Aurelian and Probus: The Soldier Emperors Who Saved Rome
5/5
()
About this ebook
This is a narrative military history of the emperors Lucius Domitius Aurelianus (“Aurelian,” reigned 270-275) and Marcus Aurelius Probus (276-282) that also includes the other reigns between the years 268 and 285. It shows how these two remarkable emperors were chiefly responsible for the Empire surviving and emerging largely intact from a period of intense crisis. It was Aurelian who first united the breakaway regions, including Zenobia’s Palmyra, and it was Probus who then secured his achievements.
The reigns of Aurelian and Probus have been subjected to many studies, but none of these have approached the extant material purely from the point of view of military analysis. Most importantly, the previous historians have not exploited the analytical opportunities provided by the military treatises that describe the strategy and tactics of the period Roman army. It is thanks to this new methodology that Ilkka Syvänne has been able to reconstruct the military campaigns of these two soldier emperors and their other contemporaries in far greater detail than has been possible before.
Praise for Aurelian and Probus
“A critical work… Aurelian and Probus is a very good look at a very confusing period in Roman history.” —The NYMAS Review
Ilkka Syvänne
Dr. Ilkka Syvänne gained his doctorate in history in 2004 from the University of Tampere in his native Finland. Since then he has written extensively about ancient and medieval warfare and his publications include: 'The Age of Hippotoxotai, Art of War in Roman Military Revival and Disaster 491-636' (Tampere UP 2004), 'The Reign of Gallienus' (Pen & Sword, 2019), the multivolume 'Military History of Late Rome' published by Pen & Sword and the critically acclaimed Caracalla. He is the co-author with Professor Katarzyna Maksymiuk of the 'Military History of Third Century Iran' (Siedlce UP, 2018) and the 'Military History of Fifth Century Iran' (Siedlce UP, 2019). He was Vice Chairman of the Finnish Society for Byzantine Studies from 2007 until 2016. He has been an Affiliated Professor of the University of Haifa since 2016. He lives in Kangasala, Finland.
Read more from Ilkka Syvänne
Military History of Late Rome 425–457 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsCaracalla: A Military Biography Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Military History of Late Rome, 395–425 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMilitary History of Late Rome, 284–361 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Military History of Late Rome 361–395 Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Military History of Late Rome 602–641 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Reign of Emperor Gallienus: The Apogee of Roman Cavalry Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Military History of Late Rome 518–565 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Military History of Late Rome 565–602 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMilitary History of Late Rome 457–518 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsBritain in the Age of Arthur: A Military History Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Gordian III and Philip the Arab: The Roman Empire at a Crossroads Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsLate Roman Combat Tactics Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratings
Related to Aurelian and Probus
Related ebooks
The Roman Emperor Aurelian: Restorer of the World Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Pyrrhus of Epirus Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Gordian III and Philip the Arab: The Roman Empire at a Crossroads Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMilitary History of Late Rome 565–602 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsJustinian II: The Roman Emperor Who Lost his Nose and his Throne and Regained Both Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Macedonian War Machine, 359–281 BC Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsEmulating Alexander: How Alexander the Great's Legacy Fuelled Rome's Wars With Persia Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMilitary History of Late Rome 457–518 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsPertinax: The Son of a Slave Who Became Roman Emperor Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMilitary History of Late Rome 602–641 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMilitary History of Late Rome 518–565 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Julius Caesar: The Pursuit of Power Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Sparta's Kings Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsCaesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Persian Invasions of Greece Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Cyrus The Great Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter That Saved Greece -- and Western Civilization Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Wars of Alexander's Successors, 323–281 BC Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Mithridates the Great: Rome's Indomitable Enemy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Eager for Glory: The Untold Story of Drusus the Elder, Conqueror of Germania Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Kings & Kingship in the Hellenistic World, 350–30 BC Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Imperial General: The Remarkable Career of Petellius Cerialis Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Gaius Marius: The Rise and Fall of Rome's Saviour Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Cataclysm 90 BC: The Forgotten War that Almost Destroyed Rome Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Sword of Rome: A Biography of Marcus Claudius Marcellus Rating: 2 out of 5 stars2/5Germanicus: The Magnificent Life and Mysterious Death of Rome's Most Popular General Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Lucullus: The Life and Campaigns of a Roman Conqueror Rating: 2 out of 5 stars2/5Constantius III: Rome's Lost Hope Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Antigonus the One-Eyed: Greatest of the Successors Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Great Battles of the Hellenistic World Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5
Wars & Military For You
Sun Tzu's The Art of War: Bilingual Edition Complete Chinese and English Text Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Art of War Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Happiest Man on Earth: The Beautiful Life of an Auschwitz Survivor Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Art of War: The Definitive Interpretation of Sun Tzu's Classic Book of Strategy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Wager Disaster: Mayem, Mutiny and Murder in the South Seas Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Last Kingdom Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Killing the SS: The Hunt for the Worst War Criminals in History Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The God Delusion Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Dr. Seuss Goes to War: The World War II Editorial Cartoons of Theodor Seuss Geisel Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5They Thought They Were Free: The Germans, 1933–45 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Twilight of the Shadow Government: How Transparency Will Kill the Deep State Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsNuclear War: A Scenario Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5On War: With linked Table of Contents Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Faithful Spy: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Plot to Kill Hitler Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5SEAL Survival Guide: A Navy SEAL's Secrets to Surviving Any Disaster Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Forgotten Highlander: An Incredible WWII Story of Survival in the Pacific Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5A Daily Creativity Journal Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Only Plane in the Sky: An Oral History of 9/11 Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5
Reviews for Aurelian and Probus
1 rating0 reviews
Book preview
Aurelian and Probus - Ilkka Syvänne
Chapter One
Sources and Analysis
1.1. Sources
The principal literary sources for the reigns of Aurelian and Probus are: Eusebius of Caesarea with Jerome (4–5th century), Lactantius (early 4th century), Orosius (375/80–417/8), Zosimus (early 6th century), Zonaras (beginning of 12th century), Cedrenus (11–12th cent), Historia Augusta (turn of 4th century and/or late 4th century, also known as Scriptores Historiae Augusta ), Sextus Aurelius Victor (c.
