harbour of Gotenhafen (now called Gdynia) and dropped anchor in the outer roads. They were the battleship Bismarck, the most formidable warship in the world, and a powerful heavy cruiser, Prinz Eugen. They were embarking on an enterprise which was to be endowed with all the foreboding, tragedy and suspense of the most melodramatic of Wagnerian operas, leaving two of the biggest warships in the world at the bottom of the sea, with over 4,000 seamen alongside them. All this action was compressed into a period of less than ten days. It was to be a contest in which technology, luck, seamanship, airmanship and old-fashioned human grit all played a part. To understand it fully we must start by reviewing briefly the strategic situation as it existed in May 1941.

Germany had crushed the Polish forces in 1939, and Hitler’s cynical pact with Stalin had allowed the division of that unfortunate country between two ruthless regimes of unparalleled savagery. Holland, Belgium and Denmark had been subdued without too much difficulty, and Norway, with its rich mineral resources, vital to the German war effort, had fallen to a brilliantly planned and executed naval and military campaign. The countries of central Europe had been recruited or dragooned onto the Axis side. Last of all, in summer 1940 France had fallen to a devastating armoured and airborne assault, destroying her own army and sending the British forces in France scrambling desperately home, leaving their arms and many of their colleagues behind them. Germany was checked at the Channel, where the Luftwaffe was unable to establish the air superiority needed to allow German armies to force a crossing, so for the time being the land war in the West was suspended. For Germany this was not a significant check. Hitler himself was not really committed to an invasion of Britain at this point. He had other fish to fry. As the onset of autumn weather and the valour of the RAF aircrews brought a halt to the intense daytime bombing raids on southern England, his air fleets and Panzer armies redeployed in readiness for a devastating assault planned for summer 1941. This was to be against his erstwhile partner in crime – the Soviet Union.

A more active theatre of conflict for Britain now emerged in the Mediterranean. It was vital for her to retain control of the Suez Canal and of Egypt. Italian forces in Libya and Ethiopia threatened both. The Italians had at first been fairly easily defeated, but in 1941 Rommel arrived on the scene with his superb Afrika Korps, supported by modern aircraft. Before long, British forces were pushed back and the desperate siege of Tobruk commenced, tying down a large part of the British army, and the ships and aircraft required to supply them. The Germans also pulled Italy’s chestnuts out of the fire in Greece, where local fighters had held up and indeed reversed Italian advances. The appearance of German forces in support of the Italians rapidly turned the tables. Churchill unwisely diverted the efforts of the forces facing Rommel in Egypt to support the Greek cause, and the result was a crushing defeat for Britain and the Greek patriots. In May, at the same time that Bismarck’s voyage was in progress, German forces had thrown the British out of mainland Greece altogether and were overrunning Crete, forcing a British withdrawal from the island, which was accomplished a few days later with heavy losses of men and material. In particular, total lack of air cover for the ships evacuating the troops resulted in disastrous losses for the British Mediterranean Fleet. Here, as everywhere, it seemed, Hitler’s forces were triumphant.

It was not in Greece or in north Africa, however, that Germany presented the most deadly threat to Britain. Depending on international trade routes to supply her with arms, raw material, food and troops from her Empire, Britain was at the mercy of any enemy who could challenge her navy and close her vital, sea lanes. This had very nearly happened in 1917, when U-boats had brought the country to within a few weeks of running out of food. Then only the diversion of the bulk of the destroyer force from guarding the Grand Fleet and the deployment of the little ships as escorts for convoys saved the country from being forced to sue for an ignoble peace. In 1941 it seemed that in spite of the convoy system there might be no way of averting a similar disaster.

It was not that Germany had been getting all her own way at sea. In the years leading up to the war, Germany had begun to develop a powerful surface navy, intended to be strong enough to take on that part of the Royal Navy likely to be stationed in home waters during hostilities. The naval building programme was set out in ‘Plan Z’. It called for the following fleet to be built:

As shown in the third column, the number of ships actually built fell far short of the plan, and left Germany with an unbalanced fleet. There were two reasons for this. Firstly Hitler had completely miscalculated the reaction of Britain and France to his invasion of Poland. He had actually promised Admiral Raeder, the chief of his navy, that there was no question of a war with Britain until 1945 at the earliest. Indeed he actually apologised to the admiral for the fact that his plans had gone wrong soon after the outbreak of the war. Secondly, as soon as war broke out the whole warship-building programme was suspended, and the labour and materials that had been allocated to surface ships were diverted to other projects. Only the U-boat programme remained intact. This left numerous half-built hulls on the stocks, notably the carrier Graf Zeppelin and the cruisers Seydlitz and Lutzow (which was later sold to Russia). Raeder, who had a difficult relationship with Hitler, had to make do with what ships he had. (A brief description of the organisation of the Kriegsmarine is given in Appendix 1.)