AD
360), Epitome de Caesaribus formerly attributed (wrongly) to Aurelius Victor (turn of 5th century) and hence the so-called Pseudo-Victor, Eutropius’ Breviarium (c.369), Rufus Festus’ Breviarium (c.370), fragments of Herennius Dexippus (a period source from the 3rd century), fragments of Anonymous Continuator of Dio Cassius now attributed to Petrus Patricius/Peter the Patrician (6th century), Malalas (6th century), George Syncellus (early 9th century), Jordanes (6th century), fragments of John of Antioch (6–7th century), and other less important sources.¹
There are indeed many sources, but none of these includes any detailed narratives of the reigns of Aurelian or Probus, the heroes of this narrative history. Furthermore, we no longer possess any of the original period sources in their entirety. The most detailed sources are the very unreliable Historia Augusta and the slightly more reliable Zosimus. It is largely thanks to this that the numismatics has assumed a very important role in the analysis of their reigns, and it is the numismatic evidence that dates for example the course of the war between Aurelian and Zenobia.
In this study the sources are analyzed from the point of view of military history and military probability so that I have sought to analyze each of the sources on its own terms. In other words, I have not dismissed evidence preserved in the generally unreliable source on the basis that it is preserved in this source unless there are very strong reasons to do so. This has been done case-by-case so that each piece of evidence has been analyzed separately, not like it used to be done by the methodologically ultra-conservative Classicists roughly from the 1970s until the 2010s, who have been in the habit of dismissing the entire source as worthless with the result that they have replaced close-to-the-period evidence with their own ‘must-have-beens’. This concerns in particular the use of the Historia Augusta (Augustan History/Scriptores Historiae Augusta), which some historians dismiss as worthless and therefore not worth even commenting on. I agree with those who are prepared to use it (e.g. Christol, Cizek, Yann Le Bohec, White, Geiger, Paul N. Pearson) and I am also inclined to accept the older and now the newer opinion that the Historia Augusta was indeed written by six separate authors, as it claims to have been.
The authors that concern us are as follows:
For the sake of clarity however, I have used the traditional HA to mean all of the authors of the Historia Augusta collectively even if I also use the supposed name of the author in an effort to avoid unnecessary repetition. In addition to this I also abbreviate the names of the books.
The following analysis of the reigns takes the account of Zosimus as its core text so that it includes several quotes from it. These quotes are then compared with the other evidence that we have to arrive at a likely reconstruction of the events.
1.2. My Analysis of the Battles
The following analysis combines the information provided by the sources and military treatises with military probability to provide an account of the likely course of action. The reason for this combination of different analytical tools and sources is the scantiness of evidence provided by the narrative sources. Therefore, if one wants to shed additional light onto the events it is necessary to analyze this evidence from the point of view of period military practices and from the point of view of military probability. It is therefore very important to place the events on the map as this provides additional insights into the thinking processes behind the decisions taken by the military commanders in each situation, and this is one of the principal methodological tools behind the concept of military probability, alongside the military doctrine of the period. It should still be kept in mind that all of these analyzes of the military situations are by nature speculative and should be seen as such. It is because of this that I will always state in the narrative when the reconstruction is based on such educated guesses and it is because of this that I include the reasons for the conclusions and long quotes from the sources with my analysis also in the text instead of presenting the events as a single narrative.
Chapter Two
The Roman Empire in 268
2.1. The Divided Empire
The period from 249 until 269, just before the rise of Aurelian on the throne in 270, is among the darkest in the history of the Roman Empire. It was then that the Goths annihilated the Roman field army together with the emperor Decius at the battle of Abrittus in 251. It was during those years that the Franks, Alamanni, Sarmatians, Goths, Heruls and many other barbarians ravaged and pillaged Roman territory in North Africa, Spain, Gaul, Raetia, Noricum, the Balkans and Asia Minor. As if this would not have been enough, the Persians under their great military king of kings Shapur I repeatedly ravaged Roman Mesopotamia, Syria and Asia Minor and even took the emperor Valerian prisoner. It was under Valerian’s son Gallienus that things took a distinct turn for the worse thanks to the numerous usurpations and revolts at the same time as the empire was still threatened by the barbarians and Persians. As a result of this chaos Gaul separated itself from the Roman Empire and became the Gallic Empire led by the usurper-emperor Postumus. In the meantime, the East became the private domain of the Palmyrene royal house thanks to the fact that Gallienus was forced to rely on it to crush the Persians and the usurpers (Macriani and Ballista). At the time of his death in 268 the situation was even worse because the Goths and their allies still roamed in the eastern Mediterranean and the city of Milan was still controlled by the usurper Aureolus. In addition to this, the frantic and erratic monetary policies of Gallienus had created a situation in which the populace no longer trusted the value of their coins. However, it was also under Gallienus that the revival of the Roman Empire began, thanks to his relentless efforts to save it. Regardless, the situation was still critical at the time of his death, and it required the frantic efforts of three emperors – Claudius II, Aurelian and Probus – to restore order. All of these generals owed their initial rise to Valerian, but their rise to prominent positions was still one of the most enduring legacies of Gallienus, who clearly recognized their military talents and promoted them to higher posts.
Gallienus’ emergency ad hoc reforms included, for example: 1) the re-creation of cavalry army, 2) the creation of new offices; 3) restrictions put on senatorial careers, 4) defence-in-depth; 5) the use of large regional field armies; 6) new forms of propaganda. In most of these cases Gallienus merely followed the precedents set up by his predecessors, but he was certainly prepared to go further in all of these fields than any of them, so it was under him that many of the previous exceptions became the norm. The equestrian officers had already been placed in command of several legions by the previous emperors, but under Gallienus they became the commanders of all legions. The senators, however, retained some of the governorships, with the result that they still commanded legions, each of which now had an equestrian prefect in command. The unofficial titles for the temporary generals – for example the dux, comes, comes domesticorum, magister equitum and tribunus et magister officiorum – became permanent under him. Even though the Romans had sometimes used large cavalry armies in the past, it was under Gallienus that it became the dominant arm of service when he recreated the large cavalry army previously destroyed under Decius. The Romans had also used the defence-in-depth concept in the past whenever necessary, but under Gallienus it became more widely used than ever before thanks to the many threats that he faced. Gallienus was also forced to group his forces, which consisted largely of detachments drawn from other units, into regional field armies and one personal field army. This was not a new practice and had been used for example by his father and several of his predecessors whenever there had been a need to form a large field army to meet an emergency, but the scale of this phenomenon was unprecedented under Gallienus.
2.2. Roman Military in 268
Just like any empire, the Roman Empire possessed armed forces and security apparatus. The official security apparatus consisted of: 1) the land forces (legions, auxiliaries, national numeri); 2) navy (Praetorian and Provincial); 3) vigiles (firemen/policemen); 4) urbaniciani (policemen, urban combat troops); 4) the imperial bodyguard units (praetoriani; equites singulares Augusti/germani; aulici/collegia/scholae/protectores; and evocati Augusti). Their strength was bolstered by: a) treaty-bound allied forces (foederati); and b) the paramilitary civilian citizen militias and policemen which patrolled seas and land areas. However, the division of the Roman Empire into the central Empire led by Claudius II, the forces of the usurper Aureolus at Milan, the Gallic Empire of Postumus, and the de facto Palmyran Empire in 268 means that the composition of armed forces varied in the different parts of the Empire. In the legitimate part of the Empire under Claudius II it was the cavalry – the equites of Gallienus – that formed the crème de la crème of the armed forces. In Gaul, however, it was the infantry which formed the flower of the armed forces. These consisted of those forces that had been left in the many garrisons of the area, and of the new locally recruited forces and very large numbers of German mercenaries (mainly Franks and Alamanni). The German mercenaries consisted also mainly of infantry and it was these forces that became the precursors of the late Roman auxilia palatina.
In normal circumstances the Imperial bodyguards and the Legio II Parthica (organization is given below) formed the principal mobile reserve army at the immediate disposal of the emperor. However, at the time of the death of Gallienus the situation was different because he had formed a separate imperial field army in about 257/8. The core of this force consisted of the cavalry units grouped together as equites under the cavalry commander (in the sources the hipparchos presumably meaning the magister equitum or comes domesticorum equitum) and of the infantry army consisting of the units drawn from the regular bodyguard units, legions, and auxiliaries. It is probable that the infantry had a separate commander (possibly comes domesticorum peditum or magister peditum) just like the cavalry and that the overall commander of both cavalry and infantry was tribunus et magister officiorum (Tribune and Master of Offices) who appears to have been Claudius II at the time of Gallienus’ murder.