The demands placed on the Kriegsmarine were considerable, in spite of its obvious weakness. From the very first day of the war, two ancient pre-dreadnought battleships, Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesien, were pressed into service to bombard Polish shore installations. More serious for Britain were the activities of the ‘pocket battleships’. These were specifically designed for commerce raiding. They had many novel design features to enable them to fulfil their role. The three ships, Deutschland (later renamed Lutzow), Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer, were all armed with six 11-inch guns. Their firepower was thus more than enough to overpower any British 8-inch cruiser fast enough to catch them, and their high speed of 28 knots enabled them to get away from a battleship should they encounter one. The only British ships that might be able to catch and out-gun them were the now aged battle cruisers, all but one of which were relics from the First World War. The ship’s design was revolutionary, having all electrically welded steel hulls, and 56,800 hp diesel engines. The diesels were chosen because they were extremely economical in the cruising mode, enabling the pocket battleships to stay at sea unsupported for long periods. These ships were built in defiance of the Versailles Treaty, which limited German warships to 10,000 tons – in fact their fully loaded tonnage was over 15,000, but the Germans managed to cover this up. Reconnaissance for the pocket battleships was provided by on-board Arado float-planes.

In August 1939 two of these formidable hunters put to sea so as to be in a position to threaten the sea lanes if war should break out. On 30 September Graf Spee struck her first blow, sinking the British steamer Clement. Deutschland followed suit on 5 October by sinking Stonegate. The two raiders continued their successful guerre de course into October, when Deutschland was recalled to Germany on the direct orders of the Führer, who feared that she would antagonise the neutral US government, but Graf Spee remained on station in the Indian Ocean and the south Atlantic until November, when disaster struck her. On the 14th she intercepted and sank the small tanker Africa Shell off Lourenço Marques, but the tanker’s crew were allowed to escape by lifeboat, and they raised the alarm as soon as they got ashore. This alerted the Royal Navy to the presence of a pocket battleship in the area, and the next victim, Doric Star, managed to contact patrolling British warships by radio before being sunk. Eventually, on 12 December, three cruisers, Ajax, Achilles and Exeter, brought the raider to battle. Although completely out-gunned by Graf Spee, they managed to force her to divide her fire, and damaged her structure enough to compel her to seek refuge in Montevideo harbour, Uruguay. Refused permission to repair the damage suffered at the hands of the British cruisers in the neutral port, and fearing the approach of heavy British ships, Graf Spee’s captain scuttled her just outside the harbour. It was the first major German loss in the war at sea and was a serious blow to the morale and prestige of the Kriegsmarine. Graf Spee had sunk some 60,000 tons of merchant shipping, but the humane and gentlemanly conduct of her captain, Langsdorff, had gained the admiration even of his victims; her loss demonstrated clearly the long reach and indomitable fighting spirit of the Royal Navy.

While these operations were in progress in the South Atlantic, Germany’s heavier battleships were active further north. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were much more formidable than the lightly armoured pocket battleships. Launched in 1936, they mounted nine 11-inch guns and displaced 38,900 tons fully loaded. They were driven by steam turbines of 165,000 horsepower, giving a top speed of 32 knots, and were protected by 14,000 tons of armour plate, 13.8 inches protecting the armoured belt and 14.17 inches the turrets. These were truly formidable ships, much faster than any British battleship and better protected than any battle cruiser. They had, however, one significant weakness. Their engines and boilers proved extremely unreliable, resulting in long periods in dock for repairs. In November these two powerful ships, accompanied by a screen of light cruisers and destroyers, steamed northwards towards the Iceland–Faeroes Gap. Their object was to attempt to divert attention from the hunt for the Graf Spee and if possible to break out into the Atlantic so as to attack lightly escorted convoys. They encountered the British armed merchant cruiser Rawalpindi, which was easily disposed of in spite of a spirited defence by her captain, Kennedy, and the crews of her worn-out 6-inch guns. In spite of this victory, the encounter with Rawalpindi was fatal to the enterprise. The German ships were under strict instructions to avoid contact with heavy British ships. They were aware that Rawalpindi had signalled their presence to the Admiralty and that the battle cruiser Hood, the French battleship Dunkerque and a number of cruisers were searching for them, so the plan to attack Atlantic convoys was aborted. Taking advantage of a spell of foul weather, they slipped away and back to Wilhelmshaven. The Germans claimed a great naval victory, but in fact this sortie only proved how difficult it would be for significant German forces to slip unobserved out into the north Atlantic.