In normal circumstances the imperial bodyguards consisted at least of the praetoriani (10,240 foot, 1,920 horse?), 300 cavalry speculatores, a numerus of statores Augusti, equites singulares Augusti (2,048 horse), frumentarii (spies), and of the peregrini (spies). There are also reasons to believe that the staff of the Imperial Stables (stratores/equerries and grooms, the stablesiani, under tribunus stabuli) and the evocati Augusti also belonged to the bodyguards of the emperor. It is unfortunate that we do not possess any reliable numbers for the frumentarii, peregrini, stablesiani and evocati Augusti. Similarly we do not know the size of the bodyguard unit variously called the aulici/collegia/scholae/ protectores/protectores domestici. The problem is accentuated by the fact that the meaning of the names scholae, protectores and domestici changed in the course of the third to fifth centuries; but a good educated guess is that the protectores/domestici would have encompassed at least roughly the same number of soldiers as the scholae of one half of the Empire in the fifth century – a minimum of 3,500 horsemen. The reason for this conclusion is that the scholae appear to have been commanded by the protectores/domestici and at the beginning of the fourth century all those forces that were commanded by them were called protectores. The problem with this is that even the protectores proper seem to have included far more men than this before the reign of Julian.¹ The other units, which were in normal circumstances at the immediate disposal of the emperor, consisted of the Urban Cohorts (cohortes urbanae/urbaniciani, 4,500 policemen usable also as a military force), the vigiles (7,000 firemen and policemen) and of the detached naval cohorts from the two Praetorian Fleets (Misenum and Ravenna) all located in Rome and of the Legio II Parthica located at Alba (Albanum). The urbaniciani operated throughout the Empire to secure supplies for the capital on behalf of the Urban Prefect, and it was because of this that we find separate urban cohorts at least at Ostia, Puteoli, Lyon and Carthage. The soldiers on leave in Rome could also be used for military purposes, but obviously these did not count in the making of any military plans.²
At the end of the third century the equipment used by the legionaries and units of bodyguards was undergoing a change in fashions which then became the standard equipment of the so-called late Roman period. What remained the same was that the legionaries and bodyguards were taught how to fight with empty-handed (martial arts) techniques and with weapons such as the short sword (semispatha, gladius), medium to long sword (spatha), various types of javelins and spears, shield, and the throwing of stones by hand or sling. In addition to this, at least a third of the infantry were also taught how to use bows, presumably including in this figure the crossbows. In contrast, all horsemen were required to able to use bows and crossbows while mounted.
It is probable that the change in fashions resulted from the dominance of Illyrian soldiers in the Roman armed forces. This was the result of their better availability during the reign of Gallienus whose principal recruiting ground was in Illyricum. The main result of this was that ridge and segmented helmets started to replace the other types of helmets, while it became fashionable to use the pilleus Pannonicus (round Pannonian hat, often made of fur). Typical protective equipment of this period consisted of the: 1) flat (or slightly curved) oval and round shields; 2) scale and mail armour; 3) metal- made muscular armour; 4) muscular leather armour and other types of ersatz armour; 5) ridge and segmented helmets. Just like before and later, it was also possible for men to be unarmoured to increase the mobility of the unit. In short, ever fewer men used the older lorica segmentata type of armour and the rectangular scutum. However, this does not mean that the older types of equipment would not have continued in use, because we find these still in use at least until the turn of the fifth century and in some cases (e.g. pseudo- Corinthian helmets) much later still, but it does mean that these were by then relatively rare. Similarly, just like before and later, legionaries could also be equipped either lightly (no armour, small shield and light javelins or bows or slings) or with heavier equipment (armour, heavy shield, and heavy javelins or long spears) as required by the situation, which means that we should not draw too drastic conclusions from the evidence. The men fought basically in the same manner as before even if military fashions had changed. The main difference between the typical legionary and the bodyguard was that the latter often wore more expensive equipment than the former.
The number of legions, auxiliary units and numeri at the disposal of the various rulers is not known, but what we know is that their internal organization was based on the following models. The legions followed three basic models: 1) the old standard legions; 2) the legions based on the Parthian legions of Septimius Severus; 3) the temporary legions built out of the detachments drawn from the legions. The Parthian legions may have been based on a different unit structure and their tactics with unit depths and equipment may have been different from the standard units (see Appendix 1).
The old standard legion consisted of about 5,120 heavy infantrymen plus recruits, servants, horsemen and specialists. Such legions consisted of cohorts (quingenary 480 men and milliary 800 men), maniples of 160 men, centuria of 80 men, and contubernia of eight men. Each contubernium (tent group/file in rank and file array) consisted of eight men, one green recruit and one servant so that it in truth consisted of ten men under a commander of ten, called a decanus. Each of the legions had also a cavalry contingent which consisted of 500 to 600 horsemen (but typically a 512 horsemen ala) all of whom were taught how to use spears, javelins, swords, crossbows, shields and composite bows so that these could be used for a great variety of missions. Severus’ Parthian legions differed from the above in that they had ca. 6,000 footmen and 732 horsemen. The attached diagrams show the basic structures of the various types of legions.
STANDARD LEGION
Probable command structure of the regular legion c.
AD
90–260
- 1 Legate (S) until the reign of Gallienus who abolished the office; or Prefect (E) for the Egyptian and Parthian legions. After Gallienus the commanders were prefects (E); commander of the legion.
- 1 Laticlavian tribune (S) changed by Gallienus into tribunus maior (E); in charge of one cohort and second-in-command of the legion.
- 1 Praefectus Castrorum (camp, medics, siege equipment etc.) (E)
- 1 Praefectus Fabrorum (workmen, construction etc.) (E)
- 5 tribunes (E) each in charge of one cohort 480 men.
- 1 tribunus sexmenstris (in charge of cavalry?) (E).
- 5 centurions of the 1st Cohort (incl. primus pilus who could act as praepositus for the cohort).
- 54 centurions (called centenarii by the end of the 3rd century):
- 5 unattached centurions who could be detailed for variety of purposes; these could be used e.g. as acting praepositi (commanders for the cohorts (à 480 men)).
- 9 x 1 centurion each in charge of two centuries (2 x 80).
- 9 x 4 centurions each in charge of one century (80 men).
- 4 cavalry centurions each with 128 horsemen.
- 64 infantry decani one of whom was optio/second-in-command to centurion (each decanus part of and in charge of their 8 man file/contubernium, in addition to which came a tiro/recruit and one servant used for the guarding of the camp).
- 16 cavalry decurions (each in charge of their 32 horsemen turma).
- 1st cohort 800 men (5 centuries à 160 men) plus 100 recruits and 100 servants.
- cohorts 2–10 = 9 x 420 footmen (including the decani 480) plus 60 recruits and 60 servants per cohort.
- 496 horsemen (with the decurions 512; Vegetius may have been wrong in adding the decurions to the strength of the turma, because the Roman cavalry organization was based on the Greek one; however, if Vegetius is correct then these should be added to the total for a total of 512 + 16 decurions plus about 128 servants/squires.
- at least 715 artillerymen in charge of the 55 carroballistae (cart-mounted bolt/arrow shooters) and 10 onagri (single-armed stone-throwers).
- 10 speculatores (formerly scouts), but now couriers, police officers and executioners.
- proculcatores and exploratores scouted the roads. It is not known whether these counted as part of the cavalry or were separate from it. In practice the mensores could also act as scouts.
- unknown numbers of military police with the title of stator, and unknown numbers of guard dogs. Inside each camp there was also a police station called statio under a tribune. Some of the soldiers were also used as sentinels (excubitores) and there were also other specific guards for various things.
- in addition there were unknown numbers of other specialists and bureaucrats consisting of surveyors, campidoctor (Chief Instructor), haruspex (who read the entrails prepared by victimarius), pullarius, actuarii, librarii (librarius a rationibus worked also for the state post and could act as a spy), notarii (could act as spies on the activities of the commander), commentariensis (archivist under head curator), heralds, standard-bearers, draconarii, cape-bearers, trumpeters, drummers, engineers, workmen, artisans, hunters, carters and cartwrights, doctors, medics etc.
- the legates/prefects were also guarded by a unit of singulares (both inf. and cav.), which consisted of detached auxiliaries (confusingly the staff officers in training could also be called singulares). These bodyguards were replaced by protectores detached by the emperor from his staff at the latest during the reign of Gallienus as a safety measure against usurpations.
- the legion also included beasts of burden (which, depending on the units, could be horses, asses, mules, camels, oxen).
(S) = senatorial office; (E) = equestrian office
THE PARTHIAN LEGIONS CREATED BY SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS (HOWEVER, SEE ALSO APPENDIX 1).
Vegetius’s Ancient Legion (Epit. 2.6ff.) with additional comments in brackets.
- 1 praefectus legionis formerly legatus; commander of the legion.
- 1 tribunus maior; appointed by the emperor in charge of one cohort (probably the 1st; second-in- command of the legion).
- 1 Praefectus Castrorum (camp, medics, siege equipment etc.)
- 1 Praefectus Fabrorum (workmen, construction etc.)
- tribuni minores from the ranks (6 tribunes? put in charge of the cohorts and cavalry alongside with the praepositi).
- 5 centurions of the 1st Cohort (Vegetius’ list differs from the other known lists of officers and is also 100 men short of the 1,100 men he gives for the 1st Cohort)
primus pilus in charge of 4 centuries/400 men (this probably means that there were 440 men
which consisted of 4 centuries each with 110 men)
primus hastatus ‘now called ducenarius’ in charge of two centuries/200 men (probably 220 men)
princeps 1.5 centuries/150 men (probably 165 men)
secundus hastatus 1.5 centuries/150 men (probably 165 men)
triarius prior 100 men (probably 110 men)
- 5 centurions for the cavalry.