The next major operation of the German fleet was the occupation of Norway. Hitler considered this essential to the war plans of the Reich because supplies of strategic materials and iron ore from that region were vital to her war industries. A reluctant Raeder was persuaded to commit almost all of his surface fleet to transport troops and supplies to carry out the invasion. The operation commenced on 7 April 1940. An ill-planned Allied attempt to counter it on land was abandoned, as the forces involved were urgently required to defend France. The Royal Navy became aware that the German invasion fleet was at sea almost as soon as it set out, but mistook its mission, and deployed following a plan designed to counter another sortie into the north Atlantic. The invasion fleet consisted of the battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Lutzow (previously called Deutschland), and the heavy cruisers Blücher and Hipper, attended by light cruisers and fourteen destroyers. Troops were successfully landed by sea and by air and achieved their objectives, but the operation was extremely costly for the Kriegsmarine. Blücher was sunk by Norwegian shore-based artillery, and her sister ship Hipper was rammed and heavily damaged in a suicidal attack by the destroyer Gloworm. Lutzow was hit by shore batteries and then by torpedoes from the submarine Spearfish. She was just able to limp home under tow, but took more than a year to repair. Gneisenau was hit by 15-inch shells from the battle cruiser Renown. Two cruisers, Karlsruhe and Königsberg, were sunk by a submarine and by air attack, and worst of all, ten of Germany’s invaluable destroyers were lost in the two battles of Narvik, the second of which featured the dramatic charge into the fjord by the old battleship Warspite. During the course of the Allied withdrawal, the German battleships scored a major success by intercepting and sinking the carrier Glorious, with a full load of aircraft, off the north Norwegian coast. Some measure of revenge for this was achieved when the destroyer Acasta hit Scharnhorst with a torpedo, doing serious damage. A few days later a torpedo from the submarine Clyde hit Gneisenau, forcing her to limp home to be dry-docked. Germany emerged from the Norway operation with not one of her battleships serviceable, and almost half of her cruiser and destroyer forces were at the bottom of the sea. The resources available to Raeder at the beginning of May were reduced to the damaged heavy cruiser Hipper, four light cruisers and ten destroyers.

As German forces swept through France and the British Expeditionary Force was evacuated from Dunkirk, the navy had to stand idly by, suffering at the same time the annoyance of frequent bombardment in their bases by the RAF. By October the third of Hitler’s pocket battleships, Admiral Scheer, was ready to renew the task of Atlantic raiding, and slipped out through the Denmark Strait. She was to be the most successful of all the German commerce raiders. Her first encounter was with a convoy escorted only by the armed merchant cruiser Jervis Bay. Jervis Bay’s gallant captain, Fegen, fought a hopeless action against his powerful adversary, and in doing so saved most of the merchantmen. However, Scheer continued her cruise, reprovisioning and refuelling from captured vessels as well as from her own support ship. She did not return to Germany until 1 April, having sunk sixteen ships totalling over 100,000 tons. It was a uniquely successful commerce-raiding cruise.

The next major sortie into the Atlantic was made by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, repaired after their unfortunate Norwegian adventures. After a false start, during which they were damaged by bad weather, the two left Wilhelmshaven on 22 January 1941, and this time were able to slip into the Atlantic unobserved. Once again the commander of the force, Admiral Lutjens, was under strict orders not to put his ships at risk by giving battle to heavy British ships, so it was unfortunate for the commerce raiders that their first encounter was with the convoy HX 106 out of Halifax, Nova Scotia. This was escorted by the First World War battleship Ramillies. Though she was old and only capable of 21.5 knots, Ramillies had eight 15-inch guns and was very heavily armoured, so she would