- 45 centurions of the 2nd to 10th COs each in charge of 110 men ‘now’ called centenarii.
- 1st Cohort: 1,105 footmen (this probably means that there were 720 heavy infantry deployed four deep, two in the front and two in the back of a six-rank-array, and 360 light infantry deployed two deep between the heavy infantry ranks + 10 optiones, 10 standard-bearers, and 5 centurions). 132 horsemen (128 horsemen and 4 decurions; in truth the decurions may have been part of the 128 horsemen in addition to which came one centurion, 2 musicians and one standard-bearer; when trained to do so the 128 horsemen could form up a rhombus so that at each apex stood one decurion).
- 2nd to 10th Cohorts: 9 x 555 footmen (this probably means that there were 360 heavy infantry deployed four deep so that these formed the two front ranks and two rear ranks in a six deep formation, and 180 light infantry deployed two deep between the heavy infantry ranks + 5 optiones, 5 standard-bearers, 5 centurions).
9 x 66 horsemen (64 horsemen and 2 decurions; as noted above the decurions should possibly be included as part of the 64 horsemen; the 64 men could be formed either as a wedge or two rank-and-file oblongs).
- artillerymen (55 carroballistae each with 11 men and 10 onagri per legion), ‘squires’, servants,
various kinds of standard-bearers and musicians, and other specialists like clerks, medics, wood- workers, masons, carpenters, blacksmiths, painters, siege-equipment builders, armourers etc. (aquiliferi, imaginarii/imaginiferi, signiferi/draconarii, tesserarii, optiones, metatores, librarii, tubicines, cornicines, buccinators, mensores, lignarios, structores, ferrarios, carpentarios, pictores etc.)
- On the basis of my above hypothesis regarding the organization behind Vegetius’ figures, a possible overall fighting strength of Vegetius’ legion may have been: 6,100 footmen (3,960 heavy infantry; 1,980 light infantry) plus supernumeraries; 726 cavalry; at least 660 artillerymen with 55 carroballistae and 10 onagri; at least 510 recruits left to defend the marching camp together with the servants and workmen. The extra men on top of the older paper strengths may actually represent the recruits not normally included in armed strengths, but one cannot be entirely sure of that. It is possible that the cohorts were really 555 men strong because Dio’s reference to 550 men does suggest this. The obvious problem with Vegetius’ information and my reconstruction based on it is that we have practically no evidence to corroborate it, but at least if one presents the information in this manner it does make sense and is therefore plausible. Vegetius notes that the legion could also include several milliary cohorts, which probably refers to the Praetorians which had milliary cohorts after Septimius’s reign, or it refers to the practice of Vegetius’s own day to group together different units to form ‘temporary legions’ that were later called mere by the East Romans (sing. meros/division).
The equipment of the auxiliary forces which belonged to the ‘line infantry and line cavalry’ was basically the same as in the legions so that the auxiliary units typically used the flat (or slightly curved) oval or round shields, spatha-longsword, spears, and javelins, but other types of equipment was also used. The auxiliary units were either quingenary or milliary in size. Some of the auxiliary units specialized in a particular type of combat (e.g. cavalry cataphracts, mounted archers, foot archers, slingers), but the vast majority were required to be able to perform all types of combat either as line infantry/cavalry or as skirmishing forces. There also existed a special type of auxiliary force called numeri. There was no uniformity in their unit size or use in combat. In addition to this there were barbarian forces called laeti (defeated enemies) which were settled on Roman territory with the duty of providing soldiers when required to do so. Despite being called auxiliary forces the above-mentioned auxiliaries were actually part of the Roman army. At this time the real auxiliary forces were the allies who were called foederati (treaty-bound allies). These forces consisted of whatever type and size of force the ally could contribute for their Roman ally. The following list (based on my earlier studies) summarizes the information.
Approximate size and organization of auxiliary units:
The attached drawings and the images in the plates depict some of the types of forces employed by contemporary Romans. One of the drawings in the text (page 14) is a three-panel drawing of some of the scenes from the Arch of Constantine by Bellori. It gives a good overview of the different types of forces employed by the Romans from the Germanic auxiliaries (unarmoured spearmen, the auxilia palatina of the late Roman period) to the Meroitic foot archers (archers with arrows placed in the hair) and from the shieldless unarmoured horsemen of Constantine to the scale-armoured Praetorians of Maxentius. Note the resemblance of the latter to the Sarmatian cavalry in Trajan’s column. The only differences are that the horses are unarmoured and the helmet is the so-called pseudo-Attic helmet. Readers should however be aware that Bellori has taken some artistic liberties and has drawn most of the helmets inaccurately. For a more accurate picture, see the photos in the plates. Bellori’s drawing gives only a general image.
Roman elite horseman equipped with a ridge helmet and scale armour (source Arch of Galerius)
Soldiers wearing coifs in the Vatican Manuscript (drawn after Bishop & Coulston)
Aurelius Sudecentius, legionary of the Legio XI Claudia (first half of the fourth century AD)
Third-century tombstones drawn after Bishop and Coulston. Severus Acceptus, legio VIIIAugusta (Istanbul). The armour
in this image is actually the so-called subarmalis, which was worn underneath the armour, but it could also be worn as the only "armour’' as in this case. The subarmalis or other ersatz annour could be made out of linen, felt or leather.
Third-century tombstones drawn after Bishop and Coulston. Julius Aufidius, legio AVI Claudia (Veria)
A sketch/drawing of a soldier depicted in a shield found at Dura Europos. The date is therefore before its capture in 253 or 256. Note that the Romans continued to use also this archaic style equipment at least until the seventh century when updated versions are depictcd in the so-called David Plates. However, there is quite secure evidence for the persistence of these styles much later in East Rome.
A sketch/drawing of a soldier depicted in the Synagogue mural depicting the battle of Eben-Ezer at Dura Europos. Dale before 256. Note the scale annour coif and the six-sided shield. These continued in use at least until the fourth century.
The above funerary relief shows a Roman auxiliary charging over the enemy footman. The relief is early for this period, but it show's nicely how the Romans taught their cavalry to run over the die enemy infantry formations like lawnmovers. If the morale of the enemy held and they w'ere in close order, this tactic was not necessarily successful because even when the horses were taught to do this, it was possible that the horse’s instincts prevailed and the horse refused to charge into the solid looking enemy formation. The source of the draw ing: Duruy.
A so-called ADLUCTIO coin of Probus depicts him addressing the soldiers. Source: Beger 1696. The important point is that it depicts the soldiers with the rectangular curved/ cylindrical scutum shield. This is of course a 17, h century drawing, but its depiction of equipment is still accurate. See e.g. the wildwinds coins website RIC 581/Cohen 19. The works of art continue to depict this type of shield at least until the turn of the sixth century and it is very likely that it was also used at least until then. One possible reason for the continued use of this type of shield would have been the idolisation of the gladiators, and vice versa it is possible to think that it fell out from use thanks to the ending of the gladiatorial games in the fifth century.
Constantine the Great’s Elite Cavalry
The drawing on the left depicts a horseman in the Arch of Constantine. What is striking about the cavalry images is that the Constantinian cavalry has no armour or shields. Some of them do not even have a helmet, like this one, but when they do, and most do, they have the pseudo-Attic helmet which I have depicted here separately. What is also notable about these images is that many of them show both hands to make it clear to the viewer that the horseman does not carry any shield. This suggests that these men did not carry shields so that they could demonstrate their manhood in combat. Does this mean that the cavalry in question would have consisted of Herul horsemen who did not use shields or armour in combat before they had proved their manhood by killing an enemy, or does this mean that Constantine’s Roman soldiers would have emulated them? Both are possible because the Arch also gives a prominent role for the Cornuti auxiliaries and Meroitic archers. If this is the case, then it would have been foreigners who decided the war in favour of Constantine. However, in light of the use of Pseudo-Attic helmets it is more likely that the soldiers are Roman elite cavalry who just demonstrated their superior fighting skill and spirit by not using armour and shields. Whatever the truth, the inclusion of these images implies in no uncertain terms that Constantine employed a cavalry of this type and it was this cavalry that had a decisive role in the battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312. In short, the image suggests that the cavalry of this type and the Meroitic foot archers, which are also in that image, both had a very significant role in this battle. Did the Meroitic infantry ride pillion to the bridge? The Greco-Roman military theory (e.g. Arrian, Techne Taktike 4.4, Modestus 18, Vegetius 3.16) and other period evidence (see e.g. the attached tombstone and Dura Europos painting on page 10) recognized a type of cavalry that did not carry shields so it is clear that the images in the Arch must represent reality and that Constantine employed this type of cavalry to great effect. Its main advantage was speed and my assumption is that Constantine unleashed these cavalry forces in pursuit of the defeated armoured enemy cavalry at the battle of the Milvian Bridge with the result that they were unable to flee. It is difficult to know with certainty what type of spear was employed by these men because the size of the reliefs dictated the length shown, but in light of the fact that the spears are used like javelins in the images the spears cannot have been longer than about 2.5 metres or at most 3.74 metres so that the latter would have already been a lanciarius or contarius. The continuity in the types of cavalry (Arrian, tombstone, Arch etc.) suggests that the same type of cavalry forces were also used in the latter half of the third century.
These Roman soldiers drawn after the mid-third century Ludovisi Sarchophagus depict some of the more unusual types of shields used by the Romans at this time. In addition to this, they continued to use the sexagonal and hexagonal shields.
A scene in the Arch of Constantine depicting the siege of Verona in 312. Bellori has drawn the helmets incorrectly, but the drawing still gives a good overall image of how the Roman soldiers were equipped.
A scene in the Arch of Constantine depicting the battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312. Note the horsemen without armour and shields with Pseudo-Attic helmets and the Meroitic archers.
Constantine’s army marching.
2.3. Combat on Land
Roman military doctrine was very practical. It was based on the expectation that the generals possessed accurate intelligence of the enemy and its activities and that the logistical network provided adequate supplies for the Roman armed forces. This combination would then enable the commander to pick and choose the best time and place and how to engage the enemy.
The Romans also took safety precautions very seriously so that they employed layers of spies, scouts and patrols for the protection of their armies, and always built fortified marching camps. Combat doctrine also required that marching of the armies was done by the book so that soldiers were similarly protected by layers of spies, scouts and patrols. Typical marching formations were the hollow square/oblong array (baggage in the middle), epikampios opisthia (baggage behind or in the hollow), epikampios opisthia with the baggage train and rearguard following so that it could be formed into a hollow square/oblong, and the use of marching columns where the above were not possible. In addition to this, the Romans typically posted vanguards and rearguards that could be used both defensively and offensively. In certain conditions the vanguard could consist solely of cavalry so that it was used separately from its infantry support.
Roman combat doctrine had always been based on the combined arms concept, but from the reign of Alexander Severus onwards the Romans had depended increasingly on their cavalry to win their battles, to such an extent that we see Decius fighting only with cavalry against the Goths and Gallienus fighting mainly with his cavalry. At the time of the death of Gallienus, Roman combat doctrine was based on the use of cavalry when this was advantageous and on the use of the combined arms concept when this was advantageous, but in such a manner that the cavalry was clearly the favoured arms of service.³
The combined arms combat doctrine was based on the advantageous use of all arms of service, but in such a manner that the infantry formed its core. Land tactics were traditional so that the Romans could deploy their infantry in cohorts (one to four lines) or as phalanxes so that the battle line was usually divided into left, centre and right. Standard combat formations were the lateral phalanx with baggage train (with ballistae-carts) posted behind for its protection and the double phalanx (or two lines of cohorts) if the baggage train did not follow. Standard depths for these lines were 6 (4 ranks of heavy infantry and 2 of light infantry), 12 (8 heavy, 4 light), and 24 (16 heavy and 8 light), but in practice this could vary according to the quality of the unit, place and amount of light infantry, the number of men fit for service, and the type of unit (see Appendix 1). The cavalry was usually posted on the flanks and in reserve to protect the infantry, to outflank the enemy, or to pursue the defeated foe. The light infantry was placed where considered the most advantageous.
The Romans employed four standard ways to defeat the enemy: 1) ambushes and surprise attacks; 2) to break the enemy line with deeper formations or with a wedge array; 3) to outflank the enemy either on the left or right flank; 4) to outflank the enemy on both wings. To achieve these, the Romans employed several different grand tactical formations most of which are described by Vegetius (see the diagrams borrowed from my earlier books), but the other military treatises and narrative histories prove that the Romans used a variety of defensive arrays like the oblong and hollow square arrays that they could also use for offensive purposes. In addition to this, the Romans could use a double front (amphistomos phalanx, orbis) or double phalanx (diphalangia amphistomos, ⁴ duplex acies) if the enemy had managed to outflank the Romans.
Basic unit orders were: 1) the open order; 2) close order with shields placed rim-to-rim in width; 3) the defensive tortoise (testudo/foulkon) against cavalry (front rank kneeling, shields rim-to-boss in depth and almost rim-to-rim in width), which was used to bring an enemy cavalry attack to a halt with a wall-like appearance after which the front-rankers rose and attacked if the enemy cavalrymen had advanced close enough; 4) the offensive testudo (shields rim-to-boss in width and depth), which could also be used defensively by having all men kneel to receive enemy missiles, but with the expectation that the men would rise to their feet to fight.; 5) the siege testudo (rear rank kneeling to help the ‘mounting’ of the formation by other men, shields rim-to-boss in depth and almost rim-to-rim in width or alternatively rim-to-boss if the shields allowed this); 6) the irregular array (drungus/droungos).
simplified versions of the standard infantry battle formations not specifically mentioned among Vegetius's seven tactics
The attached diagrams provide an overview into the different tactical concepts and formations used when the Romans used the combined arms approach. In addition to these methods, the Romans could also employ their infantry units in ways that negated the advantages posed by the enemy (e.g. by opening up their array to allow cavalry wedges, elephants, chariots etc. to pass through) and/or they could employ specialist units like the mace/club-bearers against heavily armoured opponents like the cataphracts. A good example of the use of these tactics can be found in the narrative of the battle of Emesa in 272 and these are detailed there in greater depth. Appendix 1 also suggests a possible variation to the tactics discussed when the Romans deployed two different types of legion simultaneously.